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From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role
What turns rich nations into great powers? How do wealthy countries begin extending their influence abroad? These questions are vital to understanding one of the most important sources of instability in international the emergence of a new power. In From Wealth to Power , Fareed Zakaria seeks to answer these questions by examining the most puzzling case of a rising power in modern history--that of the United States.
If rich nations routinely become great powers, Zakaria asks, then how do we explain the strange inactivity of the United States in the late nineteenth century? By 1885, the U.S. was the richest country in the world. And yet, by all military, political, and diplomatic measures, it was a minor power. To explain this discrepancy, Zakaria considers a wide variety of cases between 1865 and 1908 when the U.S. considered expanding its influence in such diverse places as Canada, the Dominican Republic, and Iceland. Consistent with the realist theory of international relations, he argues that the President and his administration tried to increase the country's political influence abroad when they saw an increase in the nation's relative economic power. But they frequently had to curtail their plans for expansion, he shows, because they lacked a strong central government that could harness that economic power for the purposes of foreign policy. America was an unusual power--a strong nation with a weak state. It was not until late in the century, when power shifted from states to the federal government and from the legislative to the executive branch, that leaders in Washington could mobilize the nation's resources for international influence.
Zakaria's exploration of this tension between national power and state structure will change how we view the emergence of new powers and deepen our understanding of America's exceptional history.
If rich nations routinely become great powers, Zakaria asks, then how do we explain the strange inactivity of the United States in the late nineteenth century? By 1885, the U.S. was the richest country in the world. And yet, by all military, political, and diplomatic measures, it was a minor power. To explain this discrepancy, Zakaria considers a wide variety of cases between 1865 and 1908 when the U.S. considered expanding its influence in such diverse places as Canada, the Dominican Republic, and Iceland. Consistent with the realist theory of international relations, he argues that the President and his administration tried to increase the country's political influence abroad when they saw an increase in the nation's relative economic power. But they frequently had to curtail their plans for expansion, he shows, because they lacked a strong central government that could harness that economic power for the purposes of foreign policy. America was an unusual power--a strong nation with a weak state. It was not until late in the century, when power shifted from states to the federal government and from the legislative to the executive branch, that leaders in Washington could mobilize the nation's resources for international influence.
Zakaria's exploration of this tension between national power and state structure will change how we view the emergence of new powers and deepen our understanding of America's exceptional history.
216 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1998
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About the author
Fareed Zakaria
33 books1,156 followersFareed Rafiq Zakaria is an Indian-born American journalist, political commentator, and author. He is the host of CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS and writes a weekly paid column for The Washington Post. He has been a columnist for Newsweek, editor of Newsweek International, and an editor at large of Time.
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February 10, 2018
المؤلف فريد زكريا صحفي أمريكي من أصل هندي، كان والده سياسيا في حزب المؤتمر الهندي ودارسا لعلم الكلام الإسلامي، وكانت والدته رئيسة تحرير جريدة "سنداي تايمز أوف إينديا". وفي سن 28 سنة أصبح محررا لمجلة "فورين أفيرز" وتحت إشرافه تطورت المجلة وأصبحت تصدر كل شهرين بدلا من كل 3 شهور. وله برنامج حواري أسبوعي على قناة سي إن إن يستضيف فيه سياسيين مهمين وشخصيات عامة، كما أنه يكتب مقالا أسبوعيا بجريدة واشنطن بوست. وكان قد اتهم عدة مرات ب"الإقتباس" من مصادر أخرى دون الإشارة إلى هذه المصادر، وأوقف عن الكتابة لمدة أسبوع، وتمت تحقيقات في هذا الموضوع، ولكنه عاد إلى الكتابة بعد ذلك
في هذا الكتاب - الذي كان في الأصل رسالته للدكتوراه - يناقش المؤلف فترة مهمة في تاريخ الولايات المتحدة: من نهاية الحرب الأهلية الأمريكية عام 1865 إلى قرب نهاية ولاية الرئيس الأمريكي تيودور روزفلت عام 1908. وقد اختار هذه الفترة لسببين:
- الولايات المتحدة تطورت بسرعة خلال هذه الفترة سياسيا واقتصاديا وأصبحت في نهايتها من أغنى وأقوى دول العالم
- في الجزء الأول من هذه الفترة استمرت الولايات المتحدة على انعزالها عن العالم ورفضها للتدخل والتوسع مثل غيرها من القوى الأوربية الغنية والقوية، ثم ابتداء من تسعينات القرن التاسع عشر تحولت سياستها الخارجية إلى سياسة عدوانية توسعية.
