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Hazin Savaş 1914 - 1918
“The Times”ın “kuşağının en parlak tarihçisi” olarak tanımladığı Niall Ferguson’a göre savaş her şeyden önce korkunçtu, yanı sıra da kaçınılmazdı. Tiyatronun bize öğrettiği trajediden daha fazlasıydı ve aslında doğrudan modern tarihin “hata”sıydı. Bir asker, savaşı “Avrupa’daki tüm ışıkların sönüşü” olarak nitelendirmişti. 8 milyondan fazla insan bu savaşta hayatını kaybetti.
Ferguson, “Hazin Savaş”la, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’na geleneksel ve büyük oranda kendi cephelerinden bakan askeri tarihçilerin ve iktisat tarihçilerinin yaklaşımını birleştirmeyi hedefliyor ve bunu başarıyor. “Militarizm, emperyalizm ve silahlanma yarışı nedeniyle savaş kaçınılmaz mıydı?”, “Almanlar savaş kumarına niçin girdi?”, “Savaş sahiden de halk tarafından coşkuyla karşılandı mı?”, “Cephede şartlar bu kadar kahırlıyken insanlar savaşmaya neden hâlâ devam etti?” Ferguson’un “Hazin Savaş”ta yanıtlamaya çalıştığı on temel sorudan bazıları bunlar. En önemli ve sonuncu soru ise sizi bu kitabı okumaya davet ediyor: “Barışı kim kazandı, daha kesin bir ifadeyle, sonunda savaşın bedelini kim ödedi?”
“Bugüne kadar yapılmış en ilgi çekici ve kışkırtıcı Birinci Dünya Savaşı analizi” Ian Kershaw
“Dâhice ve ufuk açıcı… esaslı, okunmaya değer ve inandırıcı” The Times
“Muhtemelen yıllardan beri Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın kökenlerini gösteren en önemli kitap... Ferguson emin adımlarla A. J. P. Taylor’un mirasını devralmayı iddia edebilir.” Paul Kennedy, New York Review of Books
Ferguson, “Hazin Savaş”la, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’na geleneksel ve büyük oranda kendi cephelerinden bakan askeri tarihçilerin ve iktisat tarihçilerinin yaklaşımını birleştirmeyi hedefliyor ve bunu başarıyor. “Militarizm, emperyalizm ve silahlanma yarışı nedeniyle savaş kaçınılmaz mıydı?”, “Almanlar savaş kumarına niçin girdi?”, “Savaş sahiden de halk tarafından coşkuyla karşılandı mı?”, “Cephede şartlar bu kadar kahırlıyken insanlar savaşmaya neden hâlâ devam etti?” Ferguson’un “Hazin Savaş”ta yanıtlamaya çalıştığı on temel sorudan bazıları bunlar. En önemli ve sonuncu soru ise sizi bu kitabı okumaya davet ediyor: “Barışı kim kazandı, daha kesin bir ifadeyle, sonunda savaşın bedelini kim ödedi?”
“Bugüne kadar yapılmış en ilgi çekici ve kışkırtıcı Birinci Dünya Savaşı analizi” Ian Kershaw
“Dâhice ve ufuk açıcı… esaslı, okunmaya değer ve inandırıcı” The Times
“Muhtemelen yıllardan beri Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın kökenlerini gösteren en önemli kitap... Ferguson emin adımlarla A. J. P. Taylor’un mirasını devralmayı iddia edebilir.” Paul Kennedy, New York Review of Books
624 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1998
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About the author
Niall Ferguson
103 books3,325 followersNiall Ferguson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, former Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and current senior fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, a visiting professor at Tsinghua University, Beijing, and founder and managing director of advisory firm Greenmantle LLC.
The author of 15 books, Ferguson is writing a life of Henry Kissinger, the first volume of which--Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist--was published in 2015 to critical acclaim. The World's Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild won the Wadsworth Prize for Business History. Other titles include Civilization: The West and the Rest, The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die and High Financier: The Lives and Time of Siegmund Warburg.
Ferguson's six-part PBS television series, "The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World," based on his best-seller, won an International Emmy for best documentary in 2009. Civilization was also made into a documentary series. Ferguson is a recipient of the Benjamin Franklin Award for Public Service as well as other honors. His most recent book is The Square and the Tower: Networks on Power from the Freemasons to Facebook (2018).
(Source: Amazon)
The author of 15 books, Ferguson is writing a life of Henry Kissinger, the first volume of which--Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist--was published in 2015 to critical acclaim. The World's Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild won the Wadsworth Prize for Business History. Other titles include Civilization: The West and the Rest, The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die and High Financier: The Lives and Time of Siegmund Warburg.
Ferguson's six-part PBS television series, "The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World," based on his best-seller, won an International Emmy for best documentary in 2009. Civilization was also made into a documentary series. Ferguson is a recipient of the Benjamin Franklin Award for Public Service as well as other honors. His most recent book is The Square and the Tower: Networks on Power from the Freemasons to Facebook (2018).
(Source: Amazon)
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July 20, 2025
“It was Germany which forced the continental war of 1914 upon an unwilling France (and a not so unwilling Russia). But it was the British government which ultimately decided to turn the continental war into a world war, a conflict which lasted twice as long and cost many more lives than Germany’s first ‘bid for European Union’ would have, if it had only gone according to plan. By fighting Germany in 1914, [Herbert] Asquith, [Edward] Grey and their colleagues helped ensure that, when Germany did finally achieve predominance on the continent, Britain was no longer strong enough to provide a check on it…The First World War was at once piteous, in the poet’s sense, and a ‘pity.’ It was something worse than a tragedy, which is something we are taught by the theatre to regard as ultimately avoidable. It was nothing less than the greatest error in modern history…”
- Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I
The First World War has long lived in the shadow of the much larger, costlier, and relatively simpler Second. Despite this, there is a strong argument to be made that the so-called Great War is actually the defining event of the twentieth century. It killed millions of soldiers, maimed or wounded many more, shattered several empires, redrew the maps of Europe and the Middle East, created the environment for the Russian Revolution, and – not least – set the table for the next war to come.
In The Pity of War, well-known historian and noted opinion-haver Niall Ferguson sets out to explain – among other things – how the war began, why it unfolded as it did, and who emerged as the real winners and losers.
As Ferguson states up front, this is not a history of the First World War. It does not follow a chronology; it does not explain all the players; it does not narrate any battles. Instead, Ferguson posits a series of questions, and then endeavors to answer them with a curious mixture of smugness, certainty, offensiveness, and occasional insight.
***
Ferguson’s questions – ten in all – provide The Pity of War with its structure. Over the course of fourteen chapters and 462 pages of text, he asks the following: whether war was inevitable; why Germany gambled on war in 1914; why Britain decided to intervene; whether the war was greeted with popular enthusiasm; whether the press kept the war going; why Britain’s economic superiority did not bring a quicker victory; why Germany’s military superiority failed on the Western Front; why men kept fighting; why men stopped fighting; and who won the peace.
Many of these questions have been the object of numerous inquiries. The war’s inevitability – in other words, its causes – is its own cottage industry. Likewise, issues surrounding the war’s end, specifically the perceived unfairness of the Treaty of Versailles, have been extensively litigated. Some of Ferguson’s other probes, however, are a bit more idiosyncratic, such as his look at the role of the press, and the psyche of the fighting man.
Before diving into my impressions, I think this is as good a place as any to state that I found myself disagreeing with almost all of Ferguson’s conclusions. Nevertheless, I still enjoyed it as an intellectual exercise, subject to some particular criticisms which I’ll set out below.
***
Though Ferguson’s investigation is wide-ranging, perhaps The Pity of War’s chief marketing line is its naughty schoolboy assertion that the First World War was entirely Great Britain’s fault. This is, of course, absolutely absurd, as even Ferguson acknowledges. Whether or not Great Britain intervened, there was going to be a continental war fought by powerful empires including France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany. The notion that this war wouldn’t have been a “world war” is therefore one of Ferguson’s many empty counterfactuals.
Nevertheless, Great Britain’s entry into war on France’s behalf is fascinating for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the historical enmity between the two nations. The war proved massively costly to the British Empire, and so interrogating its precipitous intervention– much based on a wink-wink, nudge-nudge Anglo-French agreement authored by Foreign Secretary Edward Grey – is worthwhile.
Ferguson’s handling of this issue, which consumes The Pity of War’s first four chapters, is emblematic of the whole project. It is marked by reference to a wide array of sources, sharp writing, and a willingness to challenge every bit of received First World War wisdom.
Indeed, Ferguson makes a number of ponderable points throughout The Pity of War. For instance, in discussing war enthusiasm, he has a lively debate about the role of religion and churches in turning the war into “a crusade without infidels.” A later chapter on prisoners of war does a deep-dive into the killing of captives, suggesting that one of the keys to victory was to make surrender safe for the enemy.
***
While engaging, however, The Pity of War is seldom convincing. To Ferguson’s credit, he mostly presents the views of both sides of every issue. To the detriment of his persuasiveness, though, the evidence he discounts often seems better than that he chooses to keep. This includes declarations regarding the purported lack of importance of the naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany, Germany’s alleged lack of militarism, and his insistent deprecation of America’s battlefield contributions. In addition, Ferguson often flatly contradicts himself, or judges decisions based on information that could only have been known with hindsight.
Ferguson also confidently arrives at solutions that cannot actually be quantified. For instance, there is an odd, Freudian-inflected section in which he argues that men continued fighting because they liked it. Leaving aside the obvious – that men kept going because they were humans in the army, and humans generally follow the orders of authority figures, especially in the army – his proposals are based on a selection of cherrypicked anecdotes from veterans like Ernst Junger. It goes without saying that Ernst Junger – a German super-soldier and memoirist – is not exactly a statistically relevant sample. Moreover, for every death-loving account, there are many more that say just the opposite. Beyond that, many of the first-person testimonies that Ferguson excerpts are clearly the words of psychologically damaged men. Not lovers of war, but mentally damaged victims of it.
***
More seriously, The Pity of War has problems with its tone. Some of this is minor, such as Ferguson’s pathological disdain for the “war poets” who turned the war’s ghastliness into haunting art. Ferguson’s implication that the war wasn’t such a bad thing – you make friends, you don’t spend the whole time in a trench, there are prostitutes – is certainly bad form. Furthermore, his castigation of poets who hadn’t been in the trenches is very, very rich, given that Ferguson also – checks notes – wasn’t in the trenches. Overall, though, this is something I can forgive, especially since eye-poking provocation – such as using venereal disease rates as proof that war is fun – is his stock-in-trade.
Less forgivable is Ferguson’s overt homophobia, which is an issue that has arisen a few times in his career. Since Ferguson is known as an economic historian, it is fair game for him to go after John Maynard Keynes on the basis of his theories and policies regarding deficit spending. Instead, Ferguson goes after him because of his sexuality, suggesting – snidely and without evidence – that Keynes’s actions were guided by his desires. Later, in discussing comradeship’s role in the war’s continuation, Ferguson writes that it was “unlikely that the war was kept going by its homoerotic undertones,” the negative pregnant of the statement clearly indicating that he has seriously considered the reverse.
I get that Ferguson’s schtick – which neatly prefigures today’s social media cesspool – is to rile people up, often in the context of his pro-imperialist leanings. Even ignoring the moral dimension of this type of engagement, it makes for bad arguments that eschew inductive or deductive reasoning in favor of schoolyard taunts.
***
The bottom line with The Pity of War is that it is lively, in ways both good and bad. It does not seem to have achieved any kind of lasting impression, or changed any minds. At least, when I went on a First World War binge around its 2014-18 centenary, I saw little mention of Ferguson’s impact. That said, one of the best ways to arrive at sound judgments is to test your assumptions against opposing viewpoints. Since Ferguson disagrees with everything, this a good place to do that.
- Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I
The First World War has long lived in the shadow of the much larger, costlier, and relatively simpler Second. Despite this, there is a strong argument to be made that the so-called Great War is actually the defining event of the twentieth century. It killed millions of soldiers, maimed or wounded many more, shattered several empires, redrew the maps of Europe and the Middle East, created the environment for the Russian Revolution, and – not least – set the table for the next war to come.
In The Pity of War, well-known historian and noted opinion-haver Niall Ferguson sets out to explain – among other things – how the war began, why it unfolded as it did, and who emerged as the real winners and losers.
As Ferguson states up front, this is not a history of the First World War. It does not follow a chronology; it does not explain all the players; it does not narrate any battles. Instead, Ferguson posits a series of questions, and then endeavors to answer them with a curious mixture of smugness, certainty, offensiveness, and occasional insight.
***
Ferguson’s questions – ten in all – provide The Pity of War with its structure. Over the course of fourteen chapters and 462 pages of text, he asks the following: whether war was inevitable; why Germany gambled on war in 1914; why Britain decided to intervene; whether the war was greeted with popular enthusiasm; whether the press kept the war going; why Britain’s economic superiority did not bring a quicker victory; why Germany’s military superiority failed on the Western Front; why men kept fighting; why men stopped fighting; and who won the peace.
Many of these questions have been the object of numerous inquiries. The war’s inevitability – in other words, its causes – is its own cottage industry. Likewise, issues surrounding the war’s end, specifically the perceived unfairness of the Treaty of Versailles, have been extensively litigated. Some of Ferguson’s other probes, however, are a bit more idiosyncratic, such as his look at the role of the press, and the psyche of the fighting man.
Before diving into my impressions, I think this is as good a place as any to state that I found myself disagreeing with almost all of Ferguson’s conclusions. Nevertheless, I still enjoyed it as an intellectual exercise, subject to some particular criticisms which I’ll set out below.
***
Though Ferguson’s investigation is wide-ranging, perhaps The Pity of War’s chief marketing line is its naughty schoolboy assertion that the First World War was entirely Great Britain’s fault. This is, of course, absolutely absurd, as even Ferguson acknowledges. Whether or not Great Britain intervened, there was going to be a continental war fought by powerful empires including France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany. The notion that this war wouldn’t have been a “world war” is therefore one of Ferguson’s many empty counterfactuals.
Nevertheless, Great Britain’s entry into war on France’s behalf is fascinating for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the historical enmity between the two nations. The war proved massively costly to the British Empire, and so interrogating its precipitous intervention– much based on a wink-wink, nudge-nudge Anglo-French agreement authored by Foreign Secretary Edward Grey – is worthwhile.
Ferguson’s handling of this issue, which consumes The Pity of War’s first four chapters, is emblematic of the whole project. It is marked by reference to a wide array of sources, sharp writing, and a willingness to challenge every bit of received First World War wisdom.
Indeed, Ferguson makes a number of ponderable points throughout The Pity of War. For instance, in discussing war enthusiasm, he has a lively debate about the role of religion and churches in turning the war into “a crusade without infidels.” A later chapter on prisoners of war does a deep-dive into the killing of captives, suggesting that one of the keys to victory was to make surrender safe for the enemy.
***
While engaging, however, The Pity of War is seldom convincing. To Ferguson’s credit, he mostly presents the views of both sides of every issue. To the detriment of his persuasiveness, though, the evidence he discounts often seems better than that he chooses to keep. This includes declarations regarding the purported lack of importance of the naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany, Germany’s alleged lack of militarism, and his insistent deprecation of America’s battlefield contributions. In addition, Ferguson often flatly contradicts himself, or judges decisions based on information that could only have been known with hindsight.
