A few years ago there was something of a vogue for applying the theory of war to business management. Yet military high command is increasingly a matter of applying the theory of business management to war.
An American colonel in Afghanistan criticised his superiors for making war by 'Power Point,' and was promptly sent home for saying so, but no one contradicted him. Sir Peter’s commentary on the First Iraq War or Gulf War, over a decade before, suggests this trend has been developing for some time. His own conflicts in this book take the form of presentations rather than gunfights.
It is important to note that this is a commentary, a personal recollection, not an overall history of the war as a whole. So, while there was serious fighting going on elsewhere, it is not Sir Peter’s function to describe it here – even if he cannot resist including a few exciting second-hand anecdotes. Its value is as a record of what the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Coalition and Commander of the British Forces saw, heard, thought, said, and did himself. As such it is fascinating.
The most telling aspect is the contrast between this book, which focuses on a single campaign, and his swashbuckling memoirs, ‘Looking for Trouble,’ where the focus is more on the breath of his earlier career as a junior and field officer with the SAS. In this book, the action takes the form of briefings, formal and informal meetings, lobbying, and telephone conversations – it could be the biography of a high-level corporate executive, except that at the end of the decision-making process, men go into battle.
Such is the nature of modern generalship that Sir Peter’s greatest achievement in the campaign is lobbying successfully for an organisational change which transferred a British armoured brigade to a separate British divisional structure. This might not sound like much of a contribution but it almost certainly saved lives.
It is to his credit that in all the political and bureaucratic manoeuvring, he never loses sight on how the actions of the high command impact on the men in the front line. As one of the most experienced and decorated combat officers of his generation, he has nothing to prove, so he understands his role is to make sure his troops have every possible advantage before the fighting begins and then to keep out of their way.
It is hardly Napoleon at the Bridge of Lodi, but it is an excellent illustration of how modern should be fought. In one respect, Sir Peter and his colleagues were too successful: their campaign tends not be taken seriously by the media because the casualties were, in the end, unexpectedly light – which is, of course, precisely why it deserves to be admired and studied.