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Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist
Ayn Rand is well known for advocating egoism, but the substance of that egoism�s instruction is rarely understood. Far from representing the rejection of morality, selfishness, in Rand�s view, actually demands the practice of a systematic code of ethics. This book explains the fundamental virtues that Rand considers vital for a person to achieve his objective well-being: rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride. Tara Smith examines what each of these virtues consists in, why it is a virtue, and what it demands of a person in practice.
330 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1969
12 people are currently reading
170 people want to read
About the author
Tara Smith
106 books28 followersTara A. Smith (born 1961) is a professor of philosophy and holder of the BB&T Chair for the Study of Objectivism and holder of the Anthem Foundation Fellowship for the Study of Objectivism at the University of Texas at Austin.
Smith specializes in moral and political theory. She did her undergraduate work at the University of Virginia and received her doctorate from Johns Hopkins University. Her published works include the books Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality (2000), Moral Rights and Political Freedom (1995), and Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist (2006). She is also a contributing author to several essay collections about Ayn Rand's novels. Smith has written in journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, Social Philosophy and Policy, and Law and Philosophy.
Smith has lectured all across the United States including Harvard University, Wheeling Jesuit University, Duke University, University of Pittsburgh, and New York University, and to groups of businessmen. She has also organized conferences, often ones emphasizing objective law.
She is on the board of The Philosopher's Index and is on the Academic Advisory Council of The Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism at Clemson University. Smith is a member of the Ayn Rand Society,which exists within the American Philosophical Association. She is also affiliated with the Ayn Rand Institute.
Smith specializes in moral and political theory. She did her undergraduate work at the University of Virginia and received her doctorate from Johns Hopkins University. Her published works include the books Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality (2000), Moral Rights and Political Freedom (1995), and Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist (2006). She is also a contributing author to several essay collections about Ayn Rand's novels. Smith has written in journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, Social Philosophy and Policy, and Law and Philosophy.
Smith has lectured all across the United States including Harvard University, Wheeling Jesuit University, Duke University, University of Pittsburgh, and New York University, and to groups of businessmen. She has also organized conferences, often ones emphasizing objective law.
She is on the board of The Philosopher's Index and is on the Academic Advisory Council of The Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism at Clemson University. Smith is a member of the Ayn Rand Society,which exists within the American Philosophical Association. She is also affiliated with the Ayn Rand Institute.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
January 19, 2013
Often, when mentioning Ayn Rand to my friends, I’m met with open scorn. People generally assume that Rand’s Objectivism philosophy stands for cold-hearted selfishness, as frowned upon by every “decent, moral citizen”. After all, isn’t altruism the way forward? Doesn’t selfishness ultimately lead to one’s downfall? How can selfishness be considered a virtue for a virtuous person? The question that’s often asked is: “What makes a person good?”
Surely your life must benefit others? Is it even possible that Rand’s rational egoism can result in an individual living a moral life governed by ethical decisions? It is easy to assume that people are, first and foremost selfish, a societal default setting if it were.
Often it’s insinuated that an egoist acts without a code of ethics, and without any consideration for others. It’s easy for people to write off Rand’s philosophy without taking a closer look. With this book, Tara Smith encourages readers to consider virtues as Ayn Rand defines them and promotes as beneficial to a rational egoist. Because, Rand states, a rational egoist will naturally live a virtuous life if she values flourishing.
Rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride might all come across as self-evident virtues. The majority of these will be promoted by your bog-standard adherent of the Abrahamic faiths, or indeed a humanist. And, you might ask, how the hell does pride fit into the picture? Tara Smith takes each of these virtues as set down by Rand, and elaborates on them. In this process, she also shows how these virtues share a basic, undeniable interconnectedness. One needn’t rely on a world religion in order to live a moral life. And one can be a giving person, if certain conditions are met—and one’s actions do not impact negatively on one’s own wellbeing.
Smith also examines how a person with these virtues must act, and also looks at how other virtues (often taken for granted) act within this context: kindness, charity, generosity, temperance, courage, forgiveness, and humility.
Ayn Rand holds up the magnifying lens to all these virtues and how they work within the framework of rational egoism. Underlying all of this is the notion of value, and how a rational individual will not trade something of greater value for the lesser. In this regard, Rand’s Normative Ethics was recommended to me as a follow-up to Smith’s Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, and provides supplementary reading.
Smith also discerns between popularly held conceptions of virtues, and how a rational egoist would approach them. Rationality is perhaps one of the most important, because it requires that we deal with facts—life as it is—as opposed as how we’d like to perceive it. Just because we want something to be true doesn’t make it so. She also underlines that we should seek rationality, not because we should live rational lives, but because we understand why rationality is so important in order for us to flourish.
Why flourish, you might ask? There’s more to life than simply breathing, and by flourishing we add value to our life. Life isn’t simply to exist. After all, if our entire raison d’etre was to simply breathe and live without pain we might as well live such exciting lives as a tree in a forest or fungus growing on a compost heap. Similarly, we should live moral lives, not because it is expected of us, but because a moral life will result in our continuing flourishing. Before we go further, it’s important to establish what Rand means by flourishing.
By flourishing, Rand suggests that we attain value within our lives, and actively pursue to better our quality of life—to create value. That which is valuable to us isn’t merely money, or a big house: we also value friendships, music, good health, art or the wherewithal to travel and see new destinations. In achieving these goals, we enrich ourselves, and, by extension, have a positive influence on our environment and the people around us.
After looking at how rationality is the master virtue, Smith touches on honesty, and how this applies in our factual assessment of our situations and future plans, and also in how we present ourselves to others. She looks also at the conditions of honesty—for example, it’s perfectly acceptable to lie to Nazis about whether you’re hiding a Jewish friend. After all, the Nazis are not upholding rational virtues in the bigger scheme of things. By being truthful to the Nazis, you basically state that you agree with how they go about doing things.
Independence is, according to Smith, a virtue. She goes on to underscore the differences between being able to live by the efforts of one’s own work, or being a parasite, or moocher, dependent on others. Once again, we look at the exchange of values and a system of free trade, and that values are not always tangible. For example, a woman who decides to stay home to raise children can provide value as much as her engineer husband who provides her the means with which to do so, and she should not be looked down upon.
Justice is another important factor that Smith examines within Rand’s writing. Much can be said for justice, and Smith examines it within the framework of meting out to others what they deserve. If you buy an item or a service from another person, you pay what that item or service is worth. In the same way, if someone goes out of his way to damage you, you’re within your rights to defend yourself and protect that which you value.
According to Smith, Rand ascribes a slightly different slant to integrity than the standard assumptions. At its core, integrity requires of an individual not to sacrifice his or her convictions or values to satisfy the whims or opinions of others. This is especially pertinent after one has established one’s values based on that which is rational, which will lead to your flourishing (and not at the expense of others as some are wont to accuse the rational egoist). A person of integrity displays qualities of devotion to their chosen path, and is consistent in his or her purpose.
Courage, says Rand, goes hand in hand with integrity. The true test of one’s integrity only really comes into play when an individual finds him or herself in a situation of danger, or where there is some sort of risk to the self or what one values. To have courage is not to be without fear, because it can be argued that she who doesn’t fear does not take full cognisance of the dangers involved in a potentially volatile situation. A courageous person therefore doesn’t allow her fears to get between her and her values.
Almost a no-brainer when suggested, Rand clearly encourages productiveness. Not so much that it can generally be agreed that sloth is a cardinal sin, no matter what one’s outlook, but that productiveness is essential to anyone considering the science and art of flourishing. Productiveness is more than creating objects of material value: it is also the mental alacrity required to conceive of objects, and to have the necessary ability to realise them as physical objects or actions that fill a specific purpose, to add value to one’s life, and by default, the lives of others.
Chapter 10 interested me because Smith examines the virtues charity, generosity, kindness and temperance—ones that are so often bandied about within a sacred context that they have lost meaning, or that cause individuals to fall within a set of behaviours that are congruent with altruism. Rand and Smith both agree that altruism is of no use to the rational egoist and her flourishing.
In conclusion, a rational egoist places value in herself. This does not require her to fall into a mire of solipsism. If you value yourself, you will value your relationship with others and their wellbeing, but not to the point where you trade something of greater value for that which is of a lesser value. Self-interested motivations do not detract from a person’s capacity to value others. The reason why Rand highlights rationality as the greatest virtue over all others is precisely so that we can make decisions that are in all our best interests, to benefit ourselves and, by default the people around us, in the long term.
Surely your life must benefit others? Is it even possible that Rand’s rational egoism can result in an individual living a moral life governed by ethical decisions? It is easy to assume that people are, first and foremost selfish, a societal default setting if it were.
Often it’s insinuated that an egoist acts without a code of ethics, and without any consideration for others. It’s easy for people to write off Rand’s philosophy without taking a closer look. With this book, Tara Smith encourages readers to consider virtues as Ayn Rand defines them and promotes as beneficial to a rational egoist. Because, Rand states, a rational egoist will naturally live a virtuous life if she values flourishing.
Rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride might all come across as self-evident virtues. The majority of these will be promoted by your bog-standard adherent of the Abrahamic faiths, or indeed a humanist. And, you might ask, how the hell does pride fit into the picture? Tara Smith takes each of these virtues as set down by Rand, and elaborates on them. In this process, she also shows how these virtues share a basic, undeniable interconnectedness. One needn’t rely on a world religion in order to live a moral life. And one can be a giving person, if certain conditions are met—and one’s actions do not impact negatively on one’s own wellbeing.
Smith also examines how a person with these virtues must act, and also looks at how other virtues (often taken for granted) act within this context: kindness, charity, generosity, temperance, courage, forgiveness, and humility.
Ayn Rand holds up the magnifying lens to all these virtues and how they work within the framework of rational egoism. Underlying all of this is the notion of value, and how a rational individual will not trade something of greater value for the lesser. In this regard, Rand’s Normative Ethics was recommended to me as a follow-up to Smith’s Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, and provides supplementary reading.
Smith also discerns between popularly held conceptions of virtues, and how a rational egoist would approach them. Rationality is perhaps one of the most important, because it requires that we deal with facts—life as it is—as opposed as how we’d like to perceive it. Just because we want something to be true doesn’t make it so. She also underlines that we should seek rationality, not because we should live rational lives, but because we understand why rationality is so important in order for us to flourish.
Why flourish, you might ask? There’s more to life than simply breathing, and by flourishing we add value to our life. Life isn’t simply to exist. After all, if our entire raison d’etre was to simply breathe and live without pain we might as well live such exciting lives as a tree in a forest or fungus growing on a compost heap. Similarly, we should live moral lives, not because it is expected of us, but because a moral life will result in our continuing flourishing. Before we go further, it’s important to establish what Rand means by flourishing.
By flourishing, Rand suggests that we attain value within our lives, and actively pursue to better our quality of life—to create value. That which is valuable to us isn’t merely money, or a big house: we also value friendships, music, good health, art or the wherewithal to travel and see new destinations. In achieving these goals, we enrich ourselves, and, by extension, have a positive influence on our environment and the people around us.
After looking at how rationality is the master virtue, Smith touches on honesty, and how this applies in our factual assessment of our situations and future plans, and also in how we present ourselves to others. She looks also at the conditions of honesty—for example, it’s perfectly acceptable to lie to Nazis about whether you’re hiding a Jewish friend. After all, the Nazis are not upholding rational virtues in the bigger scheme of things. By being truthful to the Nazis, you basically state that you agree with how they go about doing things.
