Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World

by Shadi Hamid

In Islamic Exceptionalism, Brookings Institution scholar and acclaimed author Shadi Hamid offers a novel and provocative argument on how Islam is, in fact, "exceptional" in how it relates to politics, with profound implications for how we understand the future of the Middle East. Divides among citizens aren't just about power but are products of fundamental disagreements over the very nature and purpose of the modern nation state—and the vexing problem of religion’s role in public life. Hamid argues for a new understanding of how Islam and Islamism shape politics by examining different models of reckoning with the problem of religion and state, including the terrifying—and alarmingly successful—example of ISIS.

With unprecedented access to Islamist activists and leaders across the region, Hamid offers a panoramic and ambitious interpretation of the region's descent into violence. Islamic Exceptionalism is a vital contribution to our understanding of Islam's past and present, and its outsized role in modern politics. We don't have to like it, but we have to understand it—because Islam, as a religion and as an idea, will continue to be a force that shapes not just the region, but the West as well in the decades to come.

Genres: Islam, Religion, Politics, Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Philosophy

320 pages, Hardcover

First published May 3, 2016

About the author

Shadi Hamid is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of the Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the World, which was shortlisted for the 2017 Lionel Gelber Prize. He is a contributing editor at The Atlantic. His previous book Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East was named a Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2014.

Reviews

[Murtaza · Rating 4 out of 5]

The "End of History" was a period that we were all supposed to enter together. Western democracies would lead the way, with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America following soon after into an era of ideology-free technocratic governance. After centuries of conflict over fundamental differences over how to order society and of what constitutes the good, humanity had transcended its need to even hold deep beliefs. Having shed the past in entirety, it would now enter an era of simple materialist enjoyment and abundance.

That expectation, expressed most famously by Francis Fukuyama, looks increasingly fanciful with each passing year. The rise of populist movements around the world over the past decade has suggested that ideology may indeed come back to life as a political force; before we even had time to finish dissecting it on the autopsy table. And in the Middle East, after a brief interlude of largely leftist and secular-authoritarian politics, Islam has come back with full force to its traditional predominance in public affairs.

"Islamic Exceptionalism" is Shadi Hamid's contribution to the debate about Islam and modernity in the context of contemporary politics. Unlike authors of much other popular fare on this subject, he's a real scholar and approaches the subject with academic rigor and voluminous on-the-ground research. As the title suggests, the crux of his thesis is that Islam is "exceptional" from a political standpoint (or more to his point, its not simply an analogue to Christianity) and will not go through the same historical phases of secularization that formerly Christian societies experienced. Most people in Muslim countries want different things and will continue to want different things, and simply waiting long enough until they transform themselves in post-Christian secularists is going to be folly.

Its a position that I've long held on my own part, and which I think Hamid unpacks with a lot of nuance and insight. Islam on a mass-social level is "different" from other monotheisms in a way that is either good or bad depending on your perspective. Christianity was never a religion that promulgated comprehensive rules on governing society and was focused more on accepting the personality of Christ. Judaism may have been more rigorous on the point of governance, being, similarly to Islam and unlike Christianity, a jurisprudential religion. But by virtue of Jews not being in a position of political power for thousands of years, those aspects of the faith lapsed. While Muslims living in liberal Western societies can, and generally do, reconcile their liberal social beliefs with private religious faith, its less far likely that entire Muslim societies will do the same as Christians once did before them. History is path dependent, and regardless of ultimate trajectories history has set pre-modern Muslim and Christian societies on different tracks into the future.

Hamid seems to attribute this divergence largely to ideological determinism. In his telling, inherent differences buried deep in religious traditions lead to different outcomes in the future. I'm not so sure about this. Arab Muslim populations did broadly accept secular ideologies (pan-Arabism, leftism) in the 20th century, even accepting the Westphalian international system in principle. Albeit, this was done with desired modifications to rectify the perceived injustices of its fiat imposition by the colonial powers. While modernity may have been an unprecedented phenomenon at that time in the Middle East, the 20th century was a time for unique embraces of Western modernity in countries all over the world.

The issue as I see it is that because most Arab Muslim countries were never able to enter modernity on their own terms, often being violently impeded in their attempts to claim sovereignty, secular ideologies went out of vogue. That brought back to prominence "older" ideologies representing religious identity and other forces of traditionalism. However, there's no going back to history no matter how hard one tries. The return to the old was really another innovation, albeit clothed in the garb of antiquity.

One thing that Hamid masterfully brings out, and what I found to be one of the most moving parts of the book, is how modern Islam and Muslim societies have been shaped irrevocably by the impact of secularism. "Islamism" would be a meaningless term were there not a secular opposite to refer it to. He makes mention of the formative Islamic reformers of the 19th century like Afghani, Abduh and Rida (I was particularly amused by Afghani's effusive praise for Martin Luther's delivering Europe "from barbarism to civilization") and charts how Islam and Muslims have been forever altered by their encounter with the possibility of non-Islam. Where religion was once a unifying and seemingly nature force to Muslims - something akin to Lucien Febrve's description of Christianity as "the very air we breathed" in Christian Europe - it has now become one among many competing forces. Not only is it a competing force, but by virtue of being seemingly undermined and attacked by new, secular ideologies, it has become a defensive phenomenon and has thus taken on some sharper tendencies. In such a light, the manic insecurity that seems to characterize some events, such as the periodic protests over anti-Islam cultural productions in the West, become more explicable.

I don't know how to explain to people from an entirely different background and tradition how strong a pull the idea of a "Caliphate" has on most Muslims. This has nothing to do with the barbaric polity of Islamic State, but rather the idea of a pan-Islamic political union that could promise both the physical and existential security of the global Muslim community. The Barcelona imam quoted in the book who talks of a revived Caliphate as something akin to an EU for Muslim states is speaking to something very deeply ingrained in the Muslim imagination. It is the promise of a kind of historical continuity that would represent real "progress" as opposed to the jigsaw puzzle of dictatorships and ethnonationalisms that characterize modernity for the Muslim world today. The Treaty of Westphalia was not signed by any Muslim polity and would make no sense if it had been. The political traditions, history and memory of the people living in the Muslim world is entirely different from that of Europe. While Muslims may have briefly given the new order a shot, the fact that their experience was so miserable makes it more understandable that they'd decide to chart their own course - in a manner which offers a sense of logical continuity with past. Its easy to forget that for most of the Muslim world modernity was experienced as a form of violence - enforced by colonial armies, craven military dictators and brittle totalitarian regimes that even today convulse the region with their death throes.

Unlike Hamid however, I do think Islamic societies can and will change in a manner comporting with international norms. Slavery, after all, was once part of Islam but was later discarded without people feeling that they'd compromised anything, as was the poll-tax on minorities; something almost universally considered to be anathema today. But I do agree that the world of Islam will always be somewhat different from the international order forged unilaterally by a handful of states over the past few centuries. One of the young Brotherhood activists in exile Hamid interviews spoke of his own earnest desire to never accept the international system that today animates Egypt and its government. On some level it would be better to accept such a position when broadly held, instead of repeatedly trying and failing to shape other societies in our own image. This is especially true in the case of people whom we barely understand and whose history with us has often been clouded by mutual distrust and alienation.

Not unlike the Communist states of the 20th century, America is a proselytizing society with a profound conviction that its values are universal. The reality that this isn't the case is perhaps jarring, but something that American leaders should come to terms with for the benefit of all. The best contribution of this book is its implicit exhortation for pragmatism among American policymakers. Don't try and socially reengineer other countries, don't force an international order on others that all signs indicate people do not want. Seek more modest goals of trade, peaceful coexistence across borders. If you have need to proselytize your values, do so primarily by being a good exemplar of them at home. It seems that China has taken such an approach internationally on some counts, and that could be a lesson for Americans as well.

This is a book by elites for elites, intended to inform policymaking and academic study rather than popular opinion. Although I deeply enjoyed it and would even describe it as a page-turner, its not because I'm part of any elite but rather because I have obscure interests. The argument being made here is too susceptible to being misconstrued to be conveyed at the CNN soundbite level. Ordinary people need to just hear that at least the people living amongst them are relatable - something which to be honest is largely true for Western and American Muslims, most of whom are genuinely liberal as individuals. But complex arguments about illiberal democracies abroad are a bit murky for public consumption. I'm not even sure what the practical utility of making them would be. Although I thought the comparative religion and ideological exceptionalism chapters which lead the book dragged a bit and had some mildly eyebrow raising passages (Islam doesn't seem particularly exceptional in finding people very willing to die for it as Hamid suggests; Imperial Japan for one did much the same), Islamic Exceptionalism's strongest sections by far were Hamid's on the ground interviews with young Muslim Brotherhood activists and leaders, something which is his forte as an expert on the group. He allows them to speak at length in their own words and lets them honestly convey their own hopes and desires for their societies, something that remarkably enough is a rarity in Western coverage of the subject. Despite Hamid's divergent beliefs, which he doesn't hide, the picture he paints ends up being a fairly sympathetic one.

I suspect that those with a different vision of Islam will not appreciate the seeming concessions to an illiberal Middle East contained here. But regardless, I think they do have to contend with the thorough and deeply researched arguments through which these concessions advocated. That Islamic Exceptionalism is written in earnest and engaging prose makes the task of grappling with Hamid's thesis an enjoyable effort either way. Its a compelling read and one that I honestly found difficult to put down. Whether one shares the ultimate conclusions or not, the reflections here on the trajectory of Islam, Islamism and the Muslim world are thoughtful and worthy of consideration. For me, the book also provided the rarest of enjoyments; it changed the way I looked at the world, even if just a bit.

[Cappy · Rating 4 out of 5]

The strength of this book is that it calls into question the critical assumptions of both the American Left (that Arab nations are moving inexorably towards secularism) and Right (that Islamist movements around the Arab world are monolithic and brutalizing). That it does so in the key of invitation - not confrontation - is an additional gift.

Per FTC guidelines, be advised that I received this book free from the publisher in exchange for an honest review.

[Emma Sea · Rating 2 out of 5]

The topic is important, and I definitely learned some interesting things, but Hamid's writing is uninspiring and bland. I think because he knows his topic so well, he doesn't add the details that would have made this both interesting, and easier to understand. For example, Hamid writes:

External shocks helped bring about the transformation, and ultimately the demise, of the Ottoman caliphate. The most basic assumptions of religion and state – the order of things as they had been for the better part of 14 centuries — were dismantled with the advent of modernity. What transpired were decades of sustained cultural and political assault, including, in some instances, the brutal colonial occupation of Muslim lands. If this couldn't break the religious and political status quo of the Middle East, then nothing would.

Perhaps Hamid thinks we are all familiar with these "sustained cultural and political assaults," that he doesn't care to mention any actual examples. It wouldn't be a problem if this was one paragraph in an otherwise riveting book, but the whole book is like this. It lacks small relatable narratives that illustrate his larger points, which would help me get my teeth into what Hamid is discussing.

When Hamid is discussing the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood his writing is much more engaging. I wish the historical aspects of Islamism were given as much attention. He knows his stuff, but he needs to read more excellent historical non-fiction to learn how to appeal to a generalist reader.

[Mohamed al-Jamri · Rating 2 out of 5]

هل يمكن اعتبار تاريخ الإسلام إعادة بشكل مختلف لتاريخ النموذج الأوروبي عن العلاقة بين الدين والعلمانية، أم أن الإسلام ظاهرة استثنائية مختلفة؟ هذا هو السؤال الكبير الذي يطرحه شادي حميد من «مؤسسة بروكينغز» العريقة في كتابه «الاستثناء الإسلامي: كيف يعيد الصراع على الإسلام تشكيل العالم». يميل حميد، كما يوحي عنوان كتابه إلى اعتبار مسار الإسلام مختلفاً عن المسار الأوروبي الذي أفرز لنا فكر الحداثة والعلمانية والليبرالية. بل يذهب إلى أبعد من ذلك ويقول بأن احتمالية «علمنة الإسلام» صغيرة جداً، وحتى النماذج التي تُطرح عن التوافق بين الإسلام والعلمانية كتركيا وتونس تفضح عدم وجود هذا التوافق.

