What do you think?
Rate this book
Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire
How will Russia redraw post-Soviet borders? In the wake of recent Russian expansionism, political risk expert Agnia Grigas illustrates how—for more than two decades—Moscow has consistently used its compatriots in bordering nations for its territorial ambitions. Demonstrating how this policy has been implemented in Ukraine and Georgia, Grigas provides cutting-edge analysis of the nature of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy and compatriot protection to warn that Moldova, Kazakhstan, the Baltic States, and others are also at risk.
352 pages, Hardcover
First published March 22, 2016
14 people are currently reading
224 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
December 22, 2022
„Dacă nu știm cine suntem, nu putem avea o politică externă”, afirma Samuel Huntington, iar Nicolae Titulescu, tot în aceeași notă, a sinelui național și deci a unei organizării interne bune zicea: „dați-mi o politică internă bună și vă dau o politică externă bună”.
Altă carte care argumentează amplu despre tendința nefastă de destabilizare a ordinii internaționale de către un fost imperiu eșuat aflat în căutarea supraviețuirii, pentru că Rusia, după cum spun și scriitorii clasici: Rusia poate să existe numai ca imperiu, altfel va dispărea. Montesquieu nu îndulcește imaginea, căci afirmă pe bună dreptate că: „Un imperiu care s-a format prin război nu se poate menține decât prin război”.
Și implicarea Rusiei în chestiunile interne ale statelor suverane și vecine, foste membre ale URSS, prin șantaj, presiuni și război informațional, au produs conflicte deschise și înghețate care le împiedică să se dezvolte și le păstrează vulnerabile în fața expansionismului rusesc. Un exemplu edificator este implicarea Rusiei în Armenia când țara fostă sovietică dorea o apropiere de UE, dar Rusia o voia în Uniunea Economică Eurasiatică. În 2012 a reușit cu șatajul după ce Gazprom a ajuns să mărească prețul gazului de 4 ori și avea să-l mai mărească. Armenia a primit în cele din urmă promisiunea unui preț al gazului foarte mic și astfel s-a alăturat UEE în septembrie 2013. Tot în Armenia, Rusia s-a arătat revoltată de activitatea ONG-urilor finanțate din surse occidentale și care se declarau împotriva integrării Armeniei în UEE. Astfel că cele 350 de ONG-ur au deranjat Moscova fapt care a fost subliniat de senatorul rus Konstantin Kosacev, în februarie 2015, cum că ele sunt inacceptabile. Cu un an mai devreme, ambasadorul rus la Erevan, Ivan Volinkin a cerut Erevanului neutralizarea lor, fapt care a stârnit proteste în rândul populației dar și al clasei politice armene. Tot el a dat de înțeles că orice mișcare pro-occidentală sau pro-democratică s-ar petrece în Armenia, Moscova ar înăbuși-o orice demers ar urma Erevanul. „Vom bloca orice intervenție agresivă în treburile interne ale statelor prietene, sub pretextul propagării unor idei străine de mințile și inimile noastre”, avertiza el în 2014.
Ambadorul rus din Armenia, aflat în funcție în 2015, Kovalenko afirma răspicat evidențiind implicarea Rusiei în subminarea șanselor semnării acordului cu Uniunea Europeană a Armeniei: „Armenia poate exista doar alături de Rusia sau nu poate exista deloc”. O Rusie care alimenta cu arme Azerbaidjanul pentru lupta contra armenilor în enclava Nagorno-Karabah, dar proteja în același timp și securitatea Armeniei. Publicul armean a fost prins prin astfel de manipulări între nevoia de securitate, de prețul la gaz, gândindu-se și evoluția economiei ajungându-se la blocarea activității propriului guvern de la Erevan. În 2013, Rusia a lucrat la subminarea unei Armenii dornice să se apropie de UE, un an mai târziu, același scenariu era reluat în Ucraina, dar mai decis, pentru că Ucraina era o bucată mult mai tentantă decât Armenia.
Caracterul de reimperializare al Rusiei lui Putin nu este decât continuarea tendinței celor două imperii care au precedat actuala Federație Rusească. Autoarea, Agnia Grigas, de origine lituaniană, expert în cadrul Consiliului Atlantic, exemplifică concret tendința reimperialistă rusească — reimperializarea fiind o reapariție, resuscitare sau reconstituire a unei suprastructuri statale (imperiu) care, oficial sau neoficial, intervine politica suveranității altei societăți prin forță, cooperare politică sau dependență economică, socială sau culturală —, în împărțind-o în șapte etape: exercitarea puterii necoercitive; politici umanitare; politici privind compatrioții; războiul Informațional; "pașaportizarea"; protecția; anexarea.
Premisa de la care pornește autoarea este că de la încheierea războiul rece, timp de zece ani, Rusia s-a folosit gradual de cetățenii ruși, plasați de regimurile anterioare, pentru a crea o societate sovietică multietnică, în regiunile statelor care s-au desprins din URSS. Regimul Putin a pus cel mai puternic accent pe aceste comunități etnice rusești "din statele vecine în scopul acaparării oportuniste de teritorii și al reconstrucției treptate a fostului imperiu". Astfel că acești "compatrioți", cum au fost numiți de Moscova, sunt ca o pană împlântat în teritorii practic suverane pentru a le ceea dificultăți acestora în a se occidentaliza și a deveni apoi vulnerabile influenței de la răsărit.
Studiile pe care se fondează cartea conțin și "portrete ale unor etnici ruși și vorbitori de limbă rusă", unii dintre ei mai tineri, născuți după căderea URSS, dar încadrați de Moscova sub acest termen ambiguu de "compatrioți". "Rusia îi consideră adesea compatrioți pe cei care vorbesc limba rusă, indiferent de relația acestora cu celelalte categorii, sau pur și simplu pe cei care au o legătură culturală sau spirituală cu Rusia sau cu Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă". Deci nu doar etnicul rus e clasificat drept "compatriot", ci și vorbitorul de limbă rusă; "în majoritatea țărilor studiate, limba, identitatea, apartenența etnică și naționalitatea nu merg întotdeauna mână în mână".
În cadrul expunerii, autoarea identifică cele șapte etape ale reimperializării rusești aplicate la patru categorii de țări, împărțite astfel după poziția lor geografică și dinamica lor social politică: Georgia, Ucraina și Moldova; Estonia, Letonia și Lituania; Kazahstan, Kîrgîstan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan și Turkmenistan; Belarus și Armenia.
Prefața cărții (este ediția a doua, 2022. Prima ediție fiind din 2016) este semnată de sociologul și politologul Dan Dungaciu. El aduce niște completări și corecții care ajută la a înțelege cu acuratețe mai mare textul autoarei. Analiza lui succintă ne introduce în argumentația lui Grigas, realizată pe baza studiilor de caz dedicate statelor foste sovietic.
Altă carte care argumentează amplu despre tendința nefastă de destabilizare a ordinii internaționale de către un fost imperiu eșuat aflat în căutarea supraviețuirii, pentru că Rusia, după cum spun și scriitorii clasici: Rusia poate să existe numai ca imperiu, altfel va dispărea. Montesquieu nu îndulcește imaginea, căci afirmă pe bună dreptate că: „Un imperiu care s-a format prin război nu se poate menține decât prin război”.
Și implicarea Rusiei în chestiunile interne ale statelor suverane și vecine, foste membre ale URSS, prin șantaj, presiuni și război informațional, au produs conflicte deschise și înghețate care le împiedică să se dezvolte și le păstrează vulnerabile în fața expansionismului rusesc. Un exemplu edificator este implicarea Rusiei în Armenia când țara fostă sovietică dorea o apropiere de UE, dar Rusia o voia în Uniunea Economică Eurasiatică. În 2012 a reușit cu șatajul după ce Gazprom a ajuns să mărească prețul gazului de 4 ori și avea să-l mai mărească. Armenia a primit în cele din urmă promisiunea unui preț al gazului foarte mic și astfel s-a alăturat UEE în septembrie 2013. Tot în Armenia, Rusia s-a arătat revoltată de activitatea ONG-urilor finanțate din surse occidentale și care se declarau împotriva integrării Armeniei în UEE. Astfel că cele 350 de ONG-ur au deranjat Moscova fapt care a fost subliniat de senatorul rus Konstantin Kosacev, în februarie 2015, cum că ele sunt inacceptabile. Cu un an mai devreme, ambasadorul rus la Erevan, Ivan Volinkin a cerut Erevanului neutralizarea lor, fapt care a stârnit proteste în rândul populației dar și al clasei politice armene. Tot el a dat de înțeles că orice mișcare pro-occidentală sau pro-democratică s-ar petrece în Armenia, Moscova ar înăbuși-o orice demers ar urma Erevanul. „Vom bloca orice intervenție agresivă în treburile interne ale statelor prietene, sub pretextul propagării unor idei străine de mințile și inimile noastre”, avertiza el în 2014.
Ambadorul rus din Armenia, aflat în funcție în 2015, Kovalenko afirma răspicat evidențiind implicarea Rusiei în subminarea șanselor semnării acordului cu Uniunea Europeană a Armeniei: „Armenia poate exista doar alături de Rusia sau nu poate exista deloc”. O Rusie care alimenta cu arme Azerbaidjanul pentru lupta contra armenilor în enclava Nagorno-Karabah, dar proteja în același timp și securitatea Armeniei. Publicul armean a fost prins prin astfel de manipulări între nevoia de securitate, de prețul la gaz, gândindu-se și evoluția economiei ajungându-se la blocarea activității propriului guvern de la Erevan. În 2013, Rusia a lucrat la subminarea unei Armenii dornice să se apropie de UE, un an mai târziu, același scenariu era reluat în Ucraina, dar mai decis, pentru că Ucraina era o bucată mult mai tentantă decât Armenia.
Caracterul de reimperializare al Rusiei lui Putin nu este decât continuarea tendinței celor două imperii care au precedat actuala Federație Rusească. Autoarea, Agnia Grigas, de origine lituaniană, expert în cadrul Consiliului Atlantic, exemplifică concret tendința reimperialistă rusească — reimperializarea fiind o reapariție, resuscitare sau reconstituire a unei suprastructuri statale (imperiu) care, oficial sau neoficial, intervine politica suveranității altei societăți prin forță, cooperare politică sau dependență economică, socială sau culturală —, în împărțind-o în șapte etape: exercitarea puterii necoercitive; politici umanitare; politici privind compatrioții; războiul Informațional; "pașaportizarea"; protecția; anexarea.
Premisa de la care pornește autoarea este că de la încheierea războiul rece, timp de zece ani, Rusia s-a folosit gradual de cetățenii ruși, plasați de regimurile anterioare, pentru a crea o societate sovietică multietnică, în regiunile statelor care s-au desprins din URSS. Regimul Putin a pus cel mai puternic accent pe aceste comunități etnice rusești "din statele vecine în scopul acaparării oportuniste de teritorii și al reconstrucției treptate a fostului imperiu". Astfel că acești "compatrioți", cum au fost numiți de Moscova, sunt ca o pană împlântat în teritorii practic suverane pentru a le ceea dificultăți acestora în a se occidentaliza și a deveni apoi vulnerabile influenței de la răsărit.
