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Нашествие Наполеона на Россию. 1812 год
Отечественная война 1812 года...
Что послужило причиной вторжения Наполеона на территорию Российской империи?
Почему не знавшая поражений армия французского императора потерпела столь сокрушительную катастрофу?
Как возникло и развивалось в России легендарное партизанское движение?
Кто из русских полководцев и военачальников, помимо Кутузова, внес в дело разгрома Наполеона наиболее значительный вклад?
Вот лишь немногие из вопросов, на которые отвечает Евгений Викторович Тарле в своем знаменитом военно-историческом очерке, переведенном практически на все европейские языки.
Что послужило причиной вторжения Наполеона на территорию Российской империи?
Почему не знавшая поражений армия французского императора потерпела столь сокрушительную катастрофу?
Как возникло и развивалось в России легендарное партизанское движение?
Кто из русских полководцев и военачальников, помимо Кутузова, внес в дело разгрома Наполеона наиболее значительный вклад?
Вот лишь немногие из вопросов, на которые отвечает Евгений Викторович Тарле в своем знаменитом военно-историческом очерке, переведенном практически на все европейские языки.
- GenresHistoryNonfictionRussia
Unknown Binding
First published January 1, 1979
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About the author
Yevgeny Tarle
22 books14 followersEugene Tarle (Russian: Евгений Тарле) was a Soviet historian and academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is known for his books about Napoleon's invasion of Russia and on the Crimean War, and many other works. Yevgeny Tarle was one of the founders of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia's diplomatic university.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
November 1, 2021
tarle's career as a soviet historian is both fascinating and depressing. it's also a perfect testimony to the methods and effectiveness of soviet demands for conformity in historical writing. unlike many of his colleagues, who confined their research to obscure topics or resorted to the editing of collections of documents, tarle treated events in russian history which carried important political implications. between 1936 and 1952 he wrote three basically different interpretations of the napoleonic invasions of russia, each of which reflected the current trend in soviet historiography at the time it was written. in 1936 tarle affirmed that the russian people had played no part in the war, dismissing evidence of peasant guerrilla activity as no more than the opportunistic murder of french stragglers. the following year he published an account of the war in which he said almost exactly the opposite, representing it as the triumph of the patriotic russian people. after a certain amount of hair-splitting argument couched in the language of marxist dialectics, it was once again dubbed the ‘patriotic war’, but only in inverted commas.
he adopted a traditional spiritual view of the events, representing the french victory borodino as ‘a moral victory’ for the russians and the war itself as the crucible of all that was best in russian history over the next decades. he also built up the image of kutuzov, as a kind of metaphysical emanation of the russian people, their true leader in every sense, the saviour of the fatherland.
reading this book teleported me back to my school in russia. to those magical days filled with insidious pro-government propaganda packaged as both moral philosophy and unquestionable truth. ah, those were the days
he adopted a traditional spiritual view of the events, representing the french victory borodino as ‘a moral victory’ for the russians and the war itself as the crucible of all that was best in russian history over the next decades. he also built up the image of kutuzov, as a kind of metaphysical emanation of the russian people, their true leader in every sense, the saviour of the fatherland.
reading this book teleported me back to my school in russia. to those magical days filled with insidious pro-government propaganda packaged as both moral philosophy and unquestionable truth. ah, those were the days
October 27, 2018
There are plenty of books available concerning Napoleon's invasion of Russia, but this one has several strong points to recommend it. One, the author had access to many Russian documents that other authors might not be able to access, or read for that matter. This knowledge, along with his natural inclination, makes this book valuable for its focus on the Russian side of events. Tarle excellently illustrates the complicated relationships between Alexander, Barclay, Kutuzov, Bagration, Bennigsen and other prominent characters on the Russian side. I think he is a little too generous in his evaluation of Kutuzov, but that is just my opinion. For one, Tarle makes clear the fact that Kutuzov's decision to not confront Napoleon during the Grand Armee's retreat was the result of his desire to spare the lives of his Russian soldiers.
This book is also a readable account, not very dense and at 412 pages not too long either. The writing can be choppy at times, but I think that is more a product of the the translation than anything else. That being said, it wasn't a serious factor when reading. There are two maps on the endboards, which are servicable, but not ideal.
If you are looking for a relatively brief account of the invasion of Russia in 1812, I think this book is a great choice.
This book is also a readable account, not very dense and at 412 pages not too long either. The writing can be choppy at times, but I think that is more a product of the the translation than anything else. That being said, it wasn't a serious factor when reading. There are two maps on the endboards, which are servicable, but not ideal.
If you are looking for a relatively brief account of the invasion of Russia in 1812, I think this book is a great choice.
June 8, 2021
The author is one of the most renown soviet historians of French Revolution and Napoleon Era who does not base his work on any political bias. I found his book for Napoleon to be very interesting and thorough account of events that changed the political, ideological and sociological map of European continent in the end of XVIII and the beginning of XIX century. Besides his solid historical background the author is a very talented writer and I went trough all the pages with ease and interest up to the very end. Great read!
October 31, 2013
I wrote a research paper on Napoleon's Invasion of Russia a few years ago, and Tarle's book was my main secondary source. This was a very well written book I must say. it is obvious from the beginning that Tarle is well versed in his subject. One of the things that he particularly points out is how the Russian winter did not affect Napoleon's troops until after their retreat had begun. The real reason Napoleon was defeated was supply issues in the French army and the Russian's refusal to surrender.
I enjoyed every bit of this book. I would recommend it to anyone interested in the campaign.
I enjoyed every bit of this book. I would recommend it to anyone interested in the campaign.
August 10, 2022
Before reviewing this book I think it's worth taking a moment to consider the author and the context he wrote in. Born Grigori Tarle, into a middle class Jewish family, he changed his name to Yevgeny and converted to the Orthodox Christian faith. As a young man, as well as pursuing his academic-historical interests, he got involved in radical left politics, in essence becoming a Marxist.
By the time of WWI and the Russian revolution his politics had seen him in trouble with the Tsarist authorities several times, but he'd nonetheless attained several positions at Russian universities, including that of St. Petersburg. This latter was to be the hub of his activities as an academic and writer for most of the rest of his life. But the turbulent political waters of Russia would see him exiled for four years, and criticised both abroad and at home as a historian.
At home he was usually deemed too liberal and cosmopolitan, by the State and its flunkeys, and abroad he was considered too much under the thumb of the latter, and therefore seen as overdoing the whole Marxist and/or Soviet (i.e. later on Stalinist) class struggle bit. Poor guy! Talk about caught between a rock and a hard place! At the time of first posting this review, the only reviews of Tarle's book I could find (Amazon UK) describe it either as 'a propagandistic view of Stalin's era', or mainly interesting in relation to WWII.
I think this is sad and very unfair. Tarle's account of the 1812 campaign is in fact excellent. It is true that he has modified his own position somewhat to come into line with the orthodoxy of his time and location, which is a shame, and is why I've docked a star. But considering the potential lethality of the political era in which he lived and worked, it's actually a remarkably independent piece of scholarly work, and far, far, far better than, for example, Hilaire Belloc's account of the campaign, the latter published in England in 1922.
The small hardback edition of Tarle's book that I bought and read was published in 1942, during WWII, in America and England. The first Russian edition had been published before the outbreak of war, in 1938. In 1936 Tarle had published a book on Napoleon and the entire Napoleonic period, in which he took a markedly different line on a number of aspects of the 1812 campaign. But with Germany clearly gearing up for war, and Stalin's dictatorship growing ever more paranoid and volatile, these changes, whilst lamentable, are at least understandable.
Nowadays it's gradually becoming easier to find Russian accounts translated into English, as indeed it is to find accounts from all, or at least more, of the participants in any given campaign, such as Andrew Field's excellent work on French sources for the Waterloo campaign, or, returning to Russia, Alexander Mikaribdze's excellent ‘Russian Eyewitness Accounts’ series. It's interesting for Western European readers like myself to hear, amongst the more normal official military and academic Russian sources, Marx and Engels quoted on the topic of 1812!
The translation of Tarle's book into English is good, the author's writing style coming across as easy readable prose, neither pompously verbose and academic, nor too simplistic. Structurally Tarle favours few and huge chapters, whereas I prefer to read many and shorter chapters, due to my habit of preferring to take my reading breaks at the end of rather than in the middle of a chapter.
Thanks to the predominantly Russian sources, and the resolutely Russian perspective, and also even in part the times and conditions under which this book was written, this is an interesting and unusual entry in the Russia 1812 canon. Certainly worth having in your 1812 library, and a fascinating and enjoyable read. Yes, it bears the politico-historical imprint of it's times and conditions, but so does all historical writing, albeit with varying degrees of independence and transparency.
Coverage of the action, or inaction, on the northern (Prussian) and Southern (Austrian) flanks is adequate if minimal, as with most traditional Western European histories of the campaign. The bulk of the account traces the central thrust by Napoleon's main forces, or rather how this was responded to by the central Russian forces, with plenty on the leadership issues that plagued the Russian campaign. And the Russian course was very much one of response, rather than initiative.
The Tsar, whilst lauded for his resolute stance, is criticised for interfering and destabilising at the outset. Everyone under him, including his sister and closest advisors wished him to preside from St. Petersburg; his presence with the army being viewed as almost entirely detrimental. Hard for an absolute ruler like a Tsar to swallow, especially in the face of Napoleon, who combined head of state with head of the army so well.
Then there are the issues of rivalry between Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, and later the latter and Kutuzov. In essence it appears that whoever it devolved upon to actually lead the Russians would ultimately concede that the best path was to do as Barclay and Kutuzov did, and conserve the Russian Army by evading Napoleon as far as possible, and instead shadowing him first into and then out of Russia, letting the logistical difficulties and a certain amount of harrying wear the French and their allies down.
Those around and under whoever had ultimate command would forever bang on about taking the offensive, Bagration in particular, but when their bluff was called, as when Kutuzov temporarily gave Bennigsen command, the latter quickly fell into line and adopted the evade and survive strategy. And in the end even this cautious conservative approach saw the Russians, like the French and their allies, suffering terrible losses, mainly due to cold, inadequate (and in the Russian case endemically corrupt) logistical arrangements, and disease.
Still, all things considered (by which I primarily refer to the politicised context of this account), an excellent and highly enjoyable Russian history of the momentous 1812 campaign.
By the time of WWI and the Russian revolution his politics had seen him in trouble with the Tsarist authorities several times, but he'd nonetheless attained several positions at Russian universities, including that of St. Petersburg. This latter was to be the hub of his activities as an academic and writer for most of the rest of his life. But the turbulent political waters of Russia would see him exiled for four years, and criticised both abroad and at home as a historian.
At home he was usually deemed too liberal and cosmopolitan, by the State and its flunkeys, and abroad he was considered too much under the thumb of the latter, and therefore seen as overdoing the whole Marxist and/or Soviet (i.e. later on Stalinist) class struggle bit. Poor guy! Talk about caught between a rock and a hard place! At the time of first posting this review, the only reviews of Tarle's book I could find (Amazon UK) describe it either as 'a propagandistic view of Stalin's era', or mainly interesting in relation to WWII.
I think this is sad and very unfair. Tarle's account of the 1812 campaign is in fact excellent. It is true that he has modified his own position somewhat to come into line with the orthodoxy of his time and location, which is a shame, and is why I've docked a star. But considering the potential lethality of the political era in which he lived and worked, it's actually a remarkably independent piece of scholarly work, and far, far, far better than, for example, Hilaire Belloc's account of the campaign, the latter published in England in 1922.
The small hardback edition of Tarle's book that I bought and read was published in 1942, during WWII, in America and England. The first Russian edition had been published before the outbreak of war, in 1938. In 1936 Tarle had published a book on Napoleon and the entire Napoleonic period, in which he took a markedly different line on a number of aspects of the 1812 campaign. But with Germany clearly gearing up for war, and Stalin's dictatorship growing ever more paranoid and volatile, these changes, whilst lamentable, are at least understandable.
Nowadays it's gradually becoming easier to find Russian accounts translated into English, as indeed it is to find accounts from all, or at least more, of the participants in any given campaign, such as Andrew Field's excellent work on French sources for the Waterloo campaign, or, returning to Russia, Alexander Mikaribdze's excellent ‘Russian Eyewitness Accounts’ series. It's interesting for Western European readers like myself to hear, amongst the more normal official military and academic Russian sources, Marx and Engels quoted on the topic of 1812!
The translation of Tarle's book into English is good, the author's writing style coming across as easy readable prose, neither pompously verbose and academic, nor too simplistic. Structurally Tarle favours few and huge chapters, whereas I prefer to read many and shorter chapters, due to my habit of preferring to take my reading breaks at the end of rather than in the middle of a chapter.
Thanks to the predominantly Russian sources, and the resolutely Russian perspective, and also even in part the times and conditions under which this book was written, this is an interesting and unusual entry in the Russia 1812 canon. Certainly worth having in your 1812 library, and a fascinating and enjoyable read. Yes, it bears the politico-historical imprint of it's times and conditions, but so does all historical writing, albeit with varying degrees of independence and transparency.
Coverage of the action, or inaction, on the northern (Prussian) and Southern (Austrian) flanks is adequate if minimal, as with most traditional Western European histories of the campaign. The bulk of the account traces the central thrust by Napoleon's main forces, or rather how this was responded to by the central Russian forces, with plenty on the leadership issues that plagued the Russian campaign. And the Russian course was very much one of response, rather than initiative.
The Tsar, whilst lauded for his resolute stance, is criticised for interfering and destabilising at the outset. Everyone under him, including his sister and closest advisors wished him to preside from St. Petersburg; his presence with the army being viewed as almost entirely detrimental. Hard for an absolute ruler like a Tsar to swallow, especially in the face of Napoleon, who combined head of state with head of the army so well.
Then there are the issues of rivalry between Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, and later the latter and Kutuzov. In essence it appears that whoever it devolved upon to actually lead the Russians would ultimately concede that the best path was to do as Barclay and Kutuzov did, and conserve the Russian Army by evading Napoleon as far as possible, and instead shadowing him first into and then out of Russia, letting the logistical difficulties and a certain amount of harrying wear the French and their allies down.
Those around and under whoever had ultimate command would forever bang on about taking the offensive, Bagration in particular, but when their bluff was called, as when Kutuzov temporarily gave Bennigsen command, the latter quickly fell into line and adopted the evade and survive strategy. And in the end even this cautious conservative approach saw the Russians, like the French and their allies, suffering terrible losses, mainly due to cold, inadequate (and in the Russian case endemically corrupt) logistical arrangements, and disease.
Still, all things considered (by which I primarily refer to the politicised context of this account), an excellent and highly enjoyable Russian history of the momentous 1812 campaign.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews