In The Dictator's Army, Caitlin Talmadge presents a compelling new argument to help us understand why authoritarian militaries sometimes fight very well and sometimes very poorly. Talmadge's framework for understanding battlefield effectiveness focuses on four key sets of military organizational practices: promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information management. Different regimes face different domestic and international threat environments, leading their militaries to adopt different policies in these key areas of organizational behavior.
Authoritarian regimes facing significant coup threats are likely to adopt practices that squander the state's military power, while regimes lacking such threats and possessing ambitious foreign policy goals are likely to adopt the effective practices often associated with democracies. Talmadge shows the importance of threat conditions and military organizational practices for battlefield performance in two paired comparisons of states at war: North and South Vietnam (1963 1975) and Iran and Iraq (1980 1988). Drawing on extensive documentary sources, her analysis demonstrates that threats and practices can vary not only between authoritarian regimes but also within them, either over time or across different military units. The result is a persuasive explanation of otherwise puzzling behavior by authoritarian militaries. The Dictator s Army offers a vital practical tool for those seeking to assess the likely course, costs, and outcomes of future conflicts involving nondemocratic adversaries, allies, or coalition partners."
Caitlin Talmadge is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University, where she is also a member of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies. Her research and teaching focus on defense policy, civil-military relations, U.S. military operations and strategy, nuclear proliferation, and Persian Gulf security issues. Her writing has appeared in International Security, Security Studies, The Washington Quarterly, The Non-Proliferation Review, The Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy.com , and the Harvard International Review, among other outlets, and she is currently completing a book on military effectiveness. She is also co-author of the book U.S. Defense Politics: the Origins of Security Policy (with Harvey Sapolsky and Eugene Gholz, second edition forthcoming 2013).
Dr. Talmadge is a graduate of Harvard (A.B., summa cum laude) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D.), and has held fellowships from the Olin Institute at Harvard University, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Brookings Institution, and the American Political Science Association. Prior to graduate school, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She also has previously served as a consultant to the Office of Net Assessment at the U.S. Department of Defense and was named a Next Generation National Security Leader by the Center for a New American Security in 2009.
This was a good book that adds to our understanding of civil-military relations. I like the fact that this book relates to the literature on state-building and the nature of threats. This is an important theoretical contribution with some solid empirical evidence.