Middle knowledge is the most impressive and elegant idea I've encountered for reconciling the Scriptural truths of both divine sovereignty and human freedom. If you've rejected Molinism because you're a Calvinist, you have an obligation to read this book. You'll be surprised what you find.
Notes:
Nook
Middle knowledge is God's knowledge of all things that would happen in every possible set of circumstances, both things that are determined to occur by those circumstances and things that are not determined to occur by those circumstances (13)
God can create a world providentially planned to the last detail where his purposes are achieved through free creaturely decisions and random events (13)
It should be emphasized that little in Molina's thought is specifically Roman Catholic in its orientation; indeed, much of Molina's thought stood in directly opposition to the Catholicism of his day (14)
Personal note: Middle knowledge compatible with Reformed theology? (15)
Misconception 1: Molina is only for Catholics (17)
Misconception 2: Molina is a slightly more philosophically sophisticated version of Arminius. (19)
Key difference between Arminiusand Molina on middle knowledge, Molina's conception is God knows conditionals logically prior to creation. (21)
Molina believed that making middle knowledge depend on potential created beings undermined divine perfection, since it insinuated that God needs created beings to to be omniscient (21)
Rather , Molina bases middle knowledge squarely on God 's nature, specific God 's innate and timelessly present attribute of omniscience (22)
Misconception 3: Molina stifled God's sovereignty
Molina objected that any system of salvation in which God is put in a position where creatures can compel God to save them constituents a violation of God 's sovereignty (25)
Thus an agent is called free who, with all the prerequisites for action taken into account , is able to act and able not to act, or is able to do something in such a way that he is also able to do some contrary thing (58)
Molina deduced, along with Calvin, that humans left to their own devices could not freely choose salvation. But contra Calvin, Molina believed that God's sufficient grace for salvation given to all humans by the Holy Spirit -- namely, God 's prevenient grace -- supernaturally restored their mental faculty to choose spiritual good. Hence Molina's doctrine of justification maintained that while anyone human we’ve could freely embrace Christ , this was only possible through the grace of God, without which no one could embrace Christ (76)
Molina held to double predestination? (78)
Molina agreed that good works were a logically necessary condition of salvation, such that it is impossible for anyone to possess salvation without good works. On the other hand, Molina denied that works were a casually necessary condition to salvation , such that works are not the means by which salvation is achieved (80)
Middle `election is God 's prevolitional knowledge of all true counterfactuals (93)
God apprehended the truth value of all counterfactuals, or conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood (93)
If this, then that (93)
Thus included in God's middle knowledge is God's awareness of what all possible individually with libertarian freedom 9 freely do in any set of circumstances in which they find themselves as well as how completely random, chance events would turn out in any possible set of circumstances (93)
Biblical examples of middle knowledge (95)
As Luther summarized: "So the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are diametrically opposed to our 'free-will'" (99)
In contrast to Luther and Calvin, Molina placed God's counterfactual knowledge logically prior to the divine creative decree (100)
It is logically impossible to determine that a libertarian creature freely does something says that it cannot do otherwise or to determine that a stochastic (utterly random) process contingently turn out in a certain way such that it could not turn out otherwise (101)
Circumstances do not determine. There are logically possible worlds where Peter does not deny Christ in identical circumstances (105)
Did I misunderstand? "there remains a contingent fact of the matter that if Peter's essence were instantiated in these circumstances, then Peter would indeterministically deny Jesus" (105)
We may now illustrate Molina's structure of omniscience with the following enumeration of its logical moments: 1. Natural knowledge: God's knowledge of all possible truths and therefore of all possible worlds (i.e. logically consistent sets of possible circumstances) 2. Middle knowledge : God's knowledge of all counterfactual truths and the of all feasible worlds (i.e. logically consistent sets of circumstances compatible with the decision springing from libertarian freedom and the actions springing from natural randomness) 3. Free knowledge: God's knowledge of all actual truths (past, present, and future) in the world he has chosen to create (106)
Here it should be stressed that Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge carries with it a conceptualist model of divine cognition rather than a perceptualist model of divine cognition. On the perceptualist model, God derives his knowledge by looking and seeing what exists...God 's knowledge is self-contained and should be construed on the analogy of a mind's knowledge of innate ideas (107)
As the omniscient being, God essentially possesses the attribute of knowing all truths; there exist counterfactual truths; therefore God knows all counterfactual truths. Craig has shown that one can employ this fact about omniscience to construct a philosophical argument that, if successful, proves that God has middle knowledge. The argument, in modified form, runs as follows:
1. If there exist counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures (known as “counterfactuals of creaturely freedom”) and counterfactual truths aboutstochastic processes (which we may call “counterfactuals of natural randomness”), then the omniscient God knows these truths.