بدأت مشكلة الشرعية السياسية في العالم الإسلامي منذ إعلان «أتاتورك» إنهاء نظام «الخلافة الإسلامية» في 1924، وهو نظام ظل قائماً بأشكال مختلفة منذ عهد «النبي محمد». يقول الكاتب أن جميع تيارات الإسلام السياسي -وهي التيارات التي ترى أن الإسلام يجب أن يلعب دوراً هاماً في السياسة والحياة العامة- تشترك في سعيها للإجابة على هذه المشكلة. وهي بذلك تيارات حديثة ن��أت نتيجة للاحتكاك بالفكر الغربي العلماني، فقبل وقوع هذا الاحتكاك كانت الشريعة الإسلامية –باختلاف تفسيراتها- هي نظام الحكم والقضاء الطبيعيين. تسعى تيارات الإسلام السياسي (أو على الأقل الاتجاهات السائدة فيها) إلى التوفيق بين الأفكار الإسلامية ما قبل الحداثية وبين الدولة الحديثة، وهي بذلك تمثل ظاهرة حديثة. ولكن هذه المشكلة لا تزال دون حل متفق عليه.

يستعرض الكاتب تاريخ جماعة «الإخوان المسلمين» بشكل مختصر منذ نشأتها في عام 1928 على يد حسن البنا. تعتمد هذه الحركة والحركات الأخرى المنتسبة لها أو المنبثقة عنها -والتي يشير إليها الكاتب بالاتجاه السائد في تيارات الإسلام السياسي- على أسلوب التدرّج أو «سياسة المراحل»، فبالرغم من إيمانهم بسيادة الشريعة الإسلامية على قوانين الدولة، إلا أنهم قبلوا النظام البرلماني وعملوا من داخل الأنظمة، حتى وإن كانت علمانية. ما يجعل التيارات الإسلامية المتطرفة كتنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» مختلفة هو رفضها التام لبنية الدولة الحديثة وبالتالي السعي نحو الثورة على هذا النظام بدل العمل ضمنه.

هل يمكن الفصل بين الإسلام والسياسة عند مناقشة قضايا مثل تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» أو «الرسوم الكارتونية المسيئة للنبي محمد »؟ في تخصصات العلوم السياسية في الغرب يتم الأخذ عادة بالعوامل المادية فقط كالظلم والتاريخ الاستعماري وغيرها من العوامل الاقتصادية والسياسية، ويتم اعتبار الدين مجرد طريقة للتعبير عن هذه الدوافع الكامنة، ولكن الكاتب يرى أن دور الدافع الديني كبير جداً فيما يتعلق بتيارات الإسلام السياسي، وهو أمر قد يبدو غريباً أو غير عقلاني بالنسبة للليبراليين الغربيين الذين اعتادوا على لعب الدين دوراً هامشياً في الحياة. هذا الدافع الديني هو ما يجعل تيارات الإسلام السياسي مختلفة تماماً عن التيارات السياسية العادية، فهي لا تعمل لأجل هذا العالم فحسب، بل لأجل العالم الذي يليه أيضاً (الآخرة)، لذلك ما قد يكون خسارة وفشل حسب التيارات السياسية العادية، يمكن أن يكون انتصار ونجاح بالنسبية للتيارات الإسلامية.

هناك اختلافات أسياسية بين الإسلام والمسيحية، تجعل الثاني قابل للعلمنة بصورة أكبر بكثير من الأول، فهو يحتوي نصوص دينية مثل «أَعْطُوا مَا لِقَيْصَرَ لِقَيْصَرَ وَمَا لِلّهِ لِلّهِ». وبسبب إمساك الكنيسة الكاثولوكية بمقاليد السلطة السياسية لمئات السنين وانتشار الاستبداد الديني، فقد انصب تركيز الإصلاح المسيحي على انتقاد الكنيسة والتركيز على العودة للكتاب المقدس، وهذا ما فتح الباب واسعاً أمام العلمانية والليبرالية، بسبب صمت الكتاب المقدّس عن مواضيع السياسة والحكم. في المقابل لم يكن «النبي محمد» مجرد شخصية دينية فحسب، بل كان قائداً سياسياً وعسكرياً وقاضياً. والقرآن كذلك مختلف بشكل كبير عن الكتاب المقدّس، فهو يحتوي تعليمات سياسية وقضائية لا نظير لها في الكتاب المقدس. وهناك أيضاً العامل التاريخي الذي يلقي بظله الثقيل على المشهد. لذلك فإن مشروع تأويل النصوص الإسلامية لتوفيقها مع العلمانية لا تلقى رواجاً بين جمهور المسلمين.

يتطرق الكاتب بشيء من التفصيل لحركة الإخوان المسلمين في مصر، والحركات الإسلامية في تركيا وصولاً إلى «حزب العدالة والتنمية»، وفي تونس «حركة النهضة». ويرى أن القاسم المشترك بين هذه الحركات هو أنها إما أن تصبح ليبرالية أو تجبر على التخلي عن إسلاميتها أو على الأقل تقلل منها وتخفيها، وهذا لا يعد حلاً لمشكلة الإسلام والدولة الحديثة، بل تأجيلاً للمشكلة التي سرعانما تظهر للسطح مجدداً. وهناك أيضاً فصل عن تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» وآخر عن علاقة الإسلام، الليبرالية والديموقراطية، يذكر فيه أن التفريق بين الديموقراطية والليبرالية مهم، وأنه من الممكن أن تنشأ لدينا ديموقراطية غير ليبرالية.

