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Weaver on Strategy: The Classic Work on the Art of Managing a Baseball Team
During his career as the manager of the Baltimore Orioles, Earl Weaver was called “baseball’s resident genius.” His distinctive style of managing helped his teams finish first or second thirteen times in his seventeen years as a manager. This volume reveals Weaver’s approach to the game, with a focus on how to manage a roster, a lineup, and a pitching staff. He defines the differences between running a team during a single game and managing it during an entire season. In his characteristically blunt style, Weaver explains everything from how to tell when a pitcher is tiring to how and when to argue with an umpire. Successful ball clubs still mimic his offensive strategies. Readers of this updated edition will learn new ways to think about the game as it’s played today.
- GenresBaseballSportsNonfiction
202 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1984
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 33 reviews
January 30, 2022
As I sit in my living room with a dusting of snow on the ground in January yearning for spring training to start, this book of Earl Weaver’s wisdom on managing the Baltimore Orioles was pure joy to read. Though some of the game’s conventions have moved on in the decades since Weaver managed my Orioles, there is still much wisdom that remains—like you generally don’t give up outs with bunts. I find myself agreeing with him on the merits of a four man rotation with a nine pitcher staff that pitched a lot of complete games — even though the game has moved from those practices. Of course, Weaver had Jim Palmer, Dave McNally, Mike Cuellar, and Mike Flanagan, among others as his starters. The stories about his Orioles experiences were delights for this baseball fan to enjoy once again. A great read!
October 27, 2011
Originally, I felt an urge to read this book (sitting on my shelf for more than a decade and only browsed for ideas when building baseball teams for strategy games) because of the current World Series. Tony La Russa of the Cardinals is the closest manager I know to Earl Weaver’s style. In fact, both of them are managers who absolutely hate giving up one of their 27 outs. Yet, ironically, he’s the one responsible for some of the biggest mix-ups and poor calls in this series. Nonetheless, I was inspired to read Earl Weaver’s book from cover to cover rather than nibbling, as before, on various issues like the appetizers at a cocktail party. In this book, Weaver’s co-author takes the reader from spring training through the post-season from the perspective of the famous Orioles manager.
Weaver describes the three purposes for spring training as being: a) conditioning (duh!), b) looking toward the 25-man roster, and c) reviewing fundamentals (p. 11). He describes a vague approach to conditioning, but goes into some details on drills he used to reinforce the fundamentals. But the most surprising aspect of his discussion of spring training was tied to the roster. Going against the conventional wisdom that a player is better off playing regularly in the minors than sporadically in the majors, he said, “…believe me, a player is much better off sitting on a big-league bench than starting in the minors. As long as you’re in the majors, that chance to play will come, and then you can make the most of it.” (p. 27)
I’d read the chapter on offense before. It reinforced Weaver’s reticence to send runners, bunt men over, and use the “hit and run.” I remembered interviewing Weaver during the ‘80s (just prior to the release of Earl Weaver Baseball for the Commodore Amiga) and hearing him espouse the virtue of the “run and hit” over the “hit and run.” Even then, he shared that the “hit and run” is a low percentage play because the runner takes his jump at half-speed, looking back at the plate to see if the batter is making contact with the ball. Weaver says you often give the opposition an out because you “…can’t trust the pitcher to throw a strike, so the hitter is often waving weakly at a pitch that is off the plate.” (p. 47) Instead, Weaver used the “run and hit,” sending the runner at full speed as though he’s going to steal and then, the batter can swing or not as he likes the pitch. Of course, one of Weaver’s so-called “laws” in the book is that if you play for only one run, you’re only going to get one run.
One quotation jumped out at me early on, since I know how much Weaver valued statistics. “You can’t manage strictly by stats. They just give you something else to go on.” (p. 59) I did remember that he preferred a four-man pitching rotation to a five-man rotation (against conventional modern baseball wisdom), stating, “It’s easier to find four good starters than five.” (p. 67) I also remembered that he didn’t like to carry a full 10 pitchers (p. 79) I didn’t remember that he believed, “…more hitters can be pitched high than low.” (p. 71) I also didn’t remember that he had the audacity to encourage the pitchers to call the game (p. 72).
Weaver, like Bobby Cox who eventually surpassed his record, had a knack for getting kicked out of ballgames for arguing with umpires. His philosophy was that it was the manager’s job to argue with the umpires whenever his players wanted to argue with the umpires because it wouldn’t hurt the team if the manager was thrown out of the game (p. 131). He said he got himself tossed out about half of his ejections, but the other half were caused by arguing for his players (p. 134). Weaver, unlike some later managers, didn’t curse the umpires, tried to know the rules inside-out to find whatever edge was possible, and always argued from a position within which he was comfortable (he was himself—p. 130). I’m not certain that I totally believe him when he says that stars don’t get a different strike zone than journeymen players (p. 133).
For me, one of the important chapters in the book was on scouting because it offered a full-blown pitching chart to show how “charting” a game was done in the Orioles organization (pp. 144-5). Until I thoroughly studied the example, my perspective on how this was done was way off.
Finally, I tremendously enjoyed the account of the playoff game versus the Angels. I was an admirer of Jim Fregosi when he managed the Angels and remembered that heart-breaking loss. Weaver walks the reader through it inning-by-inning and batter-by-batter as he explains what he was trying to accomplish during each inflection point. That section alone was worth reading the book through in its entirety. Weaver On Strategy is not a masterpiece of prose and I would have liked a few more anecdotes, but it is full of baseball strategy—enough to keep me interested in baseball and renew my hopes in my downtrodden Cubs. And, it keeps me wondering if La Russa has a managerial miracle up his sleeve in the same vein that Earl often did.
Weaver describes the three purposes for spring training as being: a) conditioning (duh!), b) looking toward the 25-man roster, and c) reviewing fundamentals (p. 11). He describes a vague approach to conditioning, but goes into some details on drills he used to reinforce the fundamentals. But the most surprising aspect of his discussion of spring training was tied to the roster. Going against the conventional wisdom that a player is better off playing regularly in the minors than sporadically in the majors, he said, “…believe me, a player is much better off sitting on a big-league bench than starting in the minors. As long as you’re in the majors, that chance to play will come, and then you can make the most of it.” (p. 27)
I’d read the chapter on offense before. It reinforced Weaver’s reticence to send runners, bunt men over, and use the “hit and run.” I remembered interviewing Weaver during the ‘80s (just prior to the release of Earl Weaver Baseball for the Commodore Amiga) and hearing him espouse the virtue of the “run and hit” over the “hit and run.” Even then, he shared that the “hit and run” is a low percentage play because the runner takes his jump at half-speed, looking back at the plate to see if the batter is making contact with the ball. Weaver says you often give the opposition an out because you “…can’t trust the pitcher to throw a strike, so the hitter is often waving weakly at a pitch that is off the plate.” (p. 47) Instead, Weaver used the “run and hit,” sending the runner at full speed as though he’s going to steal and then, the batter can swing or not as he likes the pitch. Of course, one of Weaver’s so-called “laws” in the book is that if you play for only one run, you’re only going to get one run.
One quotation jumped out at me early on, since I know how much Weaver valued statistics. “You can’t manage strictly by stats. They just give you something else to go on.” (p. 59) I did remember that he preferred a four-man pitching rotation to a five-man rotation (against conventional modern baseball wisdom), stating, “It’s easier to find four good starters than five.” (p. 67) I also remembered that he didn’t like to carry a full 10 pitchers (p. 79) I didn’t remember that he believed, “…more hitters can be pitched high than low.” (p. 71) I also didn’t remember that he had the audacity to encourage the pitchers to call the game (p. 72).
Weaver, like Bobby Cox who eventually surpassed his record, had a knack for getting kicked out of ballgames for arguing with umpires. His philosophy was that it was the manager’s job to argue with the umpires whenever his players wanted to argue with the umpires because it wouldn’t hurt the team if the manager was thrown out of the game (p. 131). He said he got himself tossed out about half of his ejections, but the other half were caused by arguing for his players (p. 134). Weaver, unlike some later managers, didn’t curse the umpires, tried to know the rules inside-out to find whatever edge was possible, and always argued from a position within which he was comfortable (he was himself—p. 130). I’m not certain that I totally believe him when he says that stars don’t get a different strike zone than journeymen players (p. 133).
For me, one of the important chapters in the book was on scouting because it offered a full-blown pitching chart to show how “charting” a game was done in the Orioles organization (pp. 144-5). Until I thoroughly studied the example, my perspective on how this was done was way off.
Finally, I tremendously enjoyed the account of the playoff game versus the Angels. I was an admirer of Jim Fregosi when he managed the Angels and remembered that heart-breaking loss. Weaver walks the reader through it inning-by-inning and batter-by-batter as he explains what he was trying to accomplish during each inflection point. That section alone was worth reading the book through in its entirety. Weaver On Strategy is not a masterpiece of prose and I would have liked a few more anecdotes, but it is full of baseball strategy—enough to keep me interested in baseball and renew my hopes in my downtrodden Cubs. And, it keeps me wondering if La Russa has a managerial miracle up his sleeve in the same vein that Earl often did.
October 19, 2013
This book sat unread and mostly forgotten on my bookshelf for 29 years. In a way, I'm glad I waited so long to get around to it. Reading Earl Weaver in 2013 is like opening a time capsule, to a time when managers didn't manage to the save rule (a terrible change that I blame on Tony LaRussa) and when cheating meant scuffing the ball or corking the bat, where now it means steroids and human growth hormones.
There wasn't much surprising in the book. It's well known that Earl Weaver loved the three-run homer and hated the sacrifice bunt. He preferred the four-man rotation, with his best starters getting close to 300 innings of work per season. He thought that a pitching staff should only have eight or nine pitchers, and that ten was too many. (Now, of course, the standard number is twelve.) The five-man rotation looks like it's here to stay (unless it someday gets replaced by a six-man rotation, something I wouldn't rule out) but I would love to see managers make fewer pitching changes.
Anyway, it was an interesting read, an inside look at the game from one of its most successful managers. Earl comes across as a bit of a jerk at times, especially when he said that he never praised his players because then he wouldn't have any credibility when he had to criticize them. That's the kind of boss that nobody likes to have, where you only get feedback when it's negative. He said that he treated all his players the same way, in contrast to Leo Durocher (if you haven't read Nice Guys Finish Last, read it!) who felt that every individual needed his distinct approach.
I do wish the 30 current major league managers would read this book. I doubt it would do any good, but maybe, just maybe, it would start to reverse the trend of small-ball and frequent calls to the bullpen that we see today.
There wasn't much surprising in the book. It's well known that Earl Weaver loved the three-run homer and hated the sacrifice bunt. He preferred the four-man rotation, with his best starters getting close to 300 innings of work per season. He thought that a pitching staff should only have eight or nine pitchers, and that ten was too many. (Now, of course, the standard number is twelve.) The five-man rotation looks like it's here to stay (unless it someday gets replaced by a six-man rotation, something I wouldn't rule out) but I would love to see managers make fewer pitching changes.
Anyway, it was an interesting read, an inside look at the game from one of its most successful managers. Earl comes across as a bit of a jerk at times, especially when he said that he never praised his players because then he wouldn't have any credibility when he had to criticize them. That's the kind of boss that nobody likes to have, where you only get feedback when it's negative. He said that he treated all his players the same way, in contrast to Leo Durocher (if you haven't read Nice Guys Finish Last, read it!) who felt that every individual needed his distinct approach.
I do wish the 30 current major league managers would read this book. I doubt it would do any good, but maybe, just maybe, it would start to reverse the trend of small-ball and frequent calls to the bullpen that we see today.
May 22, 2015
My initial half-way comment stands: This book is interesting, but not really applicable to anyone coaching/managing a club team. The statistics aren't usually available for us to use, (or there just aren't enough games to be statistically relevant), we don't have the luxury of choosing our roster, and homeruns are a much rarer commodity.
