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Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World
There’s little doubt that most humans today are better off than their forebears. Stunningly so, the economist and historian Deirdre McCloskey argues in the concluding volume of her trilogy celebrating the oft-derided virtues of the bourgeoisie. The poorest of humanity, McCloskey shows, will soon be joining the comparative riches of Japan and Sweden and Botswana.
Why? Most economists—from Adam Smith and Karl Marx to Thomas Piketty—say the Great Enrichment since 1800 came from accumulated capital. McCloskey disagrees, fiercely. “Our riches,” she argues, “were made not by piling brick on brick, bank balance on bank balance, but by piling idea on idea.” Capital was necessary, but so was the presence of oxygen. It was ideas, not matter, that drove “trade-tested betterment.” Nor were institutions the drivers. The World Bank orthodoxy of “add institutions and stir” doesn’t work, and didn’t. McCloskey builds a powerful case for the initiating role of ideas—ideas for electric motors and free elections, of course, but more deeply the bizarre and liberal ideas of equal liberty and dignity for ordinary folk. Liberalism arose from theological and political revolutions in northwest Europe, yielding a unique respect for betterment and its practitioners, and upending ancient hierarchies. Commoners were encouraged to have a go, and the bourgeoisie took up the Bourgeois Deal, and we were all enriched.
Few economists or historians write like McCloskey—her ability to invest the facts of economic history with the urgency of a novel, or of a leading case at law, is unmatched. She summarizes modern economics and modern economic history with verve and lucidity, yet sees through to the really big scientific conclusion. Not matter, but ideas. Big books don’t come any more ambitious, or captivating, than Bourgeois Equality .
Why? Most economists—from Adam Smith and Karl Marx to Thomas Piketty—say the Great Enrichment since 1800 came from accumulated capital. McCloskey disagrees, fiercely. “Our riches,” she argues, “were made not by piling brick on brick, bank balance on bank balance, but by piling idea on idea.” Capital was necessary, but so was the presence of oxygen. It was ideas, not matter, that drove “trade-tested betterment.” Nor were institutions the drivers. The World Bank orthodoxy of “add institutions and stir” doesn’t work, and didn’t. McCloskey builds a powerful case for the initiating role of ideas—ideas for electric motors and free elections, of course, but more deeply the bizarre and liberal ideas of equal liberty and dignity for ordinary folk. Liberalism arose from theological and political revolutions in northwest Europe, yielding a unique respect for betterment and its practitioners, and upending ancient hierarchies. Commoners were encouraged to have a go, and the bourgeoisie took up the Bourgeois Deal, and we were all enriched.
Few economists or historians write like McCloskey—her ability to invest the facts of economic history with the urgency of a novel, or of a leading case at law, is unmatched. She summarizes modern economics and modern economic history with verve and lucidity, yet sees through to the really big scientific conclusion. Not matter, but ideas. Big books don’t come any more ambitious, or captivating, than Bourgeois Equality .
768 pages, Hardcover
First published April 18, 2016
146 people are currently reading
1962 people want to read
About the author
Deirdre Nansen McCloskey
60 books313 followersDeirdre Nansen McCloskey has been distinguished professor of economics and history and professor of English and communications at the University of Illinois at Chicago. She is the author of numerous books, including Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
July 8, 2018
Amazingly, after about 21 months, I have finished this book! For those who are even harder-core autodidacts than I, this is the second of a trilogy.
Nonetheless, if you want your college-in-a-box major of economic history, this is absolutely the book.
Despite the discursive, tangential--and entertaining--style (why write one sentence when you can turn it into five paragraphs?), Professor McCloskey has some very key points to make that can be found nowhere else:
a)The increase in the world's standard of living since 1800 has not been incremental but leaps and bounds: 10, 30, 100 times better. This she terms "The Great Enrichment."
b) The reason for this is that not until the 1700s (Dutch) and 1800s (England/Scotland) did national cultures exist which dignified and respected work and workers/tradesmen. Even Shakespeare was guilty of elevating only the aristocrats/"clerisy" and looking down his nose at business and trade. We take this approach for granted--at least some do--now, but it is rare, and fortunate for us that it developed. Her term for this is "trade-tested betterment."
c) The great breakthroughs that have occurred are not due to capitalism, socialism, or science, but to-again, this dignifying of work, governments getting out of the way and not actively discouraging improvement, and engineers/tinkerers who test and compete to improve things.
I recommend this book to those who like understanding systems, economies, history, and the standard of living. For potential readers and acolytes, it is my fondest hope that someone writes a Cliff Notes guide to the book so that it becomes more accessible to a wide range of people.
This is a profound and learned book, comprehensive, useful, and most of all, optimistic.
Nonetheless, if you want your college-in-a-box major of economic history, this is absolutely the book.
Despite the discursive, tangential--and entertaining--style (why write one sentence when you can turn it into five paragraphs?), Professor McCloskey has some very key points to make that can be found nowhere else:
a)The increase in the world's standard of living since 1800 has not been incremental but leaps and bounds: 10, 30, 100 times better. This she terms "The Great Enrichment."
b) The reason for this is that not until the 1700s (Dutch) and 1800s (England/Scotland) did national cultures exist which dignified and respected work and workers/tradesmen. Even Shakespeare was guilty of elevating only the aristocrats/"clerisy" and looking down his nose at business and trade. We take this approach for granted--at least some do--now, but it is rare, and fortunate for us that it developed. Her term for this is "trade-tested betterment."
c) The great breakthroughs that have occurred are not due to capitalism, socialism, or science, but to-again, this dignifying of work, governments getting out of the way and not actively discouraging improvement, and engineers/tinkerers who test and compete to improve things.
I recommend this book to those who like understanding systems, economies, history, and the standard of living. For potential readers and acolytes, it is my fondest hope that someone writes a Cliff Notes guide to the book so that it becomes more accessible to a wide range of people.
This is a profound and learned book, comprehensive, useful, and most of all, optimistic.
July 14, 2016
The following is my decidedly non-expert review of Bourgeois Equality. I can't do full justice to this punchy, provocative, wide-ranging, and above all massive tome, but I can pick out some key themes for further reflection.
McCloskey's first step is to convince the reader that the world has undergone what she calls The Great Enrichment. That is, for most of human history, the world lived on the equivalent of $3-6 per day (in current US purchasing power). While a few nations (Haiti, Afghanistan) still fall into that range, the average world income has risen to around $33 (e.g., Brazil). Rich nations are significantly better: $130 for the USA, and around $100 for Japan, France, and Finland. Almost all this economic growth occurred since 1800. In only about 200 years, many nations became 30 times richer than they used to be. Checking McCloskey's sources reveals that though calculations may vary on the order of a few percentage points, she has indeed identified and rightly labeled a Great Enrichment. And this must be one of the most significant developments in history.
Consequently, one of the most important questions a historian or economist or anyone interested in the material welfare of world must ask is what caused such this sudden and exponential enrichment. Much of the book is dedicated to weeding out previous answers to this question. In particular, McCloskey is at pains to rule out both capital and institutions. Historical economists have established that market economies, significant commerce, and accumulation of capital have all existed in many societies. Thus, "capitalism" in the sense of attention to capital cannot explain a historical disjuncture of the size registered here (Here she takes aim at Thomas Piketty and Charles Tilley.) As for institutions, McCloskey acknowledges that many formal institutions—property rights, legal incentives and disincentives—may be necessary for supporting enrichment, but are not sufficient to cause it. After all, they too have been found in many societies across time and the globe.
McCloskey submits her own explanation: bourgeois dignity and bourgeois equality leading to trade-tested betterment. She argues that prior to the great enrichment, no society valorized the life of the common person "having a go" and benefiting or failing based on their ability to innovate. Literature from around the ancient world celebrated the aristocratic, knightly, and sometimes even the peasant life, but the merchant way of living was always looked down on as somewhat less than honorable. (Think, for example, of hostile attitudes toward Jews throughout history.) McCloskey then turns to literature and other documentary evidence to show that new, positive ways of thinking about commoners engaging in entrepreneurial activity had taken hold in The Netherlands and England by around 1700. McCloskey notes that new virtues were being emphasized in literature and drama. Instead of the reckless aristocratic courage of The Song of Roland or the wily tricks of Shakespeare's peasants, a reader can now admire the calculating prudence of Robinson Crusoe. This new rhetoric often paralleled political developments in which the common person was receiving more dignity and demanding more say. Often these developments led to the dissolving of protected industries, offering an equality of opportunity to enter production. It is important to note that McCloskey is arguing for a change at the level of society, that is, between people; this stands in contrast to a Weber-style assertion of psychological change at the level of the individual. (Though I wonder if Weber cannot be read or at least re-read more sociologically.)
The new dignity and equality afforded the bourgeois allowed them to engage in trade-tested betterment. Betterment, for McCloskey, is any kind of innovation that increases the production of goods or services. Many of these are technological, but improved methods and organization can also fall under this umbrella. Lest the reader be tempted to attribute these betterments to the rise of science, McCloskey argues that advances in scientific theory ("high science") only late in history began to have a significant effect on the economy. Most profitable betterments up through the nineteenth century derived from what she calls tinkering, entrepreneurs making small adjustments and improvements for commercial benefit. She distinguishes production-enhancing benefits from any sort of idle innovation by the qualifier trade-tested. Will someone pay for it? If not, the innovation might be a curiosity or a wonder, but not really a betterment. The market signals what is truly helpful. McCloskey argues that this system of free enterprise is liberating in production, since the government is not "picking winners and losers" by protectionism and restricting worker mobility, as well as democratic in consumption, since the people themselves decide what goods and services are profitable, no matter how much hipsters or elitists look down on their choices. Conversely, economic planning that seeks innovation without market testing loses the ability to distinguish between truly useful endeavors and wastes of money; it is also inflexible to demand.
The state of affairs in which trade-tested betterment leads to enrichment McCloskey calls the Bourgeois Deal. Much of the book is a defense of this deal from competitors. After having piled up evidence that certain parts of the world had come to accept, benefit from, and celebrate the Bourgeois Deal, she then announces that since 1848, the deal has been under assault from "the clerisy," that is, much of the Western intellectual class. McCloskey takes this challenge seriously, for she has already argued that the Bourgeois Deal was made by a change in ideas and spread through a change in rhetoric; it can be undone the same way.
She savagely critiques the left (state-planned economies, state-owned production) for incompetence in economic theory. McCloskey asserts that Marx was simply wrong in his beliefs about how economies work and that his followers down to the present have failed to grapple with the facts of the matter. She attacks minimum wages, state-funded unemployment insurance, occupational licensing, and trade unions. However, she is quite favorable toward the earned income tax credit. She also attacks the right for its nostalgic penchant for hierarchies of gender or race, for crony capitalism, and for expensive, exploitative policing and warfare.
Turning from survey to reflection, my attention falls first on the sheer range of source material. I am a historian, but I simply was not aware of how much research had been done about economic conditions across time and the globe. This is the kind of data that was not available to Marx or Keynes, and it is the sort of thing that needs to reset economic thinking. Any economic theory not based on the kinds of wide comparative data constantly referenced here is just dated. (I note that Piketty too cast a wide comparative net in his recent Capital. Expectations have been raised across ideological lines.)
A second issue concerns the place of the humanities in the social sciences. McCloskey's bold incorporation of literature (cf. Piketty), theater, ethical theory, and even theology may strike some as inappropriate. However, economics and history both are notoriously soft sciences. The answers one gets and even the kinds of questions one thinks to ask depend greatly on how individual humans and societies are modeled in the research. Thus, McCloskey's critique of the rational-choice model of the human being as a maximizer of utility is no tangent; it goes to the core of what sorts of economic models actually correspond with human behavior (ergo, are useful). Likewise, her turn to Adam Smith not only as champion of laissez-faire economics but as professor of moral sentiments is significant. She audaciously believes that humans are the sorts of things that are persuadable, and that we ought to persuade our way to a better world. For her, democracy and capitalism share the quality that they foster and require a larger amount of persuasion than do their predecessors. Both reduce the scope of coercion, and so appeal to her libertarian (humanist?) sympathies.
One issue touched on in several chapters but perhaps not faced quite squarely enough is income or wealth inequality. She straightforwardly admits inequality is not her highest priority; the absolute condition of the working class takes precedence. If the alternative is no growth for anybody, is it that important that the growth of some lags behind others? I suppose if this is really the choice, some improvement is better than none. And she certainly thinks that all proposed methods of reducing inequality inhibit growth. But perhaps there are ways yet untried that will not force this choice upon us so acutely. Also, on growth, McCloskey continually uses the metric of income per day, adjusted for all kinds of factors. I wish I were an expert, because then I would know what shortcomings this metric has. If it addressed median rather than mean income (at least, I think it's mean income), highly unequal societies might fare a bit worse.
McCloskey is resolutely against crony capitalism, the illegitimate use of money to secure from the government protected status for certain private interests. But doesn't income inequality feed crony capitalism? The influence of money on government is under-theorized in this work. That was, to be sure, not her goal, but given how wide-ranging her critiques of others' view of politics are, she might have guarded herself more closely on this point.
A few words on style. Bourgeois Equality is very interesting. McCloskey's style resembles that of an undergraduate lecturer, parceling out information in manageable doses while occasionally throwing in provocative or intriguing tidbits not absolutely necessary. She is quite liberal with her personal opinions on every topic, which lets the reader relate to her more as an individual. But it also sometimes feels like you're getting unsolicited advice and that this is causing an already lengthy conversation to drag. Again much like undergraduate lecturing, there is quite a bit of redundant material. Worse, sometimes the order of the chapters is a bit mystifying, as if she didn't find quite the right way through a subject, so she decided to attack it in all the ways she brainstormed. All considered, I think most readers will find McCloskey a thoroughly enjoyable and occasionally irritating author. Highly recommended for economists, historians, or anyone who thinks deeply about things that matter.
McCloskey's first step is to convince the reader that the world has undergone what she calls The Great Enrichment. That is, for most of human history, the world lived on the equivalent of $3-6 per day (in current US purchasing power). While a few nations (Haiti, Afghanistan) still fall into that range, the average world income has risen to around $33 (e.g., Brazil). Rich nations are significantly better: $130 for the USA, and around $100 for Japan, France, and Finland. Almost all this economic growth occurred since 1800. In only about 200 years, many nations became 30 times richer than they used to be. Checking McCloskey's sources reveals that though calculations may vary on the order of a few percentage points, she has indeed identified and rightly labeled a Great Enrichment. And this must be one of the most significant developments in history.
Consequently, one of the most important questions a historian or economist or anyone interested in the material welfare of world must ask is what caused such this sudden and exponential enrichment. Much of the book is dedicated to weeding out previous answers to this question. In particular, McCloskey is at pains to rule out both capital and institutions. Historical economists have established that market economies, significant commerce, and accumulation of capital have all existed in many societies. Thus, "capitalism" in the sense of attention to capital cannot explain a historical disjuncture of the size registered here (Here she takes aim at Thomas Piketty and Charles Tilley.) As for institutions, McCloskey acknowledges that many formal institutions—property rights, legal incentives and disincentives—may be necessary for supporting enrichment, but are not sufficient to cause it. After all, they too have been found in many societies across time and the globe.
McCloskey submits her own explanation: bourgeois dignity and bourgeois equality leading to trade-tested betterment. She argues that prior to the great enrichment, no society valorized the life of the common person "having a go" and benefiting or failing based on their ability to innovate. Literature from around the ancient world celebrated the aristocratic, knightly, and sometimes even the peasant life, but the merchant way of living was always looked down on as somewhat less than honorable. (Think, for example, of hostile attitudes toward Jews throughout history.) McCloskey then turns to literature and other documentary evidence to show that new, positive ways of thinking about commoners engaging in entrepreneurial activity had taken hold in The Netherlands and England by around 1700. McCloskey notes that new virtues were being emphasized in literature and drama. Instead of the reckless aristocratic courage of The Song of Roland or the wily tricks of Shakespeare's peasants, a reader can now admire the calculating prudence of Robinson Crusoe. This new rhetoric often paralleled political developments in which the common person was receiving more dignity and demanding more say. Often these developments led to the dissolving of protected industries, offering an equality of opportunity to enter production. It is important to note that McCloskey is arguing for a change at the level of society, that is, between people; this stands in contrast to a Weber-style assertion of psychological change at the level of the individual. (Though I wonder if Weber cannot be read or at least re-read more sociologically.)
The new dignity and equality afforded the bourgeois allowed them to engage in trade-tested betterment. Betterment, for McCloskey, is any kind of innovation that increases the production of goods or services. Many of these are technological, but improved methods and organization can also fall under this umbrella. Lest the reader be tempted to attribute these betterments to the rise of science, McCloskey argues that advances in scientific theory ("high science") only late in history began to have a significant effect on the economy. Most profitable betterments up through the nineteenth century derived from what she calls tinkering, entrepreneurs making small adjustments and improvements for commercial benefit. She distinguishes production-enhancing benefits from any sort of idle innovation by the qualifier trade-tested. Will someone pay for it? If not, the innovation might be a curiosity or a wonder, but not really a betterment. The market signals what is truly helpful. McCloskey argues that this system of free enterprise is liberating in production, since the government is not "picking winners and losers" by protectionism and restricting worker mobility, as well as democratic in consumption, since the people themselves decide what goods and services are profitable, no matter how much hipsters or elitists look down on their choices. Conversely, economic planning that seeks innovation without market testing loses the ability to distinguish between truly useful endeavors and wastes of money; it is also inflexible to demand.
The state of affairs in which trade-tested betterment leads to enrichment McCloskey calls the Bourgeois Deal. Much of the book is a defense of this deal from competitors. After having piled up evidence that certain parts of the world had come to accept, benefit from, and celebrate the Bourgeois Deal, she then announces that since 1848, the deal has been under assault from "the clerisy," that is, much of the Western intellectual class. McCloskey takes this challenge seriously, for she has already argued that the Bourgeois Deal was made by a change in ideas and spread through a change in rhetoric; it can be undone the same way.
She savagely critiques the left (state-planned economies, state-owned production) for incompetence in economic theory. McCloskey asserts that Marx was simply wrong in his beliefs about how economies work and that his followers down to the present have failed to grapple with the facts of the matter. She attacks minimum wages, state-funded unemployment insurance, occupational licensing, and trade unions. However, she is quite favorable toward the earned income tax credit. She also attacks the right for its nostalgic penchant for hierarchies of gender or race, for crony capitalism, and for expensive, exploitative policing and warfare.
Turning from survey to reflection, my attention falls first on the sheer range of source material. I am a historian, but I simply was not aware of how much research had been done about economic conditions across time and the globe. This is the kind of data that was not available to Marx or Keynes, and it is the sort of thing that needs to reset economic thinking. Any economic theory not based on the kinds of wide comparative data constantly referenced here is just dated. (I note that Piketty too cast a wide comparative net in his recent Capital. Expectations have been raised across ideological lines.)
A second issue concerns the place of the humanities in the social sciences. McCloskey's bold incorporation of literature (cf. Piketty), theater, ethical theory, and even theology may strike some as inappropriate. However, economics and history both are notoriously soft sciences. The answers one gets and even the kinds of questions one thinks to ask depend greatly on how individual humans and societies are modeled in the research. Thus, McCloskey's critique of the rational-choice model of the human being as a maximizer of utility is no tangent; it goes to the core of what sorts of economic models actually correspond with human behavior (ergo, are useful). Likewise, her turn to Adam Smith not only as champion of laissez-faire economics but as professor of moral sentiments is significant. She audaciously believes that humans are the sorts of things that are persuadable, and that we ought to persuade our way to a better world. For her, democracy and capitalism share the quality that they foster and require a larger amount of persuasion than do their predecessors. Both reduce the scope of coercion, and so appeal to her libertarian (humanist?) sympathies.