Independence is, according to Smith, a virtue. She goes on to underscore the differences between being able to live by the efforts of one’s own work, or being a parasite, or moocher, dependent on others. Once again, we look at the exchange of values and a system of free trade, and that values are not always tangible. For example, a woman who decides to stay home to raise children can provide value as much as her engineer husband who provides her the means with which to do so, and she should not be looked down upon.
Justice is another important factor that Smith examines within Rand’s writing. Much can be said for justice, and Smith examines it within the framework of meting out to others what they deserve. If you buy an item or a service from another person, you pay what that item or service is worth. In the same way, if someone goes out of his way to damage you, you’re within your rights to defend yourself and protect that which you value.
According to Smith, Rand ascribes a slightly different slant to integrity than the standard assumptions. At its core, integrity requires of an individual not to sacrifice his or her convictions or values to satisfy the whims or opinions of others. This is especially pertinent after one has established one’s values based on that which is rational, which will lead to your flourishing (and not at the expense of others as some are wont to accuse the rational egoist). A person of integrity displays qualities of devotion to their chosen path, and is consistent in his or her purpose.
Courage, says Rand, goes hand in hand with integrity. The true test of one’s integrity only really comes into play when an individual finds him or herself in a situation of danger, or where there is some sort of risk to the self or what one values. To have courage is not to be without fear, because it can be argued that she who doesn’t fear does not take full cognisance of the dangers involved in a potentially volatile situation. A courageous person therefore doesn’t allow her fears to get between her and her values.
Almost a no-brainer when suggested, Rand clearly encourages productiveness. Not so much that it can generally be agreed that sloth is a cardinal sin, no matter what one’s outlook, but that productiveness is essential to anyone considering the science and art of flourishing. Productiveness is more than creating objects of material value: it is also the mental alacrity required to conceive of objects, and to have the necessary ability to realise them as physical objects or actions that fill a specific purpose, to add value to one’s life, and by default, the lives of others.
Chapter 10 interested me because Smith examines the virtues charity, generosity, kindness and temperance—ones that are so often bandied about within a sacred context that they have lost meaning, or that cause individuals to fall within a set of behaviours that are congruent with altruism. Rand and Smith both agree that altruism is of no use to the rational egoist and her flourishing.
In conclusion, a rational egoist places value in herself. This does not require her to fall into a mire of solipsism. If you value yourself, you will value your relationship with others and their wellbeing, but not to the point where you trade something of greater value for that which is of a lesser value. Self-interested motivations do not detract from a person’s capacity to value others. The reason why Rand highlights rationality as the greatest virtue over all others is precisely so that we can make decisions that are in all our best interests, to benefit ourselves and, by default the people around us, in the long term.
January 6, 2010
I loathe Ayn Rand. I bought this book because I'm optimistic and I wanted to see if the words "Ethics", "Ayn Rand", and "Virtuous" could somehow all be reconciled within the text.
Long story short? No - I was not convinced that Ayn Rand the person nor Ayn Rand the (quote/unquote) philosopher was worthwhile in any utilitarian sense of the word: I am just as convinced as ever that the best thing she ever did for philosophy or for humanity was, well, she died.
Rest in peace, Rand. You were enough a fan of yourself that it matters not that I think you were a total waste of space and talent.
Long story short? No - I was not convinced that Ayn Rand the person nor Ayn Rand the (quote/unquote) philosopher was worthwhile in any utilitarian sense of the word: I am just as convinced as ever that the best thing she ever did for philosophy or for humanity was, well, she died.
Rest in peace, Rand. You were enough a fan of yourself that it matters not that I think you were a total waste of space and talent.
March 8, 2019
Tara Smith is an exceptional communicator of Rand’s philosophy. In this volume, Smith presents a scholarly approach to Rand’s system of ethics.