There are a few gems of wisdom sprinkled throughout concerning lineups, egos and umpires. It's also a fairly quick read too, so I would nevertheless suggest this book to anyone thinking of managing a team. Take it with a grain of salt however.
There are a few gems of wisdom sprinkled throughout concerning lineups, egos and umpires. It's also a fairly quick read too, so I would nevertheless suggest this book to anyone thinking of managing a team. Take it with a grain of salt however.
June 17, 2018
You could argue that Weaver was the best manager of the 1970s after taking a look at his year by year records. He got the most out of his teams never finished less than third. The cliché that Weaver played for the 3-run homer is something that Earl readily admits. But he surprisingly says that his strategy was determined by his players and his ballpark. He would have managed like Whitey Herzog if he played on AstroTurf in cavernous parks. He didn't bunt unless he only wanted one run and he usually wanted a whole lot more.
The book is broken down into straightforward chapters.
1) Spring Training
2) The Offense
3) The Lineup
4) Pitching
5) Fielding
6) Players
7) Coaches
8) Umpires
9) Scouting
10) The Penant Race
11) One Crucial game
12) How not to Get Fired
Like a lot of managers he valued defense which contributed a lot to his great pitching staffs. He didn't mind role players that did specific things above-average even if the player was otherwise mediocre. A really good glove for the late innings or a guy who crushed lefthanded pitching had a use during a long season even if those kinds of players could rarely start.
Chapter 11 is about the first game of the 1979 playoffs, Jim Palmer v. Nolan Ryan, and the managing decisions he made during play. It's not a long chapter but a good example of how he puts the other chapters on strategy into actual play. I would have liked more of these kinds of games examples because while Earl tells us a whole lot about baseball it still feels like he is holding out his best information. How and why he might do things at crucial situations only really works in the context of an actual game.
The book is broken down into straightforward chapters.
1) Spring Training
2) The Offense
3) The Lineup
4) Pitching
5) Fielding
6) Players
7) Coaches
8) Umpires
9) Scouting
10) The Penant Race
11) One Crucial game
12) How not to Get Fired
Like a lot of managers he valued defense which contributed a lot to his great pitching staffs. He didn't mind role players that did specific things above-average even if the player was otherwise mediocre. A really good glove for the late innings or a guy who crushed lefthanded pitching had a use during a long season even if those kinds of players could rarely start.
Chapter 11 is about the first game of the 1979 playoffs, Jim Palmer v. Nolan Ryan, and the managing decisions he made during play. It's not a long chapter but a good example of how he puts the other chapters on strategy into actual play. I would have liked more of these kinds of games examples because while Earl tells us a whole lot about baseball it still feels like he is holding out his best information. How and why he might do things at crucial situations only really works in the context of an actual game.
October 19, 2025
Very interesting take on baseball strategy and how to manage a team. For an uneducated but not ignorant man, Earl Weaver was truly ahead of his time using performance data he personally collected and stored in a usable format. What we today called analytics, Weaver was doing by writing data on index cards. I did think his chapter on umpires was a bit self serving and a rewriting of history, I thought the rest of the book was excellent.
February 13, 2024
A través de los años he tenido etapas lectoras con distintos temas. Nunca me llamaban la atención los libros de deportes a pesar de ser seguidor dedicado de algunos de ellos. Pero cuando comencé a leer libros de béisbol, y sobre todo de estrategia, me doy cuenta que esta etapa no está por terminar y menos con libros como éste.
April 4, 2023
Very useful advice on managing and coaching from one of the best managers in the business. Whether it be little league or HS, Weaver gives you strategies and advice on how to get the most out of your players and game play.
January 29, 2020
Good book that explored and explained the thoughts of a great manager.
September 26, 2021
A few very points which hadn't dropped into my mind so clearly before.
January 13, 2022
Very good at detailing what to look for as a manager in game-time situations and team building.
December 29, 2013
I was a little disappointed in this book. Perhaps I don't have a right to be; in many ways, I've spoiled it for myself. For years, I've preached on Weaver's style without reading it from his own tome. For example, I've used Weaver's example of using Mark Bellanger at shortstop. Bellanger was one of the worst-hitting position players in baseball, but Weaver played him for his defense, knowing that having Bellanger out there would make life easier on his pitchers, that a pinch-hitter could take Bellanger's place in a crucial offensive situation, and Bellanger actually did hit well against certain pitchers - including the great Nolan Ryan. My point was that there are no disposable people; you succeed in life because of what people CAN do, not because of what they can't. I didn't find that kind of nuance in Weaver's thinking as expressed here, though. It seems that some of Weaver's virtues may have remained hidden from the man himself.
The guts of the book come down to playing good defensive players and living by base hits and home runs on offense, perhaps sacrificing defense in the outfield corners in favor of good hitters. Weaver felt that a team should seldom bunt, squeeze bunt even less, and never, ever use the traditional hit-and-run play - though he did believe in the more aggressive "run and hit," where the runner on first base breaks for second at full speed while the hitter swings away. Weaver also reveals his (perhaps grudging) use of basestealing in certain situations, especially against pitchers with poor pickoff moves like Ryan.
Weaver comes off as egotistical in places, often reminding the reader that he never had a losing season (though after the book came out, the Orioles called him back for a brief period, putting an end to that streak). The book can come off as monotonous as well; we hear the same things about the same players (Bellanger, Brooks Robinson, Frank Robinson, Lee May, Eddie Murray, Jim Palmer, and a few others) time and again. Granted, this was the life of a manager in a settled position in the days before free agency's full bloom, but ghostwriter Terry Pluto should have seen this and done something about it, perhaps using more parallel examples from other teams to break things up.
It is striking - almost breathtaking - how the pitching game has changed since Weaver's day. Current practice is to keep five starting pitchers in rotation with strict pitch counts, using spot starters at any hint of arm trouble and commonly using four pitchers a game. Any current manager who rode his best pitchers the way Weaver did - going with a four-man rotation, replacing pitchers on hunches instead of pitch counts, and getting nine innings from his top guys more often than not - would find himself unemployed in a big hurry. The Orioles' use of top-flight defensive talent mitigated this somewhat, but Weaver's handling of the pitching staff today would be as out of place as a raised toilet seat in a convent.
These points aside, there are some interesting nuggets here. Weaver feels passionately that the manager is the only person who should ever argue with the umpire, and one might infer that the intensity of Weaver's well-known tirades (which earned him 89 ejections in his first fifteen years of managing) were intended to deflect the anger of his players and keep them in the game. In a moment of modesty, Weaver admits that if he gets thrown out of a game it doesn't hurt the team; if a Hall of Fame players gets kicked out, that's a different story.
Perhaps most disturbing is Weaver's distant, authoritarian approach to players; he doubts that he ever said more than ten words to Frank Robinson. Weaver is blunt in having never praised his players or become friends with any of them, feeling it would complicate the times when the manager would have to chew players out; perhaps this is why Jim Palmer bore Weaver such animosity despite their mutual success. This sets up a interesting parallel between Weaver and Joe McCarthy, the winningest manager of all time by percentage, who made a habit of being some players' personal cheering section while simultaneously earning a reputation as a disciplinarian. Weaver (perhaps at Pluto's behest) includes an episode where the manager wins a fight with Reggie Jackson about wearing a tie when the team traveled. McCarthy made a show of eschewing his dress code when he managed tie-hating Ted Williams, reasoning that if a manager couldn't get along with a .400 hitter it was the manager's problem.
Weaver on Strategy is probably still mandatory reading for baseball sachems. There is much to learn here, and it is gratifying to see Weaver use pre-Moneyball statistics in running ballgames, as detailed in chapter nine, with real-game examples in chapter 11. Weaver had a canny baseball mind, and it is instructive to see it at work, especially as it applies to matching players to specific situations. This book could have been better, but it is worthwhile none the less.