Ferguson also confidently arrives at solutions that cannot actually be quantified. For instance, there is an odd, Freudian-inflected section in which he argues that men continued fighting because they liked it. Leaving aside the obvious – that men kept going because they were humans in the army, and humans generally follow the orders of authority figures, especially in the army – his proposals are based on a selection of cherrypicked anecdotes from veterans like Ernst Junger. It goes without saying that Ernst Junger – a German super-soldier and memoirist – is not exactly a statistically relevant sample. Moreover, for every death-loving account, there are many more that say just the opposite. Beyond that, many of the first-person testimonies that Ferguson excerpts are clearly the words of psychologically damaged men. Not lovers of war, but mentally damaged victims of it.
***
More seriously, The Pity of War has problems with its tone. Some of this is minor, such as Ferguson’s pathological disdain for the “war poets” who turned the war’s ghastliness into haunting art. Ferguson’s implication that the war wasn’t such a bad thing – you make friends, you don’t spend the whole time in a trench, there are prostitutes – is certainly bad form. Furthermore, his castigation of poets who hadn’t been in the trenches is very, very rich, given that Ferguson also – checks notes – wasn’t in the trenches. Overall, though, this is something I can forgive, especially since eye-poking provocation – such as using venereal disease rates as proof that war is fun – is his stock-in-trade.
Less forgivable is Ferguson’s overt homophobia, which is an issue that has arisen a few times in his career. Since Ferguson is known as an economic historian, it is fair game for him to go after John Maynard Keynes on the basis of his theories and policies regarding deficit spending. Instead, Ferguson goes after him because of his sexuality, suggesting – snidely and without evidence – that Keynes’s actions were guided by his desires. Later, in discussing comradeship’s role in the war’s continuation, Ferguson writes that it was “unlikely that the war was kept going by its homoerotic undertones,” the negative pregnant of the statement clearly indicating that he has seriously considered the reverse.
I get that Ferguson’s schtick – which neatly prefigures today’s social media cesspool – is to rile people up, often in the context of his pro-imperialist leanings. Even ignoring the moral dimension of this type of engagement, it makes for bad arguments that eschew inductive or deductive reasoning in favor of schoolyard taunts.
***
The bottom line with The Pity of War is that it is lively, in ways both good and bad. It does not seem to have achieved any kind of lasting impression, or changed any minds. At least, when I went on a First World War binge around its 2014-18 centenary, I saw little mention of Ferguson’s impact. That said, one of the best ways to arrive at sound judgments is to test your assumptions against opposing viewpoints. Since Ferguson disagrees with everything, this a good place to do that.
February 11, 2016
Dr Ferguson seeks to overturn some long-held beliefs about WWI. He does this primarily through a masterful wielding of statistics. For example, the myth of war enthusiasm in Britain. He is able to show that this was something very short-lived, which occurred mostly at the beginning of the war. He is able to argue, too, that there were real alternatives for Britain if she had stayed out of the war. The Entente was after all a gentleman's agreement. There was no formal treaty committing British forces to the defense of France. Would Britain have been held in contempt by the international community for taking such a position, probably, but it was a real option whose upside was never given proper consideration in Britain. Among other things Ferguson believes that without Britain in the war the result would have been a limited general European conflict. Once Britain entered, however, with her unparalleled foreign possessions (colonies) it became a global imperialist war. Perhaps my favorite parts of the book are the statistics Ferguson is able to marshal to show how much more efficient Germany was on the battlefield. Germany killed something like 5 Entente soldiers for every 4 Central Power soldiers killed. And Germany did this on the cheap. It's budgetary constraints are discussed in comparison to those of the Entente Powers. There's no question that Germany was able not only to kill more Entente soldiers over the long term, they were able to do it far more cheaply than their enemies. This is a book for those who already know the course of the war through previous reading and who wish to expand upon that knowledge by closer study of its underpinnings, social, cultural, political and financial. Do not pick this book up if you what you want are depictions of combat. No question that that sort of strict military history can be very engaging, but that's not what Dr Ferguson is up to. Actual fighting is only described to the extent that it illuminates the political, cultural, and social history, especially on the various home fronts of the Entente and Central Powers. Other topics covered include: (1) the myth of an ingrained militarism in Germany; Ferguson believes there was not one. (2) an examination of why men fought, this in a chapter titled "The Death Instinct" in which the author invokes Freud, Jung and others; and the prickly problem of taking prisoners. I found it fascinating throughout. Highly recommended.
May 2, 2012
Next to John Keegan's work this is the foundation work to be read before all other books of the Great War. I know that most of the critics dislike this book immensely, because it so challenges the accepted understanding of the causes of the war--but that is precisely why I liked it. He also arranges the chapters well in an organized manner. I have several of Ferguson's books and I like his style, though some consider him a bit pedantic, I think there is a crispness and an assumption of knowledge in the way he writes. One may not agree with what he posits, or the fact that he blames the UK for the lion-share of "why" WWI happened and why it went on so long, but he makes some valid excursions into financial areas that are often glossed over and his approach turns things upside down. If you are already familiar with WWI, this may be like using Alice in Wonderland as a road map for your hometown.....
September 29, 2025
Challenging the Preconceptions
The Pity of War: Explaining World War I is formidable, hard hitting and well argued as it looks to turn upside down everything you thought you knew about the First World War. For me it was exceptional, for others it is unconvincing. This is what history and research is about; this is why we read books to improve our knowledge and to ask ourselves ‘what actually happened?’ Niall Ferguson is an intelligent and confrontational writer here, but it is done brilliantly. I simply could not put it down and read this almost cover to cover. Whether you agree or disagree with him, it’s worth knowing his arguments, some are hard to counter.
This is not your typical run of the mill, narrative history of the war, describing the events where millions tragically died in senseless fighting, Europe was destroyed and opened the door to an even more gruesome conflict. Instead the book sets out to answer ten questions or preconceptions about WWI. These include, ‘was war inevitable?’, ‘why did Germany gamble on war in 1914?’, ‘why did Britain intervene?’, ‘why did the men keep fighting?’ And ‘who won the peace?’ Ferguson lays down his points, then backs them up with an array of facts, tables and graphs to assert his points. This is done well and I never felt overburdened with statistic after statistic.
What is really great about The Pity of War: Explaining World War I is that Ferguson combines the grand events and famous figures with the less well know quirks of the war. The poetry, the art, the films, the finance (including the importance of John Maynard Keynes) and the propaganda (such as that of Viscount Northcliffe). Ferguson shows how all of these have warped our view and of the war and for every ‘traditional’ view, that men rode off enthusiastically to fight for ‘king and country’, only to live in misery and hate every second of it; there is a counter view. Men enjoyed the fighting and the thrill, men were good at it and most signed up for pay, employment and home pressure, rather than what their politicians told them to do.
His ultimate conclusion is that had Britain not intervened, something which they had been planning since as early as 1905, Germany would have won the war within two years and established a hegemony over Central Europe similar to what they have now in the modern European Union. Bolshevism and Nazism would not have taken a grip in Russia and Germany and Britain would have retained enough power and prestige to check the balance of power. This is hard to argue, Germany would have most likely have broken through the French lines and achieved what they did 44 years earlier, the capture of Paris. He states that Germany fought because it was weak and felt it had to, believing it would be overwhelmed by Russia and France. He shows how France was in fact more militaristic before the war and the old narrative that the Kaiser was a war monger is wrong and outdated. Another famous conclusion is that Britain came out of the war worse off than Germany and that the new republic should have practiced mild deflation and currency stabilisation rather than allow the wild hyperinflation. He shows how this, rather than defeat or a ‘harsh peace’ contributed more to the rise of the far right and Adolf Hitler than anything else.