One issue touched on in several chapters but perhaps not faced quite squarely enough is income or wealth inequality. She straightforwardly admits inequality is not her highest priority; the absolute condition of the working class takes precedence. If the alternative is no growth for anybody, is it that important that the growth of some lags behind others? I suppose if this is really the choice, some improvement is better than none. And she certainly thinks that all proposed methods of reducing inequality inhibit growth. But perhaps there are ways yet untried that will not force this choice upon us so acutely. Also, on growth, McCloskey continually uses the metric of income per day, adjusted for all kinds of factors. I wish I were an expert, because then I would know what shortcomings this metric has. If it addressed median rather than mean income (at least, I think it's mean income), highly unequal societies might fare a bit worse.
McCloskey is resolutely against crony capitalism, the illegitimate use of money to secure from the government protected status for certain private interests. But doesn't income inequality feed crony capitalism? The influence of money on government is under-theorized in this work. That was, to be sure, not her goal, but given how wide-ranging her critiques of others' view of politics are, she might have guarded herself more closely on this point.
A few words on style. Bourgeois Equality is very interesting. McCloskey's style resembles that of an undergraduate lecturer, parceling out information in manageable doses while occasionally throwing in provocative or intriguing tidbits not absolutely necessary. She is quite liberal with her personal opinions on every topic, which lets the reader relate to her more as an individual. But it also sometimes feels like you're getting unsolicited advice and that this is causing an already lengthy conversation to drag. Again much like undergraduate lecturing, there is quite a bit of redundant material. Worse, sometimes the order of the chapters is a bit mystifying, as if she didn't find quite the right way through a subject, so she decided to attack it in all the ways she brainstormed. All considered, I think most readers will find McCloskey a thoroughly enjoyable and occasionally irritating author. Highly recommended for economists, historians, or anyone who thinks deeply about things that matter.
September 26, 2018
The book should be subtitled, "Thank (the Anglican) God for the Dutch!" Overall an excellent work and well worth reading. It is not technical and suitable for all audiences. The central idea goes something like this: For most of human history, the vast masses lived around $1-3 per day (adjusted), then all of a sudden, circa 1800, vast improvements caused populations to increase in prosperity by magnificent orders of magnitude, starting in northwest Europe, then spreading outward. The reason for this was not the rule of law, or protection of private property, or a particular work ethic, or amassed savings, or the accumulation of capital, or labor unions forcing wages higher, or any of the other popular explanations. McCloskey shows that it was a difference in ideas, more than anything else, that opened the door to the explosion of wealth and material betterment that was historically unparalleled. In particular, the idea that working to earn money was okay, that a person should be afforded basic dignity, be able to do as he/she pleases, and retain the consequences therefrom. In her own words, "Liberty and dignity for ordinary people made us rich, in every meaning of the word." (location 329) Her argument is persuasive and she spares no words and no proofs to lay it all out, to include impeaching the more common and popular of the alternative explanations.
McCloskey arrived at this position of liberty from a very left-of-center journey (she mentions still having her union card), but she holds nothing back in displaying the canards of Progressivism (not to mention the further left varieties of socialisms) for what they are. Of course, she does not spare the right either, lambasting various forms of traditionalism/conservatism, not to mention nationalism, though in the end, the reader is left wondering if there is any difference (at least from an economical sense) between left and right. To finish getting her biases out of the way, McCloskey is rather forward in pushing why Anglicanism is best, though this last has little to do with her historical/economic analysis.
She lays out the importance of the elites in Holland, England, the United States, and to a lesser extent, the other countries to which this growth and prosperity spread, opening the door to it by themselves embracing the idea for a period of time. However, in Europe and the United States, the elites (she likes to call the self-anointed the "clerisy") changed tack in 1848 and have since that time been steadily opposed once more to the ideas of economic and material progress. Interestingly, given the seminal role of ideas and elites in her argument in terms of opening the door to the Great Enrichment (as she calls it), she seems mostly sanguine and optimistic about the consequences such elite opposition to liberty might entail in the longer-term.
She does at least consider the self-terminating nature of the Great Enrichment: those made rich by liberty and dignity seek to translate their wealth into political power and social standing, then to use such power and standing to restrict liberty and dignity (for the rest) to reduce the chances that future innovation and competition will knock them from their elevated positions. Just so Holland, a pioneer in liberty, dignity, and enrichment, saw its early successful bourgeois stifle further growth through self-protection. Yet even in light of such evidence, laid out by McCloskey, she seems in the main convinced that the self-evident benefits of a system of a liberty would prevent its wholesale disruption, even as she worries about the socialisms of the 20th century and their horrific impact on human progress (and even human life).
She takes on the idea that bourgeois values consist in prudence alone, that businesspeople are selfish, dishonest, short-sighted, etc. She notes how such stereotypes are often self-imposed by those in such work, and the more so adopted by the now-hostile clerisy. She shows that all the earthly virtues are on display by the majority of successful businesspeople and how this is beneficial to the world. (For instance, "The Bourgeois Era has set a higher social standard than others, abolishing slavery and giving votes to women and the poor." location 12488) She does note a considerably smaller focus on the more transcendent virtues, but even hard-nosed businesspeople understand intangible values (whether in art, love, religion, etc.).
While McCloskey makes a convincing argument, and in the main I accept it, I think she goes too far in disparaging some of the alternative explanations. Not that I would put them forward as eclipsing the importance of ideas and their popular acceptance as a driving force. But take the accumulation of capital, for instance. McCloskey denigrates the idea to the point that if capital is not constantly maintained, it almost instantly deteriorates. While there is some truth to the general idea, she exaggerates the degree. Conversely, she underestimates the importance of the accumulation of capital as a necessary adjunct to the Great Enrichment actually being great. Take a caveman or woman, naked, no tools, no weapons, no shelter, nothing but his/her bare hands and his/her brains. Now imagine this cave person trying to make a modern claw hammer in this state. In that person's entire lifetime, they would likely be unable to dig for iron ore, smelt it, shape it, harvest the wood needed, shape it, and join the two together. You or I can run down to the hardware store and for a few dollars, that is, the exchange of very little labor, we can be running home with our new hammer to do some great work that would further add to human prosperity. And so on with everything we so easily take for granted. So no, I would not put the accumulation of capital (or savings, or property rights, or rule of law generally, etc.) as the reason for the Great Enrichment, but certain of these conditions were absolutely also necessary for it to have such impressive results.
At one point McCloskey notes that "free movement of goods has the same economic effects on wages and prices as free movement of people. They are substitutes. You can buy a TV imported from China or you can buy a TV from immigrant Chinese workers in Chicago: it's the same TV." (location 9358) In the abstract, this is undoubtedly true. But in reality, it is not. Goods, services, and money do not have culture, language, religion, baggage they bring with when they move, children whose lives get disrupted when they are pulled from one school and put into another, etc. Goods, services, and money do not bring female genital mutilation, child marriage, intolerance, vigilante mob justice, kleptocratic and corrupt habits from their home countries, illiberal practices that might undermine a liberal (as in a system of Liberty, not "liberal" as in anti-liberal Progressive) order. Hence the issue of immigration is not so neat and pat as she would have it; given the length of the work overall and the way she beats so many other dead horses, it is disappointing to see her make such sweeping statements in little more than a footnote.
McCloskey, like many lovers of liberty, takes on the idea of intellectual property rights. She assails the very idea and complains it is merely another form of government-enforced monopoly that benefits the few at the expense of the many. Then she has the nerve to sell her books! (And last I checked, the paperback version of this one ran for $24.51 on Amazon, while Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World ran for $18.91 and The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce ran for $22.50!) She should take a cue from Murray Rothbard and David Friedman, who at least put their intellectual property where their mouths are and published it on the internet cost-free for the readers. Like others opposed to intellectual property, she completely fails to really consider it: there would never again be another blockbuster movie, if there were no restriction on people recording it and reselling it without having to absorb any of the many costs of original production. The more so for serious research and development. Why should people who work with their hands own their labor, but those who work with their minds be made the slaves of all? Which is not to say intellectual property rights, especially patents, are not in need of reform, but to assault the entire idea, as summarily as she does, leaves one unconvinced.
She does not do much in such breezy terms, however. I probably would have rated this one five stars and declared it a "must read" had she been a bit more concise. In part she beats her arguments to death in light of the popularity and immortality of arguments opposed to hers. In part, she wanders and indulges in tangents that might be entertaining at times, but add little or nothing to her arguments (do you really think whether or not the Anglican church is apostolic bears on her argument? but you'll hear all about it!). The overall length may, alas!, discourage the more casual readers; this work really is one most people should read. However, having read it out of order (that is, ahead of those other expensive paperbacks), I am left wondering if I should bother reading them. McCloskey effectively summarizes her arguments from her previous books in the introduction to this one. Perhaps if the bulk of her arguments left me unconvinced, I might feel the need to review them in much more granularity.
The book is more than just economics. Because of the focus on ideas, McCloskey goes to great pains to examine popular art and expression to examine the actual orientation of popular beliefs, not to mention elite opinion. Some may find the length and depth of her etymology, art history, comparison of William Shakespeare with virtually everybody else who wrote in the two centuries prior to and subsequent to the Bard, etc., as a bit heavy, dull, or what-have-you. Those interested especially in these subjects will likely find them a treat. I found them useful, even necessary to some extent, but like her book overall, thought she could have been a bit more compact.
