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Peirce
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is generally regarded as the founder of pragmatism, and one of the greatest ever American philosophers. Peirce is also widely known for his work on truth, his foundational work in mathematical logic, and an influential theory of signs, or semiotics. Albert Atkin introduces the full spectrum of Peirce’s thought for those coming to his work for the first time.
The book begins with an overview of Peirce’s life and work, considering his early and long-standing interest in logic and science, and highlighting important views on the structure of philosophical thought. Atkin then explains Peirce’s accounts of pragmatism and truth examining important later developments to these theories. He then introduces Peirce’s full accounts of semiotics, examines his foundational work on formal and graphical logic, and introduces Peirce’s account of metaphysics, the least understood aspect of his philosophy. The final chapter considers Peirce’s legacy and influence on the thought of philosophers such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty, as well as highlighting areas where Peirce’s ideas could still provide important insights for contemporary philosophers.
Including chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary, this invaluable introduction and guide to Peirce’s philosophy is essential reading for those new to his work.
The book begins with an overview of Peirce’s life and work, considering his early and long-standing interest in logic and science, and highlighting important views on the structure of philosophical thought. Atkin then explains Peirce’s accounts of pragmatism and truth examining important later developments to these theories. He then introduces Peirce’s full accounts of semiotics, examines his foundational work on formal and graphical logic, and introduces Peirce’s account of metaphysics, the least understood aspect of his philosophy. The final chapter considers Peirce’s legacy and influence on the thought of philosophers such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty, as well as highlighting areas where Peirce’s ideas could still provide important insights for contemporary philosophers.
Including chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary, this invaluable introduction and guide to Peirce’s philosophy is essential reading for those new to his work.
- GenresPhilosophy
336 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 26, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
July 25, 2022
An equitable and lucid presentation of Peirce's thought. The author puts on display core concepts from Peirce's thought at different stages and relates the significance both of developments in that intellectual biography and where contemporary Peirce scholars stand on the clarification of what in Peirce still seems dubious or otherwise unclear.
June 8, 2021
Peirce’s theory of the 4 types of belief is well articulated and valuable, although his arguments against the legitimacy of authority belief and a priori belief are probably too harsh to be justified. He also seems to put too much trust in scientific belief (and the scientific method), ignoring both its inherent dependence on some of the other types, and the always present existence of auxiliary hypotheses (but to be fair, Pierce is writing about this well before the Duhem-Quine Thesis).
His pragmatism is very cohesive, and was fun to think about. I would have liked to see if he ever tried to articulate the demarcation between the types of subjunctive conditionals that do not represent legitimate understanding and those that do (which he obviously had come to the accept in his later thought). I would also like to hear a robust argument about why interior “effects” are excluded when measuring the “pragmatism” of an understanding. Peirce’s view of truth as the final end of opinion is also very good, although not quite as unique as Atkin treats it.
Pierce has an incredibly sophisticated and thorough theory of semiotics, that was fascinating to read about. Truly, in his most mature articulations, this theory is a gem. His early articulation of the three “references” of signs (sign-vehicle, object, and interpretant) did seem quite convoluted; particularly the “interpretant,” which is a strange development. It does seem to reflect an essential quality of sign, but to consider it as a “referent” opens up a lot of questions, beginning with the question of the “interpretant’s” mode of existence. One might think that he was just highlighting essential components of signs (which would be a valid point, because by including this quality of simple “interpretability” and excluding things like “the idea,” Peirce would seem to be doing something very similar to Saul Kripke after him). The problem with this, however, is that Pierce doesn’t seem to use the language of “quality” when discussing the “interpretant” of signs. I was pleased, however, that Peirce clarifies these issues near the end of his life adding further necessary distinctions to the concept of “interpretant” that answered some of these questions (along with a host of other distinctions to create a brilliant guide to understanding the different types of signs and their constituents). In the end, Pierce has the resources to distinguish between 66 different sign types, even if he was not able to work them all out before he died, and remained doubtful that some of the classes hold practically. And even though the problem of “infinite semiosis” is presented in a more clear way in Peirce’s final articulation of his semiotics, it seems like it could have been overcome at any stage by the fact that at some point, signs resolve to some kind of ostentation, and waiting for Pierce to distinguish between dynamic and immediate wasn’t necessary, which seems to have been lost on Atkin. Maybe I’m missing something of the weightiness of this problem, but then again probably not, since Pierce himself apparently never considered it a problem.
The sparseness of Pierce’s metaphysics is a bit frustrating, because he has some incredibly fascinating ideas. Particularly interested is his evolutionary cosmology, especially his theory of a slow natural cosmic movement from chaos to, eventually, a state of absolute determinism. While unconvinced by the idea, and unsure why he sees it necessary, I would love to see more of his arguments for this view, especially given the respect I’ve acquired for this man’s mind. He may, however, be on to something in his evolutionary cosmology when he speaks about agapsim, but with this too, Atkin’s account has left me wanting so much more.
Quotes I collected that can’t be placed in the proper place right now:
-“despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must there be guided by the rule of hope.” EP1. 275 (1890).
-“logic requires that the more abstract sciences should be developed earlier than the more concrete ones, for the more concrete sciences require as fundamental principles the results of the more abstract sciences” (CP6. 1 (1898)).
-“[for Pierce], materialism is ruled out on the grounds that it requires us to accept the unpalatable claim that consciousness can developed from a purely mechanistic process.” Albert Atkin
His pragmatism is very cohesive, and was fun to think about. I would have liked to see if he ever tried to articulate the demarcation between the types of subjunctive conditionals that do not represent legitimate understanding and those that do (which he obviously had come to the accept in his later thought). I would also like to hear a robust argument about why interior “effects” are excluded when measuring the “pragmatism” of an understanding. Peirce’s view of truth as the final end of opinion is also very good, although not quite as unique as Atkin treats it.
Pierce has an incredibly sophisticated and thorough theory of semiotics, that was fascinating to read about. Truly, in his most mature articulations, this theory is a gem. His early articulation of the three “references” of signs (sign-vehicle, object, and interpretant) did seem quite convoluted; particularly the “interpretant,” which is a strange development. It does seem to reflect an essential quality of sign, but to consider it as a “referent” opens up a lot of questions, beginning with the question of the “interpretant’s” mode of existence. One might think that he was just highlighting essential components of signs (which would be a valid point, because by including this quality of simple “interpretability” and excluding things like “the idea,” Peirce would seem to be doing something very similar to Saul Kripke after him). The problem with this, however, is that Pierce doesn’t seem to use the language of “quality” when discussing the “interpretant” of signs. I was pleased, however, that Peirce clarifies these issues near the end of his life adding further necessary distinctions to the concept of “interpretant” that answered some of these questions (along with a host of other distinctions to create a brilliant guide to understanding the different types of signs and their constituents). In the end, Pierce has the resources to distinguish between 66 different sign types, even if he was not able to work them all out before he died, and remained doubtful that some of the classes hold practically. And even though the problem of “infinite semiosis” is presented in a more clear way in Peirce’s final articulation of his semiotics, it seems like it could have been overcome at any stage by the fact that at some point, signs resolve to some kind of ostentation, and waiting for Pierce to distinguish between dynamic and immediate wasn’t necessary, which seems to have been lost on Atkin. Maybe I’m missing something of the weightiness of this problem, but then again probably not, since Pierce himself apparently never considered it a problem.
The sparseness of Pierce’s metaphysics is a bit frustrating, because he has some incredibly fascinating ideas. Particularly interested is his evolutionary cosmology, especially his theory of a slow natural cosmic movement from chaos to, eventually, a state of absolute determinism. While unconvinced by the idea, and unsure why he sees it necessary, I would love to see more of his arguments for this view, especially given the respect I’ve acquired for this man’s mind. He may, however, be on to something in his evolutionary cosmology when he speaks about agapsim, but with this too, Atkin’s account has left me wanting so much more.
Quotes I collected that can’t be placed in the proper place right now:
-“despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must there be guided by the rule of hope.” EP1. 275 (1890).
-“logic requires that the more abstract sciences should be developed earlier than the more concrete ones, for the more concrete sciences require as fundamental principles the results of the more abstract sciences” (CP6. 1 (1898)).
-“[for Pierce], materialism is ruled out on the grounds that it requires us to accept the unpalatable claim that consciousness can developed from a purely mechanistic process.” Albert Atkin
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews