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Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb against Japan
Atomic Tragedy offers a unique perspective on one of the most important events of the twentieth century. As secretary of war during World War II, Henry L. Stimson (1867–1950) oversaw the American nuclear weapons program. In a book about how an experienced, principled man faltered when confronted by the tremendous challenge posed by the intersection of war, diplomacy, and technology, Sean L. Malloy examines Stimson's struggle to reconcile his responsibility for "the most terrible weapon ever known in human history" with his long-standing convictions about war and morality. Ultimately, Stimson's story is one of failure; despite his beliefs, Stimson reluctantly acquiesced in the use of the atomic bomb against heavily populated Japanese cities in August 1945. This is the first biography of Stimson to benefit from extensive use of papers relating to the Manhattan Project; Malloy has also uncovered evidence illustrating the origins of Stimson's commitment to eliminating or refining the conduct of war against civilians, information that makes clear the agony of Stimson's dilemma. The ultimate aim of Atomic Tragedy is not only to contribute to a greater historical understanding of the first use of nuclear weapons but also to offer lessons from the decision-making process during the years 1940–1945 that are applicable to the current world environment. As the United States mobilizes scientists and engineers to build new and supposedly more "usable" nuclear weapons and as nations in Asia and the Middle East are replicating the feat of the Manhattan Project physicists at Los Alamos, it is more important than ever that policymakers and analysts recognize the chain of failures surrounding the first use of those weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
248 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 2008
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
September 13, 2019
The author argues that, while Stimson was personally committed to ensuring a lasting peace, he basically dropped the ball and allowed a number of things to happen in the decisions about the bomb that instead laid the groundwork for the arms race/cold war even before the end of WWII.
Specifically, he argues that in '43 and '44 some decisions were made at Los Alamos under General Groves in terms of bomb design. At the highest level, he's talking about the decision not to pursue an underwater device suitable for use against ships in a bay, for example, and instead to pursue a device that would detonate in the air or on contact with the ground. Because such a device would be less effective against hardened military targets than lighter/less hardened/wooden residential units, that decision shaped later options and moved them towards residential targets and away from military ones.
He also argues that Stimson allowed himself to believe that Allied bombing efforts were more precise/targeted than they actually were. Those closer to the front knew, for example, that targeting the industrial areas on the outskirts of Hiroshima would have led to an increased chance of missing the target altogether and "wasting" the bomb. So they targeted the city center in favor of greater assurance of destruction, rather than target the industry on the outskirts and risk missing or lessening the destruction to the surrounding area.
He also takes apart the '47 Atlantic article in which Stimson and others sought to regain control of the narrative and frame the decision in terms of "it was the bomb or an invasion that would have cost up to a million Allied casualties." By June of '45, he argues, no one seriously thought an invasion would be necessary to ensure Japan's capitulation. And he argues that there were diplomatic options that could have been used to secure Japan's surrender (especially assuring them that "unconditional surrender" did not mean they would have to give up the emperor/constitutional monarchy), as well as getting Russia's signature on the demands at Potsdam, which would have provided the threat of Russia entering the war in the Pacific before they actually did it. Though he does acknowledge that figuring out how to put in place some kind of international agreement with Stalin would have been hard because, you know, he was not such a nice guy and his goals were often different from ours . . .
Specifically, he argues that in '43 and '44 some decisions were made at Los Alamos under General Groves in terms of bomb design. At the highest level, he's talking about the decision not to pursue an underwater device suitable for use against ships in a bay, for example, and instead to pursue a device that would detonate in the air or on contact with the ground. Because such a device would be less effective against hardened military targets than lighter/less hardened/wooden residential units, that decision shaped later options and moved them towards residential targets and away from military ones.
He also argues that Stimson allowed himself to believe that Allied bombing efforts were more precise/targeted than they actually were. Those closer to the front knew, for example, that targeting the industrial areas on the outskirts of Hiroshima would have led to an increased chance of missing the target altogether and "wasting" the bomb. So they targeted the city center in favor of greater assurance of destruction, rather than target the industry on the outskirts and risk missing or lessening the destruction to the surrounding area.
He also takes apart the '47 Atlantic article in which Stimson and others sought to regain control of the narrative and frame the decision in terms of "it was the bomb or an invasion that would have cost up to a million Allied casualties." By June of '45, he argues, no one seriously thought an invasion would be necessary to ensure Japan's capitulation. And he argues that there were diplomatic options that could have been used to secure Japan's surrender (especially assuring them that "unconditional surrender" did not mean they would have to give up the emperor/constitutional monarchy), as well as getting Russia's signature on the demands at Potsdam, which would have provided the threat of Russia entering the war in the Pacific before they actually did it. Though he does acknowledge that figuring out how to put in place some kind of international agreement with Stalin would have been hard because, you know, he was not such a nice guy and his goals were often different from ours . . .
June 27, 2024
The decision to use the atomic bomb remains shrouded in myth in popular culture. Policymakers and the general public remain trapped by the false dilemmas set out in Henry Stimson's 1947 Harper's Magazine article: killing hundreds of thousands with two atomic bombs or killing millions with an amphibious invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. This framing has no basis in fact, as historians have demonstrated in many books and articles over the past few decades.
Sean Malloy's book is probably one of the best single books to dispel these issues and truly understand how and why atomic bombs were used against Japan - one that serves not only as an accessible introduction but also introduces new facts and moral framings into the conversation. Secretary of War Henry Stimson is the perfect focusing point for this discussion as he was uniquely preoccupied with the moral dimensions of nuclear weapons; recognizing clearly before many others the transformative implications of a bomb others regarded as simply another military device. Stimson also harbored a longstanding aversion to total war and especially the deliberate targeting of civilians; attitudes inherited from his Victorian intellectual formation and decades of public service. Nonetheless, he ultimately assented to the deliberate use of atomic weapons against two major concentrations of Japanese civilians - Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
This was not because of any deliberate decision to weigh the deaths of Japanese civilians against the potential deaths of an invasion of the home islands. Instead, Malloy documents how indecision, misinformation, moral evasion, and self delusion ultimately came together to define the context of use and constrain the decision making of Stimson and other high level US policymakers confronted with a working atomic bomb. Even before Stimson and others began thinking about possible targets, decisions at Los Alamos defined the atomic bomb as a high-explosive city killer (as opposed to an underwater naval weapon contemplated early on). As the bomb, and its immensely potent postwar implications came into focus for Stimson toward the end of the war, he wrestled with the implications of its use on the US's moral standing and its relationship with the Soviet Union, but was unable to settle on a consistent or clear course of action. These delays and indecision allowed military figures like Leslie Groves to define the military use of the bomb in a way that was completely disconnected from any coherent diplomatic strategy toward Japanese surrender or the Soviet Union. By the time Stimson realized this at Potsdam, it was far too late to redirect already existing plans.
Some of the most important facts Malloy's book brings into focus (although not all of these are original to the book):
-Truman's marginality to the decision to use the bomb. Absent a clear presidential countermand (which only occurred after Nagasaki), the assumption in military and civilian circles was for use.
-Military leaders consistently misled Stimson and Truman are the exact targeting of the atomic bomb. While Stimson insisted on centering targeting on military-industrial build-ups to minimize civilian collateral damage, military practicality and indifference led to targeting easily identifiable population centers.
-It was entirely possible that the existing amphibious plans of Operation Olympic would've been called off (probably not indefinitely but at least for the moment) in light of the surprising build-up of Japanese troops in Kyushu.
-Oppenheimer consistently argued for targeting Japanese cities and against any warning demonstration.
There is much that is morally admirable about Stimson's ideals of public service and statesmanship, and the book makes clear that he was uniquely and presciently attuned to a problem many of peers did not recognize. But ultimately, the book comprehensively shows that the complexity of the bomb's technical, military, and diplomatic aspects simply overmatched Stimson's individual capabilities, let alone the larger military-diplomatic policymaking process in the US government. This factor, far more than any sinister motives toward the Japanese or the Soviets, defined the contexts of use of the atomic bomb. This is a relatively simply and understandable failing; but its consequences were none the less devastating. And the failure to face up to this failure has left the American public disastrously misinformed for decades. The bomb may have very well place a decisive role in accelerating the surrender of Japan, but if that's the case it did not do so as part of any comprehensively considered diplomatic-military plan for victory. Decisions of such magnitude should never be the product of bureaucratic drift.
Sean Malloy's book is probably one of the best single books to dispel these issues and truly understand how and why atomic bombs were used against Japan - one that serves not only as an accessible introduction but also introduces new facts and moral framings into the conversation. Secretary of War Henry Stimson is the perfect focusing point for this discussion as he was uniquely preoccupied with the moral dimensions of nuclear weapons; recognizing clearly before many others the transformative implications of a bomb others regarded as simply another military device. Stimson also harbored a longstanding aversion to total war and especially the deliberate targeting of civilians; attitudes inherited from his Victorian intellectual formation and decades of public service. Nonetheless, he ultimately assented to the deliberate use of atomic weapons against two major concentrations of Japanese civilians - Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
This was not because of any deliberate decision to weigh the deaths of Japanese civilians against the potential deaths of an invasion of the home islands. Instead, Malloy documents how indecision, misinformation, moral evasion, and self delusion ultimately came together to define the context of use and constrain the decision making of Stimson and other high level US policymakers confronted with a working atomic bomb. Even before Stimson and others began thinking about possible targets, decisions at Los Alamos defined the atomic bomb as a high-explosive city killer (as opposed to an underwater naval weapon contemplated early on). As the bomb, and its immensely potent postwar implications came into focus for Stimson toward the end of the war, he wrestled with the implications of its use on the US's moral standing and its relationship with the Soviet Union, but was unable to settle on a consistent or clear course of action. These delays and indecision allowed military figures like Leslie Groves to define the military use of the bomb in a way that was completely disconnected from any coherent diplomatic strategy toward Japanese surrender or the Soviet Union. By the time Stimson realized this at Potsdam, it was far too late to redirect already existing plans.
Some of the most important facts Malloy's book brings into focus (although not all of these are original to the book):
-Truman's marginality to the decision to use the bomb. Absent a clear presidential countermand (which only occurred after Nagasaki), the assumption in military and civilian circles was for use.
-Military leaders consistently misled Stimson and Truman are the exact targeting of the atomic bomb. While Stimson insisted on centering targeting on military-industrial build-ups to minimize civilian collateral damage, military practicality and indifference led to targeting easily identifiable population centers.
-It was entirely possible that the existing amphibious plans of Operation Olympic would've been called off (probably not indefinitely but at least for the moment) in light of the surprising build-up of Japanese troops in Kyushu.
-Oppenheimer consistently argued for targeting Japanese cities and against any warning demonstration.
There is much that is morally admirable about Stimson's ideals of public service and statesmanship, and the book makes clear that he was uniquely and presciently attuned to a problem many of peers did not recognize. But ultimately, the book comprehensively shows that the complexity of the bomb's technical, military, and diplomatic aspects simply overmatched Stimson's individual capabilities, let alone the larger military-diplomatic policymaking process in the US government. This factor, far more than any sinister motives toward the Japanese or the Soviets, defined the contexts of use of the atomic bomb. This is a relatively simply and understandable failing; but its consequences were none the less devastating. And the failure to face up to this failure has left the American public disastrously misinformed for decades. The bomb may have very well place a decisive role in accelerating the surrender of Japan, but if that's the case it did not do so as part of any comprehensively considered diplomatic-military plan for victory. Decisions of such magnitude should never be the product of bureaucratic drift.
October 13, 2016
When I was growing up, newspapers routinely reported on the imminent danger of nuclear warfare, H-Bomb headlines and the like. There was a small poster at the local railway station where i went each weekday to travel to school which showed a map of the area around Melbourne with concentric circles showing the distance from a nuclear blast in the central business district (CBD, what we call "downtown"). But we never had any drills at school, like you see in documentaries these days of Americans in the 1950s ducking under desks, a kind of futile exercise in reality. or anywhere else in fact. The British exploded nuclear devices in the middle of Australia though, with the Australian government's permission, displacing indigenous groups in the process and creating a still-unresolved issue..
Sean Malloy writes around the event that caused all this, the decision by the US government to drop the first atomic bombs on cities in Japan, and the involvement of Henry Stimson, then Secretary of War, in that process.
This issue first came to my attention in my last year of secondary school (1968). A book called From Yalta to Vietnam, by the then radical David Horowitz, set out a series of apparently dubious decisions and actions culminating in American involvement in Vietnam. A key decision was to drop the bombs and the issues were whether the Japanese were about to sue for peace anyway, whether it related to Soviet Russia's promised entry into the war about that time. I'd heard of Stimson, therefore and so this title grabbed my interest as somethi9ng different.
Malloy begins with Stimson after the dropping of the bomb and then goes back in time to give an account of his life up until he became Secretary of War in the Roosevelt administration, a Republican in a Democratic government. The picture is of a conservative Christian man driven by what might be called the patrician morality of his time, which includes elements of the perceived natural racial superiority of the white man (the patronising "white man's burden") as well as an anti-semitism, not virulent, but there nonetheless.
Stimson is also identified as a man of peace and presents information in the short biography to support that perception, setting up a paradox regarding his involvement in both the war itself and discussions with various groups associated with the secret development of a nuclear weapon.
The book is most interesting in its recounting of the various opinions put forward – presidents, secretaries of government departments and the views within them, ambassadors, military – as well as dealings with the British and the Soviet Union, both military allies at the time, but not exactly trusted, particularly the latter. Indeed, the problem of what to do when peace finally arrives exercises Stimson's mind in particular.
A real issue is the deliberate targeting of civilians, considered an unethical practice (but not by everybody) already problematic with Allied fire-bombing in Germany and also Tokyo. Leslie Groves, the predominant military man seems uninterested in this issue, simply wanting to test the weapon out on real targets. Stimson appears to dither around, changing his mind and not speaking up when perhaps he might have.
Malloy presents evidence to show that the government explanation of the decision to drop the bomb, published in 1947 and including Stimson's name was not exactly true. He finished by examining Stimson on the subject of the book and finds him wanting, a man in his 70s who, regardless of his vast experience, may not have had the required energy to keep across all the relevant issues for his task and his personal aims. His personal predilections may also have clouded his efforts.
This was an interesting book, mostly well-written with some repetitions and typos that may have escaped the editor.
Sean Malloy writes around the event that caused all this, the decision by the US government to drop the first atomic bombs on cities in Japan, and the involvement of Henry Stimson, then Secretary of War, in that process.
This issue first came to my attention in my last year of secondary school (1968). A book called From Yalta to Vietnam, by the then radical David Horowitz, set out a series of apparently dubious decisions and actions culminating in American involvement in Vietnam. A key decision was to drop the bombs and the issues were whether the Japanese were about to sue for peace anyway, whether it related to Soviet Russia's promised entry into the war about that time. I'd heard of Stimson, therefore and so this title grabbed my interest as somethi9ng different.
Malloy begins with Stimson after the dropping of the bomb and then goes back in time to give an account of his life up until he became Secretary of War in the Roosevelt administration, a Republican in a Democratic government. The picture is of a conservative Christian man driven by what might be called the patrician morality of his time, which includes elements of the perceived natural racial superiority of the white man (the patronising "white man's burden") as well as an anti-semitism, not virulent, but there nonetheless.
Stimson is also identified as a man of peace and presents information in the short biography to support that perception, setting up a paradox regarding his involvement in both the war itself and discussions with various groups associated with the secret development of a nuclear weapon.
The book is most interesting in its recounting of the various opinions put forward – presidents, secretaries of government departments and the views within them, ambassadors, military – as well as dealings with the British and the Soviet Union, both military allies at the time, but not exactly trusted, particularly the latter. Indeed, the problem of what to do when peace finally arrives exercises Stimson's mind in particular.
A real issue is the deliberate targeting of civilians, considered an unethical practice (but not by everybody) already problematic with Allied fire-bombing in Germany and also Tokyo. Leslie Groves, the predominant military man seems uninterested in this issue, simply wanting to test the weapon out on real targets. Stimson appears to dither around, changing his mind and not speaking up when perhaps he might have.
Malloy presents evidence to show that the government explanation of the decision to drop the bomb, published in 1947 and including Stimson's name was not exactly true. He finished by examining Stimson on the subject of the book and finds him wanting, a man in his 70s who, regardless of his vast experience, may not have had the required energy to keep across all the relevant issues for his task and his personal aims. His personal predilections may also have clouded his efforts.
This was an interesting book, mostly well-written with some repetitions and typos that may have escaped the editor.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews