It was a beautiful morning. At 7:30 a.m. on July 1st, 1916, after a week-long bombardment, the guns fell silent and 66,000 infantrymen in 84 battalions went over the top along an 18 mile front. By the end of the day 19,240 were dead or dying, along with 35,493 wounded. Add in the missing and the prisoners taken by the Germans and the total for the day was 57,470, two casualties for every yard of front.
This book is one of the classics of World War One history. Well written, meticulously researched, and scrupulously fair, it explains the strategy, the reasoning, and the alternatives that led to those soldiers going over the top in that place and time. The Somme was not an ideal battlefield, and even if there had been a breakthrough there was nothing behind the German lines of strategic value that would have been worth a great offensive. However, it was at the juncture of the British and French armies, and was planned as a joint operation. The French had to scale down their participation as they engaged in the titanic Battle of Verdun, and told the British government that they were so hard-pressed that if they did not start the offensive to divert German troops they were in danger of collapse.
The British plan was that an obliterating week long bombardment would destroy the first, second, and third lines of German trenches, and their soldiers would just walk forward and take the ground. There were, as always, high hopes of a breakthrough that would unleash Haig’s beloved cavalry into the enemy rear.
General Douglas Haig (not yet Field Marshall) was newly appointed as the commander in chief of the British forces in France, having helped maneuver Sir John French out of the job. As c.-in-c., his role was to decide where and when the battle would take place. After that, the implementation was left up to the army commanders. General Henry Rawlinson (the same rank as Haig) was in command of the Fourth Army and would lead the main attack. He based his plan on several key assumptions; first, that his troops were too new and untrained to carry out complicated maneuvers, so they should climb out of the trenches, form up their lines, and walk slowly across No Man’s Land. Second, since he believed that there would be no one left alive on the German side after the barrage, so the troops would take with them all that they would need until positions could be consolidated, and thus each man carried at least 70 pounds of gear, and often more.
Haig made some good suggestions to Rawlinson, which were not accepted, such as having the soldiers advance in loose order and at top speed, to get to the enemy trenches. Haig could have overruled his army commander, but he was a cavalry officer whereas Rawlinson was an infantry general, so he did not force the issue.
The result is well known: the wire was uncut in many places and the Germans, deep underground in their bunkers, were very much alive and ready for a fight. Once the shelling stopped at 7:30 a.m. they had time to man their trenches and ready their machine guns as the British soldiers left their trenches, formed up, and started moving across No Man’s Land at a walking pace. They were mowed down in ghastly numbers, and still they came on, wave after wave advancing into the maelstrom, which was quickly augmented by German artillery laying down saturation fire along the line of advance. Within the first hour the British had already lost more men than in any other battle in their history. “What had been the cost of the first hour? It is impossible to say exactly but probably half of the 66,000 British soldiers who had attacked were already casualties – 30,000 infantrymen killed or wounded in just sixty minutes!” (p. 148)
Rawlinson’s other mistakes only exacerbated the disaster. The British infantry were expected to advance at a steady pace along a prescribed timetable, and so the artillery had a fixed schedule that moved their firing farther and farther back of the German front line. There were no provisions for any delays in the attack, and changes could only be approved at the corps level. Therefore, even when the attackers gained footholds in the German line, and could have benefited greatly from local artillery support to break up German counterattacks, it was unavailable.
And yet, the troops on the far right of the attack, a combination of British and French soldiers, achieved all their first day objectives quickly, with the Germans retreated in disarray. It was a perfect opportunity to press the attack and dislodge the entire German left wing. There was even a cavalry division standing by to exploit just such an opportunity, but Rawlinson refused to allow any deviations from the plan, so the opportunities were lost, the Germans regrouped, and objectives which could have been taken at no cost had to be taken weeks later with terrible casualties.
Rawlinson was not incompetent, and would perform well in the 1918 battles, but he was inflexible, and unwilling or unable to tolerate changes in his carefully prepared battle plans.
After thinking about what else I could write about this book, I decided that I could not say anything better than Martin Middlebrook said it himself, so following are some quotations of his that describe and explain the battle.
- Even in the so-called ‘quiet’ times, a battalion could expect to lose about thirty men each month through death and wounds, and a similar number through sickness. (p. 35)
- Another novelty, only issued as late as the spring of 1916, was the steel helmet, intended to reduce the number of head wounds. Until then the men had nothing better than their soft service caps. The helmets were so effective that such wounds were reduced by seventy-five per cent, but one divisional commander, who also forbade the issue of rum, refused at first to permit the use of steel helmets. He considered that it would encourage the men to get soft. (p. 38)
- It might interest the present-day reader to know that, to serve the 19,372 men in the division, there were over 5,000 horses but only sixty-one motor vehicles, of which three only were lorries. (p. 40)
- Subject to major reorganization, a division contained the same brigades and battalions permanently, but the divisions themselves were frequently transferred from the control of one corps, or army, to another. Army and corps were merely headquarters units and formed part of the chain of command linking the c.-in-c. With the front-line troops. The ordinary soldier rarely knew or cared to which corps his division was attached at any given time. (p. 41)
- [The British sector in France:] This rectangle measured a mere sixty miles, by fifty miles and was the same size and shape as the county of Lincolnshire. (p. 44)
- Because the front line was anything but straight the total length held by the British was eighty-five miles (in mid-1916); this compared with the French front of about 300 miles and the Belgian of only fifteen. (p. 44)
- The Germans units were lower in strength than the British; the German battalions when at full strength had 750-800 men and, with only nine battalions, the total fighting strength of the division was just over half that of a British division. (p. 57)
- There was a gun, howitzer or mortar for every seventeen yards of the enemy front line to be attacked. Compared with the previous best effort, at Loos, there were twice as many guns and six times as many shells. More shells were destined to be fired in one week than in the first twelve months of the war. (p. 87)
- The news of hungry and demoralized German prisoners and empty, flattened trenches encouraged the generals to think that the bombardment was achieving its object. The worse news, of raids being bloodily repulsed and wire defences not destroyed, was discounted as being exaggerated and unreliable. (p. 92)
- A typical man from the first wave, in addition to all his packs, carried a rifle and bayonet, two gas helmets, 220 rounds of rifle ammunition, two grenades (which he was to give to the trained bombers to throw), two empty sandbags, a spade, a pair of wire-cutters, a flare and a variety of smaller items. The basic minimum load was about seventy pounds and most men had more than this. (p. 96)
- Eighty-four battalions had attacked in the first hour, a total of some 66,000 men. Roughly one-third by hard fighting, skill and some luck, had gained all their objectives. Another third had nothing to show for their losses, except small and vulnerable footholds in the German trenches. - - The final third had been completely repulsed; not a living attacker was inside the German wire, unless as a prisoner of the enemy. Five out of the nine villages due to be taken during the day should have been captured in the first hour. Not one had fallen. (p. 146)
- two brigade commanders, fifty battalion commanders and an R.A.M.C. lieutenant-colonel became casualties during the day. Of these, thirty-one, an unusually high proportion, lost their lives. (p. 165)
- the 752 Newfoundlanders advancing over the open ground less than half a mile away. Before the men could even get into No Man’s Land they had to pass through several belts of British barbed wire. As the Newfoundlanders bunched together to get through the narrow gaps in this wire, the German machine-gunners found their best killing ground. Dead and wounded men soon blocked every gap, but those still not hit struggled on, having to walk over their comrades’ bodies. (p. 189) [The battalion would take 684 casualties, 91% of those attacking.]
- An estimate of the losses at midday shows that nearly 50,000 British soldiers had been killed or wounded. Whatever the afternoon brought, it was going to be a black day for the British Army. (p. 194)
- Some 21,000 soldiers, representing the cream of the manhood of Great Britain, Ireland and the colony of Newfoundland, had been killed or would die as a result of their wounds. Over 35,000 more had been wounded and nearly 600 were prisoners of war. (p. 942)
- Only one man answered his name when the roll as called for 14 Platoon of the 1st Rifle Brigade. The platoon had been forty strong before the battle. (p. 255)
- Almost exactly half of the men in the 143 battalions who had attacked [84 initially and 59 more in subsequent waves] had become casualties. The figures for officers alone were far higher; only one in every four of those who had gone over the top remained unhurt at the end of the day – a seventy-five per cent casualty rate. (p. 263)
- The British Army’s casualties, on 1 July, were the equivalent of seventy-five battalions or of more than six full divisions of fighting infantry. For every yard of the sixteen-mile front from Gommecourt to Montauban there were two British casualties. (p. 264)
- The British Army’s loss on that one day easily exceed its battle casualties in the Crimean War, the Boer War and the Korean War combined. (p. 265)
- Eighty per cent of Britain’s casualties [for the entire war] occurred after the opening of the Battle of the Somme. Most of Britain’s losses were on the Western Front; 522,206 casualties were sustained there up to the end of June 1916; 2,183,930 afterwards. (p. 275)
- The French were lucky; they had nearly four times as many heavy guns for each mile of the front as did the British. (p. 277)
- it is reasonable to suggest that Rawlinson’s men lost the battle on 1 July by a matter of seconds – the interval between the lifting of the artillery barrage and the arrival of the first wave at the German trenches. If the British infantry could have fallen on the German front line quickly, it is possible that the day would have ended very differently. (p. 280)
- Looking back at Haig’s three original aims for the battle, all seem to have been fulfilled. The French were relieved from defeat at Verdun; the positions held by the Allies at the end of the battle were better than on 30 June; losses were inflicted on the Germans. But the Battle of Verdun was probably waning, with both sides nearing exhaustion, before the Somme started, and the final Allied positions on the Pozières Ridge were rendered valueless when the Germans retired the following spring. Only the third achievement cannot be argued against: it was on the Somme that the Germans lost the core of their battle-hardened army. (p. 290) [All of the ground gained on the Somme would be lost in a single day during the German offensive of March, 1918.]
- Of the army commanders, Rawlinson emerges very badly. His Fourth Army had taken only a quarter of its objectives and had suffered 50,000 casualties in one day. He had been responsible for three major errors, one each for the artillery, the infantry and the cavalry. (p. 290)
- On 14 November the battle ended. No one could ever agree on the final casualty figures, but it is certain that in the 140 days that the battle lasted Britain’s share was over 400,000. For this loss, Haig’s troops had advanced exactly six miles and were still four miles short of Baupaume, which the cavalry had hoped to take in the opening attack. (p. 295)
- Most men stood by their duty; a few did not. Self-inflicted wounds, almost unheard of in the early days, became a great problem. Men tried all the old dodges such as chewing cordite or sleeping in wet towels to induce sickness, and being gassed almost became a court-marital offense. Successful desertion was difficult to achieve: the penalty for being caught could be death by firing squad. (Of all death sentences, only about ten per cent were carried out. In the B.E.F. an average of one soldier was executed every five days, mostly for cowardice or desertion. The Australian Government refused to allow execution in their divisions.) (p. 300)
-The heavy casualties of 1917 had left the B.E.F. in France considerably under strength. Although there were large numbers of men under arms in England, the government refused to send these out to replenish the depleted battalions. No one had the courage to dismiss Haig; instead, the War Cabinet sought to prevent him launching new offensives in 1918 by keeping him short of men. (p. 301)
- Casualties 1 July 1916:
Killed or died of wounds: 19,240
Wounded: 35,493
Missing: 2,152
Prisoners: 585
Total 57,470
Casualties by attacking unit type:
Fighting Battalions (54,335), Machine Gun Companies (1,080), Pioneer Battalions (1,020), Light Trench Mortar Batteries (350). All of these were manned by the infantry, total: 56,785 (99.8%);
Royal Engineers (450), Artillery (170), Royal Army Medical Corps (60), Royal Flying Corps (6): total 686