Studiile pe care se fondează cartea conțin și "portrete ale unor etnici ruși și vorbitori de limbă rusă", unii dintre ei mai tineri, născuți după căderea URSS, dar încadrați de Moscova sub acest termen ambiguu de "compatrioți". "Rusia îi consideră adesea compatrioți pe cei care vorbesc limba rusă, indiferent de relația acestora cu celelalte categorii, sau pur și simplu pe cei care au o legătură culturală sau spirituală cu Rusia sau cu Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă". Deci nu doar etnicul rus e clasificat drept "compatriot", ci și vorbitorul de limbă rusă; "în majoritatea țărilor studiate, limba, identitatea, apartenența etnică și naționalitatea nu merg întotdeauna mână în mână".
În cadrul expunerii, autoarea identifică cele șapte etape ale reimperializării rusești aplicate la patru categorii de țări, împărțite astfel după poziția lor geografică și dinamica lor social politică: Georgia, Ucraina și Moldova; Estonia, Letonia și Lituania; Kazahstan, Kîrgîstan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan și Turkmenistan; Belarus și Armenia.
Prefața cărții (este ediția a doua, 2022. Prima ediție fiind din 2016) este semnată de sociologul și politologul Dan Dungaciu. El aduce niște completări și corecții care ajută la a înțelege cu acuratețe mai mare textul autoarei. Analiza lui succintă ne introduce în argumentația lui Grigas, realizată pe baza studiilor de caz dedicate statelor foste sovietic.
August 31, 2016
This is a very well-researched book that looks at how Russia perceives and defines the citizenship of Russian-speakers living in the now independent states of the former Soviet Union. According to Grigas, Russia uses these "compatriots" for its foreign policy purposes and gaining influence. She divides her study in 4 main grouped case studies: (1) Ukraine and Georgia; (2) the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; (3) the 5 Central Asian states; and (4) Armenia and Belarus. Within each of these chapters, she assesses Russian foreign policies of passportization, humanitarian assistance, information warfare and more. She also includes interviews with people of different backgrounds living in these countries. It made me realize how complex ethnicity, nationality, identity and language is in these countries--there is an incredible amount of diversity among the people. Overall, a great book to learn more about contemporary issues affecting this region as they relate to Russia.
March 6, 2024
Cartea abordează numeroase concepte relevante în domeniul politicii externe, având o structură argumentativă bine definită. Cu toate acestea, textul este ușor și uneori repetitiv. Mi-ar fi plăcut să găsesc mai multe elemente din sfera teoriilor de relații internaționale, dar înțeleg că aceasta nu era o necesitate dată publicului larg căruia i se adresează cartea. În concluzie, este o lectură valoroasă pentru cei interesați să înțeleagă anumite aspecte ale politicii externe ruse și modul în care un stat poate manipula concepte sentimentale, cum ar fi "protejarea conaționalilor", pentru a-și ascunde interesele cinice.
January 29, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Книгу забросил в самом начале, т.к. автор выдвигает идею, объясняющую путинскую агрессию, с которой я полностью не согласен. Тут нужно подчеркнуть, что я не согласен именно с объяснениями проводимой Путиным политики, а не с тем, что это не агрессивная внешняя политика. К примеру, я не согласен с тем, что Путин якобы восстанавливает империю, ибо, если бы он в действительности восстанавливал бы империю, он бы до 2022 года, по примеру гитлеровской Германии, все усилия направлял бы на построение военной машины, которая бы за несколько месяцев смогла бы поглотить всю Украину. Что же в реальности происходит? В реальности Путин, какой год не может захватить даже восток Украины, не говоря про всю страну. Разве так действует империя? Нет, конечно. В истории было много разных империй, как например Римская, Австро-Венгерская, Британская, Китайская, Испанская и пр. Все эти империи объединяет то, что они не только проводили агрессивную внешнюю политику, но и действовали в этом направлении успешно. СССР также является хорошим примером, ибо СССР за несколько дней подавил восстания в Венгрии и Чехословакии. Вот это – империя. То, что сегодня представляет из себя РФ скорее походит на локальную диктатуру, а путинский военный поход на Украину напоминает не захватнические войны Священной Римской империи, а войну Ирака против Ирана в конце XX века. Поэтому когда автор наделяет сегодняшнюю Россию чертами империи, автор не только предлагает искажённый взгляд на реальность, но и оскорбляет само понятие и дух империи.
The central argument of this book is that since the 1990s and particularly since the 2000s there has been an increasing tendency in Russian foreign policy toward reimperialization of the post-Soviet space, especially in regard to the territories where Russian compatriots reside.
<…>
This has resulted in de facto or de jure annexation of territories where Russian compatriots reside, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova
Это где это автор нашла русских в Грузии? Я могу ещё понять наличие русских в Украине и даже отчасти, в Молдове, но, Боже мой, КАКИЕ РУССКИЕ В ГРУЗИИ???!!! Автор, ты о чём вообще пишешь? Ну какие на фиг русские в Грузии?! Это Путин начал войну с Грузией из-за русских, проживающих в Грузии? Мне могут возразить, что речь идёт о чисто формальном акте – раздаче российских паспортов. Хорошо, но тогда почему автор ограничивается только этими тремя странам, ведь паспорта можно раздать и в Монголии и в Китае и вообще в любой стране? Вот давайте представим, что никакой раздачи паспортов не было, хорошо? Остановило бы это Путина от вторжения в Грузию и Украину? Разумеется, нет! Даже если бы в Крыму вообще не было бы ни одного российского паспорта, сама совместная история Крыма и России уже «оправдывала» бы в глазах многих людей (как внутри России, так и за её пределами) путинские действия. Боевые действия против Грузии были не из-за того что там якобы проживали или проживают русские или люди с российскими паспортами, а исключительно из-за возможности это сделать. Ну, да, формальная причина была нужна, но как показала история во время вторжения американцев в Ирак, серьёзных причин для вторжения в страну сильной военной державе не нужно, ибо сама мощь её армии обеспечивает ей такое право, т.е. право на военную интервенцию. Именно так и думает и действует Путин и наличие в некой стране русского анклава или людей с российскими паспортами вовсе не требуется. Именно поэтому то, что написала автор, является полной чушью.