The guts of the book come down to playing good defensive players and living by base hits and home runs on offense, perhaps sacrificing defense in the outfield corners in favor of good hitters. Weaver felt that a team should seldom bunt, squeeze bunt even less, and never, ever use the traditional hit-and-run play - though he did believe in the more aggressive "run and hit," where the runner on first base breaks for second at full speed while the hitter swings away. Weaver also reveals his (perhaps grudging) use of basestealing in certain situations, especially against pitchers with poor pickoff moves like Ryan.
Weaver comes off as egotistical in places, often reminding the reader that he never had a losing season (though after the book came out, the Orioles called him back for a brief period, putting an end to that streak). The book can come off as monotonous as well; we hear the same things about the same players (Bellanger, Brooks Robinson, Frank Robinson, Lee May, Eddie Murray, Jim Palmer, and a few others) time and again. Granted, this was the life of a manager in a settled position in the days before free agency's full bloom, but ghostwriter Terry Pluto should have seen this and done something about it, perhaps using more parallel examples from other teams to break things up.
It is striking - almost breathtaking - how the pitching game has changed since Weaver's day. Current practice is to keep five starting pitchers in rotation with strict pitch counts, using spot starters at any hint of arm trouble and commonly using four pitchers a game. Any current manager who rode his best pitchers the way Weaver did - going with a four-man rotation, replacing pitchers on hunches instead of pitch counts, and getting nine innings from his top guys more often than not - would find himself unemployed in a big hurry. The Orioles' use of top-flight defensive talent mitigated this somewhat, but Weaver's handling of the pitching staff today would be as out of place as a raised toilet seat in a convent.
These points aside, there are some interesting nuggets here. Weaver feels passionately that the manager is the only person who should ever argue with the umpire, and one might infer that the intensity of Weaver's well-known tirades (which earned him 89 ejections in his first fifteen years of managing) were intended to deflect the anger of his players and keep them in the game. In a moment of modesty, Weaver admits that if he gets thrown out of a game it doesn't hurt the team; if a Hall of Fame players gets kicked out, that's a different story.
Perhaps most disturbing is Weaver's distant, authoritarian approach to players; he doubts that he ever said more than ten words to Frank Robinson. Weaver is blunt in having never praised his players or become friends with any of them, feeling it would complicate the times when the manager would have to chew players out; perhaps this is why Jim Palmer bore Weaver such animosity despite their mutual success. This sets up a interesting parallel between Weaver and Joe McCarthy, the winningest manager of all time by percentage, who made a habit of being some players' personal cheering section while simultaneously earning a reputation as a disciplinarian. Weaver (perhaps at Pluto's behest) includes an episode where the manager wins a fight with Reggie Jackson about wearing a tie when the team traveled. McCarthy made a show of eschewing his dress code when he managed tie-hating Ted Williams, reasoning that if a manager couldn't get along with a .400 hitter it was the manager's problem.
Weaver on Strategy is probably still mandatory reading for baseball sachems. There is much to learn here, and it is gratifying to see Weaver use pre-Moneyball statistics in running ballgames, as detailed in chapter nine, with real-game examples in chapter 11. Weaver had a canny baseball mind, and it is instructive to see it at work, especially as it applies to matching players to specific situations. This book could have been better, but it is worthwhile none the less.
September 11, 2015
A good read no matter your expertise on the game of baseball. If for no other reason if you want some insight into the coach-player relationship. Of course, Weaver was a pretty 'radical' manager for the time. You get a helping snootful of the 'pitching, defense and the three-run homer' mentality that made him, arguably, one of the top 10 managers of all time.
Much in the vein of 'Moneyball' tactics of on-base percentage and waiting for the big hit (largely ignoring small-ball tactics of stealing bases, sacrifice bunts and hit and runs) Weaver valued baserunners. In one chapter, he details inning by inning the first game of a playoff series against the California Angels and their starting pitcher Nolan Ryan. Continually he cites the temptation to sacrifice a runner into scoring position in a close, low-scoring game (the Orioles won 3-2), but opts for allowing the batter to hit to move the runner over another way or slice a hit into the outfield.
Weaver, too, relied a lot on statistics and advanced scouting to determine match-ups, line-ups and in-game strategy. A progressive thought even if he relied on so-so stats like RBI and batting average.
Much in the vein of 'Moneyball' tactics of on-base percentage and waiting for the big hit (largely ignoring small-ball tactics of stealing bases, sacrifice bunts and hit and runs) Weaver valued baserunners. In one chapter, he details inning by inning the first game of a playoff series against the California Angels and their starting pitcher Nolan Ryan. Continually he cites the temptation to sacrifice a runner into scoring position in a close, low-scoring game (the Orioles won 3-2), but opts for allowing the batter to hit to move the runner over another way or slice a hit into the outfield.
Weaver, too, relied a lot on statistics and advanced scouting to determine match-ups, line-ups and in-game strategy. A progressive thought even if he relied on so-so stats like RBI and batting average.
August 4, 2012
For a book that came out in the early 80s, it's kind of amazing how much the wisdom of Earl Weaver still stands up today - although it seems like not many teams still try to employ most of it. Weaver writes (with the help of his co-author) in a very conversational style as he conveys his way of thinking about managing a baseball team. He uses a lot of concrete examples for particular players of his day, all of which are still pretty effective even if you don't remember the specific player from 30 years ago - and why would you?
I think it's effectively written both for someone who has never tried to think on a deeper level about baseball before, and also for someone who is fully immersed in the modern "SABRmetrics" movement, if only to see where was the genesis of so many things that now are taken for granted.
Somewhere along the line, my beloved Baltimore Orioles stopped paying attention to all of Earl's advice and they have suffered for it. I suppose I can dream they will get back to the basics eventually. At least stop bunting!
I think it's effectively written both for someone who has never tried to think on a deeper level about baseball before, and also for someone who is fully immersed in the modern "SABRmetrics" movement, if only to see where was the genesis of so many things that now are taken for granted.
Somewhere along the line, my beloved Baltimore Orioles stopped paying attention to all of Earl's advice and they have suffered for it. I suppose I can dream they will get back to the basics eventually. At least stop bunting!
January 31, 2011
Earl Weaver is of frameof mind where bunting is frowned upon, the five-men rotation is scoffed at, and the hit-and-run is mocked. Finesse baseball? Not on the watch of the man whose recipe for winning was "pitching, defense, and the three-run homer." Weaver didn't even have a sign for hit-and-run!
His was the mind behind behind "The Oriole Way." Weaver's strategies and machinations led the Baltimore Orioles to four pennants and one World Series win over 17 years of managing. He was elected to baseball's Hall of Fame in 1996.
In WEAVER ON STRATEGY, the legendary manager explains some of his more unusual tactics, outlines his approach to the game, and gives tips on everything from when to pull your starting pitcher, to when and how to argue with the umpires. This special, updated edition includes Weaver's views on today's managers and their strategies as well.
His was the mind behind behind "The Oriole Way." Weaver's strategies and machinations led the Baltimore Orioles to four pennants and one World Series win over 17 years of managing. He was elected to baseball's Hall of Fame in 1996.
In WEAVER ON STRATEGY, the legendary manager explains some of his more unusual tactics, outlines his approach to the game, and gives tips on everything from when to pull your starting pitcher, to when and how to argue with the umpires. This special, updated edition includes Weaver's views on today's managers and their strategies as well.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 28, 2023
This is a great, quick read on the basics of managing a Major League Baseball Team. Weaver preaches many principles of sabermetrics, before they had come into vogue. Instead, he had come to espouse many sabermetric principles (i.e. high OBP guys at the top of the lineup, eschewing stealing/the hit and run/sacrifice bunting) not by reading Bill James, but simply from watching thousands of baseball games. His book lays out his simple yet innovative approaches to the game, and also, indirectly proves how intelligent of a manager he had been.
Admittedly, this book is a little dated, but his main points still hold true in today's game. For anyone who wants to talk intelligently about managers in the Majors. This is a must read.