والكتاب يناقش أسباب هذا التحول ويناقش النظريات المختلفة التي تحاول الإجابة عن سؤال مهم: لماذا تميل الدول الغنية إلى التوسع خارجيا؟ والمقصود بالتوسع ليس فقط احتلال أو ضم بلاد أو أراضي أخرى، إنما أيضا النفوذ السياسي والدبلوماسي والقدرة على التدخل في شئون الدول الأخرى. ويقول أن هناك نظريتان
1- الواقعية التقليدية: تقول أن الدول الغنية تتوسع خارجيا لأنها لا بد أن تفعل ذلك من منطلق إحساسها بالتفوق والسيطرة ولأنها تحتاج إلى أسواق خارجية وما إلى ذلك
2- الواقعية الدفاعية: تقول أن الدول تبدأ في التوسع وضم الأراضي عندما تشعر بالتهديد وذلك لكي تحمي نفسها
والمؤلف يحبذ ويدلل على النظرية الأولى بالنسبة للفترة التي يتحدث عنها ويفند النظرية الثانية بأمثلة كثيرة من التاريخ الفعلي لهذه الفترة، ويشير بالذات إلى أن حجة "الشعور بالتهديد والحاجة إلى الأمن" هي حجة مطاطة للغاية ويمكن بمنتهى السهولة إساءة استخدامها، وأنه عندما تدعي دولة ما أنها تتوسع في الخارج "دفاعا عن أمنها القومي" فإنها تفعل ذلك فقط لأن البديل الوحيد عن ذلك هو الاعتراف بنزعتها الإمبريالية والتوسعية
يناقش الكتاب أيضا الصراع المزمن بين الرئيس الأمريكي وبين الكونجرس؛ حيث كان الكونجرس في فترة الانعزال الأولى يرفض أي ميل للتوسع خارج البلاد، ويرى أن الأمور الخارجية من اختصاصاته لدرجة جعلت الرئيس مجرد منفذ لسياسات الكونجرس. ثم مع الوقت استطاع الرؤساء بالتدريج السيطرة على الموقف، وأصبح الرئيس وجهازه التنفيذي هم السلطة الفعلية، ومن وقتها زادت النزعة التوسعية والعدوانية خاصة مع تيودور روزفلت
ما لفت نظري في هذا الكتاب هو كمية "البجاحة" والغطرسة التي يمكن أن تتصف بها قوة عظمى، وهو ما يدفعها إلى التجاهل التام لرغبات أو أمن الدول والكيانات الأصغر من حولها. وكما اعتبرت بريطانيا مثلا أن من حقها احتلال واستنزاف الهند، ثم احتلال واستنزاف مصر من أجل "تأمين الطريق إلى الهند" (!!) ثم احتلال السودان لتأمين احتلالها لمصر (!!!!!)، ووصل بها الأمر إلى احتلال شريط كامل من أقصى شمال أفريقيا لأقصى جنوبها - بنفس الطريقة، اعتبرت الولايات المتحدة أن نصف الكرة الغربي هو ملعبها الخاص الذي لا يجب أن يشاركها فيه أحد، بل أنها طردت أسبانيا من مستعمراتها، خاصة في كوبا. وتمكنت قبل ذلك من ضم ألاسكا، وبعد ذلك بفترة ضمت جزر هاواي في منتصف المحيط الهادي
بل إن المؤلف يحكي أن "سيوارد" وزير خارجية أمريكا الداهية أخذ يقنع نفسه أو الآخرين بأن جزيرة كوبا لم تتكون إلا من الرمال التي ينزحها نهر المسيسيبي من ضفتيه أثناء جريانه إلى الجنوب ويلقي بها في خليج المكسيك، وأنها لذلك ليست إلا أرضا أمريكية. وكان سيوارد باستمرار يحاول ضم كل الجزر والدول الصغيرة في أمريكا الوسطى والبحر الكاريبي، بل أنه كان يخطط لضم جرينلاند وأيسلند !! ولم ينجح أثناء ولايته إلا في ضم ألاسكا التي اشترتها من روسيا ب5 ملايين دولار، حيث أن روسيا لم تكن تريد تلك الأرض القاحلة الشاسعة التي لم تكن تستفيد منها
كتاب مهم لفهم كيف تفكر الدول القوية والغنية في الدول الصغيرة والكحيانة
في هذا الكتاب - الذي كان في الأصل رسالته للدكتوراه - يناقش المؤلف فترة مهمة في تاريخ الولايات المتحدة: من نهاية الحرب الأهلية الأمريكية عام 1865 إلى قرب نهاية ولاية الرئيس الأمريكي تيودور روزفلت عام 1908. وقد اختار هذه الفترة لسببين:
- الولايات المتحدة تطورت بسرعة خلال هذه الفترة سياسيا واقتصاديا وأصبحت في نهايتها من أغنى وأقوى دول العالم
- في الجزء الأول من هذه الفترة استمرت الولايات المتحدة على انعزالها عن العالم ورفضها للتدخل والتوسع مثل غيرها من القوى الأوربية الغنية والقوية، ثم ابتداء من تسعينات القرن التاسع عشر تحولت سياستها الخارجية إلى سياسة عدوانية توسعية.