Smith’s approach is hierarchical. She begins with a general overview of egoism and then presents Rand’s case for rationality as the primary virtue (virtue for Rand means the actions necessary to acquire or preserve value—the top value in Objectivism being one’s own life) before delving into the six derivative values in Rand’s philosophy.
Throughout Smith’s presentation of the derivative virtues she takes special care to identify relevant distinctions between Rand’s conception of the virtue compared to other philosophers’ approaches. Then Smith identifies the intellectual and existential aspects of each virtues. Finally, the volume concludes by addressing the role of conventionally approved virtues (charity, generosity, kindness, temperance) and how those virtues fit into rational egoism.
Overall, this is an excellent book for anyone interested in a thorough explanation of the Objectivist virtues and suitable for any level of familiarity with Objectivism or philosophy generally.
Smith’s approach is hierarchical. She begins with a general overview of egoism and then presents Rand’s case for rationality as the primary virtue (virtue for Rand means the actions necessary to acquire or preserve value—the top value in Objectivism being one’s own life) before delving into the six derivative values in Rand’s philosophy.
Throughout Smith’s presentation of the derivative virtues she takes special care to identify relevant distinctions between Rand’s conception of the virtue compared to other philosophers’ approaches. Then Smith identifies the intellectual and existential aspects of each virtues. Finally, the volume concludes by addressing the role of conventionally approved virtues (charity, generosity, kindness, temperance) and how those virtues fit into rational egoism.
Overall, this is an excellent book for anyone interested in a thorough explanation of the Objectivist virtues and suitable for any level of familiarity with Objectivism or philosophy generally.
Want to read
November 9, 2016Looking forward to reading this. So tired of Ayn Rand haters who just hate her without even trying to understand what she was actually after.
I love Ayn Rand.
I love Ayn Rand.
March 20, 2021
I re-learned a lot from this book, but I can’t really say that it is an important book. The main reason for that is she does a very inadequate job of citing earlier thinkers and works. She mainly cites Rand, of course, and Leonard Piekoff. She cites a number of non-objectivists for purposes of stating their differences, or using their definitions of terms. She never really cites Tibor Machan and his work on egoism and Rand. She makes no reference to Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand. She rarely discusses the similarities of Rand’s work with Aristotle. In fact, she mimics Rand’s dismissal of Aristotle, despite the fact that so much of her thinking was derivative of his.
She really doesn’t do a good job of addressing the issue of context.
She does not mention any other virtues than the “Big 7.” Her discussion of such conventional virtues as generosity, charity and kindness says that they are not virtues because they are optional, or discretionary. But how is that different from the contextual application of the big 7?
Her discussion of temperance is inconclusive or incomplete as she equivocates on the definition of the word.
She does not go beyond what Rand or Piekoff has already said. Though that is not her purpose, it seems to me that discussion of ancillary and complementary virtues could aid the discussion. Are there no other virtues in Rand’s universe? Or Smith’s?
She really doesn’t do a good job of addressing the issue of context.
She does not mention any other virtues than the “Big 7.” Her discussion of such conventional virtues as generosity, charity and kindness says that they are not virtues because they are optional, or discretionary. But how is that different from the contextual application of the big 7?
Her discussion of temperance is inconclusive or incomplete as she equivocates on the definition of the word.
She does not go beyond what Rand or Piekoff has already said. Though that is not her purpose, it seems to me that discussion of ancillary and complementary virtues could aid the discussion. Are there no other virtues in Rand’s universe? Or Smith’s?
Read
July 7, 2019Very clarifying book on the seven Objectivist virtues
August 4, 2016
When presented with a philosophy which claims that one's only moral concern is his own self-interest, the question soon becomes, "What is truly in my self-interest"?
Most people intuit, to varying degrees, that working collaboratively, honestly, and with respect for one another tends to benefit everyone involved.
Yet when considering the idea of "self-interest" on its own, that intuition is often discarded for a different one, which is that to act in your own self-interest means to lie, cheat, and steal in order to get ahead in life.
There is a wide perception that the only reason to act honestly is that we have a moral duty to something greater than ourselves (the collective, the state, our neighbor). There is a perception that if a person were to choose to default on his social and political duty to the rest of humanity, he would win at the expense of everyone else. By ignoring the collective moral imperative, a person can get ahead on the backs of us all by lying to us, cheating us--by taking advantage of those of us who are participating in the social and political contract whereby we are honest and generous--not for the good of ourselves but for the good of all.
This intuition must be challenged, and that's what this book sets out to do.
The author demonstrates why and how it is truly in a person's own long term self-interest to act with honesty and integrity in all aspects of their life.
The fact is that our collective intuition about self-interest is wrong. Despite our revulsion to "selfishness", on some level we must be aware that lying, cheating, and stealing is not a reliable way to achieve a deep happiness and flourishing.
This is why, most of the time, we don't do it. People overwhelmingly act in what they perceive to be their self-interest. We make our day to day decisions primarily with respect to how they will improve our own lives.
When we do lie--when we do steal--we are keenly aware (if often only emotionally) of the negative impact such acts have on our own lives. We feel it as a personal failing--not that we have failed humanity proper--but that we have failed ourselves and are sabotaging our own life. We regret acts of dishonesty and breaches of integrity for the negative impact they have on our own health and happiness.
In order to understand these feelings and this reality, we have to identify why, in real practical terms, being dishonest or acting fraudulently is not actually in our own interest. This book lays it all out. This understanding allows one to act with honesty and integrity and to do so consistently with the knowledge that we are acting in our own interest and improving our own lives.
Without an understanding of the true consequences of one's actions, we can only assume and hope that a given action is good for us.
In many cases, whether one has a collectivist or individualist perspective, we are living with a contradiction:
In the collectivist minded, we believe that we are acting in a way which is morally right, but that we are limiting or harming ourselves in doing so. We would be happier and more successful if it weren't for our pesky moral duties. If only the moral were the practical... Alas, life is apparently an unresolvable contradiction.
In the individualist's case we believe that it is morally right to act in our own interest and that we have no obligation to the collective, yet we don't WANT to lie or cheat in order to achieve our ends. What gives? If I have no duty to anyone but myself, then why does it feel so wrong to act dishonestly? Am I too weak to truly act in my own interest, or is there something wrong with my philosophy?
This book resolves these contradictions by showing that the moral IS the practical and that acting with integrity IS acting in self-interest.
It's dry material, but I don't think the importance of understanding the consequences of our daily choices and actions can be overstated. This knowledge is necessary to living with moral consistency and certainty. When we know for a fact that our choices and actions are both morally right and are actively improving our own life, we are free to be happy and love life without hesitation.
Most people intuit, to varying degrees, that working collaboratively, honestly, and with respect for one another tends to benefit everyone involved.
Yet when considering the idea of "self-interest" on its own, that intuition is often discarded for a different one, which is that to act in your own self-interest means to lie, cheat, and steal in order to get ahead in life.
There is a wide perception that the only reason to act honestly is that we have a moral duty to something greater than ourselves (the collective, the state, our neighbor). There is a perception that if a person were to choose to default on his social and political duty to the rest of humanity, he would win at the expense of everyone else. By ignoring the collective moral imperative, a person can get ahead on the backs of us all by lying to us, cheating us--by taking advantage of those of us who are participating in the social and political contract whereby we are honest and generous--not for the good of ourselves but for the good of all.
This intuition must be challenged, and that's what this book sets out to do.
The author demonstrates why and how it is truly in a person's own long term self-interest to act with honesty and integrity in all aspects of their life.
The fact is that our collective intuition about self-interest is wrong. Despite our revulsion to "selfishness", on some level we must be aware that lying, cheating, and stealing is not a reliable way to achieve a deep happiness and flourishing.