يختم الكاتب بقوله أن الإصلاح الإسلامي المنشود لن يأتي على المدى القريب والمتوسط وقد لا يأتي مطلقاً وأن اعتبار الليبرالية مسار محتوم للتاريخ أمر غير صحيح، ولذلك لا بد للسياسات العامة من التعامل مع الوضع كما هو بدلاً عن الأحلام بحدوث إصلاح ديني في الإسلام شبيه بذلك الذي تم في المسيحية.

بشكل عام الكاتب صريح ودقيق في تناوله لطبيعة تكوين ونمط تفكير التيارات الإسلامية، وكانت هذه مدعمّة بمقابلات ولقاءات قام بها الكاتب ونسجها بأسلوب جميل، والسؤال الذي يطرحه في الكتاب مهم جداً كونه يتعلق بمستقبل المنطقة وربما العالم أجمع. ولكن نقاط القصور في الكتاب كبيرة، حيث أن الكاتب لم يستعرض حجة القائلين بإمكانية «علمنة الإسلام» إلا بصورة بسيطة جداً، بينما خصص مساحة كبيرة للحجة المضادة. من المفترض عند الرغبة في تفنيد وجهة نظر ما، أن يتم تقديمها في أقوى وأوضع صورها ومن ثم الرد عليها. كذلك لم يتم التطرق لحركات مهمة في الإسلام السياسي كالتيارات الشيعية والسلفية، وهذه الأخيرة بالخصوص كان يجت التطرق لها عند الحديث عن تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية». في المقابل ركّز الكاتب بشكل مبالغ فيه على الأحداث المعاصرة في مصر، خصوصاً تلك التي سبقت وتلت عزل الجيش –أو انقلابه على– الرئيس محمد مرسي. أما أكبر خيبة أمل فكانت في الخاتمة التي لم أشعر أنها خاتمة، بل أحسست أنه ينقصها الكثير. باختصار فكرة الكتاب رائعة جداً إلا أن الكاتب لم يأخذها إلا إلى منتصف الطريق.

[E.T. · Rating 4 out of 5]

First things first - The title should contain "struggle over Islamism" which is the book's subject and not Islam. The author is one of a no of commentators who believe that any two values r equivalent - freedom of speech/punishment for blasphemy, freedom of religion/punishment for apostasy, human rights/theocracy and so on. Unfortunately their thinking is seriously flawed.
Why then do I consider this as one of the most important books ? Because with his approach of moral equivalence, he takes us into the hearts and minds of the "believers" in the Muslim-majority countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and how they perceive politics and religion. The depth, the subtleties, the variations of Islamist politics r faithfully depicted. His inference that religion is inseparable from politics for a great percentage of the ppl and that the rest of the world/non-Muslims have to learn to live with it, would have been I-phobic but perhaps for his own identity !
PS:- The book was a little dry in d middle.

[Omar Amer · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author has a very simple argument in this book. Islam, when it comes to how religion relates to politics, is different. He asks "If islam is different, why should it follow the same path in the Middle East that Christianity walked in Europe?" When it comes to secularism Islam has shown a certain resiliance.
Another intersting point is that Islamism is a product of modernity, which is quite ironic. Islam was no longer a source of unity for muslims and instead found itself challenged by different emerging ideologies.
He recounts how islamists themselves had changed when they tried to change the system, obsessing over the nation-state which was the very entity they had to struggle with.
I disagree with the author on several points, of course, but he offers a very deep look at what happened, why it happened and how to learn from it.

[Anant Mittal · Rating 2 out of 5]

Too dense. Boring. And a very biased view of the Muslim activities and actions. Seems almost like the author is trying to explain the Islamist activities and give them rationale.

[Nazmi Yaakub · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dengan melihat tiga model gerakan Islam/Islamisme, iaitu al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun/Ikhwan Muslimin di Mesir; Parti Ennahda di Tunisia dan AKP di Turki serta perbandingan secara kontra dengan model ‘kenegaraan’ ISIS, pengarang cuba memberikan jawapan untuk masyarakat Barat memahami bagaimana Islam dan Islamisme membentuk lingkungan politik di Asia Barat.

Pun begitu sebagaimana Barat bergelut untuk memahami bukan sahaja bagaimana Islam memberikan kesan kepada ideologi dan iklim politik masyarakat di negara Islam hingga menjejaskan fahaman liberalisme, kita juga sukar untuk meletakkan kefahaman terhadap tindakan golongan liberal khususnya di Mesir yang mengambil tindakan bersekongkol dengan regim tentera untuk menjatuhkan kerajaan yang dimenangi melalui demokrasi dan tidak menunggu lunas yang sama untuk berbuat demikian.

Di sinilah, Shadi Hamid cuba meleraikan tanda tanya kepada kedua-dua kelompok pembaca walaupun pada akhirnya, jawapan diberikan belum cukup untuk meredakan pergelutan tanda tanya itu kepada mana-mana pihak.

[Chris · Rating 3 out of 5]

I received this book as part of Good Reads First Reads give away.

My favorite quote from this book is "We aren't all the same and why should we be (p242)?" That pretty much sums up the overall thesis of the book. That Islam interacts with politics in a way fundamentally different from Christians, agnostics and atheists in the West.

Mr Hamid starts out by laying out why Islam and Christianity aren't the same and won't relate to politics in the same way. He references the different early years of the faiths. Where Jesus was executed as a criminal, Muhammad founded an empire. Where Christianity's first few centuries involved a lot of persecution by the reigning empire, Islam's early centuries had a rapidly expanding caliphate. So Muslims have a truly Islamic state in their past while the Christian polities were all made by co opting the laws and political framework of existing pagan empires.

Also, he talks about the possibility of a 'Protestant Reformation' of the Muslim world and discounts the likelihood. Largely because Islam lacks the clericalism that medieval Catholicism had that provoked the Reformation in Europe.

From there he talks about the Islamist movements in Egypt, Turkey and Tunisia and, of course, ISIS and how they have interacted with the state and the world.

I guess I'm walking away from this with a better understanding of Middle Eastern politics and why things can be such a mess over there but I'm also feeling a little worried too. It doesn't seem like there's a lot of room for compromise between the Islamist view of a government informed by Islamic law and liberal secular states in the West. Not promoting any kind of discrimination, just worrying where things will go as Muslim populations in Western countries continue to grow.

[Michael McCluskey · Rating 2 out of 5]

The premise of this book is that Islam is by nature prone to theocracy. It begins by arguing against using Christianity as a comparison, especially considering the fact that Islam is a younger religion. Of course, the book then goes on to compare itself to Christianity at various points in its history. Instead of illustrating any real exceptionalism, it examines how historical circumstance and context place Islam at a crossroads, whether to accept democratic ideals or use them to justify theocracy. Of course, any true believer will accept loss of rights and even horrible treatment (read: misogyny) as long as their religious superiors encourage it, just as various Christian groups have done, in the past and now. The only real difference is willingness to use violence as a tool, which at least some of the Islamists are happy to do. A line near the end of the book, saying that there are things that justify hatred of, and anger toward other groups in Middle Eastern polities, makes the premise of this book lose its appeal. It essentially says that democracy can be good for Islam in order to establish a new caliphate, as opposed to establishing civil rights. That would be too secular.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

Do not be fooled by the title, this book does not attempt to make the case that Islam is "better" than other religions. What it does is show how Islam is different in the way it interacts with politics and social policy. The idea of "Islamism" as a backlash against forced secularism seemed particularly insightful. The return of ancient traditions creates a jarring contrast with liberal societies, but Hamid makes the case that outside policymakers -- and the United States in particular -- must accept that the creation of international orders that marginalize Islam will continue to be met with violent backlash from the Middle East.

Although casual readers might find the sections on international policy to be boring, the historical contrast of the early centuries of Christianity vs the early years of Islam is profound. These religions were not started in the same manner, and the expectation that they would evolve in the same way is both short-sighted and dangerous.

In accordance with FTC rules, I am required to declare that I received this book for free from the publisher through Goodreads FirstReads.

[Faheem · Rating 3 out of 5]

Here's my take:
Taking Exception to Shadi Hamid’s Islamic Exceptionalism

'It takes a brave person to comment on the Middle East, one never knows when a crisis will erupt that threaten to render one’s judgment obsolete. Since first reading Shadi Hamid’s Islamic Exceptionalism, Turkey’s AK Party have suffered an attempted failed coup orchestrated by parts of Turkey’s military, and Tunisian Islamists rebranded as Muslim Democrats, events dramatic enough to render chapters from the book out of date. However because Shadi Hamid, Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution and author of the Temptations of Power, is one of the most thoughtful commentators on the Middle East one can be confident that his new book Islamic Exceptionalism will remain relevant longer than most.

...'

[Sue · Rating 4 out of 5]

I won this book from Good Reads.

I'm very interested in the politics surrounding ISIS and Islam. This book was interesting to me because it attempted to explain to the Western Mind how Islam started, its divides and nuances between its many sects. The book also explains how the Middle East has descended into violence because of religion.

After reading this book, I found it even MORE important for the US to strive towards total separation of Church and State. So called "Christianity" is slowly creeping into our government.

[Laavanya · Rating 3 out of 5]

I could not get through the whole book, so read some chapters completely and others skimmed through. It gave me a better understanding of Islamism, political Islam, and the difficulty in establishing Western style democracies, liberalism, and secularism in the Middle East and Arab world. I do wish he went into Islamism and political Islam especially in South Asia (Pakistan) and why it failed there as well.

[Rachella Baker · Rating 2 out of 5]

I couldn't get into this book at all.I have passed it on to others to read.it just doesn't go with the title it was given.I hope others that have won this can give a much better review than I can.I won this book through goodreads free give aways.

[Shabbs15 · Rating 5 out of 5]

There is a trade off in the middle east. A trade off between democracy and secularism. Democracy will give you islamist parties, people want islamist parties. You get secularism when the leaders of the regime are authoritarian.

"Democratic values" is a meaningless term. Our western paradigm suggests that democracy and liberalism go hand in hand, and in the west, this usually tends to be the case, but liberalism doesn't go hand in hand with democracy in the middle east. You get weird things caused illiberal democracies.

Modern islamist movements, those willing to work with democracy and pre-existing state institutions are largely peaceful. The brotherhood for instance, when in the 70s and 90s, lots of other islamist groups were using violence, emphasised it's peacefullness and it's wilingess to work with the democratic processs.

Despite this, modern islamist movements are viewed with contempt. Typically, repression against non-violent campaigns induces international outrage and sympathy is developed as well as "sanctions" employed. This hasn't been the case for 25 years as of 2009 for modern islamist movements. MIS, are more often than not the victims of repression as opposed to the subjugators of it.

Look no further than at the Rabaa Masacarre.

[Frumenty · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'm going to revisit this book in the near future for a closer reading and to take some notes. I found it very instructive. I'm still not sure exactly what is meant by "exceptionalism", but basically the book is a study of Islamism, a.k.a. political Islam, as exemplified in four case studies : Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, and ISIS. Islamism is a modern phenomenon, a response to the historically recent ascendence of the secular West.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the one of the oldest, and probably the largest, Islamist organisations. It was born in 1928 in British-occupied Egypt for the purpose of bringing Muslims back to the religious life, first as individuals, then as families and communities, and eventually the nation and even the "ummah" (the whole people of Islam). The Brotherhood ran mosques, hospitals, schools, and much more, and its model of political activism and charity work was imitated by Islamic organisations in many countries.

The Brothers were ruthlessly suppressed by the secular-military government of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and didn't fare a lot better under his successors ; driven underground, they have long been Egypt's de facto political opposition, and they were swept to power in the elections of 2012. The dithering incompetence of political neophytes, combined with the not unreasonable fear that they would establish an Islamic theocracy, led to popular resistance to the Morsi government, which in turn created ideal conditions for a military coup.

The experience of Egypt has made Islamist parties in other countries very cautious. In Turkey, and especially in Tunisia, Islamist parties (Law and Justice in Turkey, Ennahda in Tunisia) have survived in power by moderating their Islamism in the face of secular hostility to the point where little more than the rhetoric is distinctly Islamic. The other model is ISIS, to which Hamid ascribes "a frighteningly ambitious effort to rethink the nature of the state" while still providing basic services, at which they have been "relatively effective" (p.224). But ISIS has aroused the hostility of the global powers and their state may not be expected to survive long. All in all, the record so far of Islamist parties in government doesn't look impressive ; the only Islamist entity that is driving change is unlikely to survive long, given the global hostility that it has aroused. This book seems to support Olivier Ray's notion of the "failure" of political Islam, and I think it makes the case much more effectively.

Review #2 (I had no recollection of having already reviewed this book, so I've written a second review. I'm getting forgetful in my old age.)

I'm finding it ever more difficult to review non-fiction books since, for the most part, I read them to be informed about matters about which I am quite certainly no expert. In reviewing any particular such book, I risk putting my ignorance and uninformed judgement on public display, and also I risk writing something that will make me wince at a future date when the nature of my erstwhile ignorance is as apparent to me as it is to others.

However, if I postponed commenting on every book till I had made myself master of the field of which it treats, I'd have an insurmountable backlog of books waiting for review ; so I'm going to push on with my reviewing, for the sake of the act of reviewing itself which assists me to digest what I have read, and for the sake of having an aide-mémoire to consider if, years hence, I'm wondering if the book is worth re-reading.

This is a book about islamism, a.k.a. political Islam, in contemporary times. Islamism is something comparatively new, a response to secular modernity and the ascendancy of Western power, culture, and values ; it is an attempt by Muslims to reassert the primacy of Islam in the world that they inhabit. Islamism is a challenge to Western democratic and secular ideals because, given a completely free vote, majorities of voters in many Muslim-majority countries would prefer to be governed according to unambiguously illiberal Islamic principles than according to liberal and democratic principles. It doesn't help that so many nations in the Middle East have been governed for a long time by absolute monarchies and secular dictatorships, by comparison with which an islamist government looks very liberal indeed, and that the West has a long history of supporting such regimes.

Hamid presents 4 islamist governments as case studies, 3 of them democratically elected : the erstwhile Muslim Brotherhood government of Egypt, the AKP government of Turkey, the Ennahda government of Tunisia, and Islamic State (a.k.a. ISIS, ISIL, Daech).

Egypt has a long history of secular military dictatorship, and the Muslim Brotherhood has long been the backbone of opposition to the regime. The Brothers are gradualists, eschewing revolutionary ideology in favour of a program intended to transform society from the grassroots up ; the Arab Spring caught them unprepared for government, their programs of reform were timid, and their President, Mohammed Morsi, incompetent and politically naïve.

Turkey's AKP President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a canny and skilful politician who succeeded in overcoming the Kemalist state apparatus by presenting the AKP as a conservative democratic party friendly to projects favouring the prosperity and prestige of the state (particularly the pursuit of EU membership) and eschewing anti-Western and anti-Israel posturing. Only when the military establishment had been sufficiently weakened and the Constitutional Court neutralized did the AKP embrace the task of "correcting the excesses of Kemalist secularism", supporting and incentivizing conservative religious values rather than enforcing them by fiat ; Turkey has been free of religious government too long to tolerate coercive implementation of an islamist program. For all Erdogan's public piety, his vision of a golden age owes more to the glory days of the Ottoman Empire than to the life and example of the Prophet ; the AKP's islamism is inextricably mixed with Turkish nationalism.

The spark that ignited the Arab Spring was struck in Tunisia, and of the Arab Spring states only Tunisia has succeeded both in overthrowing an authoritarian regime and in implementing and maintaining democratic institutions to the present day. For the sake of maintaining those fragile democratic institutions Ennahda has, at the risk of alienating its conservative base, downplayed its islamist agenda : demonstrating "moderation" to secular elites, international actors, and any other sceptics. A common fear among older supporters of the party is that the face that Ennahda presents to the electorate is becoming the real Ennahda, especially for younger party members who have no memory of anything else.

Hamid presents ISIS not only as a terrorist organization, but as an entity with "a distinctive interest in long term governance and state building" (p. 217), entailing concern for such mundane matters as traffic police, charity work, judicial systems, hospitals and agricultural projects. He speaks of a "frighteningly ambitious effort to rethink the nature of the state" (p.224), based on what one author calls a "scrupulous legality". Islam is unique among the Abrahamic religions in having a body of law which is conceived by a significant number of believers to be a suitable foundation for the state. There are many insights here into the workings of Islamic State, but the picture is, to me, less clear than what Hamid presents in the preceding cases.

Hamid has interviewed a great number of islamists, trying to understand their perspective, taking their ideas very seriously because these are people to whom ideas matter a great deal. I would have liked for there to have been a chapter about Iran, but there must be limits to what one man can achieve, including linguistic limits ; even without such a chapter, the book is very impressive. I have a lingering feeling that I'm missing some important overarching theme - I'm not convinced I understand the import of the title - but I'll be revisiting it again soon, to take some notes and mull over Hamid's ideas, so it is to be hoped that I will understand it much better at a later date. Recommended reading if the topic is one that interests you.

[Book Club of One · Rating 3 out of 5]

I received this book for free through Goodreads Giveaways.

