The Killing Zone comprehensively addresses a subject which gets comparatively little press in the U.S.: American Cold War actions in Latin America. After a general history of the region prior to about 1935, the events covered by the book include the major US engagement initiatives:
1954 Overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala
1961 Kennedy announces Alliance for Progress aid program for Latin America,
1961 US forces the Trujillo family out of the Dominican Republic
The Bay of Pigs (1961) and what Rabe calls the “war against Cuba” in the 1960’s
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
1963 Juan Bosch overthrown in Dominican Republic – CIA involvement alleged
1963 Brazilian military, with US encouragement, overthrows civilian government
1964 Cheddi Jagan is prevented from taking office as president in Guyana by US pressure
1965 US forces invade Dominican Republic to prevent “second Cuba”
1966 US backed candidate wins presidential election in DR
1967 US-trained Bolivian forces capture and kill Che Guevara
1968 CIA rigs the presidential election in Guyana
1970 CIA attempts to defeat Allende in Chilean election, but he wins presidency
1973 US encourages military takeover of government in Uruguay
1973 CIA executes Nixon policy to overthrow Allende – Pinochet takes power
1976 US encourages military takeover of Argentine government
1981 US begins massive military aid to El Salvador
1981-89 US forces deployed clandestinely and openly in Central America in large numbers
1982 Reagan publicly defends President Rios Montt of Guatemala against genocide charges
1983 US Forces invade Grenada
1984 US backed candidate wins presidency in El Salvador
1985 Reagan admits it is US policy to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua
1986 Americans learn of the Iran-Contra scandal
As the ‘80’s wore on, the usurper military governments which were helped into power by the US gradually reverted to civilian control. In Argentina, after their defeat in the Falklands War with Britain, “Argentina’s leaders had demonstrated to the world that their leadership skills and competence were limited to torturing and murdering innocent civilians”, and the people of Argentina threw them out. In Uruguay, power passed peacefully back to civilians. In Brazil, the generals allowed civil rule to return in 1985. As of 2019, almost every country in Latin America has returned to democratic rule, but sadly, US involvement delayed the progress of democracy there by at least a generation.
What a mess the United States made of its policy in Latin America; the original policy idea, generally formulated by George Kennan, was that the Western Hemisphere was a US sphere of influence and absolutely no communist governments would be allowed here. The Cold War in Latin America consisted of preventing communism from gaining a foothold; and from the first intervention in 1954 in Guatemala, the policy smacked of paranoia and a lack of a sense of proportion. Jacobo Arbenz was a charismatic president and leader who was reaching out to all elements of Guatemalan society, which State and CIA immediately characterized as “encouraging communists”. As many have noted, the US overthrow of Arbenz was the “original sin” by the US in Latin America. Whereas FDR had worked hard to repair relations in the region, from 1954 on, the US followed the Kennan doctrine, amplified by others as time went on, which had the practical effect of supporting dictators and overthrowing democratically elected leaders if there was even a whiff of leftist ideology. This approach gradually morphed into an overt preference for military dictators in the region, particularly under Nixon, Ford, and Reagan.
Early on, despite the Guatemala coup, America’s approach toward the region showed promise: Kennedy’s Alliance for Peace drove economic growth in Latin America – for example, an average 4% annual growth rate in Central America in the 1960’s. And the aid was not specifically or predominately military; hospitals and schools were built, and the US found itself relatively popular in Latin America in the ‘60’s. Unfortunately, the Kennedy brothers’ obsession with unseating Castro turned into a policy of opposing any regime whose policies were even slightly left of center.
It is important to understand that neither in Cuba nor in Nicaragua were the revolutions led by Communists. Castro did not declare himself a Marxist-Leninist until it was clear that US was going to steadfastly oppose him, and Somoza’s army killed 40-50,000 people in Nicaragua between 1977 and 1979, which led directly to a people’s revolution under the Sandinista’s, who did not seek Soviet aid until America made its opposition to them clear. With regard to US actions in the Dominican Republic, Lyndon Johnson later said that invading the DR was one of the things he regretted most in his presidency; he was persuaded to invade by advisors who said he had to prevent “another Cuba”.
It was Henry Kissinger and Nixon who came down hard on the side of tyrants. Kissinger had a cynical view of the military rulers in the region, “They’re SOB’s, but they’re our SOBs”, and both Nixon and Kissinger had a desperate need to win, regardless of whether a tactical win actually yielded a strategic loss. The best example of this was the CIA’s overthrow of Allende in Chile which emboldened military juntas across the region and set back democracy in the “cone countries” of South America a generation, while earning the United States the enmity of the people of those countries. Supposedly, it was Kissinger who said “Academic fights are so vicious because the stakes are so small”, but he was unable to see the corollary in Latin America, i.e., why was the US willing to spend so much money and effort to subvert democratic processes in the region when the likelihood of the emergence of a communist country in Latin America was so low? But throughout the Nixon and Ford administrations, dictators were encouraged to clamp down on dissent; for example, at one point, Uruguay had the highest percentage of population incarcerated of any nation on earth.
Then, in Carter’s presidency, there was a brief respite, and even a roll-back of support for military governments. Argentina was directly challenged on the guerra sucia, the dirty war, and if nothing else, US government military aid to dictators decreased.
And then came Reagan, and with Reagan came the proponents of aiding military governments, especially in Central America. US aid to the military in the tiny country of El Salvador was, for a time in the early ‘80’s, at a level that put it in the top three recipients of U.S. military aid after Israel and Egypt. One of the most ardent proponents of the dictators was Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations. Her love of Argentina’s military rulers went so far as to bring her to ask Margaret Thatcher not to oppose Argentina’s military takeover of the Falkland Islands. Thatcher responded negatively, but tactfully. Thatcher’s Ambassador to the US, Sir Nicholas Henderson, was more direct; he assessed Kirkpatrick as “more fool than fascist….tactless, wrong-headed, ineffective, and a dubious tribute to the academic profession of which she claims to be a part”. Rabe notes, “She was known for the "Kirkpatrick Doctrine", which advocated supporting authoritarian regimes around the world if they went along with Washington's aims. She believed that they could be led into democracy by example. She wrote, “traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies’” This thinking led her to support even the death squads of El Salvador. Of the four American nuns killed by the military there in 1980, Kirkpatrick said “the nuns were not just nuns. They were political activists. We ought to be a little more clear about this than we actually are.” That bit made me want to vomit, since I have read Carolyn Forche’s account of her time in El Salvador in that era.
It became clear in the 1990’s from declassified documents that the Reagan Administration knew exactly what was happening in El Salvador, and did not care, as long as Communism was kept out of Latin America. And again, this was the tragedy; communism was about as likely to spring up in El Salvador as in Oklahoma, but the neo-cons were apparently too mentally lazy to see that. Given Kirkpatrick’s steadfast opposition to the Soviet Union and communism in general, it is hard to understand how she squared her championing of prisoners in the Gulag with her disregard of the Disappeared in Argentina, Chile, and other Latin American countries. One of the common responses of the Reagan Administration to critics of its Central America policies was “whataboutism”, i.e., they said the leftist were as bad or worse than the military juntas. But multiple studies in El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and Argentina found that approximately 95% of the killings were carried out by the military.
Contrary to what some think, this critique of US policy in Latin America is not about “Blame America”. I served in the U.S. Army in Central America in the 1980’s, and I know America can do great things when governed by wise leaders. I also speak Spanish and have spent time in Honduras, Brazil, Uruguay, and particularly in Mexico. It is possible to examine the mistakes of your country in foreign policy, or any kind of policy, learn the lessons of those failures, and formulate better policy. As someone who has worked decades in the unforgiving world of measurable outcomes, both in engineering and manufacturing management, I discovered long ago that failure is a better teacher than success. What makes me crazy is “leaders” who can’t or won’t learn, and who keep doing the same wrong thing in the face of facts that show their actions are producing a demonstrably bad outcome. This is the story of American involvement in Latin American until about 1990.
After the end of the dictatorships in Argentina and Chile, truth commissions carried out investigations that were effective in getting to the truth, and to some extent, in bringing the guilty to justice. Such efforts in Guatemala and El Salvador have been notably less effective, and the continuing near-chaos in Honduras, Guatmala, and El Sal have perpetuated the exodus from those countries, and – surprise! – the arrival on the United States southern border of masses of immigrants fleeing violence in those countries, violence set in motion in large part by the policies of Reagan.
So Rabe’s book is a counterpoint to the successful conclusion to the Cold War in Europe, which freed millions in Eastern Europe from the tyranny of their Soviet client governments. In Latin America, the end of the Cold War simply meant an end, for the most part, to American meddling in their affairs. So much more could have been achieved in the region from 1954 to 1990 if the U.S. had chosen to build schools, hospital, power plants, and roads instead of funding military juntas and dictators who terrorized their own people.
In all, the book is a good overview of a complex subject, and very readable.