A present from friends, this is a good example of a book I probably wouldn't have bought myself but was a very enjoyable read. I have read a lot about the Western Desert Campaign but hadn't previously heard of Maj Gen John Strawson. This is a reissue of a book from 1969 and is a very worthwhile addition to the many volumes already available on this campaign.
One caution, however: it is not the book for anyone fairly new to the subject. Though he discusses the battles, and gives some stirring soldiers' accounts of the fighting, he mostly offers a broad strategic overview of the war in North Africa, and assumes quite a lot of prior knowledge in his readership. My edition also has no maps, which would make it difficult for any reader coming fresh to the campaign.
The writing, especially compared with the "yoof TV presenter" style affected by some modern military historians or the "cut-and-paste unit war diaries" approach of most of the others, is a breath of fresh air - forthright, well-organised, and erudite. I can't recall a previous military history work which concluded with a Latin epigram adapted from Tacitus ! And in addition to well-chosen quotations from Churchill, Rommel, JFC Fuller, Wavell and others, he offers pithy, knowledgeable analysis of his own:
"{Rommel} was always critical of British command arrangements, above all of their not choosing tank specialists as Army commanders in a conflict where the handling of armour was paramount.";
".......the truth was that the battle for North Africa was marked on the British side by strategic vision linked to tactical deficiency, and on the Axis side by tactical brilliance manacled to strategic blundering." (as a retired British general he was considerate enough of his colleagues to say "tactical deficiency" rather than "tactical blundering", which would perhaps have been more accurate - and a neater quote).
Faults ? The lack of maps mainly. But also (ironically given the subject matter) the book gives the impression of being a compromise between the one the author wanted to write and the one his publisher agreed to publish. You get the impression Gen Strawson was asked to "cut" quite a lot to create a shorter book (and save on costs). There were many changes in command in the 8th Army before the arrival of Alexander and Montgomery, and some of these chaps are introduced perfunctorily or not at all, the name just popping up apropos of nothing instead of the previous GOC's. Again, this would be a problem for a reader not already very familiar with Wavell, Auchinleck, O'Connor, Cunningham, Ritchie, Gott.......(cont. p94)
And an author who generally writes so lucidly would probably like to rephrase a few clumsy passages:
".......had Wavell long before not established the logistic foundations which were indispensable.......";
"Hitler's decision to invade Russia and win there the decisive objective which had eluded him in the West - this reorientation of Axis strategy clearly had a major influence on Britain's intentions and capabilities. As was customary with a Minister of Defence who had such a passionate grasp of detail, combined with a determination that British arms should not stand idle whilst an ally was in distress......." Whoooah, Neddy ! We've shifted the subject from Hitler to Churchill without even drawing breath !
In summary, read other accounts of the campaign first. but if you're interested in the 8th Army in WW2, read this one too.