The Pity of War: Explaining World War I was a great book and I really enjoyed reading about it. Even if you disagree with Ferguson, there are definitely talking points to consider and learning to be made. Some of his arguments are more convincing than others, but I agree with his main arguments that Germany didn’t want a war and definitely not a global one, that if Britain didn’t intervene, the war would have been settled much quicker and that the horrors of the Second World War would likely have been avoided and that the popular preconceptions about why men fought and why they eventually gave up need to be challenged. I’ll go again with this one at some point.
The Pity of War: Explaining World War I is formidable, hard hitting and well argued as it looks to turn upside down everything you thought you knew about the First World War. For me it was exceptional, for others it is unconvincing. This is what history and research is about; this is why we read books to improve our knowledge and to ask ourselves ‘what actually happened?’ Niall Ferguson is an intelligent and confrontational writer here, but it is done brilliantly. I simply could not put it down and read this almost cover to cover. Whether you agree or disagree with him, it’s worth knowing his arguments, some are hard to counter.
This is not your typical run of the mill, narrative history of the war, describing the events where millions tragically died in senseless fighting, Europe was destroyed and opened the door to an even more gruesome conflict. Instead the book sets out to answer ten questions or preconceptions about WWI. These include, ‘was war inevitable?’, ‘why did Germany gamble on war in 1914?’, ‘why did Britain intervene?’, ‘why did the men keep fighting?’ And ‘who won the peace?’ Ferguson lays down his points, then backs them up with an array of facts, tables and graphs to assert his points. This is done well and I never felt overburdened with statistic after statistic.
What is really great about The Pity of War: Explaining World War I is that Ferguson combines the grand events and famous figures with the less well know quirks of the war. The poetry, the art, the films, the finance (including the importance of John Maynard Keynes) and the propaganda (such as that of Viscount Northcliffe). Ferguson shows how all of these have warped our view and of the war and for every ‘traditional’ view, that men rode off enthusiastically to fight for ‘king and country’, only to live in misery and hate every second of it; there is a counter view. Men enjoyed the fighting and the thrill, men were good at it and most signed up for pay, employment and home pressure, rather than what their politicians told them to do.
His ultimate conclusion is that had Britain not intervened, something which they had been planning since as early as 1905, Germany would have won the war within two years and established a hegemony over Central Europe similar to what they have now in the modern European Union. Bolshevism and Nazism would not have taken a grip in Russia and Germany and Britain would have retained enough power and prestige to check the balance of power. This is hard to argue, Germany would have most likely have broken through the French lines and achieved what they did 44 years earlier, the capture of Paris. He states that Germany fought because it was weak and felt it had to, believing it would be overwhelmed by Russia and France. He shows how France was in fact more militaristic before the war and the old narrative that the Kaiser was a war monger is wrong and outdated. Another famous conclusion is that Britain came out of the war worse off than Germany and that the new republic should have practiced mild deflation and currency stabilisation rather than allow the wild hyperinflation. He shows how this, rather than defeat or a ‘harsh peace’ contributed more to the rise of the far right and Adolf Hitler than anything else.
The Pity of War: Explaining World War I was a great book and I really enjoyed reading about it. Even if you disagree with Ferguson, there are definitely talking points to consider and learning to be made. Some of his arguments are more convincing than others, but I agree with his main arguments that Germany didn’t want a war and definitely not a global one, that if Britain didn’t intervene, the war would have been settled much quicker and that the horrors of the Second World War would likely have been avoided and that the popular preconceptions about why men fought and why they eventually gave up need to be challenged. I’ll go again with this one at some point.
December 1, 2018
World War I was the greatest mistake of modern time. Ferguson makes the case better than I could that the war was not inevitable, that without British intervention it would have been a relatively quick German victory, and that the results of a quick German victory would have been better for everyone (including the French and British).
Ferguson downplayed the extent that WW1 essentially ruined Europe permanently (particularly if you combine WW1 with WW2), and didn't particularly describe the horrible impact it had on the US (and states generally) by making them all much more centralized and interventionist.
Ferguson downplayed the extent that WW1 essentially ruined Europe permanently (particularly if you combine WW1 with WW2), and didn't particularly describe the horrible impact it had on the US (and states generally) by making them all much more centralized and interventionist.
May 17, 2014
This is one of the worst books I have ever read. I will never touch anything by Niall Ferguson again. There is an interesting thesis in the summary, that the catastrophe that was WWI was entirely England's fault, but I have no idea if that is true or not because the scholarship in the book is so incredibly awful. At one point, he devolves into simply listing fiction books that show that England was set on going to war. How that has ANYTHING to do with the war being only England's fault, I have absolutely no idea. All the main participants had been preparing for the war for years, England was not special in that case.
Additionally, since reading this terrible book, I have read many actually good books on WWI, including Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, GJ Meyer's A World Undone, and Robert Massie's Nicholas and Alexandria, all of which contain much better scholarship than this book. Those books collectively make clear that Britain was a side player in how the war started and that Britain's entry into the war was dependent upon the incredibly stupid decision by Germany to invade Belgium. I think that what Ferguson would have liked to have argued if he was capable of it is that the without the BEF the Germans would have won the war quickly and it never would have devolved into the the drawn-out human disaster it turned into. That's an incredible statement to make, when the BEF at the start of the war was less than 100,000 and Germans and French both had armies over a million. The initial German advance into France didn't work because the Germans picked the one moment in history in which it would be most likely to fail. In all eras prior to the war, armies fleeing an enemy advance would have been wiped out by calvary. In all eras after the war, fleeing armies would have been wiped out by the fully mechanized advancing army (unless that mechanized army was run by Hitler, in which case he would let you escape by sea). In this case, though, all the Germans had to send after the French and British, who were running just as fast as their legs could take them, were calvary. And the French and British had machine guns to cover their retreat. It was the technology that the combatants were dealing with that turned the war into what it was. Nowhere is this so clear as at Gallipoli, which turned into a mini western front because of the technology of the time. The armies were using modern killing machines but weren't fully mechanized. Trench warfare was the result.
One of the horrible ideas that has grown out of the failure of the initial German advance has been the idea that if only it had worked, the entire 20th century would have gone better. I understand where this is coming from: people look at WWI and see a worst-case scenario and think 'anything would have been better than this' and that is true in terms of WWI but most definitely not true in terms of the 20th century as a whole. As bad as it was, humanity managed to get out of it without a nuclear holocaust, and while a German victory at the start of the war would have prevented the horrors of the trench warfare that followed, it also might have driven Europe into a far worse conflict down the line. Britain would have been terrified and isolated. The governments of Germany and Russia weren't stable and were never going to function well under the demands of modern nation states. Add to that toxic mix the atomic bomb, and who knows how badly things might have turned out.
Additionally, since reading this terrible book, I have read many actually good books on WWI, including Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, GJ Meyer's A World Undone, and Robert Massie's Nicholas and Alexandria, all of which contain much better scholarship than this book. Those books collectively make clear that Britain was a side player in how the war started and that Britain's entry into the war was dependent upon the incredibly stupid decision by Germany to invade Belgium. I think that what Ferguson would have liked to have argued if he was capable of it is that the without the BEF the Germans would have won the war quickly and it never would have devolved into the the drawn-out human disaster it turned into. That's an incredible statement to make, when the BEF at the start of the war was less than 100,000 and Germans and French both had armies over a million. The initial German advance into France didn't work because the Germans picked the one moment in history in which it would be most likely to fail. In all eras prior to the war, armies fleeing an enemy advance would have been wiped out by calvary. In all eras after the war, fleeing armies would have been wiped out by the fully mechanized advancing army (unless that mechanized army was run by Hitler, in which case he would let you escape by sea). In this case, though, all the Germans had to send after the French and British, who were running just as fast as their legs could take them, were calvary. And the French and British had machine guns to cover their retreat. It was the technology that the combatants were dealing with that turned the war into what it was. Nowhere is this so clear as at Gallipoli, which turned into a mini western front because of the technology of the time. The armies were using modern killing machines but weren't fully mechanized. Trench warfare was the result.
