While much of the information has already been presented elsewhere, this is an interesting, engaging and insightful memoir of Morell’s CIA career, and the underlying theme appears to be the CIA’s central role in the war against al-Qaeda following 9/11. Morell describes many of the successes, failures, challenges, and opportunities in a straightforward, readable fashion. As you may already know from other books, Morell was President Bush’s personal CIA briefer for much of that presidency, and his account of 9/11 and the aftermath is vivid and gripping. “There are two times when you need to worry about terrorists,” Morell writes. “When you pick up their chatter and when you don’t---which means, of course, that you worry all the time.” The rest of the book deals with the Agency’s counterterrorism role in the aftermath of the attacks, and how its action took on a more aggressive, paramilitary nature during that time.
Morrell is fairly sympathetic to both Presidents Bush and Obama and appreciative of the weight of their offices and their role in expanding US counterterrorism capabilities. Morell seems to have genuinely liked Bush, while his relationship with Obama was more formal, albeit more personally engaging than some accounts suggest. Other players are not treated kindly, such as Vice President Cheney and his staff, who pressed the CIA to confirm some sort of link between Saddam and al-Qaeda when CIA analysts repeatedly told them they could find no significant signs of cooperation. According to Morrell, “the view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on WMD is just flat wrong. No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years before Bush came to office.” He notes that the CIA and pretty much the entire intelligence community agreed that Saddam had WMD, a view that went back to the Clinton administration and was shared by other intelligence agencies, the UN, and even Saddam’s own generals. Given that Saddam had kicked UN weapons inspectors out of the country in 1998, much of the intelligence on the issue was quite dated. Morell notes that intelligence resources available for Iraq were quite strained since Clinton had charged the Agency with the additional mission of regime change in 1998; it did not, however, assign additional people to this mission. “Congressional oversight committees are briefed on covert actions, and they sometimes provide additional funding, but they do not raise the Agency’s personnel ceiling just because there is a new plan. So the folks who could have been trying to figure out how to collect intelligence from Saddam’s inner circle to discover Saddam’s plans, intentions and capabilities with regard to weapons of mass destruction were diverted to find generals willing to overthrow him.” Apparently, Saddam thought that the US would eventually discover his lack of WMDs and that they would then lift the sanctions and refrain from an invasion.
He is also critical of other figures, such as McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Porter Goss. Morell calls Goss’s tenure “the worst during my three decades of service,” although he blames Goss’s aides more than Goss himself. He appears to have genuinely appreciated the work of Panetta, Hayden, and Petraeus (while noting that the Agency rank and file did not always feel the same way, especially about Petraeus). Morell asserts that the CIA was successful in thwarting al-Qaeda attacks following 9/11, but is also critical of many encountered shortcomings by the intelligence community as a whole (including CIA and NSA). Interestingly, he notes that, at the time of the Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding NSA surveillance, most Wall Street firms had better security than that agency. Regarding the Arab Spring, Morell notes that Agency analysts often struggled to understand what was happening, relying too heavily on governments in the region and not enough on independent street-level sources and media outlets, although it is unclear to Morell what difference the Agency’s failure made in the long run.
From reading the book it also seems like the level of cooperation between the CIA and the special operations community was one the great successes of the era, and he generously praises the skill and dedication of these men and women. Contrary to the old cliche about CIA-approved Agency memoirs, Morrell is quite straightforward about intelligence failures like the pre-Arab Spring Middle East and about the inner workings of the intelligence bureaucracy. Morell’s account of the Benghazi attacks is quite defensive but well-reasoned (this part of the book can get tedious and Morell even advises the reader to skip it). The book also glosses over controversies like the torture debate and the Camp Chapman attack (and maybe to a lesser degree the WMD fiasco). He is fairly critical of the recently released Senate report on the Agency’s interrogation program, which might be off-putting if you agree with the report’s findings, but will probably make sense if you happen to agree with the mostly ignored minority report and CIA response. Morell also addresses the drone debate, writing that claims of significant civilian casualties due to these strikes are “highly exaggerated,” and mainly the result of al-Qaeda propaganda. While many argue that these strikes simply create more terrorists than they kill, Morrell notes that there is simply no way to prove this claim and that bin Laden’s own documents indicate that al-Qaeda’s leadership believed that the strikes severely degraded its ability to carry out attacks.
As is usual for this genre, Morell regales the reader with all kinds of interesting insider tidbits about working for the Agency. Apparently, CIA analytical pieces are often poorly written, confusing, or badly argued. When Morell was Tenet’s executive assistant, he often took it upon himself to rewrite them. Also, most CIA covert operations do, in fact, leak, but according to Morell, most of these leaks come from the White House, not Congress. Also, the CIA’s August 6, 2001 PDB has now become famous, mainly for its title. Many sources also claim that Bush responded to the PDB with “Alright, you’ve covered your ass now.” But, according to Morell, this was simply a joking reference; also, Morell writes that he was simply addressing some of Cheney’s and Rumsfeld’s concerns on whether or not the constant bin Laden-related threat reporting was a deception or not. Bush has claimed that he personally requested the briefing, and Morell confirms this in his memoir.