In the very current Islamic Exceptionalism presents Shadi Hamid's argument of how Islam can be reconciled with democracy and liberalism. As the title makes quiet clear, and Hamid reiterates many times throughout the book, Islam is different from Christianity and Judaism and will therefore have a unique interpretation of democracy. Hamid offers a brief history of Islam with a focus on how Islamic governments have worked. Four case studies are presented, predominately focused on the Arab Spring and its aftermath: Egypt (through the Muslim Brotherhood), Tunisia, Turkey and the Islamic State. The latter being one of the best sections of the book. Hamid concludes with a discussion of what is most likely in short term, as well as long term changes to how Islam and Democracy will coexist. As with the Muslim Brotherhood, change seems likely to be slow and gradual.

While very informative, I found many sections that delved into political thinking hard to maintain an interest in, or to completely understand. I do not typically read in depth about current world events, usually preferring fiction or history works. With that I mind it is perhaps no surprise I found the historic sections the most interesting and easiest to follow. Hamid clearly spent time researching as the pages of footnotes illustrate.

[Daud Khan · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author lays out a clear case for why Islam is different from other world religions in how it incorporates politics within its fundamental structure. When God has laid out everything, from what to wear, how to punish and who is eligible for head of state, it pretty much leaves little room for secular politics. This fundamental contradiction has led to a fierce and bloody conflict in the Islamic world between the secular elite, and popular Islamist movements. The author takes 4 separate examples from the Muslim world, to showcase how Islamists have responded to the challenge of rich and powerful elites, controlling (often illegally) the upper echelons of government, and even undermining democracy, just so Islamists don't come to power.

Some reservations :

1. The author gives very little consideration to Muslims living outside the Middle East (which holds just 1/3rd of all Muslims in the world), and completely neglects the Indian subcontinent. Even Malaysia and Indonesia are just side-characters in this story.

2. Islamists are almost always shown as being the "good" guys, with very little attempt to show why the liberals of the Islamic world are so much alarmed by them.

I summarized the contents of this book in more depth, here : https://miningthemadness.wordpress.co...

[Lars]

Pretty disappointed by this so far (40 %). Or rather: I feel like I'm not getting the book I was promised. Way too much detail about interviews with random Muslim Brotherhood members, sipping tea somewhere in Turkey, reminiscing. Way too many repetitions (How many times must we hear that the Rabaa massacre cost 800 lives?). Reads more like an overlong magazine article in need of an editor, and it's no surprise that most quotes are from recent New York Times articles. Also agree with other commenters that Hamid seems to be - knowingly? - downplaying the radicalism of Hassan Al Banna and the Brotherhood (they are described as peaceful gradualists since around 1970, but the uprisings/coup attempts in Syria around 1980 are ignored).

Of course, this could still get better and I was enjoying the first 20-30 pages that seemed refreshing.

[Jelan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reading this book was challenging and rewarding. I often felt like I was prepping for a college class. And I definitely struggled through some of Hamid's logic, largely because I am woefully ignorant about both Islam and political history in the Middle East. But ultimately, reading Islamic Exceptionalism was absolutely worth the effort. It increased my understanding (but unfortunately not my optimism). It underscores the complexity of issues in that part of the world and the fundamental differences that make it very hard for us to relate to their opinions and struggles.

[Nathaniel Horadam · Rating 5 out of 5]

As someone previously in the camp arguing the need to foment an Islamic "reformation," I found myself mostly persuaded by Hamid's argument that Islam's fundamental differences with Christianity made such a movement unlikely. One can always wish for additional historical references and modern case studies (I'd contend Cromwellian Britain and puritanical Sunni governments close to the Arab orbit like Somalia and Afghanistan offer useful context for ISIS), but Hamid strikes a nice balance between academic utility and accessibility for the less-informed reader. Highly recommended.

[Dayna · Rating 3 out of 5]

I tried reading his book Temptations of Power and didn't get far at all, but this one grabbed my attention. I am not sure if it's the writing as the subject matter is only slightly different. For that matter, the author is the same so is he writing really any different?
A great fellow up to this would be listening to his podcast/conversation with Sam Harris at samharris.org.

[Richard Tullberg · Rating 3 out of 5]

Shadi Hamid's book "Islamic Exceptionalism" is at least in the first half quite apologetic to Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. He touches on events, doesn't delve to much into them with details, and that is not bad at all it's just that he might not himself realize it but some details are quite valuable for us who are not so well versed in Islam and the Brotherhood. For example, he speaks of the Muslim Brotherhoods and other Islamic political parties policy to reinstate "Sharia" and proclaimed liberals opposition to that. Maybe, we would understand the opposition more clearly to Sharia if he explained the parts of Sharia that deals with extremely illiberal matters such as death sentence of Apostasy, punishing Homosexuality, cutting off hands for stealing and many more. Shadi forgets to mention why so many people in Egypt demonstrated against Morsi. Maybe it had something to do with an Islamic Leaders attempts to gain supreme power and remove the courts. You don't need to be an intolerant liberal to rise up against obvious tyranny.

In the end Shadi's views comes better into light. He presents the distinction that many westerners don't seem to grasp. Democracy and Liberalism are not the same and they don't need to be connected. You can have a liberal society and live under dictatorship as long as the dictator enforces liberalism. I believe it was Mill who said something of the sort. And you can have Democracy without having to end up with a liberal society, democracy is not the ends, its the means and what that "means" is does not have to be what the west has.

The book is a good read for anyone interested in the Arab Spring and the current events of the Middle East. Before you read I recommend listening to Sam Harris discussion with Shadi Hamid regarding his book and his views and then read it. The only reason why is that I think that he comes off as extremely apologetic, almost to the degree of hiding the savage truth what some of the state actors he mentions has in mind if only they could wield power.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mg9sS...

[Keith · Rating 3 out of 5]

A blow by blow description of resent Islamic history full of descriptions of competing forces that cause plans to go awry. These competing pressures cause things to seldom work out as expected.

"The Chicago statement on biblical inerrancy, published in 1978…" Page 49–50

"That Muslims go well beyond Christian notions of scriptural inerrancy and believe that the Quran is god’s actual speech does not necessarily mean that they believe it should be taken literally." Page 51

"If you come to believe that the world offers nothing but darkness, then modern notions of restraint may sound nice, but they are of little use in a state of war." Page 224

And probably the most meaningful part of the book to me:

George Orwell wrote:
"Hitler has grasp the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life. Nearly all western thought since the last war, certainly all progressive thought, has assumed tacitly that human beings desire nothing beyond ease security and avoidance of pain… The socialist who finds his children playing with soldiers is usually upset but he is never able to think of a substitute for the tin soldiers; tin pacifist somehow won’t do. Hitler because in his own joyless mind he feels it with exceptional strength, knows that human beings don’t only want comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth control and, in general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention drums, flag and loyalty parades. However they may be as economic theories, Fascism and Nazism are psychologically far sound than any hedonistic conception of life… Whereas socialism, and even capitalism in a grudging, have said to people “I offer you a good time,“ Hitler has said to them I offer you struggle danger and death,“ and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet.”
Page 236 A reference is on page 290. This quotation is also found at: https://bookmarks.reviews/george-orwe...

[Richard Lawrence · Rating 3 out of 5]

While this book is well worth reading if only for familiarizing yourself with aspects of Islamic culture you might not have been aware of and the nuances of internal politics in the Middle East it does not make the case in any way, shape or form for Islamic Exceptionalism. In fact, the picture it paints is of yet another reiteration of, as the subtitle of Christopher Hitchens book ,God Is Not Great so eloquently states, how religion poisons everything. The claim is that Islam will never fall to the rise of secularism and enlightenment values the way other major belief systems have and we must adjust our political realities accordingly. Why is this? "Islam is exceptional in this sense compared to all other belief systems." What makes Islam different? "It just is and if you don't see that you lack understanding." Sorry, to quote Hitchens again, "What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence." In my opinion the author does not provide any evidence at all to support the claim and as such the claim is dismissed as spurious. This book is a defense of the Separation of Church and State even though it was obviously not the author's intention. Islam is no more unique than Christianity or Judaism was and the magical worldview it claims to exist (with not one shred of verifiable evidence) is of no practical value in the modern world when it comes to governance or individual rights. The sooner it is removed from that sphere of human activities the better we all will be. The path to doing this is the incorporation of the Separation of Church and State in the constitutions of the Arab states.

[Carlos · Rating 3 out of 5]

I came across this book through a though-provoking video in The Atlantic where Shadi Hamid talks about the folly of ever expecting the secularization of the Middle East (https://www.theatlantic.com/video/ind...). In this book Hamid explores how the desire by conservative Muslim majorities in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey for an Islamic government have fared through the instrument of Islamists parties and the strategies tried in each country. In this respect, I wish the book would have been titled “Islamists’ Exceptionalism” since while the author acknowledges the Islamic aspects of the Indonesian and Malaysian governments, he, unfortunately, does not draw any conclusions about what their experience might mean for countries like Egypt and Tunisia attempting to transition from dictatorships to democracies. Nonetheless, Hamid does have several eye-opening discussions like the tensions between democracy and classical liberalism, especially when majorities espouse illiberal ideas (such as the death penalty for apostasy) or the legacy, and cultural weight, of the caliphate, an institution that existed from the time of the prophet Mohammed up to 1924, ruling (even if nominally) at least some part, if not the entirety, of the Middle East. At the same time, some discussions were completely unnecessary as when he devotes entire pages to show that no Christian denomination truly believes the Bible is the literal word of God. Overall though, Hamid does a good job in outlining the difficult reality faced by Islamists parties in the Middle East even after all the hope of the Arab Spring movement.

[Caitlin · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was, in part quite a challenge not least because of me very limited knowledge of the Ottoman Empire and more generally the history of politics in the middle east, so there were large parts of this book that I worry went over my head. I

Hamid argues that the separation of Islam from politics may not be possible or desirable in many countries, laying out some pretty complex sociological and ideological arguments about why this is, and analysing the various failures and successes in various Islamist movements and governments in recent history.

There are some really interesting points throughout and despite being quite heavy it did keep me reading. As a Brit I find myself feeling uncomfortable generally with the idea that religion has any place in politics beyond feeling hat people should be free to practise their faith without fear of persecution and that this should be protected. But Hamid reiterates throughout the tendency for those from the West to look at the Middle East through a western lens, and that democracy doesn't necessarily equate to liberalism (and perhaps shouldn't always). It has had me reflecting a lot on the way I think about democratic politics.

[Patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hamid provides an insightful and very readable exploration of the relationship between Islam and Politics in the Arab world. He does make almost passing reference to Malaysia and Indonesia, which explains why he focuses on the Arab world, and in particular those countries that ring the Mediterranean, although there is also a chapter looking at IS. His understanding of Christianity and its relationship with politics is much more sketchy; while he does appreciate some fundamental differences associated with the foundation of Islam and Christianity and how these drive different outcomes, he fails to really understand either the integrated nature of a Christian understanding of the Bible or the way in which Christianity was, and continues to be, related to politics and, in particular, the notion of liberal democracy through, among other factors, its foundational role in the development of natural law theory. But in its central thesis and are of focus, Islam and politics, an excellent read.

[Tim Chesterton · Rating 5 out of 5]

I came across Shadi Hamid through the podcast 'Zealots at the Gate', and I immediately realized that he could teach me a thing or two about the relationship between Islam and politics. His basic thesis in this book is that Islam is exceptional—not in the sense that it is 'the best', but in the sense that its relationship to government and politics is different from that of other religions. In a very helpful chapter he contrasts Christianity—whose New Testament gives absolutely no detailed guidance as to how to go about setting up a Christian state and governing it Christianly—with Islam, which has a legal structure built right into its foundational documents. How this political orientation relates to nation-states and the modern liberal-democratic system is a complicated and thorny subject, and Hamid spends the bulk of this book examining examples from the contemporary Middle East—specifically, Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book and I learned a lot from it. Five stars out of five.