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The Concept Of Belief In Islamic Theology
The Concept Of Belief In Islamic Theology by Toshihiko Izutus
272 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 2005
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176 people want to read
About the author
Toshihiko Izutsu
85 books196 followersToshihiko Izutsu was a university professor and author of many books on Islam and other religions. He taught at the Institute of Cultural and Linguistic studies at Keio University in Tokyo, the Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy in Tehran, and McGill University in Montreal, Canada.
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October 23, 2024
This book follows the semantic development of the discussion surrounding the term “Iman” in Islamic theological history.
Several refreshers from Izutsu’s preceding ideas:
Izutsu assumed that the meaning of words or key terms can change according to historical or cultural shifts. This is not an appeal to relativism, meaning that a word would not be freely interpreted according to anyone’s intention. Instead, Izutsu argued that words are relational, their basic meaning connected with other concepts. It is this relational meaning that undergoes semantic shifts.
For example, the word “innocent” retains its basic meaning of being blameless or non-guilty, but its application has shifted. It once referred to being completely blameless due to lack of understanding (as in mentally incapable), but now commonly refers to a state of non-guilt in legal or current contexts.
In relation to Islamic theology, Izutsu believed that key terms in the Arabic language underwent a radical semantic shift with the revelation of the Quran. For example, the word “Allah” no longer referred to one of many deities, as the pre-Islamic Arabs believed, but became the term for the only existing God, with the idols no longer holding any divine power.
Even the key terms in the Quran underwent subsequent changes in history. This book especially elaborates on the word “Iman.” During the time of the Prophet, “Iman” (belief) was a personal and existential state. A person would be considered a believer (mu’min) upon uttering the shahadah, thus entering the community of Muslims. Conversely, a non-believer (kafir) was someone who refused to utter the shahadah. While there were hypocrites in Madinah, their status as Muslims was not questioned, despite their faults (such as turning back before the Battle of Uhud).
However, during the Battle of Siffin between Ali and Muawiyya, when Ali agreed to arbitration to preserve the integrity of the community, his power as caliph was nullified. Muawiyya was declared the new caliph. A group from Ali’s army, disillusioned by the decision, condemned the participants of the arbitration as “kafir” for prioritizing the laws of men over the laws of God. This group, the Khawarij, broke away from Ali’s side and committed atrocities, even killing women and children in open markets, declaring anyone who did not prescribe to their extreme views as kafir.
For the first time in Islamic history, the semantic field of “kafir,” which had previously applied only to non-believers, was now applied within the Muslim community. Essentially, the Khawarij opened a Pandora’s Box, where every Muslim was at risk of being excommunicated even after reciting the shahadah. This led to devastating consequences as reactions piled upon reactions.
As usual, Imam al-Ghazali played a crucial role in resolving the issue by affirming that the decision to excommunicate someone belonged to God alone. The sole criterion for losing one’s status as a believer in the eyes of the community and God, according to al-Ghazali, was denying (takdhib) the teachings of the Prophet. Beyond the main provisions of religion, it was God’s ultimate will to judge a person as a believer or unbeliever.
Yet the damage was done. The meaning of “Iman” continued to evolve. Theological debates arose about what constitutes “Iman.” Is it mere knowledge without the need for external works, as the extreme Murjiites believed? Or is it only verbal confession without assent, as the Karramites believed? Is belief created or uncreated? Does belief increase or not? Is belief located in the heart, the tongue, or the limbs? Izutsu provided a detailed discussion of how various Islamic sects divided on these and many other issues.
How is this possible? For us, who adhere to the orthodox creed of the Ash’arites and Maturidites, the answer is clear: belief involves assent by the heart, confession through the tongue, and action by the bodily members. As Taftazani pointed out, assent must be based on correct knowledge with voluntary choice. This succinct formula refutes the Jahmites, who believed humans have no choice, and silences the Karramites, who rely solely on verbal confession.
These permutations are due to the fluid nature of semantics. The Khawarij opened Pandora’s Box by allowing the semantic field of “Iman” to intersect with many other key terms. Again, this is not an appeal to relativism. “Iman” retains its basic meaning of belief, and the boundaries between truth and falsehood remain clear. However, its relational meaning expanded to include complex and obscure discussions, sometimes driven by the extremes of conflicting parties trying to excommunicate one another.
Izutsu suggested several mechanisms through which such permutations occur. These mechanisms are activated when two key terms enter into a dialectical relationship. For example, the debate between the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites over God’s attributes involved two different key terms. The former emphasized terms like “absolute simplicity” and “absolute unity,” while the latter focused on avoiding the denial of God’s power and will (as seen in al-Arba’in).
1. Synonymous association: Synonyms do not mean exact sameness; otherwise, there would only be one word. Synonyms are words with close enough resemblances without drastically altering the semantic context. However, the relationship between word A and word B on concept C creates tension and eventually may result in a complete divergence.
2. Antonymous association: The Khawarij extended the meaning of “kufr,” which is antagonistic to the word “Iman,” to include members of the Muslim community.
3. The splitting of one key concept into several constituent elements: This is evident in the discussions on Iman, which was split into four key terms—ma’rifah (knowledge), tasdiq (assent), iqrar (confession), and amal (action). These were then further divided and debated infinitely.
What does this book convey? First, it suggests that the integrity of the religion can be preserved without resorting to excommunication or overly lax interpretations of the creed. This is achieved by adhering to the orthodox line of thinkers who maintained the creed according to the consensus. Second, the book emphasizes that while revelation is timeless, individual interpretations are shaped by personal motives. Think of the Khawarij, Karramites, and Batinites, who interpreted the Word according to their own desires.
Finally, while acknowledging human psychological limitations, the solution is not to abandon the creed entirely or accuse it of relativism and confusion. The Word and rightful scholars were never confused—their understanding of the Truth is clear. It is we who are confused and remain in a state of confusion, if we decided to abandon everything due to the endless debates. This is akin to someone dying of thirst who gives up trying to drink because they do not know how to turn on the tap.
Several refreshers from Izutsu’s preceding ideas:
Izutsu assumed that the meaning of words or key terms can change according to historical or cultural shifts. This is not an appeal to relativism, meaning that a word would not be freely interpreted according to anyone’s intention. Instead, Izutsu argued that words are relational, their basic meaning connected with other concepts. It is this relational meaning that undergoes semantic shifts.
For example, the word “innocent” retains its basic meaning of being blameless or non-guilty, but its application has shifted. It once referred to being completely blameless due to lack of understanding (as in mentally incapable), but now commonly refers to a state of non-guilt in legal or current contexts.
In relation to Islamic theology, Izutsu believed that key terms in the Arabic language underwent a radical semantic shift with the revelation of the Quran. For example, the word “Allah” no longer referred to one of many deities, as the pre-Islamic Arabs believed, but became the term for the only existing God, with the idols no longer holding any divine power.
Even the key terms in the Quran underwent subsequent changes in history. This book especially elaborates on the word “Iman.” During the time of the Prophet, “Iman” (belief) was a personal and existential state. A person would be considered a believer (mu’min) upon uttering the shahadah, thus entering the community of Muslims. Conversely, a non-believer (kafir) was someone who refused to utter the shahadah. While there were hypocrites in Madinah, their status as Muslims was not questioned, despite their faults (such as turning back before the Battle of Uhud).
However, during the Battle of Siffin between Ali and Muawiyya, when Ali agreed to arbitration to preserve the integrity of the community, his power as caliph was nullified. Muawiyya was declared the new caliph. A group from Ali’s army, disillusioned by the decision, condemned the participants of the arbitration as “kafir” for prioritizing the laws of men over the laws of God. This group, the Khawarij, broke away from Ali’s side and committed atrocities, even killing women and children in open markets, declaring anyone who did not prescribe to their extreme views as kafir.
For the first time in Islamic history, the semantic field of “kafir,” which had previously applied only to non-believers, was now applied within the Muslim community. Essentially, the Khawarij opened a Pandora’s Box, where every Muslim was at risk of being excommunicated even after reciting the shahadah. This led to devastating consequences as reactions piled upon reactions.
As usual, Imam al-Ghazali played a crucial role in resolving the issue by affirming that the decision to excommunicate someone belonged to God alone. The sole criterion for losing one’s status as a believer in the eyes of the community and God, according to al-Ghazali, was denying (takdhib) the teachings of the Prophet. Beyond the main provisions of religion, it was God’s ultimate will to judge a person as a believer or unbeliever.
Yet the damage was done. The meaning of “Iman” continued to evolve. Theological debates arose about what constitutes “Iman.” Is it mere knowledge without the need for external works, as the extreme Murjiites believed? Or is it only verbal confession without assent, as the Karramites believed? Is belief created or uncreated? Does belief increase or not? Is belief located in the heart, the tongue, or the limbs? Izutsu provided a detailed discussion of how various Islamic sects divided on these and many other issues.
How is this possible? For us, who adhere to the orthodox creed of the Ash’arites and Maturidites, the answer is clear: belief involves assent by the heart, confession through the tongue, and action by the bodily members. As Taftazani pointed out, assent must be based on correct knowledge with voluntary choice. This succinct formula refutes the Jahmites, who believed humans have no choice, and silences the Karramites, who rely solely on verbal confession.
These permutations are due to the fluid nature of semantics. The Khawarij opened Pandora’s Box by allowing the semantic field of “Iman” to intersect with many other key terms. Again, this is not an appeal to relativism. “Iman” retains its basic meaning of belief, and the boundaries between truth and falsehood remain clear. However, its relational meaning expanded to include complex and obscure discussions, sometimes driven by the extremes of conflicting parties trying to excommunicate one another.
Izutsu suggested several mechanisms through which such permutations occur. These mechanisms are activated when two key terms enter into a dialectical relationship. For example, the debate between the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites over God’s attributes involved two different key terms. The former emphasized terms like “absolute simplicity” and “absolute unity,” while the latter focused on avoiding the denial of God’s power and will (as seen in al-Arba’in).
1. Synonymous association: Synonyms do not mean exact sameness; otherwise, there would only be one word. Synonyms are words with close enough resemblances without drastically altering the semantic context. However, the relationship between word A and word B on concept C creates tension and eventually may result in a complete divergence.
2. Antonymous association: The Khawarij extended the meaning of “kufr,” which is antagonistic to the word “Iman,” to include members of the Muslim community.
3. The splitting of one key concept into several constituent elements: This is evident in the discussions on Iman, which was split into four key terms—ma’rifah (knowledge), tasdiq (assent), iqrar (confession), and amal (action). These were then further divided and debated infinitely.
What does this book convey? First, it suggests that the integrity of the religion can be preserved without resorting to excommunication or overly lax interpretations of the creed. This is achieved by adhering to the orthodox line of thinkers who maintained the creed according to the consensus. Second, the book emphasizes that while revelation is timeless, individual interpretations are shaped by personal motives. Think of the Khawarij, Karramites, and Batinites, who interpreted the Word according to their own desires.
Finally, while acknowledging human psychological limitations, the solution is not to abandon the creed entirely or accuse it of relativism and confusion. The Word and rightful scholars were never confused—their understanding of the Truth is clear. It is we who are confused and remain in a state of confusion, if we decided to abandon everything due to the endless debates. This is akin to someone dying of thirst who gives up trying to drink because they do not know how to turn on the tap.
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