One of the horrible ideas that has grown out of the failure of the initial German advance has been the idea that if only it had worked, the entire 20th century would have gone better. I understand where this is coming from: people look at WWI and see a worst-case scenario and think 'anything would have been better than this' and that is true in terms of WWI but most definitely not true in terms of the 20th century as a whole. As bad as it was, humanity managed to get out of it without a nuclear holocaust, and while a German victory at the start of the war would have prevented the horrors of the trench warfare that followed, it also might have driven Europe into a far worse conflict down the line. Britain would have been terrified and isolated. The governments of Germany and Russia weren't stable and were never going to function well under the demands of modern nation states. Add to that toxic mix the atomic bomb, and who knows how badly things might have turned out.
April 22, 2017
I am tempted to simply write good riddance and be done with it. Aside from the fact that the book had no real central theme (it was all over the place) and that the arguments set forth seem to have been decided upon before the research and the research molded around them, they don't make sense to me. It occurs to me that if, after having written a book it is necessary to then tell readers what the book was about in the manner in which Ferguson did, you are admitting defeat- at least tacitly.
Ferguson seemed to have some axes to grind and saw the opportunity to do in this book. That is rather pathetic. He is certainly entitled to his opinions about John Maynard Keynes and his economic views; it is totally out of line to make a personal attack upon him about his sexuality- and it was done completely out of the blue. I would only respond that Keynes will be remembered far longer than Ferguson and his ideas make far more sense.
The argument about Britain being the sole cause of the War is so ludicrous that it makes one wonder how anyone could take the author seriously after reading it. The "evidence" offered was off the mark and irrelevant in my mind. Moreover, the argument about reparations and their effect on Germany seem to me to be a case of picking out those things that seem to support the thesis and ignoring those that didn't.
Really, the only positive thing I can say about the book is that there was some interesting information contained in it (the only thing that earned 2 stars) but I found the quality of the writing to be uneven and even dull at times. Suffice to say that I would not recommend this book and will not be reading anything else by this author.
Ferguson seemed to have some axes to grind and saw the opportunity to do in this book. That is rather pathetic. He is certainly entitled to his opinions about John Maynard Keynes and his economic views; it is totally out of line to make a personal attack upon him about his sexuality- and it was done completely out of the blue. I would only respond that Keynes will be remembered far longer than Ferguson and his ideas make far more sense.
The argument about Britain being the sole cause of the War is so ludicrous that it makes one wonder how anyone could take the author seriously after reading it. The "evidence" offered was off the mark and irrelevant in my mind. Moreover, the argument about reparations and their effect on Germany seem to me to be a case of picking out those things that seem to support the thesis and ignoring those that didn't.
Really, the only positive thing I can say about the book is that there was some interesting information contained in it (the only thing that earned 2 stars) but I found the quality of the writing to be uneven and even dull at times. Suffice to say that I would not recommend this book and will not be reading anything else by this author.
May 18, 2015
Ferguson argues that not only was the Great War piteous in that so many suffered and died, but was a pity in that it was unnecessary. Britain could have stayed out, as German war aims, initially, weren't anything the British couldn't live with. A continental war that humbled France and Russia might have actually led to a EU-like organization decades earlier. Ferguson is to be complimented for his though-provoking economic and social perspectives on the war. Even if all of his arguments don't entirely convince, this is well worth reading.
July 18, 2011
This book marked my intense distaste for Niall Ferguson as an historian and public intellectual wannabe. Since, he has only fallen in my esteem.
June 2, 2012
Challenging and provocative. A little heavy-going but steadily blasts away at some well-established but lazy Great War myths.
October 4, 2012
Originally published on my blog here in December 2000.
Niall Ferguson takes a fresh look at the First World War, looking mainly to see whether there is evidence to support the various historical traditions which have grown up around certain aspects of the war, principally its cause and outcome. It is not a book aimed at someone who knows nothing about the history of the period; a fair amount is assumed and much of Ferguson's argument is quite technical.
The issues that Ferguson wishes to raise are distilled by him into ten questions, printed both in the Introduction and in the Conclusion, where they are answered in summary. The first three deal with the War's causes, looking at the traditional view that German militarism made it inevitable. Then the next two are about what in the Second War would be called the Home Front (though in all the main combatants not just Britain), examining the tradition that the non-fighter viewed the war with an enthusiasm fired by the propagandist media. The next four are about the end of the war - why it didn't come sooner through the Allies' superior economic might, or through the German superior military might, and why the appalling conditions on the Western Front in particular did not bring an end through mutiny, and what eventually brought the War to an end. The final question is who was the real victor in economic terms, if any country could really have been said to have won.
Ferguson takes issue with the traditional answers to all these questions, as might be expected. Much of his argument is based around analyses of figures - for example, the amount spent on defence by the various combatants - which makes some parts of the book quite complex. He hardly touches on the tactics and strategy which fill most books about the War. As far as I can tell, his arguments seem convincing and fair, though they are hardly likely to topple the traditionally held, popular views. One or two individuals come in for a great deal of criticism, notably Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary in the years immediately before the War, and economist Maynard Keynes, and I suspect that more patriotically British readers than myself would consider Ferguson to be rather pro-German.
However, I don't feel this myself, and it doesn't seem at all unlikely to me that English language histories might have tended to put more blame on Germany and whitewashed Britain. Ferguson's approach can be criticised; it occasionally seems rather callous to those who lost their lives in the conflict - though this is defensible in terms of what he aims to do, which means he needs to look at casualties as figures rather than as individual tragedies. His use of counterfactuals (alternative historical scenarios) is interesting but a dangerously seductive technique. It is not overused here, and is always clearly signposted as speculative. The Pity of War is generally a book which will fascinate anyone looking for a deeper understanding of the First World War.
Niall Ferguson takes a fresh look at the First World War, looking mainly to see whether there is evidence to support the various historical traditions which have grown up around certain aspects of the war, principally its cause and outcome. It is not a book aimed at someone who knows nothing about the history of the period; a fair amount is assumed and much of Ferguson's argument is quite technical.
The issues that Ferguson wishes to raise are distilled by him into ten questions, printed both in the Introduction and in the Conclusion, where they are answered in summary. The first three deal with the War's causes, looking at the traditional view that German militarism made it inevitable. Then the next two are about what in the Second War would be called the Home Front (though in all the main combatants not just Britain), examining the tradition that the non-fighter viewed the war with an enthusiasm fired by the propagandist media. The next four are about the end of the war - why it didn't come sooner through the Allies' superior economic might, or through the German superior military might, and why the appalling conditions on the Western Front in particular did not bring an end through mutiny, and what eventually brought the War to an end. The final question is who was the real victor in economic terms, if any country could really have been said to have won.
Ferguson takes issue with the traditional answers to all these questions, as might be expected. Much of his argument is based around analyses of figures - for example, the amount spent on defence by the various combatants - which makes some parts of the book quite complex. He hardly touches on the tactics and strategy which fill most books about the War. As far as I can tell, his arguments seem convincing and fair, though they are hardly likely to topple the traditionally held, popular views. One or two individuals come in for a great deal of criticism, notably Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary in the years immediately before the War, and economist Maynard Keynes, and I suspect that more patriotically British readers than myself would consider Ferguson to be rather pro-German.
However, I don't feel this myself, and it doesn't seem at all unlikely to me that English language histories might have tended to put more blame on Germany and whitewashed Britain. Ferguson's approach can be criticised; it occasionally seems rather callous to those who lost their lives in the conflict - though this is defensible in terms of what he aims to do, which means he needs to look at casualties as figures rather than as individual tragedies. His use of counterfactuals (alternative historical scenarios) is interesting but a dangerously seductive technique. It is not overused here, and is always clearly signposted as speculative. The Pity of War is generally a book which will fascinate anyone looking for a deeper understanding of the First World War.
September 24, 2014
Most disappointing, in fact I felt somewhat conned by a title designed to lure those of us brought up on Wilfrid Owen, "Oh what a lovey war!" and "Black Adder". The pity of the First World War, Ferguson reckons, was not so much the 37 million dead or the fact the war achieved nothing, only sowing the seeds of a new and even more terrible one. No, the tragedy is that it delayed the formation of a German-led EU by a few decades. Golly.
Lest I be charged with flippancy, note how the author goes out of his way to downplay any notion the trenches were hell on earth by selectively winnowing a couple of snippets out of millions of letters home, purporting to show soldiers appreciated camaraderie. The same may be said for jail, for that matter, but few want to go there.
It is fair enough to detail Britain's bungling and to say there was nothing inevitable about the war, but to insist on one out of any number of possible "what ifs", as Ferguson does, is arbitrary to say the least. This sort of speculation is the stuff of fiction, and best left to novelists, but even then they tend not to be taken as seriously as those who write about things that DID happen. To illustrate what I mean, try comparing Robert Harris with Tolstoy.
It is likewise all very well to challenge orthodoxy, in this case that harsh reparations prompted hyperinflation in Germany in the early 1920s, but Ferguson strays into tinfoil hat territory when he says the Germans deliberated stoked inflation to wriggle out of paying reparations. In fact, he seems to have studied economics for no other reason that to beg this question.
I don't know whether he's being provocative to attract attention or just being contrary, but either way his arguments are too slippery for me. In future, I'll read "Forgotten voices" and give those who were there the credit of telling their story.
Lest I be charged with flippancy, note how the author goes out of his way to downplay any notion the trenches were hell on earth by selectively winnowing a couple of snippets out of millions of letters home, purporting to show soldiers appreciated camaraderie. The same may be said for jail, for that matter, but few want to go there.
It is fair enough to detail Britain's bungling and to say there was nothing inevitable about the war, but to insist on one out of any number of possible "what ifs", as Ferguson does, is arbitrary to say the least. This sort of speculation is the stuff of fiction, and best left to novelists, but even then they tend not to be taken as seriously as those who write about things that DID happen. To illustrate what I mean, try comparing Robert Harris with Tolstoy.
It is likewise all very well to challenge orthodoxy, in this case that harsh reparations prompted hyperinflation in Germany in the early 1920s, but Ferguson strays into tinfoil hat territory when he says the Germans deliberated stoked inflation to wriggle out of paying reparations. In fact, he seems to have studied economics for no other reason that to beg this question.
I don't know whether he's being provocative to attract attention or just being contrary, but either way his arguments are too slippery for me. In future, I'll read "Forgotten voices" and give those who were there the credit of telling their story.
June 18, 2013
I write this opinion piece on ���The Pity of War’ to offer a few words of warning to those interested in picking up this book, but do not have much background knowledge about the Great War.
This fascinating book is not a general account of the Great War, and, in my opinion, should not be the first book an interested party picks up on the subject. Instead Dr. Ferguson offers a revisionist view on many of the prevailing wisdoms found on the subject. And he manages to wield his intellect with verve and conviction throughout much of the book in painting a new picture of pre-war Europe. Despite his best effort to persuade me otherwise, some of his contentions – particularly regarding militaristic German – I found to ring false.
Having read many of his books, I have always thought Dr. Ferguson to be a highly gifted historian with a talent for unearthing new perspectives on familiar topics. In the Pity of War, I thought his passion for contrariness overwhelms his discipline, thereby allowing him to present a more skewed picture of the Great War than he normally would. This is not to say that the book isn’t interesting – it most certainly is! – but, like I originally mentioned, I feel the book is at its most thought-provoking after a solid-grounding of more mainstream views.
With this I mind, I like to recommend a few books that would, in turn, make this book a more worthwhile read: ‘The Guns of August’ by Barbara Tuchman, ‘The First World War’ by John Keegan and ‘The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918’ by A.J.P Taylor.
This fascinating book is not a general account of the Great War, and, in my opinion, should not be the first book an interested party picks up on the subject. Instead Dr. Ferguson offers a revisionist view on many of the prevailing wisdoms found on the subject. And he manages to wield his intellect with verve and conviction throughout much of the book in painting a new picture of pre-war Europe. Despite his best effort to persuade me otherwise, some of his contentions – particularly regarding militaristic German – I found to ring false.
Having read many of his books, I have always thought Dr. Ferguson to be a highly gifted historian with a talent for unearthing new perspectives on familiar topics. In the Pity of War, I thought his passion for contrariness overwhelms his discipline, thereby allowing him to present a more skewed picture of the Great War than he normally would. This is not to say that the book isn’t interesting – it most certainly is! – but, like I originally mentioned, I feel the book is at its most thought-provoking after a solid-grounding of more mainstream views.
With this I mind, I like to recommend a few books that would, in turn, make this book a more worthwhile read: ‘The Guns of August’ by Barbara Tuchman, ‘The First World War’ by John Keegan and ‘The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918’ by A.J.P Taylor.
April 15, 2013
Controversial and brilliant. A fascinating reassessment of the Great War using primary sources and a significant amount of new economic data, Ferguson questions some of the fundamental assumptions about the war. In particular, he discusses the issue of the inevitability of war, which has become so entrenched, based on the system of treaties between the various empires. Almost everyone would agree with the statement that the war was mis-managed by the 'old contemptibles' but Ferguson argues that Britain had such an economic superiority over Germany that it is almost a crime the war wasn't brought to a swift conclusion. I wasn't swayed by all of it, but I was totally fascinated. And lest you think this is a dry-as-dust economic history, be assured that it's not. His prose is beautiful, his frame of reference cultural and social as well as economic, and some of his chapters, while difficult to swallow and very perturbing, gave me a very different insight into the nuts and bolts of the men who fought. The trade in death cards and photographs, for example, the macabre souvenir collecting, while I suppose wholly human, force you to confront the fact that the war itself has been rather glorified, and bring you smack down to earth. Not an easy read, and definitely not one to be swallowed in one gulp, but really highly recommended, and for me, an excellent reference tome.
May 12, 2009
WWI has always been a fascination of mine and Niall Ferguson went a long way to answering my biggest question: how did they get hundreds of thousands of otherwise clever men to climb out of muddy trenches and WALK across a patch of land, all the while being shot at. Not being a man, I'm not sure I will ever understand it (it's GOT to be a guy thing), but now I can a little bit more intellectually appreciate the why.
If you are even a little bit interested in the topic, Ferguson is very readable, the chapters are broken out by topic and can be read in any order (I skipped arpund a lot) and it's anything but a dry history.
If you are even a little bit interested in the topic, Ferguson is very readable, the chapters are broken out by topic and can be read in any order (I skipped arpund a lot) and it's anything but a dry history.
October 4, 2016
An Interesting, Partly Patchy Assessment of the Great War
It is a very ambitious undertaking which Niall Ferguson attempts with his book The Pity of War, not so much to give yet another account of the First World War but rather to offer a re-interpretation of various results of historical research into what George F. Kennan named “the seminal catastrophe of [the 20th] century”. In the introduction to his book, Ferguson names ten questions which he wants to deal with, namely
- whether militarism, imperialism, diplomatic strategies and the arms race made the War inevitable;
- what induced German policy makers to gamble on war,
- why British politicians decided to enter into the War on the side of France and Russia,
- whether the War was really greeted with common enthusiasm, as is often claimed,
- what role propaganda and mass media had in perpetuating the War,
- why the British Empire, despite its economic superiority, was not able to defeat the Central Powers without help from the U.S.,
- why the military superiority of the German Empire did not result in a victory on the Western Front,
- why men kept on fighting,
- why men decided to surrender, and
- who won the peace and who ended up paying for the war.