Azerbaijan and a few of the Central Asian countries will be awarded less attention as they do not significantly add new insights on Moscow’s reimperialization efforts and in the latter cases, publicly available information is limited.
Автор прямо признаётся, что её теория не очень хорошо работает в отношении таких диктатур как Азербайджан и оно понятно, ведь в реальности Путин вовсе не восстанавливает империю, а создаёт вокруг России дружественные к Путину государства и неважно насколько сильно эти среднеазиатские государства подавляют русское население. Я помню, как Путина обвиняли в том, что он предал интересы русскоязычных граждан в Туркменистане в обмен на газовые интересы. Притеснения русских, разумеется, существуют, вот только проблема в том, что на самом деле Путину это не интересно. Путина не волнует ни русских народ, ни его интересы. Единственное что интересует Путина, это его собственная власть и ради этого он готов пожертвовать русским народом. Просто подумайте, что хорошего Путин сделал в отношении русского народа или хотя бы российских граждан, если не сводить всё население России к узкой группе российской элиты – главных и единственных бенефициантов проводимой Путиным политики.
To offset the facts and figures of historical and contemporary realities of Moscow’s compatriot policies and the Russian diaspora, I will rely on the warmth of human voices of this largely misunderstood but highly politicized group of people. Each country study will present portraits of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers selected from nearly a hundred interviews.
Видите ещё одну большую проблему этой книги? Многие тезисы автора базируются на интервью. Проблема тут в том, что в любой стране можно найти пару десятков людей, которые будут говорить именно то, что вам нужно и что будет подтверждать нужным вам тезис. Однако по существу это не будет иметь какого-либо отношения к реальной ситуации. В любой стране можно найти группу людей настроенных либо позитивно к Путину и/или к России или негативно. Нахождение нескольких людей вовсе не объясняет и точно не доказывает тезис или тезисы автора, какими бы они не были. Это просто мнение отобранных автором людей и ничего более.
For the purposes of the argument of this book, I consider the contemporary Russian Federation as an “empire” and the successor of the historical Soviet and Romanov empires—a concept that requires some explanation, especially as regards the Soviet Union.
Опять же, нынешняя Россия не имеет никаких признаков империи, ибо слаба во всех сферах: военной, экономической, культурной, технологической и пр. (пожалуй, только в спортивной сфере РФ входит в тройку или пятёрку лидеров). О какой «империи» может идти речь, если Россия, по заявлению Валентины Матвиенко, даже гвозди не может сама производить? Я не думаю, что размер страны автоматически делает страну империей, особенно учитывая тот факт, что многие территории РФ не пригодны для жизни, как например территория крайнего севера. С демографией в РФ тоже не очень хорошо обстоят дела.
Simply put, this book will argue that reimperialization—either by regaining lost territories or by maintaining influence and sometimes regaining it where it has been lost—is the end-goal of Moscow’s policies.
Вот это разброс у автора. Вообще-то все страны в мире стремятся сохранять влияние (maintaining influence) над своими соседями, что не делает их империями. Про восстановление потерянных территорий тоже бред полный, ибо империи не начинают создавать в тот момент, когда политическому лидеру исполнилось больше 70 лет, ибо для создания империи нужно много времени. Если Путин якобы решил собрать потерянные территории, то почему он не начал это делать ещё в 2001 году? Много ли территорий Путин присоединил к РФ к 2022 году? Кроме Крыма - ничего. А как же Донецкая и Луганская «республика»? До 2022 года Путин проводил ту же саму политику, которую начал проводить Ельцин, когда создавал Приднестровье. Всё же когда речь идёт о настоящей империи, то происходит именно присоединение территорий, а не создание никем не признанных республик, типа Приднестровья или ДНР/ЛНР.
In 2014 pending Crimea’s annexation, Putin’s approval rating was 72 percent, marking a three-year high after several years of decline, which continued to increase to 85 percent by the end of 2014, almost as high as in 2008 following the Georgian war when his approval rating was 88 percent.
Это был последний аргумент, после которого я бросил читать эту книгу. Автор на полном серьезе воспринимает социологические опросы в путинской России как релевантные. Что ж, тогда следуя за логикой автора, следует признать, что референдум о независимости не только в Крыму, но и на территории донецкой и луганской областей также показал, что на самом деле думают жители этих регионов. Тут нужно выбрать что-то одно: либо любые опросы и выборы в РФ не отражают действительность, как не отражают действительность любые опросы при диктатуре (никто же всерьёз не рассматривал социологические опросы, проводимые в СССР) либо все опросы и все выборы в РФ являются честными и справедливыми.
У меня возникло ощущение, что автор решила срубить $ на популярной теме, воспользовавшись популярными идеями рисующими мир чёрно-белыми красками. Однако реальность намного сложнее, чем представление в виде бинарной системы чёрного и белого. Конечно, никто не отрицает факт нападения Путина на Украину, но вот что побудило его это сделать и кто ещё, пусть и косвенно, способствовал реализации путинской агрессивной политике, такие авторы не говорят.
I abandoned the book at the very beginning because the author puts forward ideas explaining Putin's aggression, which I completely disagree with. It should be emphasized that I disagree with the explanations of Putin's policy, not that it is not an aggressive foreign policy. For example, I don't agree that Putin is supposedly rebuilding an empire, because if he were actually rebuilding an empire, he would have spent all his efforts, following the example of Hitler's Germany, building a military machine that could swallow up all of Ukraine in a few months. But what's really going on? In reality, Putin has been unable to seize even eastern Ukraine, let alone the entire country, for years. Is that how an empire works? No, of course not. There have been many different empires in history, such as the Roman, Austro-Hungarian, British, Chinese, Spanish, and so on. What all these empires have in common is that they not only pursued an aggressive foreign policy but also acted successfully in this direction. The USSR is also a good example because the USSR suppressed the uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in a few days. Now that is an empire. What Russia is today is more like a local dictatorship, and Putin's military campaign in Ukraine resembles not the wars of conquest of the Holy Roman Empire, but the war of Iraq against Iran in the late 20th century. Therefore, when the author endows today's Russia with the features of an empire, the author not only offers a distorted view of reality but also insults the very concept and spirit of empire.
The central argument of this book is that since the 1990s and particularly since the 2000s there has been an increasing tendency in Russian foreign policy toward reimperialization of the post-Soviet space, especially in regard to the territories where Russian compatriots reside.
<…>
This has resulted in de facto or de jure annexation of territories where Russian compatriots reside, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova
Where did the author find Russians in Georgia? I can understand the presence of Russians in Ukraine and even partly in Moldova, but, my God, which Russians in Georgia can we talk about????!?!!!!! Author, what are you writing about? What kind of Russians did you find in Georgia?! Did Putin start a war with Georgia because of the Russians in Georgia? It may be argued that this is a purely formal act - the distribution of Russian passports. Well, but then why does the author limit herself to only these three countries, because passports can be distributed in Mongolia, China, and in general in any country? Let's pretend there was no passport distribution, shall we? Would that have stopped Putin from invading Georgia and Ukraine? Of course not! Even if there were no Russian passports at all in Crimea, the very common history of Crimea and Russia would already “justify” Putin's actions in the eyes of many people (both inside and outside Russia). The hostilities against Georgia were not because Russians or people with Russian passports were or are supposedly living there, but solely because of the opportunity to do so. Well, yes, a formal reason was needed, but, as history showed during the American invasion of Iraq, a strong military power does not need a serious reason to invade a country, because the very power of its army provides it with such a right, i.e. the right to intervene militarily. This is exactly how Putin thinks and acts, and the presence of a Russian enclave or people with Russian passports in a certain country is not required at all. That is why what the author wrote is utter nonsense.
Azerbaijan and a few of the Central Asian countries will be awarded less attention as they do not significantly add new insights on Moscow’s reimperialization efforts and in the latter cases, publicly available information is limited.
The author explicitly admits that her theory doesn't work very well for dictatorships like Azerbaijan, and understandably so, because in reality Putin is not rebuilding an empire at all, but creating Putin-friendly states around Russia, no matter how much these Central Asian states suppress the Russian population. I remember when Putin was accused of betraying the interests of Russian-speaking citizens in Turkmenistan in exchange for gas interests. The oppression of Russians exists, of course, but the problem is that Putin is not interested in it. Putin doesn't care about the Russian people or their interests. The only thing Putin is interested in is his own power and for that, he is willing to sacrifice the Russian people. Just think what good Putin has done for the Russian people, or at least Russian citizens, unless you reduce the entire population of Russia to a narrow group of the Russian elite - the main and only beneficiaries of Putin's policies.
To offset the facts and figures of historical and contemporary realities of Moscow’s compatriot policies and the Russian diaspora, I will rely on the warmth of human voices of this largely misunderstood but highly politicized group of people. Each country study will present portraits of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers selected from nearly a hundred interviews.
See another big problem with this book? Many of the author's theses are based on interviews. The problem here is that in any country you can find a couple of dozen people who will say exactly what you need and what will confirm the thesis you need. However, in essence, it will not have any relation to the real situation. In any country, you can find a group of people who are either positive towards Putin and/or Russia or negative. Finding a few people does not explain or prove the thesis or theses of the author, whatever they may be. It is just an opinion of the people selected by the author and nothing more.
For the purposes of the argument of this book, I consider the contemporary Russian Federation as an “empire” and the successor of the historical Soviet and Romanov empires—a concept that requires some explanation, especially as regards the Soviet Union.
Again, today's Russia has no signs of empire, because it is weak in all spheres: military, economic, cultural, technological, etc. (perhaps only in the field of sports Russia is among the three or five leaders). What kind of “empire” can we talk about if Russia, according to Valentina Matvienko, cannot even produce nails by itself? I don't think that the size of a country automatically makes it an empire, especially considering the fact that many territories of the Russian Federation are uninhabitable, such as the far north. Demographics in the RF are not very good either.
Simply put, this book will argue that reimperialization—either by regaining lost territories or by maintaining influence and sometimes regaining it where it has been lost—is the end-goal of Moscow’s policies.
In general, all countries in the world strive to maintain influence over their neighbors, which does not make them empires. The restoration of lost territories is also nonsense because empires do not begin to be created when a political leader is over 70 years old (it takes a long time to create an empire). If Putin allegedly decided to reclaim the lost territories, why didn't he start doing it in 2001? Did Putin annex many territories to the Russian Federation by 2022? Apart from Crimea, nothing. What about the Donetsk and Lugansk “republics”? Until 2022, Putin pursued the same policy that Yeltsin began to pursue when he created Transnistria. However, when we are talking about a real empire, it is the annexation of territories that takes place not the creation of unrecognized republics like Transnistria or DNR/LNR.
In 2014 pending Crimea’s annexation, Putin’s approval rating was 72 percent, marking a three-year high after several years of decline, which continued to increase to 85 percent by the end of 2014, almost as high as in 2008 following the Georgian war when his approval rating was 88 percent.
