Less than twenty-four months after the hope-filled Arab uprising, the popular movement had morphed into a dystopia of resurgent dictators, failed states, and civil wars. Egypt's epochal transition to democracy ended in a violent military coup. Yemen and Libya collapsed into civil war, while Bahrain erupted in smothering sectarian repression. Syria proved the greatest victim of all, ripped apart by internationally fueled insurgencies and an externally supported, bloody-minded regime. Amidst the chaos, a virulently militant group declared an Islamic State, seizing vast territories and inspiring terrorism across the globe. What happened?
The New Arab Wars is a profound illumination of the causes of this nightmare. It details the costs of the poor choices made by regional actors, delivers a scathing analysis of Western misreadings of the conflict, and condemns international interference that has stoked the violence. Informed by commentators and analysts from the Arab world, Marc Lynch's narrative of a vital region's collapse is both wildly dramatic and likely to prove definitive. Most important, he shows that the region's upheavals have only just begun -- and that the hopes of Arab regimes and Western policy makers to retreat to old habits of authoritarian stability are doomed to fail.
So you thought the Arab Spring is over? It is just beginning. They will be back. And this time, with a vengeance
It is a grim message indeed. Marc Lynch argues that the Arab Spring, which seemed to be contained or have resulted in bloody civil wars, is not over. Arab regimes have not even begun to deal with the underlying problems which drove the 2011 uprising, and most of those problems have gotten worse. The Arab regimes have largely destroyed the hope for meaningful democratic change, and the failures of transitional regimes have badly degraded popular enthusiasm for democratic institutions. The bloody repression by regimes such as Bahrain’s or Egypt’s probably means that the next uprising will be far more focused on revenge, far less peaceful, and far less tolerant of allowing members of the old regime to hang around with impunity.
The Arab Spring, which started as a popular movement with a real desire for democratic change, extended the already polarised Arab world into two broad coalitions: a “moderate bloc” of Sunni dictators allied with the United States (and, indirectly, Israel) against a “rejection bloc” including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. At the same time, it also resulted in an intra-Sunni conflict between Qatar and Saudi-Arabia which first eclipsed and then accelerated sectarianism and the Saudi-Iranian conflict.
Most of the Gulf regimes were quit pleased to see peaceful uprising devolve into a violent armed conflict. A peaceful mass mobilization for democratic reforms challenged autocratic regimes in novel and uncomfortable ways. Proxy wars did not. Regimes which struggled to respond to the peaceful demands of their citizens were well-equipped to channel money and guns to favored insurgent groups and to use their media empires to promote rebel causes. It are these wars that the author is calling “The New Arab Wars”.
The US, Lynch argues, was wise to stay out of an intervention. In fact, Lynch applauds Obama’s politics: “He understood deeply that American military power could not solve the region’s conflicts and that limited intervention would only pave the way to ever-escalating demands for more,” Lynch argues. “He understood the iron logic of the slippery slope from limited intervention to full-scale quagmire.” Or worse.”
The rest of the world should stay out. “America can be more or less directly involved,” the author writes, “but it will ultimately prove unable to decide the outcome of the fundamental struggles by Arabs over their future.”
Professor Lynch is a professional political scientist with a chair at Georgetown University and the author of several books on the Middle East. He is the kind of writer whose expertise is unquestioned, and it is only in his interpretation of events that one might find controversy.
I didn’t find any, myself. I would only say that Lynch failed to fault Islam, the religion itself, for the horrors taking place in the Middle East today. This is understandable since there is little to be gained by blaming an entire religion and much to lose through distraction and ineffectual focus. True, it is in part Islam’s inability to separate mosque from state that underlies the failure of democracy to take hold in the Middle East. Lynch seems to intimate as much when he writes, “The Arab uprisings of 2011 were only one episode in a generational challenge to a failed political order.” (p. 254)
What Lynch focuses on is the autocratic regimes themselves and their inability to awaken to the new reality brought about by rapid and nearly universal communication among the populace. (They can see clearly how much better things are in other places in the world.) No longer can the regimes manage public opinion and knowledge through nearly absolute control of media. Instead with Facebook, Twitter and other venues anyone with a smart phone and/or an Internet connection can learn via YouTube videos, outside news sources and messages from friends, comrades, family and even enemies the truth about what is happening almost anywhere in the Middle East.
Lynch of course points with muted voice to the colonialism of the past since this book is about today and now, and the past is well known and nothing can be done about it. (The word “colonialism” does not even appear in the excellent Index.) As for the more recent past beginning with the stupidities and gross ignorance of the Bush administration, Lynch spells them out unsparingly. He finds less fault with Obama than he does with Bush, and that is understandable since George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and the neocons are the ones who destabilized the Middle East with their invasion of Iraq. As Lynch points out one of the effects of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was to increase the influence of Iran. Iraq with Hussein’s Sunni government in charge was a buffer against Iranian ambitions.
Whereas Bush didn’t care how many people his actions caused to die, Obama’s policies are obviously directed toward killing as few people as possible. However any decision that Obama made or will make will result in the death of people. Such is the nature of military and political power, which is why sociopaths (such as some of the autocrats in the Middle East and elsewhere) are often found in power today and historically. Personally, writing as a political scientist (I have an undergraduate degree in Political Science from UCLA) I believe that Obama should have gone after Asad following the gassing of his people. For complicated reasons including Russian support of Asad and the possibility of a negotiated settlement Obamas was persuaded not to attack the regime. In the last chapter of the book Lynch, disagreeing with me, states that the “Intervention would not have saved Syria.” He writes:
“The conventional wisdom now holds that the Obama administration’s failure to act in Syria has been as devastating as the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq…But American non-intervention was not the problem, and if it does ultimately intervene directly this will only create new problems.” (p. 248) He adds (p. 249) that intervention by the Obama administration was exactly what jihadists wanted since it would ultimate fail. “Obama was right to avoid this intervention. Perhaps his greatest sin in the eyes of the Washington consensus was to have learned the lessons of Iraq.”
As for the prognosis, Lynch (writing in January, 2016) contends forcefully that the uprising that began in 2011 is not over, that the autocratic powers will continue to be under pressure from people who want a greater say in how their lives play out.
Further he believes (p. 246) that “…America has no real allies in the Middle East.” (Interesting. Does that include or exclude Israel?)
Finally, Lynch expects Islamic extremism to get worse.
The book is eminently readable and exquisitely edited but with this reservation: if you don’t have some familiarity with the politics of the Middle East you might want to take notes. It’s hard to know the players without a score card, and separating Sunni from Shi’a can take some getting used to.
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
Must read for all wannabe middle east pundits like me (read: wannabe everything pundit). It shed a lot of light on intra-Gulf power dynamics and their manifestations in the various outcomes of the Arab Spring uprisings. Caveat: the author is clearly team Obama so he turns a very blind eye on the US' involvement in the continued overall post Arab Spring fuckedupness.
Helped me understand Gulf countries’ relationships to the Muslim Brotherhood/Islamists through 2016 (background to GCC crisis): how that changed the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Sisi’ coup, Haftar’s advance). Gave a justification of Obama’s midEast policy, arguing against the slippery slope of intervention in Syria. How Saudi opposition to the Iran deal influenced the invasion of Yemen. Still ends with the future being of protests for change.
American policy will always matter in a region deeply shaped by the legacy of its imperium, of course, but there is no reason to believe that a more assertive American posture would have made a positive difference in the unfolding politics of the Arab uprisings. It is easier to blame Barack Obama's weakness for Syria's catastrophe than to examine the contributions of a diverse range of actors to the radicalization and fragmentation of an externally-fueled, ill-conceived insurgency. It is easier to accuse Obama of failing to lead on Egypt than to assess the domestic and regional drivers of Cairo's hotly contested politics. But that doesn't make the critique correct. The failure of the 2003 occupation of Iraq, which so deeply informed Obama's approach to the use of military force in the region, should have fully revealed the limitations of American power. One of the most commonly repeated mantras in Washington has been that "everything which opponents of intervention in Syria warned would happen has happened anyway." These pundits refuse to notice that thousands of American troops are not dying while vainly patrolling the streets of Damascus. America's long policy of aligning with unsavory but cooperative regimes would become a crippling liability after the Arab uprising. A key vulnerability of the American imperium in the Middle East was the absence of any major ally which shared its fundamental values or goals. The assembly of kings, generals, and presidents-for-life which ruled American-allied regimes did not even make the pretense of valuing democracy, human rights, or liberal values. Their survival depended on heavy-handed repression, patronage disbursed through state and non-state channels, and, in some cases, electoral institutions designed to distribute resources among elites. Most depended heavily on the demonization of external and internal enemies to legitimate their rule Israel, Iran, Islamists, and Amer-ica. This challenge has only become more acute as America's putative allies spiral in ever more violent and repressive directions. - The New Arab Wars : Uprisings and Anarchy in the middle east by Marc Lynch . . "The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East" by Marc Lynch offers a detailed examination of the Arab Spring uprisings that unfolded across the Middle East from 2010 onwards. The book consists of nine chapters, each addressing different aspects of the region's upheaval. I don’t think I will elaborate much on this book because I am expecting something new, but it was nowhere to be found. Majority of the arguments are pretty exhaustive and can be found in other books. For those who are well-versed in Arab Spring Uprisings and wanted to read more analysis or takes from the history experts, I believe you may skip this one. This book, in my opinion, is not engaging at all which is why i took more than one week to finish this book. And Obama Administration is not really the innocent one – sure the predecessors of Obama has been instigating war in Middle Eastern much worse than he is but he is also is not a saint in this prolonged conflicts in these regions. While the book offers nothing new (at least to me), it did enlighten how and why majority of Arab countries seeks to normalise the relationships with Israhell and demonising Houthis in ensuring Peace in Yemen. Yet, here we are in 2024, Houthis are among those trying to stop the genocide in Gaza and while Saudi Arabia and others being a complicit, sit idly seeing muslim country being slaughtered by the Zionists. The summary for each chapter has been provided below : ‘The introduction’ provides an overview of the Arab Spring and outlines their significance in the Middle East. It sets the stage for the subsequent chapters by highlighting the key themes and arguments of the book. ‘The Roots of the Uprisings’ chapter explores the underlying causes, including political, economic, and social factors that led to the Arab Spring uprisings. It examines popular discontent and the desire for change of the countries that experienced the uprisings. ‘The Trajectories of the Uprisings’ chapter aim to investigate the varied paths and outcomes of the uprisings in different countries. It also delves the factors that shaped the trajectories of the uprisings, including state responses, external interventions, and regional dynamics. ‘The International Response’ chapter managed to examine how the international community, including the US, EU, and regional powers, responded to the uprisings. ‘Tunisia’ chapter focuses on Tunisia, where the Arab Spring began, and explores the country's transition to democracy. It highlights the challenges and achievements of Tunisia's democratic experiment and its implications for the wider region. ‘Egypt’ chapter examines the trajectory of the Egyptian uprising and its subsequent transformation into a counterrevolution. It delves the role of the military, political elites, and external actors in shaping Egypt's post-uprising political landscape. ‘Syria: From Uprising to Civil War’ chapter explores the evolution of the Syrian uprising into a full-blown civil war. It examines the complex dynamics of the conflict, including the role of the Assad regime, opposition groups, and external actors. ‘Iraq, Libya, and Yemen’ chapter focuses on the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, where the uprisings led to state collapse and fragmentation. It explores the factors that contributed to the breakdown of state institutions and the emergence of multiple armed factions. ‘Conclusion’ chapter summarizes the main arguments and findings of the book. It reflects on the broader implications of the Arab Spring uprisings for the Middle East and the international community. Overall, the book offers valuable insights into the complexities of the Arab Spring and its aftermath, making it essential reading for policymakers, scholars, and those interested in the Middle East's contemporary challenges.
There was such incredibly clear bias in this book, and Marc Lynch ends on the last page with, "There is no hope for the Arab states. It's all going to explode again very soon." It was extremely pessimistic and emotional.
The information in this book was good, however, the factual data was constantly overshadowed by Marc Lynch's style of reporting. I found this book hard to read and not at all engaging.
This is a very readable and clear account of what went wrong after the joyous highs of the Arab Spring. I really enjoyed how Lynch explored the role of state-run media in the conflict, particularly the dominance of the Qatari-run Al-Jazeera. Lynch also very clearly lays out the pros and cons of every step of the American response to Libya and Syria. Overall, this book improved my understanding of the GCC's role in perpetuating conflict, and the often tricky conflict between secularization and democracy.
For someone who has never read a political science book or a detailed book on the Middle East, it is an incredibly hard read. The cataclysmic domino effect that occurred during the Arab Spring was so rapid, drastic and to an extent coincidental, I found it hard to follow. That being said, the author Marc Lynch does this remarkable job of not just recounting the occurrences of the new Arab wars but distils and analyses the events in a constructive and orderly fashion. I may not have understood everything – I mean, how can one understand the uprisings of the Middle East by reading one book – but Lynch’s writing has definitely pushed me closer to be able to say “yes, I understand as much as one can about the happenings in the Middle East.”
If any part of the world is misunderstood by Americans, surely it is the Middle East. It's a very complex part of the world, made infinitely more complex by the confluence of religions, cultures, and continents. There is not one single book that puts it all in perspective, but this one by Marc Lynch will go a long way toward giving you a basic literacy of the issues. Here are some things you need to know to understand why Libya failed, why Syria is in constant civil war, why Egypt's experiment in democracy failed, why Saudi Arabia hates the Muslim Brotherhood, why Qatar hates Saudi Arabia, why Turkey wants its foot back in its old stomping grounds, and why France is universally hated in Syria and Lebanon. And why America's best shot at improving things there is to stay the hell out.
Well, you have to read some of Salim Yaqub's work; Margaret McMillan's 1919 would be good; a history of the Ottoman Empire would also contribute to this background.
Yes, it takes that much reading to make sense of it all. The value of this book is that it ties all the loose threads together and makes the whole shebang finally comprehensible, in an eminently readable style.
Even though this was mandatory reading for one of my classes this semester, I still it extremely interesting and well written. Lynch does a great job at addressing the various causes and consequences of the 2011 Arab Spring when applied to war in the region. Even though it's an academic book, the writing doesn't feel academic whatsoever and is easily accessible (i.e. not overly dry), meaning if you're someone interested in learning more about the Arab Spring's impact on war in the Middle East and North Africa, I'd highly recommend it.
good book, I loved the authors explanation of how things transpired and went down the drain in arab spring countries(especially on Egypt, the analysis provided was totally on point,satisfactory and thorough. I found the author too defensive of Obama's administration policies.While at some points I found this totally warranted and justified and at other times not as much. There is also a line which i found unfortunate in the book about Americans valuing democracy as a value and arabs only looking to instrumentalize it.This is a disconcerting viewpoint. The analysis provided in the book is wholesome but not authoritative given the tumultuous changes the region was and still going through.
The book offers a general overview of the situation in the Middle-East, while attempting to delineate the role of international and local politics in the shaping of the reality of the region. Having taken on such a large-scale project (while constantly zooming in to the micro-scale); the author has not much to offer someone who is well-read on the region. However, the book does offer a great introduction to the beginner on the region, and clarifies the Western misreading of middle-eastern problems.
This is not an easy book to read. The problem is highlighted by the author himself early on. This book is not for layman. Preferably those who wanted to read this book should have some knowledge on the politics of the middle east.
I did not. Yet I did managed to distill a lot of knowledge reading this book (quite a struggle though). This book paints a vivid dark reality that is of the politics in the middle east and politics in general. My understanding of the neo politics (only with respect to Islam sentiment) would be heavily influenced by this book.
It was very strange to hear from the specialist in the field that Arabs became more religious without connection to Muslim brotherhood and that Muslim brotherhood itself tried to incorporate into democracy and not use it from the beginning. But the book is good as an introduction to these years into the Middle East.
7/10 - deeply informative look across MENA re: the Arab uprisings of 2011. Uses three lenses to analyse the events that lead up to 2010/11 and the subsequent regional instability - the Sunni/Shia balance of power; the inter-Sunni powerbrokers pursuing strategic depth; transnational non-state actors vs state actors.
الكتاب: الحروب العربية الجديدة: الانتفاضات والفوضوية في الشرق الأوسط المؤلف: مارك لينش الناشر: بابليك أفيرز تاريخ الإصدار: 26 أبريل 2016 عدد الصفحات: 304 اللغة: الإنجليزية
"الاضطرابات التي تشهدها منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا بدأت للتو، وآمال الأنظمة العربية وصناع السياسة الغربيين بالعودة إلى عادات الاستقرار الاستبدادي القديمة مآلها الفشل المحتوم". (1) بدأ مؤلف هذا الكتاب مبكرا في التعرف علي الوطن العربي، الذي عاش في جنباته ثلاث سنوات بداية التسعينات، متنقلا بين عمان والقاهرة، وهو متخصص في شؤون الشرق الأوسط، خاصة شؤون الإسلاميين والعراق وفلسطين، وله رؤية بضرورة دمج الإسلاميين في الحياة السياسية في المجتمعات العربية. هو مارك لينش؛ أستاذ العلوم السياسية المساعد بجامعة ويليامز، حصل على الدكتوراة من جامعة كورنيل، وألف كتاب "أصوات الشعب العربي الجديد" الصادر عن دار جامعة كولومبيا للنشر في ديسمبر 2005، إلى جانب نشر كتاباته في مجلة فورين بوليسي. (2) بعد مرور أقل من 24 شهرًا على الربيع العربي المفعم بالأمل، تحولت الحركة الشعبية إلى واقع مرير، حيث عاود الطغاة الظهور، وفشلت دول، واندلعت حروب أهلية. انتهى التحول المصري إلى الديمقراطية بانقلاب عسكري عنيف، وانزلقت اليمن وليبيا إلى حروب أهلية، وابتليت البحرين بقمع طائفي، واستأثرت سوريا بنصيب الأسد من النكبة. في خضم هذه الفوضى، أعلنت جماعة مسلحة عنيفة قيام دولة إسلامية، واستولت على مساحات شاسعة من الأراضي لتصبح مصدر إلهام للإرهاب في أنحاء العالم. فما الذي حدث؟ والأهم: كيف حدث؟ (3) بعمقٍ، يشرح كتاب "الحروب العربية الجديدة" أسباب هذا الكابوس، ويفصِّل فاتورة القرارات السيئة التي اتخذتها الأطراف الإقليمية الفاعلة، ويقدم تحليلا قاسيًا لسوء قراءة الغرب لهذه الصراعات، ويدين التدخل الدولي الذي أدى إلى تفاقم العنف. أكثر ما يقدمه كتاب "لينش أهميةً، هو: التأكيد على أن الاضطرابات التي تشهدها منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا بدأت للتو؛ هذا هو الخبر السيء. لكن ثمة خبر جيد، مفاده أن آمال الأنظمة العربية وصناع السياسة الغربيين بالعودة إلى عادات الاستقرار الاستبدادي القديمة مآلها الفشل المحتوم. ورغم هذه الجرعة المعقولة من التفاؤل، لا يقدم "لينش" إجابات سهلة، فضلا عن أن يوفر مهربًا، بل يطرح رؤيته بصراحةٍ صارمة: جذور انتفاضات الربيع العربي عميقة، وستكون عصية على القمع بأيدي المستبدين الجدد، سواء في مصر أو السعودية، ولن يكون بإمكان التدخل الأمريكي منع سوريا من التفتت، أما التطرف الإسلامي فسوف يتفاقم إلى الأسوأ. (4) من أجل ذلك يصف ديفيد إجناتيوس من صحيفة واشنطن بوست، هذا الكتاب بأنه "شديد الصراحة حدّ القسوة، يُغَرِّد خارج السرب. وحتى من لا يواف��ون على بعض استنتاجات لينش، سيجدون أن كتابه "الحروب العربية الجديدة" جدير بالقراءة". ويقول عنه وليام ج. بيرنز، رئيس مؤسسة كارنيجي للسلام الدولي، ونائب وزير الخارجية الأمريكي السابق: "هو كتاب هام، ملء بالرؤى الحادة، والتحليل المتزن. وأي شخص يسعى لفهم جذور ومسارات الانتفاضات العربية، وتأثيراتها على مستقبل منطقة حاسمة، سوف يستفيد من هذا الكتاب الرائع". وكتب عنه رامي خوري، مدير معهد عصام فارس للسياسات العامة والشؤون الدولية- الجامعة الأمريكية، بيروت: "كتاب "الحروب العربية الجديدة" هو عرض مقنع ودقيق وشامل للحالة شديدة الاختلاط التي تمر بها منطقتنا المضطربة في هذه اللحظة الانتقالية التاريخية. التقط فيه "لينش" كافة التفاصيل الدقيقة، ومواطن القمة والضعف، والفاعلين، والأخطار، والوعود؛ التي تتضافر لتشكل صورة الشرق الأوسط اليوم. وإني أوصي بشدة بهذا الكتاب لكل من يسعى إلى فهم ما يجري في منطقتنا، وكيف وصلنا إلى هذه الحالة، وكيف نقيم الأدوار المتغيرة التي يلعبها العديد من اللاعبين الإقليميين والدوليين".
(نُشِرَ هذا العرض على موقع مركز إدراك للدراسات والاستشارات في عام 2016، ومتاح على الرابط التالي https://idraksy.net/the-new-arab-world/، كما نُشِرَ على موقع "العالم بالعربية"؛ أول منصة عربية متخصصة في رصد وتحليل اتجاهات الصحف ومراكز الأبحاث والإصدارات العالمية)
The book starts with a warning quote from Qaddafi ''We are coming tonight. There will be no mercy'' and ends on a policy suggestion by Lynch that ''America would be better served to [...] invest not on its [Middle Eastern] brutal regimes but in those Arabs seeking a more democratic future''.
Lynch provided a detailed account of all the important events that led Arab Spring(2011). More importantly, he described the underlying political and sectarian power game, why KSA and Qatar are leading the opposing camps when it comes to question of a political system? Why KSA despite being a strict Wahabist regime tends to support non wahabi secular regimes in length and breadth of ME? Why Turkey and Qatar support Muslim Brotherhood and the likes to further their interests in the region ? And also why the US showed reluctance at start to openly intervene in Syria and other ME.
Another, equally interesting, is Lynch's detailed account of present situation of Middle Eastern regimes and the possible future that could possibly result from all the sectarian disturbance caused by the fighting and political interference by the contending leaders of the Middle eastern world to occupy the status of 'Ameer ul Muslimeen' (the leader of muslims).
Overall, this book shows a liberal perspective of the situation at hand. Mr. Lynch has totally ignored the fact that Modern middle east has been created with a policy of divide and rule. Artificial and totally absurd demarcations were drawn on the map despite of a concious knowledge of the fact that only thing holding this whole region together is their religion. (Fromkin) This was all done before the knowledge of the existence of a large quantity of oil in the region. Lynch has explained the current scenario efficiently but he erred at the proposal of a possible peace solution.
Instructive about the role and cold war between Saudi-Arabia, UAE vs Qatar & Turkey (in Egypt, Libya & Tunisia). Qatar and Turkey gained an edge with the victory of Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) and Ennadha (Tunisia) in the political arena but that was rescinded with the coup that brought Sisi back to power and Ennahda losing a majority in Tunisia (both orchestrated & supported by by Saudi & UAE).
On the other hand Gulf States vs Iran (with regards to Iraq, Syria & Yemen). Gulf states will stop at nothing to have Assad (who they see as Iran's Pawn) out of power even at the expense of tacitly supporting ISIS.
I agree with Dennis that this is a dense read. It moves along but there is so much to absorb. I felt as if I was taking a 500 class in Arab History of War. Although, I was fascinated by this author's carefully arranged and detailed outlook of this global powder keg. Highly recommended for anyone interested in our global survival. I found it to be hauntingly reflective.