Morell writes that “Politicians are so fixated on scoring points and thinking in terms of partisan advantage that they project these same attitudes and behaviors on public servants. They have a hard time remembering that we serve Democrats and Republicans with the same professionalism and dedication.”
According to Morell, 9/11 was not a failure of imagination. He mentions the various specific examples of lapses by CIA, FBI, and NSA personnel that contributed to the failure to prevent the attacks; whether a different course could have prevented it remains unknowable. He also points to overlooked shortcomings like the lack of funding and the failure to implement recommendations by previous investigations into airline incidents. He points out that it is unclear whether the American people would have supported these measures in the pre-9/11 era.
Of course, Morell also addresses Benghazi. He denies the assertion that the CIA base in Benghazi was involved in shipping arms to Syrian rebels. Due to violence in the Libya at the time, the CIA had improved its security over time, but the State Department TMF did not, for reasons unclear to Morell. He denies the charge that there was any advance warning of the attack. While he characterizes the attack as an act of terrorism, he finds no evidence that they were planned in advance, especially given the attackers’ poor armament, looting, and vandalism. He does, however, believe that the attack on the CIA annex was more organized. Republicans accused Morell of lying under oath during the hearings over the incident. Morrell asserts that the controversy over the incident being a protest or an organized attack was the result of a simple error by a CIA editor, and that the CIA’s analyst thought the attack was terrorism from the beginning. He describes various mistakes made by the CIA’s offices of public and congressional affairs, who took the lead (inappropriately, in Morell’s view) in coordinating the talking points. He writes that the evidence regarding Ansar al-Sharia’s involvement was classified at the time. He also denies that the White House played a significant role in editing the talking points. He notes that the initial talking points blamed the attack on the video, even though the CIA disagreed. He states that the “stand-down order” controversy was simply a delay made by the Benghazi base chief due to the lack of assistance by local Libyan militias. He notes that many of the administration's’ critics simply got their facts wrong regarding Morell’s role in drafting the talking points, noting that “the administration’s critics were doing exactly what they accused the administration of doing.” Morell advises future CIA officers to refrain from “the talking point business” and that the best remedy for messes like Benghazi is immediate, full transparency. He notes that the Benghazi furor failed to highlight what should have been an obvious concern---protecting diplomats overseas, and Morell’s recommendations regarding this problem make sense.
Morell describes the interplay between the Senate and the CIA regarding the torture investigation, noting that the Republicans on the committee pulled their staff off the review team due to the Democrats’ refusal to interview any of the program’s participants. Of course, the investigation started due to Jose Rodriguez’s destruction of the interrogation tapes; Morell considered Rodriguez’ actions inappropriate given his superiors’ direct orders to preserve the tapes. This set in motion the chain of events leading to the Senate investigation. According to Morell, Feinstein wanted to hold the endorsement vote in December so Republican Olympia Snowe could vote in favor; thus it could not be called a “party line” vote by pundits. According to Morell, “the SSCI staff that produced the Committee’s study did a great disservice to the committee, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the country. It appears to me that the staffers wrote the report that they thought their political masters wanted to see.” Morell goes on to point out some factual, logical, and contextual errors, calling the report “one of the worst pieces of analysis that this thirty-three-year veteran of analysis at CIA has ever seen.” He goes on to note several arguments against the report’s credibility; if you’ve read the CIA’s response or the minority report, these will probably be familiar (documents that, Morrell notes, the media almost completely ignored).
Morrell also addresses controversy over the NSA surveillance and Edward Snowden’s role in that episode. He suggests that Snowden had contact with the Russian and Chinese intelligence services before releasing his trove of NSA secrets; he writes that he is not permitted to go into details. Morell writes that Snowden was “not smart enough to realize when and how he might be being used.” Morell argues that all of the NSA’s actions were fully approved by the White House, the DNI, and Congress. He also writes that the NSA had neglected to secure its software or compartmentalize its organization; loopholes that Snowden took full advantage of. He also recalls some of the amateurish, over-the-top news reports following Snowden’s revelations, many of which suggested it was literally phone-tapping, even though it was actually metadata collection. According to Morell, the NSA did not commit any illegal offenses or abuses of power under the 215 program. Morrell also cites Snowden’s January 2009 chatroom activity as “The TrueHOOHA” to suggest that Snowden is a bit of a hypocrite regarding the leaking of classified information (Morell also accuses Snowden of having an “enormous ego”). According to Morell, “the vast amount of information he stole and disclosed to journalists had nothing to do with privacy,” and that “the media and international organizations have relentlessly pumped hot air into his inflated self-esteem,” an entirely believable characterization.
In one instance Morell refers to “India’s May 1988" test of a nuclear weapon when he means 1998.
Interesting, thoughtful, well-organized and often riveting. The book is more big-picture than detail-oriented (probably because of classification issues), but well worth a read.