Very nearly a "must read," the main detractor being the work's length and sometimes wandering parts. McCloskey tackles all the important and popular arguments counter to her own, rather than ignoring or waving them away like so many other contemporary writers. Further, one can infer, as much from her tangents as her intended arguments, that she did not arrive at a conclusion of liberty as a first choice, but was led inexorably there by the evidence she uncovered, and which she is determined to lead you, dear reader, as well.
McCloskey arrived at this position of liberty from a very left-of-center journey (she mentions still having her union card), but she holds nothing back in displaying the canards of Progressivism (not to mention the further left varieties of socialisms) for what they are. Of course, she does not spare the right either, lambasting various forms of traditionalism/conservatism, not to mention nationalism, though in the end, the reader is left wondering if there is any difference (at least from an economical sense) between left and right. To finish getting her biases out of the way, McCloskey is rather forward in pushing why Anglicanism is best, though this last has little to do with her historical/economic analysis.
She lays out the importance of the elites in Holland, England, the United States, and to a lesser extent, the other countries to which this growth and prosperity spread, opening the door to it by themselves embracing the idea for a period of time. However, in Europe and the United States, the elites (she likes to call the self-anointed the "clerisy") changed tack in 1848 and have since that time been steadily opposed once more to the ideas of economic and material progress. Interestingly, given the seminal role of ideas and elites in her argument in terms of opening the door to the Great Enrichment (as she calls it), she seems mostly sanguine and optimistic about the consequences such elite opposition to liberty might entail in the longer-term.
She does at least consider the self-terminating nature of the Great Enrichment: those made rich by liberty and dignity seek to translate their wealth into political power and social standing, then to use such power and standing to restrict liberty and dignity (for the rest) to reduce the chances that future innovation and competition will knock them from their elevated positions. Just so Holland, a pioneer in liberty, dignity, and enrichment, saw its early successful bourgeois stifle further growth through self-protection. Yet even in light of such evidence, laid out by McCloskey, she seems in the main convinced that the self-evident benefits of a system of a liberty would prevent its wholesale disruption, even as she worries about the socialisms of the 20th century and their horrific impact on human progress (and even human life).
She takes on the idea that bourgeois values consist in prudence alone, that businesspeople are selfish, dishonest, short-sighted, etc. She notes how such stereotypes are often self-imposed by those in such work, and the more so adopted by the now-hostile clerisy. She shows that all the earthly virtues are on display by the majority of successful businesspeople and how this is beneficial to the world. (For instance, "The Bourgeois Era has set a higher social standard than others, abolishing slavery and giving votes to women and the poor." location 12488) She does note a considerably smaller focus on the more transcendent virtues, but even hard-nosed businesspeople understand intangible values (whether in art, love, religion, etc.).
While McCloskey makes a convincing argument, and in the main I accept it, I think she goes too far in disparaging some of the alternative explanations. Not that I would put them forward as eclipsing the importance of ideas and their popular acceptance as a driving force. But take the accumulation of capital, for instance. McCloskey denigrates the idea to the point that if capital is not constantly maintained, it almost instantly deteriorates. While there is some truth to the general idea, she exaggerates the degree. Conversely, she underestimates the importance of the accumulation of capital as a necessary adjunct to the Great Enrichment actually being great. Take a caveman or woman, naked, no tools, no weapons, no shelter, nothing but his/her bare hands and his/her brains. Now imagine this cave person trying to make a modern claw hammer in this state. In that person's entire lifetime, they would likely be unable to dig for iron ore, smelt it, shape it, harvest the wood needed, shape it, and join the two together. You or I can run down to the hardware store and for a few dollars, that is, the exchange of very little labor, we can be running home with our new hammer to do some great work that would further add to human prosperity. And so on with everything we so easily take for granted. So no, I would not put the accumulation of capital (or savings, or property rights, or rule of law generally, etc.) as the reason for the Great Enrichment, but certain of these conditions were absolutely also necessary for it to have such impressive results.
At one point McCloskey notes that "free movement of goods has the same economic effects on wages and prices as free movement of people. They are substitutes. You can buy a TV imported from China or you can buy a TV from immigrant Chinese workers in Chicago: it's the same TV." (location 9358) In the abstract, this is undoubtedly true. But in reality, it is not. Goods, services, and money do not have culture, language, religion, baggage they bring with when they move, children whose lives get disrupted when they are pulled from one school and put into another, etc. Goods, services, and money do not bring female genital mutilation, child marriage, intolerance, vigilante mob justice, kleptocratic and corrupt habits from their home countries, illiberal practices that might undermine a liberal (as in a system of Liberty, not "liberal" as in anti-liberal Progressive) order. Hence the issue of immigration is not so neat and pat as she would have it; given the length of the work overall and the way she beats so many other dead horses, it is disappointing to see her make such sweeping statements in little more than a footnote.
McCloskey, like many lovers of liberty, takes on the idea of intellectual property rights. She assails the very idea and complains it is merely another form of government-enforced monopoly that benefits the few at the expense of the many. Then she has the nerve to sell her books! (And last I checked, the paperback version of this one ran for $24.51 on Amazon, while Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World ran for $18.91 and The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce ran for $22.50!) She should take a cue from Murray Rothbard and David Friedman, who at least put their intellectual property where their mouths are and published it on the internet cost-free for the readers. Like others opposed to intellectual property, she completely fails to really consider it: there would never again be another blockbuster movie, if there were no restriction on people recording it and reselling it without having to absorb any of the many costs of original production. The more so for serious research and development. Why should people who work with their hands own their labor, but those who work with their minds be made the slaves of all? Which is not to say intellectual property rights, especially patents, are not in need of reform, but to assault the entire idea, as summarily as she does, leaves one unconvinced.
She does not do much in such breezy terms, however. I probably would have rated this one five stars and declared it a "must read" had she been a bit more concise. In part she beats her arguments to death in light of the popularity and immortality of arguments opposed to hers. In part, she wanders and indulges in tangents that might be entertaining at times, but add little or nothing to her arguments (do you really think whether or not the Anglican church is apostolic bears on her argument? but you'll hear all about it!). The overall length may, alas!, discourage the more casual readers; this work really is one most people should read. However, having read it out of order (that is, ahead of those other expensive paperbacks), I am left wondering if I should bother reading them. McCloskey effectively summarizes her arguments from her previous books in the introduction to this one. Perhaps if the bulk of her arguments left me unconvinced, I might feel the need to review them in much more granularity.
The book is more than just economics. Because of the focus on ideas, McCloskey goes to great pains to examine popular art and expression to examine the actual orientation of popular beliefs, not to mention elite opinion. Some may find the length and depth of her etymology, art history, comparison of William Shakespeare with virtually everybody else who wrote in the two centuries prior to and subsequent to the Bard, etc., as a bit heavy, dull, or what-have-you. Those interested especially in these subjects will likely find them a treat. I found them useful, even necessary to some extent, but like her book overall, thought she could have been a bit more compact.
Very nearly a "must read," the main detractor being the work's length and sometimes wandering parts. McCloskey tackles all the important and popular arguments counter to her own, rather than ignoring or waving them away like so many other contemporary writers. Further, one can infer, as much from her tangents as her intended arguments, that she did not arrive at a conclusion of liberty as a first choice, but was led inexorably there by the evidence she uncovered, and which she is determined to lead you, dear reader, as well.
August 30, 2016
This book is a pleasure to read. The scope of McCloskey’s erudition is impressive and she is refreshingly commonsensical about economics and many of her fellow practitioners of it. The writing is fluid and on page after page there pop up instances of “I wish I’d said that!”
However, I have to say the case for her fundamental thesis is rather unconvincing. Briefly, the thesis is that the Great Enrichment that began in Holland and England in the 17th and 18th centuries and continues to this day throughout nearly all the world was driven primarily by a shift in rhetoric (or ideology) from one favoring traditional hierarchies (feudal, aristocratic, royal or religious) to one that recognizes and affords dignity to the common person, the entrepreneur, the businessman. The explosion of creativity – and creative destruction – that was released by this liberation of all levels of society to “give it a go” is what caused the whole world to become unimaginably rich by historic standards.
There’s no doubting the reality of the Great Enrichment (the evidence is overwhelming), and her arguments that it can’t have been caused by the typical economists’ explanations (well-defined property rights, good institutions, accumulation of investment capital) are well-taken --because these prerequisites have occurred in many places and at many times before in history without a Great Enrichment following.
So something did change in Holland, and then England, in those years of the Golden Age and the Industrial Revolution. But was it the rhetoric honoring business and enterprise and the bourgeoisie? Sure, hierarchies were leveled and individual liberty was expanded. But apart from Adam Smith and the American founding documents, the supporting rhetoric seems scant, especially in comparison to the vast and continuing flood of anti-business, anti-free market rhetoric that saturates our culture today and (as McCloskey herself notes well) pretty much always has, from the ancients, through Shakespeare and Dickens, all the way to Oliver Stone.
In America today (surely one of the most free-market disposed societies in the world), there is a common underlying respect and appreciation for the fruits of enterprise – we love our iPhones and our internet and keep using Uber and Air BNB despite the protestations of the “clerisy” (as McCloskey refers to the chattering classes). But at the same time there is very widespread distrust of business and an instinct that our economy and society needs to be even more regulated by wise government officials. The acceptance of a broad sympathy to free enterprise is more evident in our actions than our words. And aren’t the words what constitute rhetoric? I was hoping McCloskey was going demonstrate with copious and convincing examples how the rhetoric changed and caused the onset of the Great Enrichment. Instead, apart from a heavy reliance on Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations both) and Benjamin Franklin (along with some weak waves at Jane Austin), she mostly asserted her thesis. Again and again.
Despite this disappointment, it is a very worthwhile and thought-provoking work.
