In this book Samuel Moyn, a professor of law and history at Harvard University, details the conservative Christian origins of the immediate postwar interest in human rights. However, in making this argument, Moyn is not suggesting that human rights emerged from a long Judeo-Christian tradition, but rather from a fairly recent development within Christianity, particularly within Catholicism -- the rise of personalism in the early 1900s and its emphasis on human dignity. In fact, he argues that for centuries, the notion of individual rights" was anathema to the corporatist and hierarchical churches. In making this argument, he points to a few leading conservative Protestants and Catholics who played leading roles in the advancement of human rights in the postwar era and in some cases were active in the formation of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. He argues that for these Christians, the promotion of human rights in the immediate postwar era had less to do with Nazi crimes against the Jews and more to do with their concern about a new enemy -- communism. Thus, the promotion of freedom of religion as a universal human right emerged in a religious framework rather than a secular one, meaning it was intended to protect Christianity and the West from godless communism. He supports this argument by pointing to the larger context in which postwar human rights emerged -- the rise of conservative Christian democracy in Europe, the resurgence of interest in natural law, and cultural conservatism in the United States.
While Moyn makes a very thought-provoking argument, this books is not without its problems. First and foremost, it too often reads more like a polemic than a history. The author's disregard for religion is readily apparent throughout the text; in fact, he seems to suggest that it is the Christian origins of the postwar narrative of human rights that has ruined human rights today -- even though he claims that Christian human rights died in the 1960s, replaced by a secular understanding of human rights in the 1970s. He argues that the reason that the European Convention has repeatedly ruled against Muslim expressions of religion can be traced to the original definition of religious freedom, which was intended to protect Christianity from godless communism. Islam, he asserts, has replaced communism as the enemy of religious (Christian) freedom. Thus, rather than current prejudice and bias against Muslims that finds expression in flawed court judgements of the European Convention, the problem is a fundamental flaw in how religious freedom in the immediate postwar was formulated. Moyn's seeming disdain for religion also finds expression in the break he wants to draw between Christian human rights of the 1940s to early 1960s and secular human rights in the 1970s and thereafter. This break ignores the reality that Christian missionaries in countries such as South Korea played an active role in transnational human rights activism in the 1970s and beyond. In fact, their activism contributed to a new geopolitical orientation in human rights activism. But these missionaries did not engage in human rights activism despite their religious convictions, but because of them.
This brings us to the final problem of the book. It is too selective in its discussion of religious influences on the immediate postwar era. Although Moyn does acknowledge that there was a Christian left (both in Protestantism and Catholicism), he focuses exclusively on the Christian right in his analysis. Thus, he does not discuss the origins of personalism in leftist Catholic circles. In the 1920s, many of those who advocated personalism, were subject to censure by the church and were not rehabilitated until the postwar era. Rather he begins his narrative of personalism's history after it has been co-opted by the Pope. Yet, even then, his discussion is selective, arguing that there is no need to discuss how the Pope deployed personalism for positions on family and labor because it was not yet systematic. For anyone who has read the 1930 encyclical Casti Connubii, this assertion is wrong. In this encyclical, Pius XI utilizes personalism to advance a companionate model of marriage, but one in which there is a clear hierarchical relationship between husband and wife, not to mention between the married couple and the church. Given the late twentieth century discussion of women's rights as human rights and sexual politics, his decision to skip over the importance of this encyclical seems strange, as at one level it would support his argument. However, the incorporation of personalism found in this encyclical would have consequences for the Church, one that opened the door to challenging some traditional arguments about the relationship between man and women, between church and married couple, and between church and society. Thus, by largely ignoring the religious left, Moyn missed an opportunity to offer a much more nuanced argument of how Christianity informed secular human rights discussions in the immediate postwar era and beyond.
Moyn readily admits in his epilogue that this book was only a start point for a further discussion of religious influences on postwar secular society. As such, it is well worth the read, even though at many levels its analysis is flawed. Still in detailing the contributions of many conservative Christians to the postwar narrative of human rights, Moyn demonstrates the ways in which the narrative of human rights can be misused to advance a West and the rest history.