This was the last argument after which I gave up reading this book. The author considers sociological polls in Putin's Russia to be relevant. Well, then, following the author's logic, we should recognize that the referendum on independence not only in Crimea but also in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions also showed what the residents of these regions really think. Here you have to choose one thing: either any polls and elections in the RF do not reflect reality, as any polls under dictatorship do not reflect reality (nobody seriously considered sociological polls conducted in the USSR) or all polls and all elections in the RF are honest and fair.
I had a feeling that the author decided to make $ on a popular topic, taking advantage of popular ideas by painting the world in black and white colors. However, the reality is much more complex than the binary system of black and white. Of course, no one denies the fact of Putin's attack on Ukraine but what prompted him to do it and who else, albeit indirectly, contributed to the realization of Putin's aggressive policy, such authors do not say.
Книгу забросил в самом начале, т.к. автор выдвигает идею, объясняющую путинскую агрессию, с которой я полностью не согласен. Тут нужно подчеркнуть, что я не согласен именно с объяснениями проводимой Путиным политики, а не с тем, что это не агрессивная внешняя политика. К примеру, я не согласен с тем, что Путин якобы восстанавливает империю, ибо, если бы он в действительности восстанавливал бы империю, он бы до 2022 года, по примеру гитлеровской Германии, все усилия направлял бы на построение военной машины, которая бы за несколько месяцев смогла бы поглотить всю Украину. Что же в реальности происходит? В реальности Путин, какой год не может захватить даже восток Украины, не говоря про всю страну. Разве так действует империя? Нет, конечно. В истории было много разных империй, как например Римская, Австро-Венгерская, Британская, Китайская, Испанская и пр. Все эти империи объединяет то, что они не только проводили агрессивную внешнюю политику, но и действовали в этом направлении успешно. СССР также является хорошим примером, ибо СССР за несколько дней подавил восстания в Венгрии и Чехословакии. Вот это – империя. То, что сегодня представляет из себя РФ скорее походит на локальную диктатуру, а путинский военный поход на Украину напоминает не захватнические войны Священной Римской империи, а войну Ирака против Ирана в конце XX века. Поэтому когда автор наделяет сегодняшнюю Россию чертами империи, автор не только предлагает искажённый взгляд на реальность, но и оскорбляет само понятие и дух империи.
The central argument of this book is that since the 1990s and particularly since the 2000s there has been an increasing tendency in Russian foreign policy toward reimperialization of the post-Soviet space, especially in regard to the territories where Russian compatriots reside.
<…>
This has resulted in de facto or de jure annexation of territories where Russian compatriots reside, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova
Это где это автор нашла русских в Грузии? Я могу ещё понять наличие русских в Украине и даже отчасти, в Молдове, но, Боже мой, КАКИЕ РУССКИЕ В ГРУЗИИ???!!! Автор, ты о чём вообще пишешь? Ну какие на фиг русские в Грузии?! Это Путин начал войну с Грузией из-за русских, проживающих в Грузии? Мне могут возразить, что речь идёт о чисто формальном акте – раздаче российских паспортов. Хорошо, но тогда почему автор ограничивается только этими тремя странам, ведь паспорта можно раздать и в Монголии и в Китае и вообще в любой стране? Вот давайте представим, что никакой раздачи паспортов не было, хорошо? Остановило бы это Путина от вторжения в Грузию и Украину? Разумеется, нет! Даже если бы в Крыму вообще не было бы ни одного российского паспорта, сама совместная история Крыма и России уже «оправдывала» бы в глазах многих людей (как внутри России, так и за её пределами) путинские действия. Боевые действия против Грузии были не из-за того что там якобы проживали или проживают русские или люди с российскими паспортами, а исключительно из-за возможности это сделать. Ну, да, формальная причина была нужна, но как показала история во время вторжения американцев в Ирак, серьёзных причин для вторжения в страну сильной военной державе не нужно, ибо сама мощь её армии обеспечивает ей такое право, т.е. право на военную интервенцию. Именно так и думает и действует Путин и наличие в некой стране русского анклава или людей с российскими паспортами вовсе не требуется. Именно поэтому то, что написала автор, является полной чушью.
Azerbaijan and a few of the Central Asian countries will be awarded less attention as they do not significantly add new insights on Moscow’s reimperialization efforts and in the latter cases, publicly available information is limited.
Автор прямо признаётся, что её теория не очень хорошо работает в отношении таких диктатур как Азербайджан и оно понятно, ведь в реальности Путин вовсе не восстанавливает империю, а создаёт вокруг России дружественные к Путину государства и неважно насколько сильно эти среднеазиатские государства подавляют русское население. Я помню, как Путина обвиняли в том, что он предал интересы русскоязычных граждан в Туркменистане в обмен на газовые интересы. Притеснения русских, разумеется, существуют, вот только проблема в том, что на самом деле Путину это не интересно. Путина не волнует ни русских народ, ни его интересы. Единственное что интересует Путина, это его собственная власть и ради этого он готов пожертвовать русским народом. Просто подумайте, что хорошего Путин сделал в отношении русского народа или хотя бы российских граждан, если не сводить всё население России к узкой группе российской элиты – главных и единственных бенефициантов проводимой Путиным политики.
To offset the facts and figures of historical and contemporary realities of Moscow’s compatriot policies and the Russian diaspora, I will rely on the warmth of human voices of this largely misunderstood but highly politicized group of people. Each country study will present portraits of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers selected from nearly a hundred interviews.
