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Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End?
Japan is shifting onto a new trajectory for a more muscular national security policy, US-Japan alliance ties functioning for regional and global security, and the encirclement of China's influence in East Asia. The author explores how PM Abe Shinz?'s doctrine may prove contradictory and counter-productive to Japanese national interests.
125 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 27, 2015
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January 15, 2018
Hughes connects historical revisionism in Japan to the security policy changes of Prime Minister Abe since 2012. In doing so Hughes fails to distinguish whether the new policies would be legitimate even if they were not, as he believes, the result of historical revisionism. This flaw comes through in the last two paragraphs of the book when Hughes states that instead of resorting to revisionist arguments to justify policy changes, Japan should emphasize its post-war decades as a responsible actor while settling historical issues and becoming more independent of the US. As a result, we are left unsure of whether it is the justification or the policies that Hughes disagrees with.
In fact, throughout the narrative Hughes outlines the basis for many of Abe's policy changes before dismissing the new policy as evidence of a radical revisionist tendency. Does Hughes believe that policymakers and alliance managers in the US and Japan talk about new policies in terms of revisionism, or is the revisionist goal only seen in measured statements by Abe and more direct statements by a select group of supporters?
It is unfortunate that this book is so flawed because the basis for it is sound. Hughes could have argued that Abe's security reforms are the result of a revisionist outlook and, collectively, represent a dramatic shift in Japan's security posture. Within this argument, which is what was made, he should have discussed why alternative explanations are less valid. For example, why are foreign political leaders who exploit Japanese politics to prolong historical debates less responsible than Abe in hindering negotiations? Why is Japan's decades-long track record of acting responsibly not evidence that Abe's security reforms can be carried out in a responsible manner? Why is Japan's revisionism at odds with international law when, in some cases, it is seeking to exercise defensive rights afforded every single other country under international law?
Another major flaw, more apparent in 2016 and 2017 with North Korean missile launches, is that Hughes does not address the extent to which Abe is addressing legitimate threats to Japan. Even with the security changes Abe has made, he has still not exceeded the limit of 1% of GDP on defense spending. With a Chinese submarine recently entering waters near the Senkaku Islands and the prospect of more North Korean missile launches, it would have been a worthwhile discussion to consider how much farther the Abe Doctrine may go.
This book is worthwhile as a concise summary of security policy changes between 2012 and 2014 and the basis for those changes. It is unfortunate that its methods are weak because the discussion is an essential one to have. As a result, it is disappointing that it is so easy to poke holes in this book. Considering the dramatic shifts that Hughes is describing and the potential dangers, countering his claims should not be so easy.
In fact, throughout the narrative Hughes outlines the basis for many of Abe's policy changes before dismissing the new policy as evidence of a radical revisionist tendency. Does Hughes believe that policymakers and alliance managers in the US and Japan talk about new policies in terms of revisionism, or is the revisionist goal only seen in measured statements by Abe and more direct statements by a select group of supporters?
It is unfortunate that this book is so flawed because the basis for it is sound. Hughes could have argued that Abe's security reforms are the result of a revisionist outlook and, collectively, represent a dramatic shift in Japan's security posture. Within this argument, which is what was made, he should have discussed why alternative explanations are less valid. For example, why are foreign political leaders who exploit Japanese politics to prolong historical debates less responsible than Abe in hindering negotiations? Why is Japan's decades-long track record of acting responsibly not evidence that Abe's security reforms can be carried out in a responsible manner? Why is Japan's revisionism at odds with international law when, in some cases, it is seeking to exercise defensive rights afforded every single other country under international law?
Another major flaw, more apparent in 2016 and 2017 with North Korean missile launches, is that Hughes does not address the extent to which Abe is addressing legitimate threats to Japan. Even with the security changes Abe has made, he has still not exceeded the limit of 1% of GDP on defense spending. With a Chinese submarine recently entering waters near the Senkaku Islands and the prospect of more North Korean missile launches, it would have been a worthwhile discussion to consider how much farther the Abe Doctrine may go.
This book is worthwhile as a concise summary of security policy changes between 2012 and 2014 and the basis for those changes. It is unfortunate that its methods are weak because the discussion is an essential one to have. As a result, it is disappointing that it is so easy to poke holes in this book. Considering the dramatic shifts that Hughes is describing and the potential dangers, countering his claims should not be so easy.
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