However, I have to say the case for her fundamental thesis is rather unconvincing. Briefly, the thesis is that the Great Enrichment that began in Holland and England in the 17th and 18th centuries and continues to this day throughout nearly all the world was driven primarily by a shift in rhetoric (or ideology) from one favoring traditional hierarchies (feudal, aristocratic, royal or religious) to one that recognizes and affords dignity to the common person, the entrepreneur, the businessman. The explosion of creativity – and creative destruction – that was released by this liberation of all levels of society to “give it a go” is what caused the whole world to become unimaginably rich by historic standards.
There’s no doubting the reality of the Great Enrichment (the evidence is overwhelming), and her arguments that it can’t have been caused by the typical economists’ explanations (well-defined property rights, good institutions, accumulation of investment capital) are well-taken --because these prerequisites have occurred in many places and at many times before in history without a Great Enrichment following.
So something did change in Holland, and then England, in those years of the Golden Age and the Industrial Revolution. But was it the rhetoric honoring business and enterprise and the bourgeoisie? Sure, hierarchies were leveled and individual liberty was expanded. But apart from Adam Smith and the American founding documents, the supporting rhetoric seems scant, especially in comparison to the vast and continuing flood of anti-business, anti-free market rhetoric that saturates our culture today and (as McCloskey herself notes well) pretty much always has, from the ancients, through Shakespeare and Dickens, all the way to Oliver Stone.
In America today (surely one of the most free-market disposed societies in the world), there is a common underlying respect and appreciation for the fruits of enterprise – we love our iPhones and our internet and keep using Uber and Air BNB despite the protestations of the “clerisy” (as McCloskey refers to the chattering classes). But at the same time there is very widespread distrust of business and an instinct that our economy and society needs to be even more regulated by wise government officials. The acceptance of a broad sympathy to free enterprise is more evident in our actions than our words. And aren’t the words what constitute rhetoric? I was hoping McCloskey was going demonstrate with copious and convincing examples how the rhetoric changed and caused the onset of the Great Enrichment. Instead, apart from a heavy reliance on Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations both) and Benjamin Franklin (along with some weak waves at Jane Austin), she mostly asserted her thesis. Again and again.
Despite this disappointment, it is a very worthwhile and thought-provoking work.
January 2, 2020
This book will convince you there was a Dutch-British ethical and rhetorical "revaluation of the bourgeoisie" and of its practice of "trade-tested improvement". But despite the previous volume's preview in diagram form of the causal linkages between the change in ethos and the stream of mechanical innovations that made the Industrial Revolution, the causal connections are left vague. We are to understand that society became more willing to allow creative destruction and innovations that harmed vested interests, but this is not actually demonstrated by facts on the ground, only by literary and cultural analysis. Was a spirit of laissez-faire all it took? There are no case-studies of inventions, business projects, or government policies to show how the new ethos contributed concretely to economic growth, no serious comparative studies of times and places with differing attitudes or policies. This means the trilogy has been left off with the great burden of its positive and novel argument seemingly still to be made.
September 4, 2018
Having seen this book referenced on several occasions, I had high hopes for this book. Unfortunately I was rather disappointed.
The first two sections essentially are a sales pitch, saying how she has the answer that everyone else in the world has missed. Alas, this section is particularly weak. Much of what she demolishes are straw men versions of the actual arguments/strategies, with the references strangely disappearing when she makes her most cutting points. While those who agree with her philosophy may find this a reassuring section, I found it rather unconvincing. The straw men also reappear towards the end, though its clear she understands matters better than this.
The balance of the book focussed on her core aim, to show that a tolerance or encouragement of bourgeois values led the great betterment. A significant part of this is examined through literature. The approach is interesting, and at times entertaining, but feels like it lacks rigour. Even worse, she later undermines this approach by giving plenty of literary examples where the same values are ridiculed or rejected.
Her appreciation of some of the nuances and contradictions of economic theory were better, particularly her discussions of Adam Smith. While she is open about her own starting point and perspective and freely admits these are driving her writing, she often gives a more balanced view than this would suggest. However, many times this is not the case, with her sideswipes both tedious and often poorly justified.
The first two sections essentially are a sales pitch, saying how she has the answer that everyone else in the world has missed. Alas, this section is particularly weak. Much of what she demolishes are straw men versions of the actual arguments/strategies, with the references strangely disappearing when she makes her most cutting points. While those who agree with her philosophy may find this a reassuring section, I found it rather unconvincing. The straw men also reappear towards the end, though its clear she understands matters better than this.
The balance of the book focussed on her core aim, to show that a tolerance or encouragement of bourgeois values led the great betterment. A significant part of this is examined through literature. The approach is interesting, and at times entertaining, but feels like it lacks rigour. Even worse, she later undermines this approach by giving plenty of literary examples where the same values are ridiculed or rejected.
Her appreciation of some of the nuances and contradictions of economic theory were better, particularly her discussions of Adam Smith. While she is open about her own starting point and perspective and freely admits these are driving her writing, she often gives a more balanced view than this would suggest. However, many times this is not the case, with her sideswipes both tedious and often poorly justified.
July 11, 2016
Enjoyable defense of capitalism
An entertaining and fascinating defense of capitalism. McCloskey takes on the entire field of economic history with wide references from literature and economics.
An entertaining and fascinating defense of capitalism. McCloskey takes on the entire field of economic history with wide references from literature and economics.
June 11, 2019
A measured libertarian manifesto some good points (some not so good). Unfortunately, extremely long winded too
April 3, 2019
Prof McCloskey travels a vast expanse of history to describe the meteoric economic progress of the world beginning at the start of the 19th century. To do this, she compares the financial conditions and cultural norms and laws of people before and after the year 1800 in an effort to explain the dramatic improvement and increased wealth created in many civilizations worldwide. Her theme of liberty and dignity are logically tied to the free markets and hard-working, free people who have employed their ideas (based on human ingenuity/scientific discoveries/philosophical studies) to propel societies forward.
January 20, 2019
For progress, or ’trade tested betterment’, to continue in this world, we have to let go of pessimism, turn away from nationalism and socialism, and remember that traders, inventors and managers bring us most of what’s good about our world thanks to free and open markets and societies. Egalitarian liberalism that gives everyone a shot at enterprise is the main thing, and regulation and taxation seldom help.
So goes McCloskey, a sort of virtue-obsessed libertarian who both illumines and elides in her series of books on the political economy of nations. This book really managed to get under my skin, I think because I do agree that progressive political rhetoric is at times too pessimistic, and forgets to mention the conditions that lead to dignity for the world’s poorest. But the case against regulation seems far from proven. What about Koch industries’ past dumping of mercury into the soil and water? What about the early revolt against food safety hazards in potted meat? Isn’t there such a thing as sensible regulation? And what about the corporate tax rate? Surely it makes some difference, even if Piketty is indeed wrong in some respects?
I can’t get many of the book’s passages out of my head, on intellectual property rights, on the attitude we should take towards the very wealthy, on the supposed damage done from being too pessimistic about environmental degradation. (It’s going to be fine, says McCloskey. Just stop whining and build nuclear power plants.)
On the positive side, McCloskey is essentially an annotated bibliography weaving political economy with literature, Adam Smith and Jane Austen through Kenneth Pomeranz and Henrik Ibsen. This breathes new life into my own reading of Chinese literature, giving me the basis for searching the Chinese rhetoric for signs of democratic equality. Though of course the message was already made clear by Perry Link in his magisterial Anatomy of Chinese, which now calls for a re-reading of that volume.
But on the other hand, China, a topic of some small interest to the voluminous reader McCloskey, also effectively illustrates the aporia surrounding just what makes for the dignity and virtue that will deliver “trade-tested progress.” Over and over, McCloskey praises China for its reforms since 1978, which have lead to a Great Enrichment mirroring what happened in Taiwan and Singapore in years preceding, and in the UK and the USA generations before. “Even at the modest 4 percent per year per person the the World Bank implausibly reckons China will experience out to 2030, the result will be a populace almost twice as rich.” McCloskey thinks China has remembered to value traders. But elsewhere, the ‘social virtues’ that Weber only inconsistently celebrated — “betterment, novelty, risk-taking, creativity, democracy, equality, liberty, dignity” — receive the parting comment that “Such social virtues are what China nowadays often lacks and must find in bulk if it is to get much beyond $20 a day.” So evidently China has developed a partial space for liberty and dignity, but hasn’t enough of the stuff. Fair enough. But what counts as enough? And how is it to be supplied? Is another Chinese revolution necessary, or can the Communist Party of China see itself through another significant round of reforms? Back in the USA, are not social security, health care, minimum wages, and sensible corporate taxes a reasonable guarantee of dignity for all Americans? Are there both good and bad sources of dignity? Under this questioning, McCloskey seems to falter along with all other libertarian stances, whose vision seems to involve magical trickle-down of education and infrastructure without heavy government intervention. I don’t see how that works yet, but in my own field of education, the aporia resurfaces in the subject of private and public schools, the role of the state, the issue of vouchers and charters, and the new emergence of for-profit educators. So while McCloskey is not ultimately convincing, I’ll be referring back to the bibliography here in the year to come.
So goes McCloskey, a sort of virtue-obsessed libertarian who both illumines and elides in her series of books on the political economy of nations. This book really managed to get under my skin, I think because I do agree that progressive political rhetoric is at times too pessimistic, and forgets to mention the conditions that lead to dignity for the world’s poorest. But the case against regulation seems far from proven. What about Koch industries’ past dumping of mercury into the soil and water? What about the early revolt against food safety hazards in potted meat? Isn’t there such a thing as sensible regulation? And what about the corporate tax rate? Surely it makes some difference, even if Piketty is indeed wrong in some respects?