This is why, most of the time, we don't do it. People overwhelmingly act in what they perceive to be their self-interest. We make our day to day decisions primarily with respect to how they will improve our own lives.
When we do lie--when we do steal--we are keenly aware (if often only emotionally) of the negative impact such acts have on our own lives. We feel it as a personal failing--not that we have failed humanity proper--but that we have failed ourselves and are sabotaging our own life. We regret acts of dishonesty and breaches of integrity for the negative impact they have on our own health and happiness.
In order to understand these feelings and this reality, we have to identify why, in real practical terms, being dishonest or acting fraudulently is not actually in our own interest. This book lays it all out. This understanding allows one to act with honesty and integrity and to do so consistently with the knowledge that we are acting in our own interest and improving our own lives.
Without an understanding of the true consequences of one's actions, we can only assume and hope that a given action is good for us.
In many cases, whether one has a collectivist or individualist perspective, we are living with a contradiction:
In the collectivist minded, we believe that we are acting in a way which is morally right, but that we are limiting or harming ourselves in doing so. We would be happier and more successful if it weren't for our pesky moral duties. If only the moral were the practical... Alas, life is apparently an unresolvable contradiction.
In the individualist's case we believe that it is morally right to act in our own interest and that we have no obligation to the collective, yet we don't WANT to lie or cheat in order to achieve our ends. What gives? If I have no duty to anyone but myself, then why does it feel so wrong to act dishonestly? Am I too weak to truly act in my own interest, or is there something wrong with my philosophy?
This book resolves these contradictions by showing that the moral IS the practical and that acting with integrity IS acting in self-interest.
It's dry material, but I don't think the importance of understanding the consequences of our daily choices and actions can be overstated. This knowledge is necessary to living with moral consistency and certainty. When we know for a fact that our choices and actions are both morally right and are actively improving our own life, we are free to be happy and love life without hesitation.
February 25, 2015
An in-depth exploration of the seven specific virtues advocated by Ayn Rand's egoism philosophy and the value basis of rational self-interest.
I thought the book was extremely well-written and organized. The author took care to bring up counter-arguments and ways Rand's philosophy is misunderstood in relation to these virtues, then proceeds to logically defend Rand's ideas with clear references to what Rand actually wrote or said.
Reading the book has made me much more aware of how I define ethics and values for myself. I'm encouraged to become less reliant on "pithy" generalizations and oversimplification that seem to be prevalent these days in the media. I made lots of notes while reading this book because I was surprised at how little I had really thought about just what a value or a virtue is, or what justice means, for example.
The book is an example to me of good writing in philosophy. I plan on reading more of this author's books and looking up the sources she used.
I thought the book was extremely well-written and organized. The author took care to bring up counter-arguments and ways Rand's philosophy is misunderstood in relation to these virtues, then proceeds to logically defend Rand's ideas with clear references to what Rand actually wrote or said.
Reading the book has made me much more aware of how I define ethics and values for myself. I'm encouraged to become less reliant on "pithy" generalizations and oversimplification that seem to be prevalent these days in the media. I made lots of notes while reading this book because I was surprised at how little I had really thought about just what a value or a virtue is, or what justice means, for example.
The book is an example to me of good writing in philosophy. I plan on reading more of this author's books and looking up the sources she used.
September 23, 2014
Matter is indestructible, but a living organism is not.
"Reality does not issue orders."
The pleasure principal is an abdication.
The standard of measurement is the life of man qua man.
Flourishing is not a transferable good.
"Total absorption in the present is a luxury that our nature does not permit."
Damage is damage, and damage, untended, is progressive.
Maximizing your own life does not imply besting others.
"Reality does not issue orders."
The pleasure principal is an abdication.
The standard of measurement is the life of man qua man.
Flourishing is not a transferable good.
"Total absorption in the present is a luxury that our nature does not permit."
Damage is damage, and damage, untended, is progressive.
Maximizing your own life does not imply besting others.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews