What do you think?
Rate this book
Κρατύλος, ή περί ορθότητος ονομάτων, λογικός
Η ιστορική σημασία του Κρατύλου έγκειται στο ότι στις σελίδες του ενσωματώνεται η πρώτη φιλοσοφική απόπειρα στην ιστορία της δυτικής σκέψης να αντιμετωπισθεί φιλοσοφικά η προβληματική της γλώσσας, και μάλιστα να συμπεριληφθούν σ ένα έργο η σχετική προσέγγιση του Πλάτωνος και προϋπάρξασες διδασκαλίες των Σοφιστών. Στον διάλογο αυτό δεν υπάρχει κάτι που να μην είναι αμφίσημο και - ακριβώς γι' αυτό - αντιφατικό. Από τις γραμμές, ωστόσο, αυτού του ζωηρότατου και εκπληκτικά πυκνού και σφιχτοδεμένου διαλόγου διαπιστώνουμε ότι τα ερωτήματα παραμένουν τεθειμένα και ανοικτά. Πρόκειται για έργο "σοβαρό" ή μήπως η σωκρατική ειρωνεία, που εδώ φθάνει και ξεπερνά τα όρια του ανεκτού αίρει την άνευ ετέρου εγγενή σοβαρότητα των πλατωνικών διαλόγων μετατρέποντας τον φιλοσοφικό διάλογο σε κωμωδία; Τον Κρατύλο ο Πλάτων τον θέλει άραγε τόσο "αντι-μεταφυσικό" όσο και, λ.χ., τον Φαίδρο στο δεύτερο μέρος του; Και η γλώσσα είναι όντως το όργανο εκείνο, με το οποίο ο άνθρωπος αυτοδιδάσκεται; Προηγούνται τα ονόματα της ουσίας του πράγματος ή όχι; Τις ιδέες τις υπερασπίζεται ο Πλάτων ή τις πολεμά; Στον Κρατύλο ελέγχεται η ορθότητα των ονομάτων, ερευνάται η αενάως μεταβαλλόμενη γλώσσα και δείχνεται η σχέση μεταξύ γλώσσας και αληθούς γνώσης των πραγμάτων.
544 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 351
83 people are currently reading
1206 people want to read
About the author
Plato
5,219 books8,650 followersPlato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 181 reviews
January 11, 2015
[Outside the Potts residence. JEREMY, JEMIMA, SOCRATES]
SOCRATES: Good day, young friends. May I inquire whether your father is at home?
JEMIMA: I’m sorry, Daddy is out.
JEREMY: He’s trying to sell an invention.
JEMIMA: Can we help you, Mr…?
SOCRATES: Socrates. My unworthy name is Socrates.
JEREMY: The Socrates?
JEMIMA: The one who appears in Cratylus?
JEREMY: Daddy’s been reading it to us at bedtime for the last week.
SOCRATES: Has he indeed! And what did you all think of it?
JEMIMA: He said you had some good counterarguments to the arbitrariness of the signifier.
JEREMY: Yes, he ripped out all the pages from de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale.
JEMIMA: And put them in the kitty litter.
SOCRATES: The kitty litter?
JEREMY: I think “kitty” is derived from κίνημα τίγρης, “motion of the tiger”. A cat is fast like a tiger, you understand.
JEMIMA: And “litter” comes from λιτότητας, “part”. It is the most important part of looking after a cat.
JEREMY: We’ve been studying your methods very closely.
SOCRATES: I see you have! And what other discoveries have you made, little philosophers?
JEMIMA: Well, we liked the bit about primitive names. We wondered if we could make up a primitive name of our own. A word whose signification follows from its sound.
SOCRATES: And did you succeed?
JEREMEY: We certainly did! Do you want to know what it is, Mr. Socrates?
SOCRATES: Nothing would please me more.
JEREMY AND JEMIMA: It’s… Chitty Chitty Bang Bang!
SOCRATES: Χιττι Χιττι…?
JEREMY AND JEMIMA: Βανγ Βανγ!
SOCRATES: I see! How extremely ingenious of you! Yes, the appropriateness of the name is manifestly evident. A few more examples like this, and I might even start to believe in my foolish idea…
JEMIMA: And that’s not all! We made up a song too! Based on your theory!
SOCRATES: Did you really?
JEREMY: Would you like us to sing it to you?
SOCRATES: I would be honored.
JEMIMA: Alright, Mr. Socrates, here it is. We invented it for Daddy’s girlfriend. She’s also a big fan of your work.
JEREMY AND JEMIMA:
Toot sweets sound like what they are
So do lollies in a lollypop jar
Gingerbread men have a gingerbread sound
We've found
Sugar plum cinnamon and lemon tart
Tell you what they are right from the start
And your name does the same for you
By coincidence, Truly Scrumptious
You're truly truly scrumptious
Scrumptious as a cherry peach parfait
When you’re near us
It's so delicious
Honest Truly, you're the answer to our wishes
Truly Scrumptious
Though we may seem presumptuous
Never, never, ever go away
Our hearts beat so unruly
Because we love you truly
Honest Truly, we do
SOCRATES: I did not know every one of the charming barbarian words you used, but I found your song both moving and philosophically engaging. And now, I fear I have presumed on your hospitality long enough…
JEREMY: Oh no, Mr. Socrates! Won’t you stay to tea?
JEMIMA: Mr. Russell is coming. I’m sure you’d enjoy talking to him.
SOCRATES: I’m sorry, dear children, but I must get back to the fifth century B.C. I need to tell Hermogenes and Cratylus about my new discoveries.
[He departs]
JEREMY: Now what?
JEMIMA: I think we should play a little trick on Mr. Russell. I don’t like the way he looks at Truly.
JEREMY: An apple-pie bed?
JEMIMA: No, we did that last time. He’ll be expecting it.
JEREMY: I know. Let’s refute axiomatic set theory.
JEMIMA: Wizard idea, Jeremy!
____________________________________
GRATUITOUS CROSS-PROMOTION
People who enjoy reading about kitty litter may also want to check out this review by Not.
January 31, 2019
Cratylus is one of Plato’s early-middle dialogues. It is somewhat puzzling for the modern reader, since much of the dialogue is taken up with fanciful folk etymologies of Greek words. Socrates is investigating whether the names of the Gods, heroes, citizens, or natural elements are meaningful, and in the process spins off etymology after etymology, each one more implausible than the next. The intention seems to be mockery; just as Plato earlier reveals the faulty logic of the sophists, so he exposes the emptiness of grammarians. I wish I could say that the satire has lost its bite with the passage of time; but, alas, folk etymologies remain common, and I have heard argument-from-word-origin too many times for comfort.
Still, the dialogue can be fairly dull if you do not know ancient Greek. But the beginning and the end retain philosophic interest. Socrates investigates the connection between words and things. Cratylus holds that names are essential and elemental, even god-given, while Hermogenes first maintains that the signifier is arbitrary. Socrates effectively confuses both parties, until nobody is quite sure what they think. Along the way, several theories are entertained that now seem hopelessly naive, such that legislators gave original, onomatopoeic names long ago. Nevertheless, given the time in which it was written, this dialogue shows a remarkable prescience in its view of language and Plato’s willingness to consider multiple factors. One wonders, then, to what extent Plato himself took it seriously—where the satire begins and ends—since questions of language are absent from his mature system.
By chance, I have just heard a recent version of the onomatopoeic theory of names (that the sounds of names imitate what they signify), put forward by Daniel Tammet (famous for his mental math and memory abilities) in a TED talk. Tammet suggests that names have emotional tones in their sound that even non-native speakers can grasp. He uses the Icelandic word "hnugginn" as an example, which apparently means "sad." According to Tammet, respondents with no knowledge of Icelandic are more likely to associate this word with negative emotions when given a choice. This certainly wasn't true in my case, since the word reminded me immediately of "hugging." I think Tammet would profit from this dialogue.
Still, the dialogue can be fairly dull if you do not know ancient Greek. But the beginning and the end retain philosophic interest. Socrates investigates the connection between words and things. Cratylus holds that names are essential and elemental, even god-given, while Hermogenes first maintains that the signifier is arbitrary. Socrates effectively confuses both parties, until nobody is quite sure what they think. Along the way, several theories are entertained that now seem hopelessly naive, such that legislators gave original, onomatopoeic names long ago. Nevertheless, given the time in which it was written, this dialogue shows a remarkable prescience in its view of language and Plato’s willingness to consider multiple factors. One wonders, then, to what extent Plato himself took it seriously—where the satire begins and ends—since questions of language are absent from his mature system.
By chance, I have just heard a recent version of the onomatopoeic theory of names (that the sounds of names imitate what they signify), put forward by Daniel Tammet (famous for his mental math and memory abilities) in a TED talk. Tammet suggests that names have emotional tones in their sound that even non-native speakers can grasp. He uses the Icelandic word "hnugginn" as an example, which apparently means "sad." According to Tammet, respondents with no knowledge of Icelandic are more likely to associate this word with negative emotions when given a choice. This certainly wasn't true in my case, since the word reminded me immediately of "hugging." I think Tammet would profit from this dialogue.
April 3, 2023
Nezaobilazno delo za razumevanje odnosa između reči i stvari.
U ovom Platonovom dijalogu, sukobljene su dve strane – konvencionalistička i naturalistička. Prvu zastupa Hermogen, koji brani tvrdnju da reči proističu iz dogovora između ljudi, da su reči konvencija, dok drugi pogled, koji zastupa Kratil, predsavlja uverenje da je svaki predmet dobio tačno ime koje mu po prirodi stoji. Medijator i sudija i porađalac ideja je, normalno, Sokrat. U razgovoru sa Hermogenom zaključuje kako je ime, između ostalog, oruđe koje služi za podučavanje i razlikovanje stvari – ono što je čunak za tkanje, to je ime za stvar. Zbog toga stvari treba imenovati načinom i sredstvima koja one imaju po prirodi, a ne kako se nekome prohte. Sokrat čvrsto stoji iza toga da ime ima prirodnu ispravnost i da se ne može nametnuti. Dakle, ono što je bitno za pojam, mora da bude sadržano u imenu, inače je neistinito. Mada, kaže Sokrat u raspravi sa Kratilom, u proučavanju stvari ne treba početi od imena, već od njih samih – izvan samog imena treba tražiti istinu. A istina je tu, mora biti tu: u suprotnom, ukoliko se sve stvari samo preobražavaju i ništa ne ostaje onako kako je bilo, nema ni govora o spoznaji, pa ni o razumu. Ako se menja sama ideja spoznaje, promeniće se u neku drugu ideju koja sa spoznajom veze nema.
Ono što mene zanima je (a na umu mi je sad Velimir Hlebnjikov) je nad-jezik, jezik zvezda, ptica, božanstava, zaumni jezik koji, u svojoj onomatopejičnosti, biva dostupan svima. Zvuk koji znači – kao što je svima izmišljena reč „bubu” nešto okruglačasto, a „kiki” nešto oštro. Odnos zvuka i jezika je divna misterija i neodgovorivo pitanje. Zašto Bušmani imaju kliktave glasove, a Havajci samo osam suglasnika? Otkud Č laponcima? Zašto je ubiški jezik imao 84 konsonanta i kako su govornici ovog jezika doživljavali sopstvenu verbalnu muziku? Zašto nekad reči lepog značenja zvuče ružno, a ružne lepo? Kako govorimo jezik, a kako nas jezik govori?
Sve sa čim i dan-danas muku mučimo, bilo je i kod Platona. Cela zapadna filozofija je, što reče Vajthed, niz fusnota Platona. Filozofska azbuka. Tu je, pa ko hoće, nek se počasti opismenjavanjem. Za reč, za pojam, za stvar, za biće.
U ovom Platonovom dijalogu, sukobljene su dve strane – konvencionalistička i naturalistička. Prvu zastupa Hermogen, koji brani tvrdnju da reči proističu iz dogovora između ljudi, da su reči konvencija, dok drugi pogled, koji zastupa Kratil, predsavlja uverenje da je svaki predmet dobio tačno ime koje mu po prirodi stoji. Medijator i sudija i porađalac ideja je, normalno, Sokrat. U razgovoru sa Hermogenom zaključuje kako je ime, između ostalog, oruđe koje služi za podučavanje i razlikovanje stvari – ono što je čunak za tkanje, to je ime za stvar. Zbog toga stvari treba imenovati načinom i sredstvima koja one imaju po prirodi, a ne kako se nekome prohte. Sokrat čvrsto stoji iza toga da ime ima prirodnu ispravnost i da se ne može nametnuti. Dakle, ono što je bitno za pojam, mora da bude sadržano u imenu, inače je neistinito. Mada, kaže Sokrat u raspravi sa Kratilom, u proučavanju stvari ne treba početi od imena, već od njih samih – izvan samog imena treba tražiti istinu. A istina je tu, mora biti tu: u suprotnom, ukoliko se sve stvari samo preobražavaju i ništa ne ostaje onako kako je bilo, nema ni govora o spoznaji, pa ni o razumu. Ako se menja sama ideja spoznaje, promeniće se u neku drugu ideju koja sa spoznajom veze nema.
Ono što mene zanima je (a na umu mi je sad Velimir Hlebnjikov) je nad-jezik, jezik zvezda, ptica, božanstava, zaumni jezik koji, u svojoj onomatopejičnosti, biva dostupan svima. Zvuk koji znači – kao što je svima izmišljena reč „bubu” nešto okruglačasto, a „kiki” nešto oštro. Odnos zvuka i jezika je divna misterija i neodgovorivo pitanje. Zašto Bušmani imaju kliktave glasove, a Havajci samo osam suglasnika? Otkud Č laponcima? Zašto je ubiški jezik imao 84 konsonanta i kako su govornici ovog jezika doživljavali sopstvenu verbalnu muziku? Zašto nekad reči lepog značenja zvuče ružno, a ružne lepo? Kako govorimo jezik, a kako nas jezik govori?
Sve sa čim i dan-danas muku mučimo, bilo je i kod Platona. Cela zapadna filozofija je, što reče Vajthed, niz fusnota Platona. Filozofska azbuka. Tu je, pa ko hoće, nek se počasti opismenjavanjem. Za reč, za pojam, za stvar, za biće.
September 23, 2020
Aunque es un texto corto, por momentos se vuelve bastante complejo de seguir para quienes, como yo, no tienen ninguna formación en griego antiguo. Las reflexiones sobre el rol de la etimología en la comprensión de la realidad de las cosas y las limitaciones del conocimiento a través del lenguaje me resultan muy sugerentes.
May 24, 2020
The topic of Cratylus is the correctness of names – and hence the criteria that should determine the correct choice of name. On one side, Cratylus argues that there is a “correctness of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by nature”; on the other, Hermogenes stance is that the correctness of names is determined only by convention and agreement.
I do not believe that the same names could have been attached to quite different object and the same objects given quite different names (extreme conventionalism) because names are given accordingly to the characteristics that we perceive the object to have. Etymology, linguistics, and philology all show us that words are not created in a void.
The bulk of Cratylus is long (and more or less fallacious) etymological explanations of important Greek words. It’s a longwinded quasi-monologue t that can simply skimmed over: on the whole the argument doesn’t bring us much value (Astyanax’s contemporary equivalent would be Remus Lupin, and I think that can sum my entire thesis: Plato forgets about human agency), and on the whole the argument doesn’t bring us much value (that is, value relevant to the current discussion), except as a reminder that names have a history behind them.
Indeed, then, as Socrates-Plato explains, words are not attached in a merely arbitrary way to their objects. Speaking is a human action. A name indeed is a sort of tool, not to “divide things according to their natures” but rather to transmit knowledge. Yet, names are not chosen arbitrarily; there is a history behind each name.
Except, names are not given based on the essence of a thing, but rather on our perception of it. The namegiver did not have to know the thing he was naming, but rather he gave a name based on what he believed the thing to be. Knowledge of its essence is not a requirement for naming. It might be that names cannot aspire to being perfect encapsulation of their objects’ essences, but they don’t have to try to do so in the first place. Rather, the naming is a process entirely human, in that it is done for humans by humans based on human’s perceptions.
Names are given by people – things don’t need names to exist.
I do agree that “no name belongs to a particular thing by nature” (extreme naturalism) – while it is a very romantic notion (a true name to be called upon, that knowing the true name of things gives you power over them) which might find some ground in psychology (e.g. the benefit that comes with getting a diagnosis, or recognizing that abuse is indeed abuse), it is not true for nature: Nature does not care.
[a draft of my arguments goes like this: (1) Mary Oliver’s poem that has a fox (or is it a turtle?) in it; (2) the research on bilingualism shows that people think in concepts; (3) untranslatable words: the same feeling is present whether or not you have a word for it; (4) scientific phenomena: they exist even before they get discovered and names and they will go on existing even if we don’t understand them]
This dialogue belongs to the early middle phase of Plato, the phase in which he develops his theory of the Forms – you might see reminiscences of that in my argument as well and would not be wrong. Things might be “by themselves, in relation to their own being or essence, which is theirs by nature”, but Names are nor Things nor the essence of the Things.
Anthropomorphic gods might “call themselves by true [names]”, but that’s only because we are defining them as if they were human. If the Thing, and hence the God, is not human – will it call himself with a name? [The fox says no].
I do not believe that the same names could have been attached to quite different object and the same objects given quite different names (extreme conventionalism) because names are given accordingly to the characteristics that we perceive the object to have. Etymology, linguistics, and philology all show us that words are not created in a void.
The bulk of Cratylus is long (and more or less fallacious) etymological explanations of important Greek words. It’s a longwinded quasi-monologue t that can simply skimmed over: on the whole the argument doesn’t bring us much value (Astyanax’s contemporary equivalent would be Remus Lupin, and I think that can sum my entire thesis: Plato forgets about human agency), and on the whole the argument doesn’t bring us much value (that is, value relevant to the current discussion), except as a reminder that names have a history behind them.
Indeed, then, as Socrates-Plato explains, words are not attached in a merely arbitrary way to their objects. Speaking is a human action. A name indeed is a sort of tool, not to “divide things according to their natures” but rather to transmit knowledge. Yet, names are not chosen arbitrarily; there is a history behind each name.
Except, names are not given based on the essence of a thing, but rather on our perception of it. The namegiver did not have to know the thing he was naming, but rather he gave a name based on what he believed the thing to be. Knowledge of its essence is not a requirement for naming. It might be that names cannot aspire to being perfect encapsulation of their objects’ essences, but they don’t have to try to do so in the first place. Rather, the naming is a process entirely human, in that it is done for humans by humans based on human’s perceptions.
Names are given by people – things don’t need names to exist.
I do agree that “no name belongs to a particular thing by nature” (extreme naturalism) – while it is a very romantic notion (a true name to be called upon, that knowing the true name of things gives you power over them) which might find some ground in psychology (e.g. the benefit that comes with getting a diagnosis, or recognizing that abuse is indeed abuse), it is not true for nature: Nature does not care.
[a draft of my arguments goes like this: (1) Mary Oliver’s poem that has a fox (or is it a turtle?) in it; (2) the research on bilingualism shows that people think in concepts; (3) untranslatable words: the same feeling is present whether or not you have a word for it; (4) scientific phenomena: they exist even before they get discovered and names and they will go on existing even if we don’t understand them]
This dialogue belongs to the early middle phase of Plato, the phase in which he develops his theory of the Forms – you might see reminiscences of that in my argument as well and would not be wrong. Things might be “by themselves, in relation to their own being or essence, which is theirs by nature”, but Names are nor Things nor the essence of the Things.
Anthropomorphic gods might “call themselves by true [names]”, but that’s only because we are defining them as if they were human. If the Thing, and hence the God, is not human – will it call himself with a name? [The fox says no].
October 22, 2016
Socrates is also satirizing the endless fertility of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory.
So is the introduction to Cratylus dialogue. Socrates goes on a lengthy monologue as expected about the origins of words and their meanings. Essentially it's a satire on etymologists. Plato underhandedly accepts influences of foreign language (like Sanskrit) on Greek but doesn't explore in detail.
A bit lengthy for the subject matter but interesting.
[I kinda miss haughty Socrates...]
So is the introduction to Cratylus dialogue. Socrates goes on a lengthy monologue as expected about the origins of words and their meanings. Essentially it's a satire on etymologists. Plato underhandedly accepts influences of foreign language (like Sanskrit) on Greek but doesn't explore in detail.
A bit lengthy for the subject matter but interesting.
[I kinda miss haughty Socrates...]
March 18, 2024
Cratylus takes the position of Heraclitus, that all things are in motion and flux. Words then become conventional signs, as it were, that point to something else. There is a measure of prior knowledge that is required for the sign to mean anything substantial and there is a measure of relativity involved in language.
Hermogenes takes the position that words, like art, is imitative, that is imitated a thing, so if it is a sign, it’s a sign of the thing signified and is therefore substantially true. There are of course derivative names and primary ones but whence comes the primary? From Daemons or the gods? What if the original “name giver” made some errors so there is still internal consistency but it’s slightly incorrect like the geometrician who makes a slight error in his first principles. All subsequent proofs are consistent internally but therein lies a measure of error.
Socrates ultimately points us to the Good, the Beautiful itself. The pure Forms that are constitutive of all reality, and which all things participate in to share their essence with. Eternal and unchanging, even letters, and then ultimately words, names, sentences, all participate in their corresponding eternal forms.
I think this dialogue is severely underrated. There is something extremely unsettling about this dialogue and I believe it’s because it’s so peculiarly ancient (pre-modern) in its outlook. But it’s important to know that language and the origin thereof was taken extremely seriously and all good grammarians and philosophers were apt to give an account of the same.
“But, Cratylus, I have long been surprised at my own wisdom, and doubtful of it, too. That’s why I think it’s necessary to keep re-investigating whatever I say, since self-deception is the worst thing of all. How could it not be terrible, indeed, when the deceiver never deserts you even for an instant, but is always right there with you?” —Socrates
Hermogenes takes the position that words, like art, is imitative, that is imitated a thing, so if it is a sign, it’s a sign of the thing signified and is therefore substantially true. There are of course derivative names and primary ones but whence comes the primary? From Daemons or the gods? What if the original “name giver” made some errors so there is still internal consistency but it’s slightly incorrect like the geometrician who makes a slight error in his first principles. All subsequent proofs are consistent internally but therein lies a measure of error.
Socrates ultimately points us to the Good, the Beautiful itself. The pure Forms that are constitutive of all reality, and which all things participate in to share their essence with. Eternal and unchanging, even letters, and then ultimately words, names, sentences, all participate in their corresponding eternal forms.
I think this dialogue is severely underrated. There is something extremely unsettling about this dialogue and I believe it’s because it’s so peculiarly ancient (pre-modern) in its outlook. But it’s important to know that language and the origin thereof was taken extremely seriously and all good grammarians and philosophers were apt to give an account of the same.
“But, Cratylus, I have long been surprised at my own wisdom, and doubtful of it, too. That’s why I think it’s necessary to keep re-investigating whatever I say, since self-deception is the worst thing of all. How could it not be terrible, indeed, when the deceiver never deserts you even for an instant, but is always right there with you?” —Socrates
October 22, 2020
Κάθε έργο του Πλάτωνα που έρχομαι σε επαφή είναι μία αποκάλυψη! Πόσο ωραία πλέκει τη γνώση, με τέτοιο τρόπο [βήμα-βήμα] που το κάθε θέμα φαίνεται τόσο απλό αλλά και τόσο εντυπωσιακό.
Στον διάλογο αυτό, εξετάζει την προέλευση των ονομάτων. Δίνει σημασία στον ήχο των γραμμάτων και τη σύνθεση των λέξεων, διαχωρίζοντας όμως με σαφήνεια ότι άλλο το όνομα [η λέξη] του πράγματος-της έννοιας-του προσώπου και άλλο το πράγμα-έννοια-πρόσωπο καθαυτό.
Στον διάλογο αυτό, εξετάζει την προέλευση των ονομάτων. Δίνει σημασία στον ήχο των γραμμάτων και τη σύνθεση των λέξεων, διαχωρίζοντας όμως με σαφήνεια ότι άλλο το όνομα [η λέξη] του πράγματος-της έννοιας-του προσώπου και άλλο το πράγμα-έννοια-πρόσωπο καθαυτό.
June 30, 2024
“Cratylus” challenges the reader to consider thoughtful questions about the relationship between words and objects while stimulating deeper reflection on how language functions in everyday life. If you are interested in philosophy or linguistics this dialogue has some valuable insights that make this work a worthwhile addition to your reading list.
April 1, 2018
On the importance of names and use of the right words and names
July 29, 2024
Did ancient Greek have prepositions? Yes. Of course it did. For a while, I was having my doubts while reading Cratylus, one of Plato’s middle dialogues that is devoted to a consideration of the correspondence between words (especially nouns) and the world.
As many of the dialogues are, this one is engaging and readable. It begins with Hermogenes talking with Socrates, incredulous that his friend Cratylus would claim that his name is not Hermogenes, “even if everyone calls [him] that.” The reason is that it cannot be a true name for he is not born of (genes) Hermes as his name implies. The name does not correspond to a truth and cannot be a true name. Socrates sets off from here.
As these dialogues go, this one starts with consideration of popular opinion or easily obtained viewpoints that are (often without cause) taken as common knowledge. In short order, the speakers throw out the relativistic notion that words mean only what they mean to us because, as Protagoras says, “man is the measure of all things that are that they are and that are not that they are not.” This leads to a notion of a private language but then also a corresponding public language that we use for interacting with others and that may or may not overlap with a private language. Also thrown out is the idea that the meaning in words is all convention or what we collectively agree they are. If whims changes and the conventions follow then this would suggest that there are no true names and words are potentially disconnected from the world that they reference or “imitate” in this work.
Socrates and Hermogenes start to make progress on a different kind of correspondence theory of word meanings by taking a cue from Prodicus of Ceos to consider etymology. Here, words can be traced back to roots in older Greek words and to words from other languages brought to Greece. The discussion is fascinating in showing how words trace back through words that lead closer to actual observations of the world, to first principles, or what Aristotle will come to call first philosophy, the metaphysics, being, categories, cosmology. This is the tether to reality through a long etymological chain that comes to the present day in a word. Evidence of that chain may be in word stems or in (remarkably!) single letters. Socrates’ extemporaneous etymological work is a little over the top, but the point is an interesting one. And there is a degree to which this argument still makes sense, even with words of modern coinage that trace, if not a direct history then at least an indirect one to other words through various generative, neologistic ways. The idea is that words all bottom out in reality at some point. They imitate reality as a painting imitates reality — so the argument goes.
Maybe in principle this is the case but it certainly can’t be true that we are aware of the etymological history of words when we use them, especially if the only trace of that etymological history is (as Socrates claims) a single letter. So, here I think Hermogenes might have been right to begin with: convention is important because words means what they do in how they are invoked, how they are used. And usages of words, invoked over time, pointing to conventional meaning will maintain a connection to an inherited sense of a word. The language is living and changing and I thought that the dialogue was going to go here when Heraclitus came up and his observation about change being a constant. This is why dead languages no longer maintain their currency in that the words and concept do not float on the current of renewable experience. Experience as it is embodied in that language ceased when the use of the language ceased.
Fascinating dialogue with big implications for the suitability of language for doing any kind of science or philosophy that attempts to say something about reality. If there is no correspondence then how do we talk about the world at all? I think that this argument will also figure into some of the later philosophy of language, especially when broader consideration is given to functional language.
As many of the dialogues are, this one is engaging and readable. It begins with Hermogenes talking with Socrates, incredulous that his friend Cratylus would claim that his name is not Hermogenes, “even if everyone calls [him] that.” The reason is that it cannot be a true name for he is not born of (genes) Hermes as his name implies. The name does not correspond to a truth and cannot be a true name. Socrates sets off from here.
As these dialogues go, this one starts with consideration of popular opinion or easily obtained viewpoints that are (often without cause) taken as common knowledge. In short order, the speakers throw out the relativistic notion that words mean only what they mean to us because, as Protagoras says, “man is the measure of all things that are that they are and that are not that they are not.” This leads to a notion of a private language but then also a corresponding public language that we use for interacting with others and that may or may not overlap with a private language. Also thrown out is the idea that the meaning in words is all convention or what we collectively agree they are. If whims changes and the conventions follow then this would suggest that there are no true names and words are potentially disconnected from the world that they reference or “imitate” in this work.
Socrates and Hermogenes start to make progress on a different kind of correspondence theory of word meanings by taking a cue from Prodicus of Ceos to consider etymology. Here, words can be traced back to roots in older Greek words and to words from other languages brought to Greece. The discussion is fascinating in showing how words trace back through words that lead closer to actual observations of the world, to first principles, or what Aristotle will come to call first philosophy, the metaphysics, being, categories, cosmology. This is the tether to reality through a long etymological chain that comes to the present day in a word. Evidence of that chain may be in word stems or in (remarkably!) single letters. Socrates’ extemporaneous etymological work is a little over the top, but the point is an interesting one. And there is a degree to which this argument still makes sense, even with words of modern coinage that trace, if not a direct history then at least an indirect one to other words through various generative, neologistic ways. The idea is that words all bottom out in reality at some point. They imitate reality as a painting imitates reality — so the argument goes.
Maybe in principle this is the case but it certainly can’t be true that we are aware of the etymological history of words when we use them, especially if the only trace of that etymological history is (as Socrates claims) a single letter. So, here I think Hermogenes might have been right to begin with: convention is important because words means what they do in how they are invoked, how they are used. And usages of words, invoked over time, pointing to conventional meaning will maintain a connection to an inherited sense of a word. The language is living and changing and I thought that the dialogue was going to go here when Heraclitus came up and his observation about change being a constant. This is why dead languages no longer maintain their currency in that the words and concept do not float on the current of renewable experience. Experience as it is embodied in that language ceased when the use of the language ceased.
Fascinating dialogue with big implications for the suitability of language for doing any kind of science or philosophy that attempts to say something about reality. If there is no correspondence then how do we talk about the world at all? I think that this argument will also figure into some of the later philosophy of language, especially when broader consideration is given to functional language.
April 21, 2023
This isn't one of the more popular Socratic dialogues because its subject matter seems so antiquated and irrelevant. (I've learned that some of the dialogues are read to learn things, and others are read to understand what humanity had to go through to get to our present level of knowlege -- and how we, too, may be stuck in some in proper ways of thinking.) The dialogue's central question is whether the way things are named is merely by convention (we all agree to call things and people by certain names) or whether there is some quality that makes a name proper.
Socrates talks the question out with Cratylus (believes names are by nature) and Hermogenes (believes names are by convention.) Socrates somewhat walks the tightrope, agreeing with Cratylus, but acknowledging that some things, people, and gods don't seem to be named well, and - yet - everyone still calls them by those names. The most important idea in the whole dialogue is that one shouldn't assume one has some grasp of a thing because one knows what it is called.
Socrates talks the question out with Cratylus (believes names are by nature) and Hermogenes (believes names are by convention.) Socrates somewhat walks the tightrope, agreeing with Cratylus, but acknowledging that some things, people, and gods don't seem to be named well, and - yet - everyone still calls them by those names. The most important idea in the whole dialogue is that one shouldn't assume one has some grasp of a thing because one knows what it is called.
February 28, 2021
Socrates gives Hermogenes a brief lesson on mythological etymology.
August 10, 2025
Las ultimas paginas son increíbles, pero la mitad del diálogo consiste en encadenar etimología tras etimología (muchas sacadas del culo según el editor).
August 29, 2024
The Cratylus is not one of Plato’s most read dialogues. It’s kind of a shame, because it addresses two fundamental questions:
What is the relationship between language and reality?
Is reality constant and unchanging or is it in constant flux (the position attributed to Heraclitus, and represented in the dialogue by Cratylus)?
The original date of the dialogue is in some dispute, and also the order in which it fits in Plato’s “middle dialogues”. The maturity of Plato’s thoughts seem to definitely place it well before The Republic, also one of the middle dialogues.
The dialogue opens with opposing positions taken by Socrates’ two companions here, Cratylus and Hermogenes. Hermogenes states Cratylus’ position, “Cratylus says, Socrates, that there is a correctness of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by nature.” Hermogenes’ own position is a contrary one, “I believe that any name you give a thing is its correct name.” “No name,” he says, “belongs to a particular thing by nature, but only because of the rules and usage of those who establish the usage and call it by that name.”
That gives us the crux of the argument to come. Call it conventionalism vs. essentialism.
Socrates’ first move in the dialogue is to establish that things do have natures. It’s a quick argument, a rebuttal to Protagoras’ relativism, which Hermogenes defends. The argument turns on whether there can be facts of the matter, e.g., that there are wise men and foolish men, as opposed to everything being left to the judgement of each individual. You could object that the argument is too quick, that that formulation of Protagoras’ relativism is extreme and that other positions are possible.
There will be other arguments in favor of essentialism as the dialogue goes on. I don’t think that everything depends on this rejection of Protagoras’ relativism.
Socrates goes on to argue that speaking, like other things, has a nature, and that it is possible to distinguish speaking correctly, i.e., according to its nature, from speaking incorrectly. Speaking correctly is speaking truly.
I’ll skip a bit ahead, since I imagine you can see the direction of the argument. Speaking correctly will imply speaking truly of the natures of things, in particular naming them in accordance with their natures. Socrates says, “We cannot name things as we choose; rather, we must name them in the natural way for them to be named and with the natural tool for naming them.”
The “tools” Socrates invokes here are rules for naming things. “Name-givers” as Socrates will call those who name things, are in a sense legislators, “rule-setters” for how things will be spoken of.
Socrates draws an analogy between name-givers and craftsmen in general, saying that name-givers are a rare sort of craftsman, but like other craftsmen, they are skilled at their trade. In particular they “know how to embody in sounds and syllables the name naturally suited to each thing.”
Also, just as a blacksmith may fashion drills that differ in their details, so long as the drills they make are made correctly, i.e., in accord with the nature of drills, so might different name-givers, working in different languages, fashion different names for the same things, so long as they accord with the natures of the things they name. This accounts for differences in names from language to language.
The next question Socrates takes up is what it means for a name to accord with the nature of the thing it names. He does this through a long series of etymological arguments, tracing back from the names of gods, human virtues and vices, truth, and knowledge (the translator, C.D.C. Reeve gives a nice summary of the categories of names Socrates covers in his introduction to the book).
But before going on to that, note that what Plato (via Socrates) treats as a “name” is a broader category than what we would call a name. “Names’ include proper nouns, like names of people or places or gods, but also common nouns, names for objects, actions, and attributes. It may also include adjectives, like “good.”
A couple of examples helps. The word for gods, “theos”, derives from “thein”, meaning to run, because the gods (originally likely the planets, sky, and earth) were in constant motion. “Daimons”, the name for the first humans, derives from “daimon”, denoting wisdom.
Often Socrates notes that the original names for such things have changed over time, having been “covered over” with embellishments or “to make them sound good in the mouth.” Those changes amount to corruptions of the original names, and a loss of the wisdom contained in those original names. Etymologies like the ones he demonstrates here can uncover those original names.
The names themselves are not just neutral tags for the things they name, they contain descriptive content, e.g., that the gods are constantly in motion. As another example, Socrates says of the name for the good, “[The good] always does away with (luei) any attempt to let motion end, making it unceasing and immortal. In my view, it is for this reason that the good is said to be ‘lusiteloun’, because it does away with (luon) an end (telos) to motion.”
When we unpack the “meanings” of names etymologically we understand better what the things, e.g., the good, are. So the etymologies aren’t just historical reconstructions, they are uncoverings of wisdom contained in the “original names” of things.
This is at least somewhat borne out by what Socrates says about the name for names themselves. He says, “Well , onoma (‘name’) seems to be a compressed statement which says: ‘this is a being for which there is a search.’” He then goes on to connect this notion of a search to the etymologies of truth (Aletheia), falsehood (Pseudos), and being (on or ousia).
But there is a tension here. If these names are well chosen by the name-givers, they will contain wisdom about the nature of the things they are names for. If they are well-chosen. And although Socrates speaks reverently of the name-givers, he doesn’t grant them infallibility.
That tension will come to a head toward the end of the dialogue. So far, the etymologies have traced names to other names, the name for gods to the name for running, etc. But etymology has to come to an end someplace, with some names that are elemental or primary.
Plato finds the relationship between these primary names and what they name in “imitation.” “It seems to follow that a name is a vocal imitation of what it imitates, and that someone who imitates something with his voice names what he imitates.”
But it’s not just any kind of imitating — it is imitation of the “essence” of the thing (e.g., not an imitation of the sound it makes or its shape). Naming seems to consist in imitating the being or essence of things via letters and syllables.
Now the job becomes one of describing in turn what the imitation consists in, how letters and syllables can imitate the essences of things (and whether or not they do so well or correctly). Since these primary names are the basis for all other derivative ones, the correctness of those primary names is the basis for the correctness (and embedded wisdom) of all names.
As an example, Socrates presents the letter “r” as a name-giver’s tool for copying (or imitating) motion, as in “rhoe" (“flow”) and in other examples of words naming motion.
It seems to be both the sound of the letter and the way it is produced by the tongue that are the basis for the imitating. “He [the name-giver] saw, I suppose, that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in pronouncing this letter, and that’s probably why he used it in these names.” He repeats the same point about the motion of the tongue to describe how other letters (“i”, “d”, . . . ) are apt tools to imitate other qualities, like smallness or smoothness or a blowing outwards of something.
This brings us back to the tension I mentioned above. If the correctness of these primary names provides the basis for the correctness of all other (driver or compound) names, and if that correctness consists in their properly imitating the nature of the things they name, are those primary names in fact correct?
Socrates rightly points out that the name-givers must have had knowledge of the things they named independently of their names. They had to know the things in order to create names for them in the first place. So they knew them directly, foreshadowing the direct knowledge of Forms he develops in The Republic.
Did the name-givers create correct primary names?
I think the dialogue actually ends with that question still open. Cratylus never gives up his defense of Heraclitus, finding evidence in the prevalence of primary names that connote (or really, “imitate”) motion or change. Socrates offers one final argument against Heraclitus. He argues, among other points, that knowledge in an Heraclitean world would be impossible, because as soon as we gained knowledge of something, it would have changed, and our knowledge would no longer be of the thing. What’s more the thing would no longer be itself. It gets downright Parmenidean at this point, although it does foreshadow again arguments that Plato will make about knowledge and Forms in later dialogues.
The dialogue closes with the promise of future conversations. Socrates gets no final “Certainly so, Socrates” from Cratylus.
To go back to the two fundamental questions:
What is the relationship between language and reality?
Plato’s answer here is really a theory of “names”, where that category is a broad one. But he doesn’t explicitly provide what we would call, in contemporary philosophy, a theory of meaning or even a theory of reference per se. His theory is more one of the history and origin of names. And there his interesting claim is that names “imitate” the things they name, more specifically they imitate the “nature” of those things. Plato doesn’t fully explain what he means by their “nature” here — that’s going to wait for a more fully developed treatment of his theory of Forms, e.g., in The Republic.
The imitation that binds names to things, if they are correctly named, is a likeness between that nature of a thing and the qualities of letters and syllables, the sounds of letters but also even the feel of the letters and syllables in the mouth and on the tongue.
Given this “likeness” between names and the things they name, we can come to know things by knowing their names. However, to do so is to both count on the things being correctly named (i.e., truly imitating the nature of things) and to know things indirectly, rather than directly knowing the natures of things (again something to be developed in Plato’s theory of knowledge and the Forms).
Is reality constant and unchanging or is it in constant flux (the position attributed to Heraclitus, and represented in the dialogue by Cratylus)?
Here I don’t think we get a full answer. As I said, Cratylus leaves the conversation still holding to a Heraclitean position. Socrates has presented several arguments, but he hasn’t proven his case against Cratylus and Heraclitus. The “primary names” give mixed results, some conveying a Heraclitean emphasis on motion and change and others a stop to change (associated with a "d" rather than "r" sound and feel). Both, though, as I said above, are fallible, as the name-givers may have or may not have named the primary things correctly.
Aristotle reports in his Metaphysics that Plato learned about Heraclitus’ thoughts from the real-life Cratylus. So the relationship portrayed in the dialogue has some validity, as may the open question at the end of the dialogue.
Plato’s later development of his theory of Forms and his theory of knowledge (especially in the Theatetus and The Republic) combines Heraclitean insights with his own essentialism, so the open-endedness of the discussion here isn’t all that surprising. It’s like a rehearsal of arguments and positions to come.
What is the relationship between language and reality?
Is reality constant and unchanging or is it in constant flux (the position attributed to Heraclitus, and represented in the dialogue by Cratylus)?
The original date of the dialogue is in some dispute, and also the order in which it fits in Plato’s “middle dialogues”. The maturity of Plato’s thoughts seem to definitely place it well before The Republic, also one of the middle dialogues.
The dialogue opens with opposing positions taken by Socrates’ two companions here, Cratylus and Hermogenes. Hermogenes states Cratylus’ position, “Cratylus says, Socrates, that there is a correctness of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by nature.” Hermogenes’ own position is a contrary one, “I believe that any name you give a thing is its correct name.” “No name,” he says, “belongs to a particular thing by nature, but only because of the rules and usage of those who establish the usage and call it by that name.”
That gives us the crux of the argument to come. Call it conventionalism vs. essentialism.
Socrates’ first move in the dialogue is to establish that things do have natures. It’s a quick argument, a rebuttal to Protagoras’ relativism, which Hermogenes defends. The argument turns on whether there can be facts of the matter, e.g., that there are wise men and foolish men, as opposed to everything being left to the judgement of each individual. You could object that the argument is too quick, that that formulation of Protagoras’ relativism is extreme and that other positions are possible.
There will be other arguments in favor of essentialism as the dialogue goes on. I don’t think that everything depends on this rejection of Protagoras’ relativism.
Socrates goes on to argue that speaking, like other things, has a nature, and that it is possible to distinguish speaking correctly, i.e., according to its nature, from speaking incorrectly. Speaking correctly is speaking truly.
I’ll skip a bit ahead, since I imagine you can see the direction of the argument. Speaking correctly will imply speaking truly of the natures of things, in particular naming them in accordance with their natures. Socrates says, “We cannot name things as we choose; rather, we must name them in the natural way for them to be named and with the natural tool for naming them.”
The “tools” Socrates invokes here are rules for naming things. “Name-givers” as Socrates will call those who name things, are in a sense legislators, “rule-setters” for how things will be spoken of.
Socrates draws an analogy between name-givers and craftsmen in general, saying that name-givers are a rare sort of craftsman, but like other craftsmen, they are skilled at their trade. In particular they “know how to embody in sounds and syllables the name naturally suited to each thing.”
Also, just as a blacksmith may fashion drills that differ in their details, so long as the drills they make are made correctly, i.e., in accord with the nature of drills, so might different name-givers, working in different languages, fashion different names for the same things, so long as they accord with the natures of the things they name. This accounts for differences in names from language to language.
The next question Socrates takes up is what it means for a name to accord with the nature of the thing it names. He does this through a long series of etymological arguments, tracing back from the names of gods, human virtues and vices, truth, and knowledge (the translator, C.D.C. Reeve gives a nice summary of the categories of names Socrates covers in his introduction to the book).
But before going on to that, note that what Plato (via Socrates) treats as a “name” is a broader category than what we would call a name. “Names’ include proper nouns, like names of people or places or gods, but also common nouns, names for objects, actions, and attributes. It may also include adjectives, like “good.”
A couple of examples helps. The word for gods, “theos”, derives from “thein”, meaning to run, because the gods (originally likely the planets, sky, and earth) were in constant motion. “Daimons”, the name for the first humans, derives from “daimon”, denoting wisdom.