2. There exist counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures andstochastic processes.
3. If God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes, then God knows them either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
4. Counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes cannot be known only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
5. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creaturesand stochastic processes (from 1 and 2).
6. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree (from 3 and 5).
7. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes logically prior to the divine creative decree (from 4 and 6), which is the sum and substance of middle knowledge.
The grounding objection holds that there is no ground or basis on which God could have middle knowledge (109)
The ground of middle knowledge is God's omniscience, from which middle knowledge follows deductively (109)
Here we detect a further refutation of the grounding objection, as we may say that Molina grounded middle knowledge in God 's cognitive ability to comprehend perfectly his own creative aptitude and power (111)
knowledge is not causally determinative (113)
Summary of middle knowledge (113)
God causes everything to happen by concurring with the choices of free individually and stochastic processes in producing their effects. however, God does this in a way that preserves contingency, including human freedom and indeterminacy in the natural world (121)
At this point Molina drew on what contemporary philosophers call the distinction between strong and weak actualization (or causation). An agent strongly actualizes (or strongly causes) an event if and only if the agent causally determines the event's obtaining (123)
God causes everything in the world either strongly or weakly (124)
Molina insisted that every evil act is weakly caused by God , whereas every good act is either weakly or strongly caused by God. Hence God causes, either indirectly or directly , every action without being the author of evil or standing morally responsible for evil (124)
Molina insisted it is obvious that a God who can infallibly control every libertarian free creaturely action and random natural event without compromising that freedom and randomness is more sovereign than a God who can only control every creaturely action or natural event if creatures lack libertarian freedom and natural processes lack randomness (131)
God always answers our prayer when it's good for us. When he doesn't, we can know that it would not have been good for us (141)
"in formulating his doctrine of predestination, Molina attempted to reconcile three sets of biblical texts -- passages affirming sovereign individually predestination, passages affirming libertarian human freedom, and passages affirming God 's universal salvific will" (148)
Molina insisted that because of the effects of the fall, no one can come to Christ by their own devices. Rather for anyone to come to Christ , God must first give that individually a new, soft heart and a new spirit to replace the old, stony heart and dead spirit wrought by the fall. Hence prior grace given by the Holy Spirit, which Molina called prevenient grace, sufficient grace, or grace making gracious, is necessary for anyone to receive Christ (151)
"For if our freely believing in Christ is the reason why God predestines us, then it is we who, in effect, predestine ourselves by our faith rather than God 's predestining us" (152)
Molina declared that "foreseen faith cannot be the ground of justification or predestination, as affirming otherwise would undermine the face-value implication that God's decree" to elect Jacob and elect Jacob and reprobate Esau dd not take into account any future good or evil acts on their part, such as belief or unbelief" (152)
Consequently, Molina was a firm believer in unconditional election, holding that God elects purely according to his pleasure without regard to any foreseen faith or good works and reprobates without regard to any foreseen unbelief or sins (153)
"...the foreknowledge described in Romans 8:29-30 and 1 Peter 1:1-2 amount to God 's prior relational knowledge of the persons whom he would predestine" (155)
Putting these passages from Ezekiel together, it followed for Molina that anyone could freely choose to cooperate with preventive grace which iteslf supplied their libertarian freedom, and thereby receive its benefits of new spiritual birth (the new heart and the new spirit). (157)
Personal note: the above seems contradictory to unconditional election. I look forward to some attempt at resolution
aS cRAIG EXPLAINS, "mOLINSA REJECTS As CALVINISTic and heretical the view ... that God gatuitously chooses certain persons to be saved and others to be damned and then premoves each elect person's will to produce saving faith, while living the non-elect in sin, so that the elect are subjects of predestination while the non-elect are subjects of reprobation" (157)
Doctrine of transworld damnation. formulated by William lane Craig and held by several contemporary Molinists, the doctrine of transworld damnation affirms that God has so providentially ordered things that any one who was lost in the actual world would have been lost in any feasible world that God could create (159) Molina himself did not hold
Molina insisted that predestination was unconditional. He proposed that god's unconditional predestination is accomplished when, in making his sovereign providential choice of which of these equally good feasible worlds to create, God does not take into consideration any particular individuals Salvation, damnation, or nonexistence. Without regard for any possible individuals salvific status or existence coma God chooses the physical world he desires as a sheer act of his sovereign T . Any individual who would freely choose to embrace god's offer of Salvation in the world God selects is the pre destined to Salvation and so we elected by God, even though God could have just as easily selected an equally good world in which that same individual would freely choose to reject god's author of Salvation or a different equally good world in which that same individual would not exist (160)
Search Molina this doctrine of predestination is entirely harmonious with libertarian freedom, and the respective sets of biblical texts teaching individual predestination and human freedom maybe simultaneously affirmed at face value (161) Personal note: unconditional because God ordains worlds. Any elect person could just as easily have been reprobate had God chosen otherwise. Yet the agents are free in the libertarian sense
Personal note: In this way Molina is very Calvinistic. He affirms both unconditional election and libertarian freedom.
Thus far, Molina agreed entirely with Calvin. The difficulty Molina had with Calvin lay in his further contention that God deterministically controls the means by which the salvation of the elect is accomplished (186)
Molina charged Calvin with confusion sing certainty with necessity (186)
God knows via his middle knowledge that the proposition, "The elect will be saved" is in fact true, even though it could have been false. In sum, it is certain that the elect will be saved contingently (186)
Our libertarian freedom, bestowed in creationa nd regained by preveniant grace...
In other words,, while God gives all persons a completely sufficient grace for salvation, God gives the elect a grace that is so perfectly adapted to their unique characters, temperaments, and situation s that they infallibly yet freely respond affirmatively to its influence (262)
In sum, since what the Reformed tradition historically denounced as middle knowledge was not Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge, and since Arminian tradition has never disclaimed Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge, their is no reason why member of both traditions cannot draw on it as a rapprochement (275)
Molinism gives the Christian the "best of both worlds" of Calvinism and Arminianism and , in the process , removes the motivation and appeal of open theism. Per Calvinism, one retains God's sovereignty over every detail of the world, good and evil. One also retains unconditional, individual election, where God chooses (but in no way determines or is morally responsible for) who is saved and who is lost. For any possible person, God can choose to actualize a world in which he is freely saved or a world in which he is freely lost. God could also choose not to create that person at all. The decision is entirely the result of God's good pleasure. Per Arminianism, one retains God's genuine desire to save all persons and the libertarian freedom of all persons. If there existed a feasible world where all the lost people in this world were freely saved and all the saved people in this world were freely saved, God would have created it. However, God middle-knows that such a world is impossible given libertarian human freedom, Thus necessitating god's choice of who is saved and who was lost. But this choice, based as it is on middle knowledge, exerts no causal power over any one's salvation or damnation, as knowledge is not causally determinative. God gives everyone sufficient grace for Salvation, such that each person has an equal chance to be saved. Each person then freely embraces or freely rejects that saving grace (276)
Molina formulated a logically consider stent and highly compelling account of divine omniscience that successfully reconciles full-blown divine sovereignty and full-blow human freedom. To date, it is the only account proposed that enjoys this significant theological benefit (293)
Hence on Molinism (1) passages teaching God's predestination of individuals (2) passages teaching God's all-encompassing providence (3) passages teaching genuine human freedom, and (4) passages teaching God's universal salvifc will may all be simultaneously taken at face value (293)