I can’t get many of the book’s passages out of my head, on intellectual property rights, on the attitude we should take towards the very wealthy, on the supposed damage done from being too pessimistic about environmental degradation. (It’s going to be fine, says McCloskey. Just stop whining and build nuclear power plants.)
On the positive side, McCloskey is essentially an annotated bibliography weaving political economy with literature, Adam Smith and Jane Austen through Kenneth Pomeranz and Henrik Ibsen. This breathes new life into my own reading of Chinese literature, giving me the basis for searching the Chinese rhetoric for signs of democratic equality. Though of course the message was already made clear by Perry Link in his magisterial Anatomy of Chinese, which now calls for a re-reading of that volume.
But on the other hand, China, a topic of some small interest to the voluminous reader McCloskey, also effectively illustrates the aporia surrounding just what makes for the dignity and virtue that will deliver “trade-tested progress.” Over and over, McCloskey praises China for its reforms since 1978, which have lead to a Great Enrichment mirroring what happened in Taiwan and Singapore in years preceding, and in the UK and the USA generations before. “Even at the modest 4 percent per year per person the the World Bank implausibly reckons China will experience out to 2030, the result will be a populace almost twice as rich.” McCloskey thinks China has remembered to value traders. But elsewhere, the ‘social virtues’ that Weber only inconsistently celebrated — “betterment, novelty, risk-taking, creativity, democracy, equality, liberty, dignity” — receive the parting comment that “Such social virtues are what China nowadays often lacks and must find in bulk if it is to get much beyond $20 a day.” So evidently China has developed a partial space for liberty and dignity, but hasn’t enough of the stuff. Fair enough. But what counts as enough? And how is it to be supplied? Is another Chinese revolution necessary, or can the Communist Party of China see itself through another significant round of reforms? Back in the USA, are not social security, health care, minimum wages, and sensible corporate taxes a reasonable guarantee of dignity for all Americans? Are there both good and bad sources of dignity? Under this questioning, McCloskey seems to falter along with all other libertarian stances, whose vision seems to involve magical trickle-down of education and infrastructure without heavy government intervention. I don’t see how that works yet, but in my own field of education, the aporia resurfaces in the subject of private and public schools, the role of the state, the issue of vouchers and charters, and the new emergence of for-profit educators. So while McCloskey is not ultimately convincing, I’ll be referring back to the bibliography here in the year to come.
May 10, 2025
For thousands of years the human quality of life changed little. The vast majority of humanity lived on the equivalent of $3/day in current money. But then something happened in Holland and Great Britain. Income and standards of living began to shoot up and have continued to do so ever since. McCloskey calls it the Great Enrichment. "The Great Enrichment," she writes, "is the most important secular event since the invention of agriculture. It has restarted history....The Enrichment has been and will continue to be more important historically that the rise and fall of empires or the class struggle in all hitherto existing societies." But why did it happen? And why then? And why there? There is no consensus among economic historians and they continue to debate the reasons.
In the predecessor book, Bourgeois Dignity, McCloskey presented her conclusion--that the Great Enrichment originated where and when it did because of the emergence of a "pro-bourgeois rhetoric" in Holland and then in England, a rhetoric that dignified the bourgeois spirit that had previously been denigrated, admiring (and imitating) bourgeois behavior that had previously been regarded as base or sinful. But she devoted most of that thick book to arguing why the many materialist explanations put forth by other economic historians are not correct or satisfactory. In this equally hefty follow-up (the third book of three), she lays out the evidence to support her case, with an impressive display of erudite agility drawing not just on economics and history (art history, social history, religious history, etc.--btw I can hear her in the background saying "as if they are any different") but also on literary criticism and rhetoric.
Very interesting and a delight to read.
In the predecessor book, Bourgeois Dignity, McCloskey presented her conclusion--that the Great Enrichment originated where and when it did because of the emergence of a "pro-bourgeois rhetoric" in Holland and then in England, a rhetoric that dignified the bourgeois spirit that had previously been denigrated, admiring (and imitating) bourgeois behavior that had previously been regarded as base or sinful. But she devoted most of that thick book to arguing why the many materialist explanations put forth by other economic historians are not correct or satisfactory. In this equally hefty follow-up (the third book of three), she lays out the evidence to support her case, with an impressive display of erudite agility drawing not just on economics and history (art history, social history, religious history, etc.--btw I can hear her in the background saying "as if they are any different") but also on literary criticism and rhetoric.
Very interesting and a delight to read.
July 14, 2025
Despite whatever omissions you care to point at, the argument that a change in values was necessary for humanity to reap the benefits of the the industrial revolution is convincing, and a useful new lens for viewing the world.
May 18, 2018
The book takes a very strong perspective that the institutionalists like Acemoglu and North and Weingast are wrong about what caused liftoff because institutions don't have enough oomph and didn't change much during 1500-1700 before industrial evolution. Instead, it was a change in ideas and how entrepreneurship and trade was viewed in society. At first in Holland in 1585-1600s and then in England, merchants and tradesmen were no longer viewed as vile and low, but were now accepted and even celebrated. Traces some interesting transitions of how words like "honest" were viewed (at first as meaning high born aristocrat and then to what it means now) during this time in literature. Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin are talled about as exemplaries. She has a great discussion and chart of 7 virtues and shows how those virtues map onto other systems like Haight and others (worth revisiting). Her thesis is that once the ideas and rhetoric about "trade tested betterment" changes to be positive, Schumpeterian creative destruction can begin and new ways start to replace old and takeoff happens. A large part if the book is spent on talking about how the "clerisy" of intellectuals is constantly trying to block this either with socialist communitarian utopia trying to get back to nonexistent romantic ideal or an aristocratic heroic nationalistic romantic ideal, and there is danger from proletariat populist peasant values as well, which all conflict with bourgeois values. Bourgeois values are ethical values of the marketplace, non zero sum, while the others are zero sum.
I would have rated this book a 5 except for two things. First, it's incredibly long and rambling. It's written in a really annoying conversational style that meanders and goes off on tangents in nearly every sentence (not exaggeration). A good editor could have cut this down from 650 pages to 150. Most of the time it feels like she is ranting or showing off her incredibly broad knowledge (which she clearly possesses). The second reason is that she spends about a third of the book about how the rhetoric changed, more than half of the book on bashing the clerisy and alternative perspectives, and a very tiny part of the book hypothesizing about what LED to the change in ideas and rhetoric (she lists protestant reformation and it's upheavals, printing, political turmoil).
So now I believe her there was a change in the way merchants and trade were viewed at the time immediately before the industrial revolution, and I am open to the idea that this was critical, perhaps even the determining factor, but I am not much closer to understanding why then, why there, and I wish I didn't have to read 650 very difficult to read (because of the maddening writing style) pages to get this.
I would have rated this book a 5 except for two things. First, it's incredibly long and rambling. It's written in a really annoying conversational style that meanders and goes off on tangents in nearly every sentence (not exaggeration). A good editor could have cut this down from 650 pages to 150. Most of the time it feels like she is ranting or showing off her incredibly broad knowledge (which she clearly possesses). The second reason is that she spends about a third of the book about how the rhetoric changed, more than half of the book on bashing the clerisy and alternative perspectives, and a very tiny part of the book hypothesizing about what LED to the change in ideas and rhetoric (she lists protestant reformation and it's upheavals, printing, political turmoil).
So now I believe her there was a change in the way merchants and trade were viewed at the time immediately before the industrial revolution, and I am open to the idea that this was critical, perhaps even the determining factor, but I am not much closer to understanding why then, why there, and I wish I didn't have to read 650 very difficult to read (because of the maddening writing style) pages to get this.
September 22, 2021
I can't even begin to describe this. But I do like this self-description that McCloskey gives of herself--“literary, quantitative, postmodern, free-market, progressive-Episcopalian, ex-marxoid, Midwestern woman from Boston who was once a man. Not ‘conservative’! I’m a Christian classical liberal."
When the average Joe is reading about economic history they are already in a place of great ignorance. McCloskey writes well and convincingly, but she throws out whole idea systems (and people) in a sentence or two. How am I suppose to know if she is correct or not? She has been doing this for a long time.
She argues that the "Great Betterment" (made by the freedom of people to work as they will in the market) which started in 1600s but really took off in Holland in 1700? and England in late 1700 and 1800 and 1900s and America in 1800 and 1900 is as important as the move from hunter/gatherer to farming.
I did not read her other two volumes. And I fell asleep often. But I will listen to the whole thing again. I enjoyed it.
When the average Joe is reading about economic history they are already in a place of great ignorance. McCloskey writes well and convincingly, but she throws out whole idea systems (and people) in a sentence or two. How am I suppose to know if she is correct or not? She has been doing this for a long time.
She argues that the "Great Betterment" (made by the freedom of people to work as they will in the market) which started in 1600s but really took off in Holland in 1700? and England in late 1700 and 1800 and 1900s and America in 1800 and 1900 is as important as the move from hunter/gatherer to farming.
I did not read her other two volumes. And I fell asleep often. But I will listen to the whole thing again. I enjoyed it.