Often Socrates notes that the original names for such things have changed over time, having been “covered over” with embellishments or “to make them sound good in the mouth.” Those changes amount to corruptions of the original names, and a loss of the wisdom contained in those original names. Etymologies like the ones he demonstrates here can uncover those original names.
The names themselves are not just neutral tags for the things they name, they contain descriptive content, e.g., that the gods are constantly in motion. As another example, Socrates says of the name for the good, “[The good] always does away with (luei) any attempt to let motion end, making it unceasing and immortal. In my view, it is for this reason that the good is said to be ‘lusiteloun’, because it does away with (luon) an end (telos) to motion.”
When we unpack the “meanings” of names etymologically we understand better what the things, e.g., the good, are. So the etymologies aren’t just historical reconstructions, they are uncoverings of wisdom contained in the “original names” of things.
This is at least somewhat borne out by what Socrates says about the name for names themselves. He says, “Well , onoma (‘name’) seems to be a compressed statement which says: ‘this is a being for which there is a search.’” He then goes on to connect this notion of a search to the etymologies of truth (Aletheia), falsehood (Pseudos), and being (on or ousia).
But there is a tension here. If these names are well chosen by the name-givers, they will contain wisdom about the nature of the things they are names for. If they are well-chosen. And although Socrates speaks reverently of the name-givers, he doesn’t grant them infallibility.
That tension will come to a head toward the end of the dialogue. So far, the etymologies have traced names to other names, the name for gods to the name for running, etc. But etymology has to come to an end someplace, with some names that are elemental or primary.
Plato finds the relationship between these primary names and what they name in “imitation.” “It seems to follow that a name is a vocal imitation of what it imitates, and that someone who imitates something with his voice names what he imitates.”
But it’s not just any kind of imitating — it is imitation of the “essence” of the thing (e.g., not an imitation of the sound it makes or its shape). Naming seems to consist in imitating the being or essence of things via letters and syllables.
Now the job becomes one of describing in turn what the imitation consists in, how letters and syllables can imitate the essences of things (and whether or not they do so well or correctly). Since these primary names are the basis for all other derivative ones, the correctness of those primary names is the basis for the correctness (and embedded wisdom) of all names.
As an example, Socrates presents the letter “r” as a name-giver’s tool for copying (or imitating) motion, as in “rhoe" (“flow”) and in other examples of words naming motion.
It seems to be both the sound of the letter and the way it is produced by the tongue that are the basis for the imitating. “He [the name-giver] saw, I suppose, that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in pronouncing this letter, and that’s probably why he used it in these names.” He repeats the same point about the motion of the tongue to describe how other letters (“i”, “d”, . . . ) are apt tools to imitate other qualities, like smallness or smoothness or a blowing outwards of something.
This brings us back to the tension I mentioned above. If the correctness of these primary names provides the basis for the correctness of all other (driver or compound) names, and if that correctness consists in their properly imitating the nature of the things they name, are those primary names in fact correct?
Socrates rightly points out that the name-givers must have had knowledge of the things they named independently of their names. They had to know the things in order to create names for them in the first place. So they knew them directly, foreshadowing the direct knowledge of Forms he develops in The Republic.
Did the name-givers create correct primary names?
I think the dialogue actually ends with that question still open. Cratylus never gives up his defense of Heraclitus, finding evidence in the prevalence of primary names that connote (or really, “imitate”) motion or change. Socrates offers one final argument against Heraclitus. He argues, among other points, that knowledge in an Heraclitean world would be impossible, because as soon as we gained knowledge of something, it would have changed, and our knowledge would no longer be of the thing. What’s more the thing would no longer be itself. It gets downright Parmenidean at this point, although it does foreshadow again arguments that Plato will make about knowledge and Forms in later dialogues.
The dialogue closes with the promise of future conversations. Socrates gets no final “Certainly so, Socrates” from Cratylus.
To go back to the two fundamental questions:
What is the relationship between language and reality?
Plato’s answer here is really a theory of “names”, where that category is a broad one. But he doesn’t explicitly provide what we would call, in contemporary philosophy, a theory of meaning or even a theory of reference per se. His theory is more one of the history and origin of names. And there his interesting claim is that names “imitate” the things they name, more specifically they imitate the “nature” of those things. Plato doesn’t fully explain what he means by their “nature” here — that’s going to wait for a more fully developed treatment of his theory of Forms, e.g., in The Republic.
The imitation that binds names to things, if they are correctly named, is a likeness between that nature of a thing and the qualities of letters and syllables, the sounds of letters but also even the feel of the letters and syllables in the mouth and on the tongue.
Given this “likeness” between names and the things they name, we can come to know things by knowing their names. However, to do so is to both count on the things being correctly named (i.e., truly imitating the nature of things) and to know things indirectly, rather than directly knowing the natures of things (again something to be developed in Plato’s theory of knowledge and the Forms).
Is reality constant and unchanging or is it in constant flux (the position attributed to Heraclitus, and represented in the dialogue by Cratylus)?
Here I don’t think we get a full answer. As I said, Cratylus leaves the conversation still holding to a Heraclitean position. Socrates has presented several arguments, but he hasn’t proven his case against Cratylus and Heraclitus. The “primary names” give mixed results, some conveying a Heraclitean emphasis on motion and change and others a stop to change (associated with a "d" rather than "r" sound and feel). Both, though, as I said above, are fallible, as the name-givers may have or may not have named the primary things correctly.
Aristotle reports in his Metaphysics that Plato learned about Heraclitus’ thoughts from the real-life Cratylus. So the relationship portrayed in the dialogue has some validity, as may the open question at the end of the dialogue.
Plato’s later development of his theory of Forms and his theory of knowledge (especially in the Theatetus and The Republic) combines Heraclitean insights with his own essentialism, so the open-endedness of the discussion here isn’t all that surprising. It’s like a rehearsal of arguments and positions to come.
Read
April 12, 2024Même si cela peut passer inaperçu, Cratyle apparaît et parle dès le début du livre (avant même Socrate) !
October 24, 2020
أوائل المحاولات لتأصيل الأسماء و الخوض في اللسانيات . طرح فيه أفلاطون سؤال مهم يتعلق بأصل الأسماء هل هي طبيعية ، بمعنى هل يحاكي الاسم جوهر الشيء كما هو في الطبيعة ، أم هي اصطلاحية ، بمعنى تواضع عليها الناس و اتفقوا بشأنها كما يحلو لهم .
و تمت مناقشة الكثير من المواضيع ذات الصلة ، مثل من الأجدر بإطلاق الأسماء ، وظيفة الإسم ، الحركة و الثبات و نظرية هيراقليطس ، و اجتهادات كثيرة لأفلاطون فيما يخص اشتقاق الكلمات اليونانية .
محاورة مفيدة بأسلوب سقراط الممتع .
و تمت مناقشة الكثير من المواضيع ذات الصلة ، مثل من الأجدر بإطلاق الأسماء ، وظيفة الإسم ، الحركة و الثبات و نظرية هيراقليطس ، و اجتهادات كثيرة لأفلاطون فيما يخص اشتقاق الكلمات اليونانية .
محاورة مفيدة بأسلوب سقراط الممتع .
December 3, 2019
Fucking boring.
November 29, 2022
A heavily satirical dialogue. Socrates argues language is historical, not arbitrary or metaphysical. Can we enjoy it as mocking deconstruction before the letter?
Read
April 13, 2022no quiero seguir en la universidad por favor llamen a mi mamá
September 7, 2023
girl what??
June 19, 2021
This will be my final Plato for the foreseeable future: I wanted familiarity with his major works, and I have that now. Cratylus is weird to modern readers because it considers a problem people haven't thought about in a long time and it honestly appears absurd to us today: the nature of naming, if people are named according to their nature or simply by convention? Most of us would pick the latter, and rightly so. The obvious problem with taking the former perspective is that naming a child by its nature requires some omniscience on the part of the namer. We can't figure out the nature of newborns.
Half of this dialogue is an exercise in deriving the meaning of the names of Greek gods, seasons, et cetera. While this was mostly boring, I found this gem -
So, if [Hades] is to bind them [people in the underworld] with the strongest of shackles, rather than holding them by force, he must, it seems, bind them with some sort of desire.
Later, when considering the problem of naming as imitation, Socrates seems to derive the logic behind one of my favourite paintings, René Magritte's The Treachery of Images:
Suppose some god didn’t just represent your color and shape the way painters do, but made all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth and softness, and put motion, soul, and wisdom like yours into them—in a word, suppose he made a duplicate of everything you have and put it beside you. Would there then be two Cratyluses or Cratylus and an image of Cratylus?
Ceci n'est pas un Cratylus? Pardon my French.
Half of this dialogue is an exercise in deriving the meaning of the names of Greek gods, seasons, et cetera. While this was mostly boring, I found this gem -
So, if [Hades] is to bind them [people in the underworld] with the strongest of shackles, rather than holding them by force, he must, it seems, bind them with some sort of desire.
Later, when considering the problem of naming as imitation, Socrates seems to derive the logic behind one of my favourite paintings, René Magritte's The Treachery of Images:
Suppose some god didn’t just represent your color and shape the way painters do, but made all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth and softness, and put motion, soul, and wisdom like yours into them—in a word, suppose he made a duplicate of everything you have and put it beside you. Would there then be two Cratyluses or Cratylus and an image of Cratylus?
Ceci n'est pas un Cratylus? Pardon my French.
May 23, 2025
“What’s in a name?”Many find Cratylus more difficult than it is. I think it’s because of the second half. Plato’s central thesis is that names do have meaning, but not in a rigid or infallible way. While words can misname or mislead, they are still meaningful tools. Plato seems to reject both the idea that names are purely conventional and that they are absolute natural extensions of things. Instead, they mediate concepts, however imperfectly.
For instance, even if Socrates doesn’t know the word Ocean and I read it in translation, we are still referring to the same thing. Language is helpful for distinction and reference, even if it’s not perfect.
A particularly intriguing moment comes when Socrates suggests that we know the names of gods only because they’ve revealed them to us. This suggests a reliance not just on linguistic construction, but on divine disclosure. It’s also an interesting pushback against postmodern views of radical linguistic relativism.
In the end, Cratylus might be less about fixing language and more about cultivating philosophical humility: words matter, but they are not ultimate. There is something behind the name—but it requires more than naming to know.
P Hidden Platonists?
For instance, even if Socrates doesn’t know the word Ocean and I read it in translation, we are still referring to the same thing. Language is helpful for distinction and reference, even if it’s not perfect.
A particularly intriguing moment comes when Socrates suggests that we know the names of gods only because they’ve revealed them to us. This suggests a reliance not just on linguistic construction, but on divine disclosure. It’s also an interesting pushback against postmodern views of radical linguistic relativism.
In the end, Cratylus might be less about fixing language and more about cultivating philosophical humility: words matter, but they are not ultimate. There is something behind the name—but it requires more than naming to know.
P Hidden Platonists?
Read
May 27, 2022sócrates usa la cuestión de la creación de la realidad del lenguaje para dar razón que éste no pertenece a un concepto real/natural, y que la convencionalidad social del lenguaje no es tampoco su solo creador (y aquí es bien interesante que sin querer también describe la falacia de la democracia), sino que existe una parte de la naturaleza de la que las cosas reciben su nombre, últimamente refiriéndose a los dioses dando a los humanos las primeras palabras como herramienta; también es interesante que ya hace referencia a Heráclito y su tesis de la realidad en constante cambio aplicada al lenguaje, hace que el análisis se vuelva muy complicado y siento que para el final ya aterriza en un concepto que engloba la ciencia como un proceso del lenguaje buscando constantes en el mundo transitorio, y en la edición que estoy leyendo lo que sigue es, precisamente, la ciencia. <3
September 22, 2025
Le texte n'a pas la portée que je lui imaginais. Pas évident non plus de rester accroché à travers toutes les analyses étymologiques de grec ancien disons.
Mais tout de même, la plupart des déclinaisons de la question du rapport du langage à l'être sont déjà là. Ce n'est pas rien, surtout que la théorie des Formes n'est pas encore ce qu'elle est dans les textes tardifs.
Les traductions françaises ont bien souvent un aspect un peu ludique et rigolo qui accentue la théâtralité du dialogue. Parmi mes expressions préférées il y a : « Parbleu », « Par le chien » et « Hé quoi? Écoute bonhomme ». Toutes excellentes.
Mais tout de même, la plupart des déclinaisons de la question du rapport du langage à l'être sont déjà là. Ce n'est pas rien, surtout que la théorie des Formes n'est pas encore ce qu'elle est dans les textes tardifs.
Les traductions françaises ont bien souvent un aspect un peu ludique et rigolo qui accentue la théâtralité du dialogue. Parmi mes expressions préférées il y a : « Parbleu », « Par le chien » et « Hé quoi? Écoute bonhomme ». Toutes excellentes.
February 7, 2018
Imagino que este seja o diálogo mais importante para ser lido no idioma original, já que aqui é tratada a questão da origem das palavras, e assim sendo, a tradução nunca alcançará as nuances que são captadas quanod temos conhecimento do grego antigo.
February 10, 2019
tartışma Yunanca kelimeler üzerinden yürüdüğü için ve ben de Yunanca bilmediğim için biraz zorlayıcı oldu. bunun dışında dil felsefesi gibi çok sevdiğim bir alanın temel sorunlarını bu kadar kolay anlaşılabilir bir biçimde tartışmaya açması, kıymetini attırıyor. adlar ve nesneler arasındaki ilişki, adların ilk kez nasıl, neye göre ve kim tarafından verildiği, adların işlevi gibi soruları düşünmenizi sağlıyor.
February 13, 2022
Discussion on Name is by convention or by the nature of things?
It's relevant even today in day to day life as we give names to things from variables in the coding standards to the names of the cities.
Conclusion - as usual, it comes to the point that only those who is well aware of the nature of a thing can give an appropriate name. And it is no other than the philosopher because he is aware of the forms. So he better understands nature.
The fun part - How Socrates scolds the cratylaus. And poor Hermogenes.
It's relevant even today in day to day life as we give names to things from variables in the coding standards to the names of the cities.
Conclusion - as usual, it comes to the point that only those who is well aware of the nature of a thing can give an appropriate name. And it is no other than the philosopher because he is aware of the forms. So he better understands nature.
The fun part - How Socrates scolds the cratylaus. And poor Hermogenes.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 11, 2020
Ending arguments redeem the very boring extended parody of etymologists that comprises 60% of the book
April 18, 2022
On naming. Main arguments: proper naming method = closely resembling the thing being named; naming has element of convention, which allow bad names to persist.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 181 reviews