والكتاب يناقش أسباب هذا التحول ويناقش النظريات المختلفة التي تحاول الإجابة عن سؤال مهم: لماذا تميل الدول الغنية إلى التوسع خارجيا؟ والمقصود بالتوسع ليس فقط احتلال أو ضم بلاد أو أراضي أخرى، إنما أيضا النفوذ السياسي والدبلوماسي والقدرة على التدخل في شئون الدول الأخرى. ويقول أن هناك نظريتان
1- الواقعية التقليدية: تقول أن الدول الغنية تتوسع خارجيا لأنها لا بد أن تفعل ذلك من منطلق إحساسها بالتفوق والسيطرة ولأنها تحتاج إلى أسواق خارجية وما إلى ذلك
2- الواقعية الدفاعية: تقول أن الدول تبدأ في التوسع وضم الأراضي عندما تشعر بالتهديد وذلك لكي تحمي نفسها
والمؤلف يحبذ ويدلل على النظرية الأولى بالنسبة للفترة التي يتحدث عنها ويفند النظرية الثانية بأمثلة كثيرة من التاريخ الفعلي لهذه الفترة، ويشير بالذات إلى أن حجة "الشعور بالتهديد والحاجة إلى الأمن" هي حجة مطاطة للغاية ويمكن بمنتهى السهولة إساءة استخدامها، وأنه عندما تدعي دولة ما أنها تتوسع في الخارج "دفاعا عن أمنها القومي" فإنها تفعل ذلك فقط لأن البديل الوحيد عن ذلك هو الاعتراف بنزعتها الإمبريالية والتوسعية
يناقش الكتاب أيضا الصراع المزمن بين الرئيس الأمريكي وبين الكونجرس؛ حيث كان الكونجرس في فترة الانعزال الأولى يرفض أي ميل للتوسع خارج البلاد، ويرى أن الأمور الخارجية من اختصاصاته لدرجة جعلت الرئيس مجرد منفذ لسياسات الكونجرس. ثم مع الوقت استطاع الرؤساء بالتدريج السيطرة على الموقف، وأصبح الرئيس وجهازه التنفيذي هم السلطة الفعلية، ومن وقتها زادت النزعة التوسعية والعدوانية خاصة مع تيودور روزفلت
ما لفت نظري في هذا الكتاب هو كمية "البجاحة" والغطرسة التي يمكن أن تتصف بها قوة عظمى، وهو ما يدفعها إلى التجاهل التام لرغبات أو أمن الدول والكيانات الأصغر من حولها. وكما اعتبرت بريطانيا مثلا أن من حقها احتلال واستنزاف الهند، ثم احتلال واستنزاف مصر من أجل "تأمين الطريق إلى الهند" (!!) ثم احتلال السودان لتأمين احتلالها لمصر (!!!!!)، ووصل بها الأمر إلى احتلال شريط كامل من أقصى شمال أفريقيا لأقصى جنوبها - بنفس الطريقة، اعتبرت الولايات المتحدة أن نصف الكرة الغربي هو ملعبها الخاص الذي لا يجب أن يشاركها فيه أحد، بل أنها طردت أسبانيا من مستعمراتها، خاصة في كوبا. وتمكنت قبل ذلك من ضم ألاسكا، وبعد ذلك بفترة ضمت جزر هاواي في منتصف المحيط الهادي
بل إن المؤلف يحكي أن "سيوارد" وزير خارجية أمريكا الداهية أخذ يقنع نفسه أو الآخرين بأن جزيرة كوبا لم تتكون إلا من الرمال التي ينزحها نهر المسيسيبي من ضفتيه أثناء جريانه إلى الجنوب ويلقي بها في خليج المكسيك، وأنها لذلك ليست إلا أرضا أمريكية. وكان سيوارد باستمرار يحاول ضم كل الجزر والدول الصغيرة في أمريكا الوسطى والبحر الكاريبي، بل أنه كان يخطط لضم جرينلاند وأيسلند !! ولم ينجح أثناء ولايته إلا في ضم ألاسكا التي اشترتها من روسيا ب5 ملايين دولار، حيث أن روسيا لم تكن تريد تلك الأرض القاحلة الشاسعة التي لم تكن تستفيد منها
كتاب مهم لفهم كيف تفكر الدول القوية والغنية في الدول الصغيرة والكحيانة
August 3, 2011
After reading "The Post American World" by the same author I went out to look for another of his books. From "Wealth to power" happed to be my secon one!
Zakaria explains why America became a world power in the "unusual," halting, delayed manner that it did. This book puts the events of 1898 and the diplomacy of Teddy Roosevelt in a fascinating light. He restores the fame and reputation of one of the great American statesmen -- William Henry Seward. It's *very* well written with interesting, well chosen anecdotes.
Zakaria explains why America became a world power in the "unusual," halting, delayed manner that it did. This book puts the events of 1898 and the diplomacy of Teddy Roosevelt in a fascinating light. He restores the fame and reputation of one of the great American statesmen -- William Henry Seward. It's *very* well written with interesting, well chosen anecdotes.
Want to read
August 13, 2008I started reading this book a while back, but it wasn't the right time (I was in the mood for something more brain-candyish). Now that I've begun it again, it seems more obvious to me that this is Fareed's dissertation. Not that that's a bad thing -- it's just stylistically different from what I remember of his book on Illiberal Freedom.
Fareed can do no wrong. I am sure once I get past the stage-setting (political theory) section in the beginning, I will be captured by the story of how the US moved into a position of world dominance. I don't mean to make the beginning sound boring -- it's not -- it's just that Fareed has some stiff competition from the other books I'm reading concurrently.
Fareed rocks! Check out his show GPS on CNN Sundays (1pm Eastern, 10am Pacific).
Fareed can do no wrong. I am sure once I get past the stage-setting (political theory) section in the beginning, I will be captured by the story of how the US moved into a position of world dominance. I don't mean to make the beginning sound boring -- it's not -- it's just that Fareed has some stiff competition from the other books I'm reading concurrently.
Fareed rocks! Check out his show GPS on CNN Sundays (1pm Eastern, 10am Pacific).
November 19, 2025
This book was a real tour-de-force that made me reflect a lot on many subjects. I had started it because I was interested in the thesis and thought it might shed some light on the rising powers of China and Brazil, who are economically powerful but in terms of power politics still punching much below their weight.
I'm not sure how far it succeeded in serving that specific purpose, but it opened my eyes in many other ways. Perhaps this thesis could apply to Brazil, but it does not seem to apply to China.
The book starts off giving some basic background information about IR theory and a number of theoretical models about state interactions. Classical realism and defensive realism are dealt with at some length, though not offensive realism of the school of Mearsheimer etc.
I had long been a committed defensive realist, with some caveats. For example the balance of power theory seems to be predicated on the experience of Europe in the last several centuries. This is another example of a Eurocentric perspective being universalized, as Mignolo discussed in an earlier book I read.
Balance of power might be unique to Europe, as scholars have pointed out that there was no balance against, say, China in the Far East. Nonetheless, defensive realism's basic tenet that aggressive expansion provokes united resistance from other states is sound. It has demonstrably occurred over and over in Europe.
The problem is that many defensive realists after the fall of the Soviet Union predicted that the unipolarity of American hegemony would not last, that Europe would unite in resistance. It did not happen. And there's all the different strategies at play of chain-ganging and buck-passing that Zakaria does not examine too closely.
The main thrust of his argument is that the defensive realists are wrong. Or at least they are wrong more often than they are right. No doubt in cases like Nazi Germany or Napoleon the defensive realist position is valid. Every other state *did* unite to stop the aggression.
But in terms of explaining state expansion I believe Zakaria has a strong case that defensive realism is often inadequate. That school posits that states expand when they feel insecure. But, as Zakaria notes, insecurity is such a vague and subjective notion that it is hard to find an instance where it could not be applied. He notes with wry humor that it would be absurd for Napoleon to claim that he was conquering Europe in self-defense, but as a matter of fact that's exactly what he claimed.
What policy is not defensive, then? Zakaria instead suggests that a better approach is to be found in classical realism with the unique addition of state-centered realism, Zakaria's own invention.
This really intrigued me because I have long been a critic of what I call the etatist tendency in history. In short my criticism is that the average person who has become so used to the omnipotence of the modern nation-state assumes that every government in any time period was essentially similar.
So, for example, they might think that the Spain of the 1500s knew everything that her subjects were doing, and were directing them consciously and deliberately like the US State Department or the US Army would today.
But, of course, this is nonsense. The primitive historical states were poor, weak, and ignorant. Until the adoption of regular surveys and censuses they did not even know how many people they had or how much their country produced. This is relevant to the question of imperialism because the colonizers were mostly working at best without the metropole's knowledge, and sometimes even against its directives.
In the context of Zakaria, the etatist fallacy goes a long way towards explaining the failure of the United States to expand after the American Civil War. To put it simply, the state was simply too small and too weak.
Perhaps the most interesting section of the book revolves around the competition between the Presidency and the Congress. For a long time Congress controlled foreign policy and would repudiate treaties or agreements signed by the Presidency. Thus we are told of a long litany of attempts by various presidents like Grant or Harrison, or Secretaries of State, most notably William Seward, to acquire territory outside of the United States, most often through purchase.
Since Congress had to appropriate the money, these initiatives were all defeated in the Senate or House. And not because the legislature was necessarily anti-expansionist, but simply because it felt that these were threats by the executive to extend its powers.
Zakaria explains that this began to change as the bureaucracy became more professionalized and as Congressional patronage declined. This was the object of the Progressive Era, for example.
Starting with McKinley the Presidency became much stronger in its relation to the Congress, and this really hit its strike under Teddy Roosevelt.
This correlated convincingly with American expansion. Zakaria argues that the strengthening of the executive and the growth of state, as opposed to just national, power, permitted this change in foreign policy.
He is less convinced by economic explanations, and does not think that the US expanded in reaction to threats. He notes that the US expanded when and where it had the opportunity to, and retracted when faced by real threats. Such as from Japan or Britain, or France in Mexico. He notes an interesting aside that the British Empire lasted so long by appeasing the US in the Western Hemisphere. And just as the British found it difficult to project power in the Americas against the US, so the US found it difficult to project power to East Asia, where the US similarly appeased Japan.
One might say that the acquisition of the Philippines actually *created* a vulnerability where one did not exist before. And as William Braisted observed in a paper, Russia was actually useful as a balance and her defeat in 1905 made the Philippines less secure. Thus the 1907 War Scare.
In this sense too, Zakaria notes that whereas in earlier decades the US was unconcerned about developments in Latin America or Europe, it began to see them as threats as its own influence and interests expanded.
This has much attraction as a theory for me because it also largely explains the European colonial expansion. Defensive realism can go far here too, as Zakaria himself notes, somewhat mockingly, in regards to the British expansion in East Africa, ostensibly to defend India and Suez.
But equally the Europeans might have, like the United States, simply expanded where they found the costs low and perceived benefits high. He contrasts this in regards to, say, Canada, whose acquisition would not be a very great gain, but which would be costly, to the acquisition of Hawaii.
This easily explains the expansion after the Spanish-American War. Because Spain was weak and the US could. Zakaria uses the example of India to demonstrate this more clearly, saying that India was a powerful nation but a weak state. The Mughals had only a limited ability to actually tap the resources of their country, while the British were much more efficient at mobilizing their resources.
Ergo, even though their resources might have been less overall, they were able to concentrate more of them on military power. One might compare this with, say, the Prussian victory over France in 1871.
There is some correlation between economic depression and anti-expansionist moods. For example Zakaria believes that the depression in 1873 reduced the country's zeal for acquiring a base in the Caribbean, and the depression in the 1890s helped defeat the attempted annexation of Hawaii in 1893.
Mahan argued that the rise of various European powers was predicated on their political unification. So that we see the idea of state-centered realism valid here too. France, for example, began to expand after the kingdom was consolidated by Richelieu. Spain began to expand after the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella. Germany began her expansion under Bismarck, and Japan after the Meiji Restoration. This is the most attractive aspect of the theory, it can be easily applied to other countries and time periods.
We might quibble with some of Zakaria's contentions. He argues, for example, that the idea of the United States being shielded by the Royal Navy for the first two centuries of its existence is a myth. That the Royal Navy was the largest threat.
This, I feel, is misunderstanding the nature of seapower. Geopoliticians like Spykman are fully justified in pointing out that the Royal Navy defended the US, and did not threaten it.
This was because the British were so vulnerable to invasion that they dare not maintain any large concentration of naval force far from Europe for long. In effect, the Royal Navy was permanently tethered to Europe to deflect the threat of France above all, but later of Germany as well. While at the same time, the necessity to defend the British Empire ensured that the British themselves confined their rivals fleets to Europe. Not to defend the US, but to defend their own colonies.
In this way the European fleets in effect cancelled each other out. All of them were permanently tied to Europe, leaving little with which to threaten the United States.
Zakaria also states at one point that the American Civil War did little to advance government authority. This seems like a strange contention to me. As the greatest crisis in American history, and as the first time the government really took control of the country to mobilize resources for war, this must have had a profound effect.
Zakaria has little time for those who argue that the US expanded in reaction to Germany in the 1890s, and though he mentions the Wisconsin School and the New Left, he does not seem to take them very seriously. He notes that the US practiced some idealized diplomacy such as the Open Door and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, policies it could not defend or support.
Apart from a few minor disagreements like the above, I found this work both insightful and useful. We should bear in mind that nations are not their governments, that strong nations can have weak governments, and that powers that are enormously rich can be seemingly inexplicably weak on the world stage.
I feel that the only question remaining is one of inclination. Zakaria mentions that Germany and Japan today are economically very powerful, but militarily very weak. I do not think this is because, as may be the case in India or Brazil, that the state is weak or inefficient. We may have to account for the welfare state as a factor for reduced military power in the international field.
But all of this is mere pedantry. I would strongly recommend that this book be read, it will make you think hard on a lot of issues. I will probably be coming back to this book again and again over the next several years.
I'm not sure how far it succeeded in serving that specific purpose, but it opened my eyes in many other ways. Perhaps this thesis could apply to Brazil, but it does not seem to apply to China.
The book starts off giving some basic background information about IR theory and a number of theoretical models about state interactions. Classical realism and defensive realism are dealt with at some length, though not offensive realism of the school of Mearsheimer etc.
I had long been a committed defensive realist, with some caveats. For example the balance of power theory seems to be predicated on the experience of Europe in the last several centuries. This is another example of a Eurocentric perspective being universalized, as Mignolo discussed in an earlier book I read.
Balance of power might be unique to Europe, as scholars have pointed out that there was no balance against, say, China in the Far East. Nonetheless, defensive realism's basic tenet that aggressive expansion provokes united resistance from other states is sound. It has demonstrably occurred over and over in Europe.
The problem is that many defensive realists after the fall of the Soviet Union predicted that the unipolarity of American hegemony would not last, that Europe would unite in resistance. It did not happen. And there's all the different strategies at play of chain-ganging and buck-passing that Zakaria does not examine too closely.
The main thrust of his argument is that the defensive realists are wrong. Or at least they are wrong more often than they are right. No doubt in cases like Nazi Germany or Napoleon the defensive realist position is valid. Every other state *did* unite to stop the aggression.
But in terms of explaining state expansion I believe Zakaria has a strong case that defensive realism is often inadequate. That school posits that states expand when they feel insecure. But, as Zakaria notes, insecurity is such a vague and subjective notion that it is hard to find an instance where it could not be applied. He notes with wry humor that it would be absurd for Napoleon to claim that he was conquering Europe in self-defense, but as a matter of fact that's exactly what he claimed.
What policy is not defensive, then? Zakaria instead suggests that a better approach is to be found in classical realism with the unique addition of state-centered realism, Zakaria's own invention.
This really intrigued me because I have long been a critic of what I call the etatist tendency in history. In short my criticism is that the average person who has become so used to the omnipotence of the modern nation-state assumes that every government in any time period was essentially similar.
So, for example, they might think that the Spain of the 1500s knew everything that her subjects were doing, and were directing them consciously and deliberately like the US State Department or the US Army would today.
But, of course, this is nonsense. The primitive historical states were poor, weak, and ignorant. Until the adoption of regular surveys and censuses they did not even know how many people they had or how much their country produced. This is relevant to the question of imperialism because the colonizers were mostly working at best without the metropole's knowledge, and sometimes even against its directives.
In the context of Zakaria, the etatist fallacy goes a long way towards explaining the failure of the United States to expand after the American Civil War. To put it simply, the state was simply too small and too weak.
Perhaps the most interesting section of the book revolves around the competition between the Presidency and the Congress. For a long time Congress controlled foreign policy and would repudiate treaties or agreements signed by the Presidency. Thus we are told of a long litany of attempts by various presidents like Grant or Harrison, or Secretaries of State, most notably William Seward, to acquire territory outside of the United States, most often through purchase.
Since Congress had to appropriate the money, these initiatives were all defeated in the Senate or House. And not because the legislature was necessarily anti-expansionist, but simply because it felt that these were threats by the executive to extend its powers.
Zakaria explains that this began to change as the bureaucracy became more professionalized and as Congressional patronage declined. This was the object of the Progressive Era, for example.
Starting with McKinley the Presidency became much stronger in its relation to the Congress, and this really hit its strike under Teddy Roosevelt.
This correlated convincingly with American expansion. Zakaria argues that the strengthening of the executive and the growth of state, as opposed to just national, power, permitted this change in foreign policy.
He is less convinced by economic explanations, and does not think that the US expanded in reaction to threats. He notes that the US expanded when and where it had the opportunity to, and retracted when faced by real threats. Such as from Japan or Britain, or France in Mexico. He notes an interesting aside that the British Empire lasted so long by appeasing the US in the Western Hemisphere. And just as the British found it difficult to project power in the Americas against the US, so the US found it difficult to project power to East Asia, where the US similarly appeased Japan.
One might say that the acquisition of the Philippines actually *created* a vulnerability where one did not exist before. And as William Braisted observed in a paper, Russia was actually useful as a balance and her defeat in 1905 made the Philippines less secure. Thus the 1907 War Scare.
In this sense too, Zakaria notes that whereas in earlier decades the US was unconcerned about developments in Latin America or Europe, it began to see them as threats as its own influence and interests expanded.
This has much attraction as a theory for me because it also largely explains the European colonial expansion. Defensive realism can go far here too, as Zakaria himself notes, somewhat mockingly, in regards to the British expansion in East Africa, ostensibly to defend India and Suez.
But equally the Europeans might have, like the United States, simply expanded where they found the costs low and perceived benefits high. He contrasts this in regards to, say, Canada, whose acquisition would not be a very great gain, but which would be costly, to the acquisition of Hawaii.
This easily explains the expansion after the Spanish-American War. Because Spain was weak and the US could. Zakaria uses the example of India to demonstrate this more clearly, saying that India was a powerful nation but a weak state. The Mughals had only a limited ability to actually tap the resources of their country, while the British were much more efficient at mobilizing their resources.
Ergo, even though their resources might have been less overall, they were able to concentrate more of them on military power. One might compare this with, say, the Prussian victory over France in 1871.
There is some correlation between economic depression and anti-expansionist moods. For example Zakaria believes that the depression in 1873 reduced the country's zeal for acquiring a base in the Caribbean, and the depression in the 1890s helped defeat the attempted annexation of Hawaii in 1893.
Mahan argued that the rise of various European powers was predicated on their political unification. So that we see the idea of state-centered realism valid here too. France, for example, began to expand after the kingdom was consolidated by Richelieu. Spain began to expand after the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella. Germany began her expansion under Bismarck, and Japan after the Meiji Restoration. This is the most attractive aspect of the theory, it can be easily applied to other countries and time periods.
We might quibble with some of Zakaria's contentions. He argues, for example, that the idea of the United States being shielded by the Royal Navy for the first two centuries of its existence is a myth. That the Royal Navy was the largest threat.
This, I feel, is misunderstanding the nature of seapower. Geopoliticians like Spykman are fully justified in pointing out that the Royal Navy defended the US, and did not threaten it.