Admittedly, this book is a little dated, but his main points still hold true in today's game. For anyone who wants to talk intelligently about managers in the Majors. This is a must read.
Read
January 26, 2016A very cool snapshot in baseball time. From 1984 - Earl Weaver, Orioles great, shares his views on how to win - basically, pitching and 3 run home runs! He says if he speaks to any of his players more than 3 times a year, there's something wrong - he wants no relationship with them, since he might have to bench them, pinch hit for them, or release them!
Most interesting in our era of sabermetrics, Weaver describes his system of index card (he was the first) for tracking pitches, opposing players tendencies against his pitchers ---- Earl was the pioneer!
Most interesting in our era of sabermetrics, Weaver describes his system of index card (he was the first) for tracking pitches, opposing players tendencies against his pitchers ---- Earl was the pioneer!
June 9, 2008
Although Weaver has always been associated with the "old-school" style of baseball, reading this book reminds us that he was in fact one of the forefathers of modern statistical analysis. Anyone interested in "modern" ideas about the value of on-base percentage in the game of baseball should read this to see how one of the greatest managers of all-time knew the value of a walk in the 1960s and 1970s.
July 30, 2012
One of the better baseball books I've come across, chock full of innovate pieces of strategy that were way ahead of their time. Weaver's voice comes through in short, staccato sentences - the book reads like a conversation with a guy who's spent close to a lifetime in dugouts from Walla Walla, WA to Kalamazoo - and some of his baseball philosophies double as an allegory for the way to approach any of life's many curveballs in the dirt.
August 13, 2013
Reading this book feels like having a one-on-one conversation with Earl Weaver. More personal feeling even than The Glory of Their Times.
I am not sure that everyone will learn something or anything, but it really feels like the reader sees a lot more gears turn than one would in almost any other study, biographical or otherwise. It certainly helps that Weaver is funny, likeable, and a winner.
I am not sure that everyone will learn something or anything, but it really feels like the reader sees a lot more gears turn than one would in almost any other study, biographical or otherwise. It certainly helps that Weaver is funny, likeable, and a winner.
April 12, 2020
I found this book interesting from a historical perspective. Many of Weaver's principles of managing are now part of sabremetrics-based managing (e.g., eschewing the bunt, line-up and pinch-hitting choices based on left-right splits). He was ahead of his times.
Terry Pluto essentially wrote this book based on extensive conversations with Weaver. So, the book is more of a transcript than transcendant prose. It's a bit repetitive too,
Terry Pluto essentially wrote this book based on extensive conversations with Weaver. So, the book is more of a transcript than transcendant prose. It's a bit repetitive too,
June 29, 2012
While you may not agree with everything Weaver wrote, this book will resonate with a lot of stat nerds of baseball. Perhaps the most pertinent to me was the wasting of outs via the sacrifice. Today statistics validate Weaver's thoughts on this subject (and many more), just stressing how truly Weaver was ahead of his time.
Regardless, I think any baseball fan should enjoy this, or learn from it.
Regardless, I think any baseball fan should enjoy this, or learn from it.
May 31, 2016
Earl Weaver once said, upon being discovered in the dressing room runway smoking a cigarette while the National Anthem was being played, "This ain't no football game; we do this shit everyday." This book was like communing with Earl on matters of deep baseball importance. Very fun read for a true fan.
January 20, 2012
The subject matter was interesting, of course, but the book was more or less just someone writing down and organizing Weaver's talking. Fine, except that it made the reading oh, so, tedious about 50pp in.
October 18, 2017
A great way to get deeper insight into the game. An easy read from before the sabermetric era that's still relevant amid the many advances. Walks you through every part of a season, gives you things to look for that will draw you further in to any game you're watching.
June 23, 2010
baseball,instructional
August 1, 2015
Fantastic. And also horribly depressing considering the current state of the Orioles.
October 8, 2012
Best book on baseball strategy. Period. About 25 years ahead of its time. Just like Earl.
December 17, 2012
One of the better baseball books i have read. Great strategy and management discussions
January 16, 2013
A good guide to the strategy behind managing a baseball team and an easy read.
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