November 1, 2019
Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World (Hardcover)
by Deirdre N. McCloskey
ILL ordered from the library
Ref to this author/book from p 65 A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy by Joel Mokyr
TOC from Worldcat:
Contents: part I.A great enrichment happened, and will happen: 1. The world is pretty rich, but once was poor ; 2. For Malthusian and other reasons, very poor ; 3. Then many of us shot up the blade of a hockey stick ; 4. As your own life shows ; 5. The poor were made much better off ; 6. Inequality is not the problem ; 7. Despite doubts from the Left ; 8. Or from the Right and Middle ; 9. The great international divergence can be overcome -- part II. Explanations from left and right have proven false: 10. The divergence was not caused by imperialism ; 11. Poverty cannot be overcome from the left by overthrowing "capitalism" ; 12. "Accumulate, accumulate" is not what happened in history ; 13. But neither can poverty be overcome from the right by implanting "institutions" ; 14. Because ethics matters, and changes, more ; 15. And the oomph of institutional change is far too small ; 16. Most governmental institutions make us poorer -- part III. Bourgeois life had been rhetorically revalued in Britain at the onset of the Industrial Revolution: 17. It is a truth universally acknowledged that even Dr. Johnson and Jane Austen exhibit the revaluation ; 18. No woman but a blockhead wrote for anything but money ; 19. Adam Smith exhibits bourgeois theory at its ethical best ; 20. Smith was not a Mr. Max U, but rather the last of the former virtue ethicists ; 21. That is, he was no reductionist, economistic or otherwise ; 22. And he formulated the bourgeois deal ; 23. Ben Franklin was bourgeois, and he embodied betterment ; 24. By 1848 a bourgeois ideology had wholly triumphed -- part IV. A pro-bourgeois rhetoric was forming in England around 1700: 25. The word "honest" shows the changing attitude toward the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie ; 26. And so does the word "eerlijk" ; 27. Defoe, Addison, and Steele show it, too ; 28. The bourgeois revaluation becomes a commonplace, as in The London merchant ; 29. Bourgeois Europe, for example, loved measurement ; 30. The change was in social habits of the lip, not in psychology ; 31. And the change was specifically British -- part V. Yet England had recently lagged in bourgeois ideology, compared with the Netherlands: 32. Bourgeois Shakespeare disdained trade and the bourgeoisie ; 33. As did Elizabethan England generally ; 34. Aristocratic England, for example, scorned measurement ; 35. The Dutch preached bourgeois virtue ; 36. And the Dutch bourgeoisie was virtuous ; 37. For instance, bourgeois Holland was tolerant, and not for prudence only -- part VI. Reformation, revolt, revolution, and reading increased the liberty and dignity of ordinary Europeans: 38. The causes were local, temporary, and unpredictable ; 39. "Democratic" church governance emboldened people ; 40. The theology of happiness changed circa 1700 ; 41. Printing and reading and fragmentation sustained the dignity of commoners ; 42. Political ideas mattered for equal liberty and dignity ; 43. Ideas made for a bourgeois revaluation ; 44. The rhetorical change was necessary, and maybe sufficient -- part VII. Nowhere before on a large scale had bourgeois or other commoners been honored: 45. Talk had been hostile to betterment ; 46. The hostility was ancient ; 47. Yet some Christians anticipated a respected bourgeoisie ; 48. And betterment, though long disdained, developed its own vested interests ; 49. And then turned ; 50. On the whole, however, the bourgeoisies and their bettering projects have been precarious -- part VIII. Words and ideas caused the modern world: 51. Sweet talk rules the economy ; 52. And its rhetoric can change quickly ; 53. It was not a deep cultural change ; 54. Yes, it was ideas, not interests or institutions, that changed, suddenly, in Northwestern Europe ; 55. Elsewhere ideas about the bourgeoisie did not change -- part IX. The history and economics have been misunderstood: 56. The change in ideas contradicts many ideas from the political middle, 1890-1980 ; 57. And many Polanyish ideas from the Left ; 58. Yet Polanyi was right about embeddedness ; 59. Trade-tested betterment is democratic in consumption ; 60. And liberating in production ; 61. And therefore bourgeois rhetoric was better for the poor -- part X. That is, rhetoric made us, but can readily unmake us: 62. After 1848 the clerisy converted to antibetterment ; 63. The clerisy betrayed the bourgeois deal, and approved the Bolshevik and Bismarckian deals ; 64. Anticonsumerism and pro-bohemianism were fruits of the antibetterment reaction ; 65. Despite the clerisy's doubts ; 66. What matters ethically is not equality of outcome, but the condition of the working class ; 67. A change in rhetoric made modernity, and can spread it.
by Deirdre N. McCloskey
ILL ordered from the library
Ref to this author/book from p 65 A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy by Joel Mokyr
TOC from Worldcat:
Contents: part I.A great enrichment happened, and will happen: 1. The world is pretty rich, but once was poor ; 2. For Malthusian and other reasons, very poor ; 3. Then many of us shot up the blade of a hockey stick ; 4. As your own life shows ; 5. The poor were made much better off ; 6. Inequality is not the problem ; 7. Despite doubts from the Left ; 8. Or from the Right and Middle ; 9. The great international divergence can be overcome -- part II. Explanations from left and right have proven false: 10. The divergence was not caused by imperialism ; 11. Poverty cannot be overcome from the left by overthrowing "capitalism" ; 12. "Accumulate, accumulate" is not what happened in history ; 13. But neither can poverty be overcome from the right by implanting "institutions" ; 14. Because ethics matters, and changes, more ; 15. And the oomph of institutional change is far too small ; 16. Most governmental institutions make us poorer -- part III. Bourgeois life had been rhetorically revalued in Britain at the onset of the Industrial Revolution: 17. It is a truth universally acknowledged that even Dr. Johnson and Jane Austen exhibit the revaluation ; 18. No woman but a blockhead wrote for anything but money ; 19. Adam Smith exhibits bourgeois theory at its ethical best ; 20. Smith was not a Mr. Max U, but rather the last of the former virtue ethicists ; 21. That is, he was no reductionist, economistic or otherwise ; 22. And he formulated the bourgeois deal ; 23. Ben Franklin was bourgeois, and he embodied betterment ; 24. By 1848 a bourgeois ideology had wholly triumphed -- part IV. A pro-bourgeois rhetoric was forming in England around 1700: 25. The word "honest" shows the changing attitude toward the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie ; 26. And so does the word "eerlijk" ; 27. Defoe, Addison, and Steele show it, too ; 28. The bourgeois revaluation becomes a commonplace, as in The London merchant ; 29. Bourgeois Europe, for example, loved measurement ; 30. The change was in social habits of the lip, not in psychology ; 31. And the change was specifically British -- part V. Yet England had recently lagged in bourgeois ideology, compared with the Netherlands: 32. Bourgeois Shakespeare disdained trade and the bourgeoisie ; 33. As did Elizabethan England generally ; 34. Aristocratic England, for example, scorned measurement ; 35. The Dutch preached bourgeois virtue ; 36. And the Dutch bourgeoisie was virtuous ; 37. For instance, bourgeois Holland was tolerant, and not for prudence only -- part VI. Reformation, revolt, revolution, and reading increased the liberty and dignity of ordinary Europeans: 38. The causes were local, temporary, and unpredictable ; 39. "Democratic" church governance emboldened people ; 40. The theology of happiness changed circa 1700 ; 41. Printing and reading and fragmentation sustained the dignity of commoners ; 42. Political ideas mattered for equal liberty and dignity ; 43. Ideas made for a bourgeois revaluation ; 44. The rhetorical change was necessary, and maybe sufficient -- part VII. Nowhere before on a large scale had bourgeois or other commoners been honored: 45. Talk had been hostile to betterment ; 46. The hostility was ancient ; 47. Yet some Christians anticipated a respected bourgeoisie ; 48. And betterment, though long disdained, developed its own vested interests ; 49. And then turned ; 50. On the whole, however, the bourgeoisies and their bettering projects have been precarious -- part VIII. Words and ideas caused the modern world: 51. Sweet talk rules the economy ; 52. And its rhetoric can change quickly ; 53. It was not a deep cultural change ; 54. Yes, it was ideas, not interests or institutions, that changed, suddenly, in Northwestern Europe ; 55. Elsewhere ideas about the bourgeoisie did not change -- part IX. The history and economics have been misunderstood: 56. The change in ideas contradicts many ideas from the political middle, 1890-1980 ; 57. And many Polanyish ideas from the Left ; 58. Yet Polanyi was right about embeddedness ; 59. Trade-tested betterment is democratic in consumption ; 60. And liberating in production ; 61. And therefore bourgeois rhetoric was better for the poor -- part X. That is, rhetoric made us, but can readily unmake us: 62. After 1848 the clerisy converted to antibetterment ; 63. The clerisy betrayed the bourgeois deal, and approved the Bolshevik and Bismarckian deals ; 64. Anticonsumerism and pro-bohemianism were fruits of the antibetterment reaction ; 65. Despite the clerisy's doubts ; 66. What matters ethically is not equality of outcome, but the condition of the working class ; 67. A change in rhetoric made modernity, and can spread it.
September 10, 2022
This book is a real achievement. McCloskey's writing is at times poetic, at times humorous and always frank. I'm a real fan of the format for the entire series, with volumes of short chapters covering each part of the argument with a depth and lucidity that can only come from a lifetime of weighing and considering ideas and rhetoric - the two subjects of this book, the last in the series.
Here McCloskey presents her positive case for the argument (not originally hers by any means) that the all important cause of the Industrial Revolution, and the subsequent Great Enrichment, was a shift in ideas and rhetoric around the bourgeoisie. For the vast majority of history, excepting small temporary pockets of bourgeois liberty and dignity, civilisations across the world held merchants in contempt. This contempt and distrust pervades across cultures, present in foundational philosophical and religious texts, literature, plays, and both left and right wing polemics.
McCloskey documents the shift in attitude across these different intellectual circles, first emanating from the Netherlands, and then taking flight in Britain (both England and Scotland). The change of attitude to the bourgeoisie is clearly shown in the play The London Merchant, in the writings of Adam Smith, J S Mill, Benjamin Franklin, John Locke (himself influenced directly from the Dutch) and Daniel Defoe. The attitude is shown persisting in the writings of Jane Austen and Dr Johnson, with a clearly demarcated revolt of the "clerisy" after 1848 against all Liberal, bourgeois ideals. The use of language itself, particularly in the words "honesty" and "responsibility" reflect a divergence of belief from what McCloskey dubs the Great Chain of Being, the caste system that characterised all of human society up to that point, and in some areas still persists.
If any other explanations of the Industrial Revolution, and of how the world got rich, are as convincing as this, it'll make choosing very difficult. McCloskey already presents a strong negative case against competing explanations, such as materialist or institutional although at times a little light in forcefulness) but presents here an even stronger positive case. The chapters dissecting Polanyi's influential work were particularly engaging.
The book wraps up with a caution against a reversion, as has happened so many times in the past, of liberty and dignity for the bourgeoisie. This ancient mistrust of profit, this zero-sum thinking, this characterisation of the modern bourgeoisie as manipulating monsters of prudent calculation above all other virtues; these are each shown to factually inaccurate and stemming from a deep moral conviction that there is something dishonourable in making a buck from buying low and selling high. We would do well to recognize the rising living standards of the poor and of the middle depend precariously on the liberty and dignity of the bourgeoisie, an attitude that can and has changed in the past with ever disastrous consequences. Or we can revert the a flat $x a day should we again choose a less enlightened path.
Here McCloskey presents her positive case for the argument (not originally hers by any means) that the all important cause of the Industrial Revolution, and the subsequent Great Enrichment, was a shift in ideas and rhetoric around the bourgeoisie. For the vast majority of history, excepting small temporary pockets of bourgeois liberty and dignity, civilisations across the world held merchants in contempt. This contempt and distrust pervades across cultures, present in foundational philosophical and religious texts, literature, plays, and both left and right wing polemics.
McCloskey documents the shift in attitude across these different intellectual circles, first emanating from the Netherlands, and then taking flight in Britain (both England and Scotland). The change of attitude to the bourgeoisie is clearly shown in the play The London Merchant, in the writings of Adam Smith, J S Mill, Benjamin Franklin, John Locke (himself influenced directly from the Dutch) and Daniel Defoe. The attitude is shown persisting in the writings of Jane Austen and Dr Johnson, with a clearly demarcated revolt of the "clerisy" after 1848 against all Liberal, bourgeois ideals. The use of language itself, particularly in the words "honesty" and "responsibility" reflect a divergence of belief from what McCloskey dubs the Great Chain of Being, the caste system that characterised all of human society up to that point, and in some areas still persists.
If any other explanations of the Industrial Revolution, and of how the world got rich, are as convincing as this, it'll make choosing very difficult. McCloskey already presents a strong negative case against competing explanations, such as materialist or institutional although at times a little light in forcefulness) but presents here an even stronger positive case. The chapters dissecting Polanyi's influential work were particularly engaging.
The book wraps up with a caution against a reversion, as has happened so many times in the past, of liberty and dignity for the bourgeoisie. This ancient mistrust of profit, this zero-sum thinking, this characterisation of the modern bourgeoisie as manipulating monsters of prudent calculation above all other virtues; these are each shown to factually inaccurate and stemming from a deep moral conviction that there is something dishonourable in making a buck from buying low and selling high. We would do well to recognize the rising living standards of the poor and of the middle depend precariously on the liberty and dignity of the bourgeoisie, an attitude that can and has changed in the past with ever disastrous consequences. Or we can revert the a flat $x a day should we again choose a less enlightened path.
January 18, 2020
"The twentieth-century experiments of nationalism and socialism, of syndicalism in factories and central planning for investment, of proliferating regulation for imagined but not factually documented imperfections in the market, did not work. And most of the pessimisms about how we live now have proven to be mistaken. It is a puzzle. Perhaps you yourself still believe in nationalism or socialism or proliferating regulation. And perhaps you are in the grip of pessimism about growth or consumerism or the environment or inequality. Please, for the good of the wretched of the earth, reconsider."
Having spent little time reading about the global transformation post-1600s (e.g. Scientific Revolution, Reformation, Industrial Revolution, etc), I appreciated this book's relatively compact introduction to the scale of the change that occurred (30x improvement in standard of living) and the competing theories behind it. For this alone, it was a valuable read for me.
McCloskey's writing is heavy-handed and rambles, but she marshals considerable, though scattered, evidence to advance her main thesis: that the Great Enrichment was not due to science, or property rights, or capitalism, but primarily a sociological change: dignifying trade and work and entrepreneurship for the first time. She mostly relies on literary analysis (e.g. Jane Austen, Ben Franklin) to illustrate a shift in rhetoric, and for much of the rest of the book, argues against competing theories. I would've liked to see more evidence around this specific mechanism, if indeed it's the primary driver - presumably there should exist plenty of primary sources that describe inventors / entrepreneur motivation and support, and how that resulted in their contributions.
Having spent little time reading about the global transformation post-1600s (e.g. Scientific Revolution, Reformation, Industrial Revolution, etc), I appreciated this book's relatively compact introduction to the scale of the change that occurred (30x improvement in standard of living) and the competing theories behind it. For this alone, it was a valuable read for me.
McCloskey's writing is heavy-handed and rambles, but she marshals considerable, though scattered, evidence to advance her main thesis: that the Great Enrichment was not due to science, or property rights, or capitalism, but primarily a sociological change: dignifying trade and work and entrepreneurship for the first time. She mostly relies on literary analysis (e.g. Jane Austen, Ben Franklin) to illustrate a shift in rhetoric, and for much of the rest of the book, argues against competing theories. I would've liked to see more evidence around this specific mechanism, if indeed it's the primary driver - presumably there should exist plenty of primary sources that describe inventors / entrepreneur motivation and support, and how that resulted in their contributions.
October 24, 2018
Why did Europe and the Anglosphere do so well economically since the 1800s? Things like rule of law and capital accumulation certainly contributed. But McCloskey's message is that in these parts of the world, bourgeois values became accepted. Entrepreneurs and merchants, so reviled in Chaucer and Shakespeare, were free to innovate and add value. To her, freedom is the key to prosperity. Like Adam Smith she sees the importance of virtuous people (practising faith, hope, and charity).e income
She is highly critical of Marxism, socialism, and the heavy hand of government. She criticizes people's concerns with automation causing unemployment - most of the jobs in the last century have been automated, yet we have near full employment. Inequality is not on her list of worries. First, she doubts (along with many other serious students of the phenomenon) that we're measuring it correctly. And secondly, the huge increase in average income in top performing economies does much for the poor than any redistribution scheme.
It's a long book. But she writes well and she has a point if view.
She is highly critical of Marxism, socialism, and the heavy hand of government. She criticizes people's concerns with automation causing unemployment - most of the jobs in the last century have been automated, yet we have near full employment. Inequality is not on her list of worries. First, she doubts (along with many other serious students of the phenomenon) that we're measuring it correctly. And secondly, the huge increase in average income in top performing economies does much for the poor than any redistribution scheme.
It's a long book. But she writes well and she has a point if view.
May 29, 2018
McCloskey's Bourgeois Era trilogy should have been a five-star single volume. The whole trilogy is marvelous. Its topic is important and its argument is novel (at least to me) and persuasive (ditto) and the writing is fresh and conversational, but it is simply too bloated and repetitive to be as successful as it could be. Most people will not put up with it for 2000+ pages and so will not get the full argument. A stricter editor could have cut this way down while maintaining the best of it.
November 14, 2018
I have been looking for a book that I could recommend to everyone universally to understand what economics is really about... I think this is the book. It is not a simple read, but it is NOT cherry picked, it is the essential facts and then a scathing criticism of what it means to do theory based around those facts. It is a superb read!
April 12, 2021
Thorough and if genius is too strong, at least inspiration is deserved. A foundation of change in the Dutch that spreads to the island of England and then to the continent and North America.
May 31, 2021
The description of the book on Goodreads is accurate. The book is also very, very long and I lost interest. A great book for scholars.
September 24, 2021
Honesty is the best policy.
May 16, 2021
[Imported automatically from my blog. Some formatting there may not have translated here.]
This is the concluding volume of Deirdre McCloskey's trilogy on the near-miraculous enrichment of the world in the last few hundred years. My takes on the first volume, The Bourgeois Virtues, is here; on the second, Bourgeois Dignity, here.
To recap somewhat: the enrichment is something that needs explaining. Humankind muddled around for millennia, stuck in a rut of poverty and oppression, the majority of lives cut short by violence, disease, or some other symptom of deprivation. But starting around the 16th century or so, a hockey-stick increase began in northwest Europe and Great Britain, giving rise to the once-unthinkable widespread prosperity we live in today. Why there, and not somewhere else? And why then, instead of before, after, or never?
McCloskey's plausible and compelling argument … well, it's right up there in the subtitle, isn't it? It was a revolution of ideas, primarily ones that gave respect and legal protection to what McCloskey terms "trade-tested betterment". (That's kind of a clunky phrase, but it's less likely to be misinterpreted than the venerable terms "capitalism" and "entrepreneurship".) McCloskey presents her evidence in streams both wide and deep: how the political and religious climate changed; how the bourgeoisie were depicted in literature, painting, opera, plays, and so on. Alternative explanations for the great enrichment are considered and debunked.
Opposed to the bourgeoisie, since around the mid-19th century, are what McCloskey dubs the "clerisy". Think Sinclair Lewis, and his contempt of George F. Babbitt, multiplied in time and space. (Or think Nancy Pelosi, who rhapsodized that Obamacare would allow people to shuck their stupid day jobs and become "a photographer or a writer or a musician, whatever".)
This could be as boring as mud, but McCloskey's prose is witty and playful, with plenty of fun references (Mae West quoted on page 113; a Monty Python reference on page 628; and many more).
My standard disclaimer: this is a scholarly work, on a matter of ongoing academic controversy. I think McCloskey makes a pretty good case for her side, but (admittedly) I'm only seeing the one side. That said, there are (to my mind) irrefutable insights on just about every page here; even if you don't buy the whole enchilada, you'll come out smarter than you went in.
Read
July 25, 2016338.064 M1275 2016
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