This was because the British were so vulnerable to invasion that they dare not maintain any large concentration of naval force far from Europe for long. In effect, the Royal Navy was permanently tethered to Europe to deflect the threat of France above all, but later of Germany as well. While at the same time, the necessity to defend the British Empire ensured that the British themselves confined their rivals fleets to Europe. Not to defend the US, but to defend their own colonies.
In this way the European fleets in effect cancelled each other out. All of them were permanently tied to Europe, leaving little with which to threaten the United States.
Zakaria also states at one point that the American Civil War did little to advance government authority. This seems like a strange contention to me. As the greatest crisis in American history, and as the first time the government really took control of the country to mobilize resources for war, this must have had a profound effect.
Zakaria has little time for those who argue that the US expanded in reaction to Germany in the 1890s, and though he mentions the Wisconsin School and the New Left, he does not seem to take them very seriously. He notes that the US practiced some idealized diplomacy such as the Open Door and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, policies it could not defend or support.
Apart from a few minor disagreements like the above, I found this work both insightful and useful. We should bear in mind that nations are not their governments, that strong nations can have weak governments, and that powers that are enormously rich can be seemingly inexplicably weak on the world stage.
I feel that the only question remaining is one of inclination. Zakaria mentions that Germany and Japan today are economically very powerful, but militarily very weak. I do not think this is because, as may be the case in India or Brazil, that the state is weak or inefficient. We may have to account for the welfare state as a factor for reduced military power in the international field.
But all of this is mere pedantry. I would strongly recommend that this book be read, it will make you think hard on a lot of issues. I will probably be coming back to this book again and again over the next several years.
March 8, 2011
This book grew out of Fareed Zakaria's doctoral dissertation. It displays the breadth and depth of his scholarship in international politics, political history and political theory. It also showcases his tremendous talent for good, lucid, compelling prose, which I think is a big part of his appeal. Since I'm writing this review about a year after actually reading the book, I'll have to go back to it to produce any more specific commentary.
January 21, 2015
Fareed Zakaria provided a new approach in realism which he called "state-centered realism." He, throughout the book ,proved that state-centered realism was more effective in predicting America's foreign policy from 1865-1903 than Defensive realism .
October 6, 2024
Readers with a particular interest in American foreign policy, of an academic bent, and looking for something very in-depth, would enjoy and gain from reading this. For others, it is too dry and reads like a dissertation (which it was based off). For leisure readers, I would recommend Fareed Zakaria's other books. In other words, this is a great book but only for the right audience.
July 30, 2008
This book uses several popular political science theories to explain the rise to prominence of the United States in the late 19th century. The author's conclusion is that the growing internal power of the American state led to a greater role for the country abroad. The book provides both an interesting history of the United States in the period between the Civil War and World War II, and an important test case for several theories of state growth. However, I would only recommend this book to someone with a background in political science, because the writing is very dense and assumes a familiarity with the source material.
April 4, 2013
Very dry. Basically a thesis paper. A significant amount of time was spent on explaining what factors didn't spur the transition the US took from a great economic power to a political one, and it wasn't until probably around 40 pages that Zakaria started talking about the factors that did cause this.
This is much drier than most of Zakaria's more popular, layman's work. I still enjoyed the topic, but it's more like reading a Special Report in the Economist than listening to an interview on Charlie Rose.
This is much drier than most of Zakaria's more popular, layman's work. I still enjoyed the topic, but it's more like reading a Special Report in the Economist than listening to an interview on Charlie Rose.
February 14, 2008
Well, if you are going to read a book on IR theory from the realist perspective, this would probably not be a bad one to choose. It offers some well-guided criticisms of classical realism and shifts focus to domestics constraints on action (such as the unwillingness of Congress to project American power abroad), but really fails (in my mind) to salvage realism from the problems it faces in a post-Cold War world.
September 25, 2008
In this book Fareed Zakaria provides a compelling argument that links the growth and expansion of nations with the nation's wealth and the centralization of power.
August 24, 2013
A lot of academic jargon here. Zakaria is one of my favorite authors, but this isn't his best work.
August 11, 2011
Worth reading again in today's chaotic economy.
August 3, 2012
Not quite the insight of Chomsky, but Zakaria is one of the most nuanced observers of foreign policy living today.
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