This list of questions that all deal with various, sometimes unrelated aspects of the War already shows the vast claim that Ferguson is trying to make, and one cannot help asking oneself whether it would not have been wiser of Ferguson to narrow his focus of interest on some of these points and to deal with them in yet more detail.
For example, Ferguson claims that Great Britain’s decision to enter the War was not due to her wish to guarantee Belgium’s neutrality – in fact, according to Ferguson, she would herself have violated Belgium’s neutrality, had not the Germans done so earlier – but Grey’s fears of a possible German victory over France and Russia, which would then have threatened British political interests in the long run. Yet, on the other hand, he also states that one of the reasons why Britain refused to enter on negations of a possible alliance with the German Empire did not lie in conflicting and incompatible interests but, quite on the contrary, in the fact that not only were there no such potential conflicts but that Britain also saw no serious threat in the Reich and therefore no need to appease Germany as was the case with regard to France and Russia. And yet Great Britain should have seen the need to support the Allies against Germany – with a view to defending her own long-term interests – although France and Russia were ahead of the Reich in terms of armament? I had some difficulty following this line of thought and accepting Ferguson’s conclusion that it was eventually Great Britain that turned the war into a World War. Ferguson cleverly debunks the Fritz Fischer myth by pointing out that, paradoxically, Germany’s readiness to risk a war was motivated by a feeling of not being able to hold her own for much longer in the arms race rather than by a desire for world power, but he fails to work out in due measure the French, and partly the Russian, responsibility for the escalation of the July crisis.
Ferguson also shows that Germany was much more successful of making the most of her limited resources, whereas the Allies at first failed to use their economic power efficiently for the war, and he also provides proof that the Germans caused more harm to their opponents in casualties and in numbers of POWs taken than they suffered themselves. Yet they could not turn the tides of the war in their favour. He does not see the reason for their ultimate defeat in a failure of Home Front morale – as contemporary proponents of the Dolchstoßlegende, the stab-in-the-back-legend, would have it – nor in the Allies’ strategy of a war of attrition, which was doomed to miss its mark because the Allied were unable for a long time to play off their material advantages against their opponent. The scales were finally tipped against Germany when German soldiers surrendered in great numbers to the enemy in the last three months of the war. Ferguson explains these mass surrenders by pointing out that Ludendorff’s last big offensive made these soldiers realize that they would not stand any chance of winning the war and by pointing out the effects of the reinforcement due to the U.S. entering the war. In his remarkable chapter “The Captor’s Dilemma”, however, he also dwells on the dangers that were commonly linked with surrendering so that the question why German soldiers started in large numbers laying down their arms from August 2018 on still remains something of a riddle.
Another insightful chapter is the one entitled “The Death Instinct: Why Men Fought”, where the author presents his thesis that one of the reasons why the war could be fought for such a long time lay in the fact that not few men actually got a kick out of the war. A closer look at what is commonly referred to as anti-war literature on the last pages of the book seems to corroborate the thesis that men were often not half as tired of killing as is generally assumed, and Ferguson aptly points out that in the wake of World War I many European countries saw a period of carnage and unrest.
The Pity of War may suffer, all in all, from the author’s obvious wish to challenge accepted notions of the history of the First World War in that Ferguson does not always manage to prove his iconoclastic points convincingly, but it is exactly this tendency of the author’s to kick against the pricks of established historiography that makes this book so refreshing and interesting to read and provides the reader amply with food for thought. Therefore, this will definitely not have been the last book by that author on my reading list.
It is a very ambitious undertaking which Niall Ferguson attempts with his book The Pity of War, not so much to give yet another account of the First World War but rather to offer a re-interpretation of various results of historical research into what George F. Kennan named “the seminal catastrophe of [the 20th] century”. In the introduction to his book, Ferguson names ten questions which he wants to deal with, namely
- whether militarism, imperialism, diplomatic strategies and the arms race made the War inevitable;
- what induced German policy makers to gamble on war,
- why British politicians decided to enter into the War on the side of France and Russia,
- whether the War was really greeted with common enthusiasm, as is often claimed,
- what role propaganda and mass media had in perpetuating the War,
- why the British Empire, despite its economic superiority, was not able to defeat the Central Powers without help from the U.S.,
- why the military superiority of the German Empire did not result in a victory on the Western Front,
- why men kept on fighting,
- why men decided to surrender, and
- who won the peace and who ended up paying for the war.
This list of questions that all deal with various, sometimes unrelated aspects of the War already shows the vast claim that Ferguson is trying to make, and one cannot help asking oneself whether it would not have been wiser of Ferguson to narrow his focus of interest on some of these points and to deal with them in yet more detail.
For example, Ferguson claims that Great Britain’s decision to enter the War was not due to her wish to guarantee Belgium’s neutrality – in fact, according to Ferguson, she would herself have violated Belgium’s neutrality, had not the Germans done so earlier – but Grey’s fears of a possible German victory over France and Russia, which would then have threatened British political interests in the long run. Yet, on the other hand, he also states that one of the reasons why Britain refused to enter on negations of a possible alliance with the German Empire did not lie in conflicting and incompatible interests but, quite on the contrary, in the fact that not only were there no such potential conflicts but that Britain also saw no serious threat in the Reich and therefore no need to appease Germany as was the case with regard to France and Russia. And yet Great Britain should have seen the need to support the Allies against Germany – with a view to defending her own long-term interests – although France and Russia were ahead of the Reich in terms of armament? I had some difficulty following this line of thought and accepting Ferguson’s conclusion that it was eventually Great Britain that turned the war into a World War. Ferguson cleverly debunks the Fritz Fischer myth by pointing out that, paradoxically, Germany’s readiness to risk a war was motivated by a feeling of not being able to hold her own for much longer in the arms race rather than by a desire for world power, but he fails to work out in due measure the French, and partly the Russian, responsibility for the escalation of the July crisis.
Ferguson also shows that Germany was much more successful of making the most of her limited resources, whereas the Allies at first failed to use their economic power efficiently for the war, and he also provides proof that the Germans caused more harm to their opponents in casualties and in numbers of POWs taken than they suffered themselves. Yet they could not turn the tides of the war in their favour. He does not see the reason for their ultimate defeat in a failure of Home Front morale – as contemporary proponents of the Dolchstoßlegende, the stab-in-the-back-legend, would have it – nor in the Allies’ strategy of a war of attrition, which was doomed to miss its mark because the Allied were unable for a long time to play off their material advantages against their opponent. The scales were finally tipped against Germany when German soldiers surrendered in great numbers to the enemy in the last three months of the war. Ferguson explains these mass surrenders by pointing out that Ludendorff’s last big offensive made these soldiers realize that they would not stand any chance of winning the war and by pointing out the effects of the reinforcement due to the U.S. entering the war. In his remarkable chapter “The Captor’s Dilemma”, however, he also dwells on the dangers that were commonly linked with surrendering so that the question why German soldiers started in large numbers laying down their arms from August 2018 on still remains something of a riddle.
Another insightful chapter is the one entitled “The Death Instinct: Why Men Fought”, where the author presents his thesis that one of the reasons why the war could be fought for such a long time lay in the fact that not few men actually got a kick out of the war. A closer look at what is commonly referred to as anti-war literature on the last pages of the book seems to corroborate the thesis that men were often not half as tired of killing as is generally assumed, and Ferguson aptly points out that in the wake of World War I many European countries saw a period of carnage and unrest.
The Pity of War may suffer, all in all, from the author’s obvious wish to challenge accepted notions of the history of the First World War in that Ferguson does not always manage to prove his iconoclastic points convincingly, but it is exactly this tendency of the author’s to kick against the pricks of established historiography that makes this book so refreshing and interesting to read and provides the reader amply with food for thought. Therefore, this will definitely not have been the last book by that author on my reading list.
April 29, 2014
If I were to be a bit unfair to the book, I would say that it was boring, repetitive and long.
The book is in fact a series of essays, and so the publisher/cover misrepresents the book as having a 'simple thesis - that the British were responsible for the war.' In fact, this is simply the subject matter of a few essays, and in most cases this is asserted only indirectly.
The only truly interesting chapter, in my opinion, was the one covering the willingness of soldiers to fight in the face of absolute destruction (given the near certainty of death or grievous injury, there were surprisingly few mutinies or desertions throughout the course of the war, excepting Russia).
It is not at all necessary to read all of the book, in fact it is sometimes tiring and redundant to do so, as it is a series of essays refuting conventional wisdom about the war. However, I am under the impression that it is a valuable accompaniment to more standard recountings of the war.
I do not regret reading it, but do believe that readers should be forewarned that its structure and methodical argumentation can make for a less than engrossing read. As to whether or not it is a persuasive work of historical analysis, I lack the expertise to lay judgement- I look forward to reviewing the recent BBC special that debates this work: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tv...
The book is in fact a series of essays, and so the publisher/cover misrepresents the book as having a 'simple thesis - that the British were responsible for the war.' In fact, this is simply the subject matter of a few essays, and in most cases this is asserted only indirectly.
The only truly interesting chapter, in my opinion, was the one covering the willingness of soldiers to fight in the face of absolute destruction (given the near certainty of death or grievous injury, there were surprisingly few mutinies or desertions throughout the course of the war, excepting Russia).
It is not at all necessary to read all of the book, in fact it is sometimes tiring and redundant to do so, as it is a series of essays refuting conventional wisdom about the war. However, I am under the impression that it is a valuable accompaniment to more standard recountings of the war.
I do not regret reading it, but do believe that readers should be forewarned that its structure and methodical argumentation can make for a less than engrossing read. As to whether or not it is a persuasive work of historical analysis, I lack the expertise to lay judgement- I look forward to reviewing the recent BBC special that debates this work: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tv...
May 24, 2017
Took me awhile to get through this one. But what an excellent book on the origin of WWI, ultimately WWII, and the consequences that the world faces today because of the choices made in the early part of the 20th century. Niall Ferguson makes a pretty compelling case, Britain's early entry into the war led to the protracted war known as the Great War. And that Germany's intentional mishandling of their post war economy led to the National Socialist movement that caused WWII. The strange part is that one of Germany's main goal in fighting WWI was to gain a controlling influence on a pan European economic market not unlike the reality of todays EU. So essentially Germany lost both world wars but still won their initial goal. Niall Ferguson makes the case that had Germany won WWI, the Nazi party would never have risen to power, the first world war would have been a more limited affair and the second world war would never have been fought at all. All for the price of a German dominated European Economic Union which they ended up with in our own time anyway. Definitely worth reading for sure.
August 25, 2009
incisive, challenging, revisionist, with a heavy dose of economic theory and reams of data. not the easiest read, but well worth the time if you're interested in the first world war. ferguson takes on commonly held beliefs about the value of propaganda, the root causes of the war (diplomacy, logistics, relative military strength, etc.), the economic strength and efficiency of the combatant powers, the military efficiency of the combatants, the treaty of versailles and the hyperinflation, literary evidence of life as a soldier, etc. most interesting and most disappointing to me was one of ferguson's final conclusions, about the motivation of individual men to continue fighting. i won't mention it here, but i would've loved to see him elaborate on the topic (which i've seen supported elsewhere, so i found myself agreeing with him, just wanting more).
there's a lot packed in here, but it takes work.
there's a lot packed in here, but it takes work.
December 11, 2014
The recent centennial anniversary of Great War has renewed a number of dormant debates around various topics including inevitability, predictability, necessity, and aftermath of the war not to mention re-evaluation of its causes and guilt attributions. Ferguson has always been vocal on the subject and his take on the war has been characterized by many as revisionist and radical. I disagree. Yes, he does indeed take an opinionated view of the events but overall his position is actually pretty nuanced and analysis sharp and fresh. The book is very readable yet it is a no-nonsense work of a serious scholar – focused, organized, detail-oriented and supported by facts. The short answer to the questions of causes, aftermath, and guilt is “it's complicated”, while the answer to whether the war was necessary and inevitable is a resounding “no”. Read it and you will become as convinced as I am that Niall once again has a point.
October 21, 2016
An engrossing dense and scholarly thesis on WWI
This is an advanced book discussing the causes and effects of WWI. Ferguson particularly argues that the conflagration was Britain's fault not Germany's. This is a dense and scholarly book. Ferguson addresses ten questions in support of his thesis (p. 442). The book requires a bit of familiarity with macroeconomics, and a background in WWI history (I have read over fourteen nonfiction and over eight fiction books). I would not take up this book as my first exposure on WWI history. It takes alot of discipline and persistence to make it through. But if you are interested in WWI history, it raises interesting ideas.
This is an advanced book discussing the causes and effects of WWI. Ferguson particularly argues that the conflagration was Britain's fault not Germany's. This is a dense and scholarly book. Ferguson addresses ten questions in support of his thesis (p. 442). The book requires a bit of familiarity with macroeconomics, and a background in WWI history (I have read over fourteen nonfiction and over eight fiction books). I would not take up this book as my first exposure on WWI history. It takes alot of discipline and persistence to make it through. But if you are interested in WWI history, it raises interesting ideas.
October 2, 2011
I started this book because Taleb mentioned how Ferguson used inter-country spreads on 10-year bond yields as a proxy for measuring estimated instability and I wanted to understand this method. However, I forgot that Ferguson is a great writer who managed to craft a series of compelling alternative narratives describing the war that most Americans ignore because it lacked a Steven Spielberg film or award-winning video game. That said, this book should be accompanied with a viewing of Kubrick's "Paths of Glory."
November 27, 2008
Ferguson at his best. Financial analysis of WW1 and its causes proving, contrary to what we learn in school, that Britain caused the war.
September 18, 2011
A brilliant piece of history which challenges many of the existing historical interpretations about WW1. Especially pressing was Ferguson's explanation of how the British government miserably failed to finance the war properly. The counter factual chapter at the end of the book, which has sadly fixated reviewers of this book, is a little odd. Regardless, ignore this minor problem and read the rest if Ferguson's excellent interpretation about the conduct of the British government throughout World War 1.
October 18, 2016
Very detailed (a little heavy on statistics to prove his points). As is no surprise with Niall Ferguson – somewhat controversial (or perhaps I should say contrarian) view of the causes, and repercussions view of WWI. He is critical of both sides, but seems to end with the war was unnecessary and the 20th century would have been potentially better off if the Germans had won. I would recommend it to those who have read other histories of the causes and fighting of the war – not as ones' first venture into the topic.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 15, 2013
Fascinating analysis of the First World War. Ferguson sets out to answer a few questions: Why did men fight? Why did the British get involved? Why did Germany gamble on war? Who ultimately won? Etc.
The answers are rather surprising, and at the conclusion Ferguson examines several "what ifs". In the end, World War I remains one of the greatest tragedies in history, the source of many woes that followed, and probably entirely avoidable.
The answers are rather surprising, and at the conclusion Ferguson examines several "what ifs". In the end, World War I remains one of the greatest tragedies in history, the source of many woes that followed, and probably entirely avoidable.
July 7, 2008
Thorough history the way only Ferguson does, treats every aspect of the war's rise and its prosecution to underscore the ongoing tragedy of the conflict. One of the few books to focus on British culpability for the war's beginnings.
July 31, 2017
This is a very good book that does a very good job with explaining the challenges of WW 1. It does bog down a bit at times but is impeccably researched and very readable. This will certainly enhance a person's u derstanding of the war.
October 29, 2008
The ever-contrary Ferguson tackles popular 'myths' about the causes and effects of the Great War.
October 14, 2018
Good. Interesting facts and lots to think about. Refined my viewpoint of the First World War.
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