Видите ещё одну большую проблему этой книги? Многие тезисы автора базируются на интервью. Проблема тут в том, что в любой стране можно найти пару десятков людей, которые будут говорить именно то, что вам нужно и что будет подтверждать нужным вам тезис. Однако по существу это не будет иметь какого-либо отношения к реальной ситуации. В любой стране можно найти группу людей настроенных либо позитивно к Путину и/или к России или негативно. Нахождение нескольких людей вовсе не объясняет и точно не доказывает тезис или тезисы автора, какими бы они не были. Это просто мнение отобранных автором людей и ничего более.
For the purposes of the argument of this book, I consider the contemporary Russian Federation as an “empire” and the successor of the historical Soviet and Romanov empires—a concept that requires some explanation, especially as regards the Soviet Union.
Опять же, нынешняя Россия не имеет никаких признаков империи, ибо слаба во всех сферах: военной, экономической, культурной, технологической и пр. (пожалуй, только в спортивной сфере РФ входит в тройку или пятёрку лидеров). О какой «империи» может идти речь, если Россия, по заявлению Валентины Матвиенко, даже гвозди не может сама производить? Я не думаю, что размер страны автоматически делает страну империей, особенно учитывая тот факт, что многие территории РФ не пригодны для жизни, как например территория крайнего севера. С демографией в РФ тоже не очень хорошо обстоят дела.
Simply put, this book will argue that reimperialization—either by regaining lost territories or by maintaining influence and sometimes regaining it where it has been lost—is the end-goal of Moscow’s policies.
Вот это разброс у автора. Вообще-то все страны в мире стремятся сохранять влияние (maintaining influence) над своими соседями, что не делает их империями. Про восстановление потерянных территорий тоже бред полный, ибо империи не начинают создавать в тот момент, когда политическому лидеру исполнилось больше 70 лет, ибо для создания империи нужно много времени. Если Путин якобы решил собрать потерянные территории, то почему он не начал это делать ещё в 2001 году? Много ли территорий Путин присоединил к РФ к 2022 году? Кроме Крыма - ничего. А как же Донецкая и Луганская «республика»? До 2022 года Путин проводил ту же саму политику, которую начал проводить Ельцин, когда создавал Приднестровье. Всё же когда речь идёт о настоящей империи, то происходит именно присоединение территорий, а не создание никем не признанных республик, типа Приднестровья или ДНР/ЛНР.
In 2014 pending Crimea’s annexation, Putin’s approval rating was 72 percent, marking a three-year high after several years of decline, which continued to increase to 85 percent by the end of 2014, almost as high as in 2008 following the Georgian war when his approval rating was 88 percent.
Это был последний аргумент, после которого я бросил читать эту книгу. Автор на полном серьезе воспринимает социологические опросы в путинской России как релевантные. Что ж, тогда следуя за логикой автора, следует признать, что референдум о независимости не только в Крыму, но и на территории донецкой и луганской областей также показал, что на самом деле думают жители этих регионов. Тут нужно выбрать что-то одно: либо любые опросы и выборы в РФ не отражают действительность, как не отражают действительность любые опросы при диктатуре (никто же всерьёз не рассматривал социологические опросы, проводимые в СССР) либо все опросы и все выборы в РФ являются честными и справедливыми.
У меня возникло ощущение, что автор решила срубить $ на популярной теме, воспользовавшись популярными идеями рисующими мир чёрно-белыми красками. Однако реальность намного сложнее, чем представление в виде бинарной системы чёрного и белого. Конечно, никто не отрицает факт нападения Путина на Украину, но вот что побудило его это сделать и кто ещё, пусть и косвенно, способствовал реализации путинской агрессивной политике, такие авторы не говорят.
I abandoned the book at the very beginning because the author puts forward ideas explaining Putin's aggression, which I completely disagree with. It should be emphasized that I disagree with the explanations of Putin's policy, not that it is not an aggressive foreign policy. For example, I don't agree that Putin is supposedly rebuilding an empire, because if he were actually rebuilding an empire, he would have spent all his efforts, following the example of Hitler's Germany, building a military machine that could swallow up all of Ukraine in a few months. But what's really going on? In reality, Putin has been unable to seize even eastern Ukraine, let alone the entire country, for years. Is that how an empire works? No, of course not. There have been many different empires in history, such as the Roman, Austro-Hungarian, British, Chinese, Spanish, and so on. What all these empires have in common is that they not only pursued an aggressive foreign policy but also acted successfully in this direction. The USSR is also a good example because the USSR suppressed the uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in a few days. Now that is an empire. What Russia is today is more like a local dictatorship, and Putin's military campaign in Ukraine resembles not the wars of conquest of the Holy Roman Empire, but the war of Iraq against Iran in the late 20th century. Therefore, when the author endows today's Russia with the features of an empire, the author not only offers a distorted view of reality but also insults the very concept and spirit of empire.
The central argument of this book is that since the 1990s and particularly since the 2000s there has been an increasing tendency in Russian foreign policy toward reimperialization of the post-Soviet space, especially in regard to the territories where Russian compatriots reside.
<…>
This has resulted in de facto or de jure annexation of territories where Russian compatriots reside, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova
Where did the author find Russians in Georgia? I can understand the presence of Russians in Ukraine and even partly in Moldova, but, my God, which Russians in Georgia can we talk about????!?!!!!! Author, what are you writing about? What kind of Russians did you find in Georgia?! Did Putin start a war with Georgia because of the Russians in Georgia? It may be argued that this is a purely formal act - the distribution of Russian passports. Well, but then why does the author limit herself to only these three countries, because passports can be distributed in Mongolia, China, and in general in any country? Let's pretend there was no passport distribution, shall we? Would that have stopped Putin from invading Georgia and Ukraine? Of course not! Even if there were no Russian passports at all in Crimea, the very common history of Crimea and Russia would already “justify” Putin's actions in the eyes of many people (both inside and outside Russia). The hostilities against Georgia were not because Russians or people with Russian passports were or are supposedly living there, but solely because of the opportunity to do so. Well, yes, a formal reason was needed, but, as history showed during the American invasion of Iraq, a strong military power does not need a serious reason to invade a country, because the very power of its army provides it with such a right, i.e. the right to intervene militarily. This is exactly how Putin thinks and acts, and the presence of a Russian enclave or people with Russian passports in a certain country is not required at all. That is why what the author wrote is utter nonsense.
Azerbaijan and a few of the Central Asian countries will be awarded less attention as they do not significantly add new insights on Moscow’s reimperialization efforts and in the latter cases, publicly available information is limited.
The author explicitly admits that her theory doesn't work very well for dictatorships like Azerbaijan, and understandably so, because in reality Putin is not rebuilding an empire at all, but creating Putin-friendly states around Russia, no matter how much these Central Asian states suppress the Russian population. I remember when Putin was accused of betraying the interests of Russian-speaking citizens in Turkmenistan in exchange for gas interests. The oppression of Russians exists, of course, but the problem is that Putin is not interested in it. Putin doesn't care about the Russian people or their interests. The only thing Putin is interested in is his own power and for that, he is willing to sacrifice the Russian people. Just think what good Putin has done for the Russian people, or at least Russian citizens, unless you reduce the entire population of Russia to a narrow group of the Russian elite - the main and only beneficiaries of Putin's policies.
To offset the facts and figures of historical and contemporary realities of Moscow’s compatriot policies and the Russian diaspora, I will rely on the warmth of human voices of this largely misunderstood but highly politicized group of people. Each country study will present portraits of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers selected from nearly a hundred interviews.
See another big problem with this book? Many of the author's theses are based on interviews. The problem here is that in any country you can find a couple of dozen people who will say exactly what you need and what will confirm the thesis you need. However, in essence, it will not have any relation to the real situation. In any country, you can find a group of people who are either positive towards Putin and/or Russia or negative. Finding a few people does not explain or prove the thesis or theses of the author, whatever they may be. It is just an opinion of the people selected by the author and nothing more.
For the purposes of the argument of this book, I consider the contemporary Russian Federation as an “empire” and the successor of the historical Soviet and Romanov empires—a concept that requires some explanation, especially as regards the Soviet Union.
Again, today's Russia has no signs of empire, because it is weak in all spheres: military, economic, cultural, technological, etc. (perhaps only in the field of sports Russia is among the three or five leaders). What kind of “empire” can we talk about if Russia, according to Valentina Matvienko, cannot even produce nails by itself? I don't think that the size of a country automatically makes it an empire, especially considering the fact that many territories of the Russian Federation are uninhabitable, such as the far north. Demographics in the RF are not very good either.
Simply put, this book will argue that reimperialization—either by regaining lost territories or by maintaining influence and sometimes regaining it where it has been lost—is the end-goal of Moscow’s policies.
In general, all countries in the world strive to maintain influence over their neighbors, which does not make them empires. The restoration of lost territories is also nonsense because empires do not begin to be created when a political leader is over 70 years old (it takes a long time to create an empire). If Putin allegedly decided to reclaim the lost territories, why didn't he start doing it in 2001? Did Putin annex many territories to the Russian Federation by 2022? Apart from Crimea, nothing. What about the Donetsk and Lugansk “republics”? Until 2022, Putin pursued the same policy that Yeltsin began to pursue when he created Transnistria. However, when we are talking about a real empire, it is the annexation of territories that takes place not the creation of unrecognized republics like Transnistria or DNR/LNR.
In 2014 pending Crimea’s annexation, Putin’s approval rating was 72 percent, marking a three-year high after several years of decline, which continued to increase to 85 percent by the end of 2014, almost as high as in 2008 following the Georgian war when his approval rating was 88 percent.
This was the last argument after which I gave up reading this book. The author considers sociological polls in Putin's Russia to be relevant. Well, then, following the author's logic, we should recognize that the referendum on independence not only in Crimea but also in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions also showed what the residents of these regions really think. Here you have to choose one thing: either any polls and elections in the RF do not reflect reality, as any polls under dictatorship do not reflect reality (nobody seriously considered sociological polls conducted in the USSR) or all polls and all elections in the RF are honest and fair.
I had a feeling that the author decided to make $ on a popular topic, taking advantage of popular ideas by painting the world in black and white colors. However, the reality is much more complex than the binary system of black and white. Of course, no one denies the fact of Putin's attack on Ukraine but what prompted him to do it and who else, albeit indirectly, contributed to the realization of Putin's aggressive policy, such authors do not say.
February 13, 2017
This is a must read for someone wanting to familiarize themselves with what has happened in the former USSR, since Putin has come to power. Only cricitizm is it didn't spend enough time discussing the color revolutions...
April 16, 2016
Very repetitive structure but some good points. Her Lithuanian background gave the Baltics an unprecedented scale over other more important areas in my opinion.
August 5, 2021
The author does a great job at summarizing Russian foreign policy and the country's attempts to shape its environment. The author poorly describes the actions as nefarious, rather than an organic outcome following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The criticisms aimed at Russian policy could be equally leveled at countries such as the United States.
August 4, 2017
Beyond Crimea is Agnia Grigas' analysis of Russia's reimperialization of the Caucuses, Central Asia and the Baltics through passports, media propaganda and compatriot associations. Chilling.
December 17, 2020
A must-read book if you want to get more familiar with Russia's interference and neo-imperialism in the eastern block
April 25, 2022
Great insight to a lot of what is going on between Russia and former Soviet countries.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews