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Thought and Reality
In this short, lucid, rich book, Sir Michael Dummett, perhaps the most eminent living British philosopher, sets out his views about some of the deepest questions in philosophy. The fundamental question of metaphysics what does reality consist of? Dummett puts forward his controversial view of reality as there may be no fact of the matter about whether an object does or does not have a given property.
124 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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About the author
Michael Dummett
54 books52 followersA skilled analytic mind and an ardent voice against racism, Sir Michael A. E. Dummett is considered by many to be one of twentieth-century Britain’s most influential philosophers of language. Dummett is best known for his work in the history of analytic philosophy and in his contributions to the philosophy of language and mathematics. Much of his work has taken the form of commentary on the likes of Frege, Wittgenstein, and Quine. Dummett, who considered himself a Wittgensteinian, is widely held as the English authority on the work of German logician Gottlob Frege. Though Dummett diverges from Frege, who is a realist, most of Dummett’s achievements have been pursued in connection with his enthusiasm for Frege’s thought.
Dummett was born in London in 1925 and attended prestigious boys’ schools in Wiltshire and Hampshire. Though he rejected religious belief in his youth, Dummett converted to Catholicism while serving in the armed forces during the Second World War. After his military service he went to Oxford University where he studied philosophy, politics, and economics at Christ Church College. He graduated in 1950 with first class honors and was awarded a fellowship at All Souls College. Throughout his acclaimed career Dummett remained associated with Oxford, though he has held visiting posts at several universities around the world. In 1962 he was appointed reader in the philosophy of mathematics at Oxford; in 1979 he was elected Wykeham Professor of Logic, where he served as chair until his retirement in 1992. Dummett, along with his wife, has remained active in antiracist campaigns and political reforms, even placing his philosophical career on hold for several years during the sixties to pursue these causes. He received a knighthood in 1999.
Many of Britain’s leading analytic philosophers have been significantly influenced by Dummett, including Crispin Wright, Simon Blackburn, John McDowell, and Timothy Williamson — though none would be properly classed a disciple. Dummett’s most notable contributions have come in his analysis of theories of meaning accounting for communication, reason, and representation in language. His commitment to a kind of anti-realism in debates about reference and language, though often overstated, has been a point of particular interest for his admirers and detractors alike. Dummett was not satisfied with the pessimism of Wittgenstein and the holists who denied the possibility of finally understanding a language from within language. Dummett argues that an alternative can be found if one denies the principle of bivalence. Bivalence is the notion that every meaningful proposition is either true or false; and in Dummett’s view the denial of bivalence entails anti-realism about the reference of language.
Dummett’s most influential writings are the first and second editions of Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973–1981), The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (1981), and the 'William James Lectures' that he delivered at Harvard in 1976 published in 1991 as The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. He also delivered a series of lectures at Bologna in 1987, published in 1988 as Origins of Analytical Philosophy. In 1991 he published a collections of papers on Frege; and in 1993 a collection entitled The Seas of Language.
Dummett was born in London in 1925 and attended prestigious boys’ schools in Wiltshire and Hampshire. Though he rejected religious belief in his youth, Dummett converted to Catholicism while serving in the armed forces during the Second World War. After his military service he went to Oxford University where he studied philosophy, politics, and economics at Christ Church College. He graduated in 1950 with first class honors and was awarded a fellowship at All Souls College. Throughout his acclaimed career Dummett remained associated with Oxford, though he has held visiting posts at several universities around the world. In 1962 he was appointed reader in the philosophy of mathematics at Oxford; in 1979 he was elected Wykeham Professor of Logic, where he served as chair until his retirement in 1992. Dummett, along with his wife, has remained active in antiracist campaigns and political reforms, even placing his philosophical career on hold for several years during the sixties to pursue these causes. He received a knighthood in 1999.
Many of Britain’s leading analytic philosophers have been significantly influenced by Dummett, including Crispin Wright, Simon Blackburn, John McDowell, and Timothy Williamson — though none would be properly classed a disciple. Dummett’s most notable contributions have come in his analysis of theories of meaning accounting for communication, reason, and representation in language. His commitment to a kind of anti-realism in debates about reference and language, though often overstated, has been a point of particular interest for his admirers and detractors alike. Dummett was not satisfied with the pessimism of Wittgenstein and the holists who denied the possibility of finally understanding a language from within language. Dummett argues that an alternative can be found if one denies the principle of bivalence. Bivalence is the notion that every meaningful proposition is either true or false; and in Dummett’s view the denial of bivalence entails anti-realism about the reference of language.
Dummett’s most influential writings are the first and second editions of Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973–1981), The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (1981), and the 'William James Lectures' that he delivered at Harvard in 1976 published in 1991 as The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. He also delivered a series of lectures at Bologna in 1987, published in 1988 as Origins of Analytical Philosophy. In 1991 he published a collections of papers on Frege; and in 1993 a collection entitled The Seas of Language.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
August 11, 2019
I am going to risk expressing an opinion where angels fear to tread, in order to pin down in my own terms what I like very much in this book and what I do not accept in it. The book itself is light to hold (104 pages), beautifully printed and bound, and its writing style is correspondingly clear and plain to read. It comes across as a labour of love. That is already a good enough reason to own it and read it. It is honestly not unlike reading good poetry. (Is that just me?)
What I liked and enjoyed was the clear, systematic explanation of important concepts in metaphysics, with some very concise and enlightening remarks on other philosophers, including Wittgenstein, Russell and especially Frege. It is always informative to hear confident and firm opinions from someone who is not intimidated by great names because it provides clear landmarks in my own mental landscape; I am not sure that I would ever have tried to read someone like Frege, despite encountering his name so often. Along the way there were also quite a number of remarks on lesser side issues which gave passing pleasure. I loved this book even though I will go on to say why I disagree with it.
What I found myself resisting was the attempt to present this material as a cumulative argument, as though constructing a logical edifice from firm foundations to a luminous peak. I did not so much mind the labour involved in cross referencing from later to earlier material and the difficulty of holding the key steps in awareness throughout; I always make pencil marks to guide me back to key lines and the first time I reached the end of the book I had a natural inclination to revert straight back to page one and chapter one - something I would not do unless I enjoyed it; it is a book I am likely to dip into again in the future.
It was partly the firm impression that I was being hurried along to accept some logical steps that, with respect, do not follow with quite the intended force. (I fully accept that my qualifications are inferior to Dummett’s, by an order of magnitude that is vast, but for the moment it is me he is trying to persuade here, so that’s his problem, not just mine.) By the time Dummett imposes God on his last chapter he has certainly failed to carry me with him, except that I may well borrow some of his very clever arguments for more useful ends.
He writes: “The concept of the world as a whole is correlative to that of God as standing over against the world. If that contrast is removed, no room remains for distinguishing the world as it is in itself from the world as we experience it and find it to be.” [p96] He is asking if there can be sound without someone there to hear it, a world without someone to witness it. His arguments all seem to me to support (or be compatible with) the firm conclusion that yes, there can be, and that Science enables us to describe such a world (the Climate Emergency suggests that the world will find out sooner rather than later if it can get by without us) but he seems to me simply to dislike that conclusion.
“We are striving to find a description of the physical universe that is independent of our modes of thought... When our descriptions have been completely purified, however, all that we are and can be left with are abstract mathematical models... As a scientific explanation this is perfectly satisfactory but what has happened to our ambition to know what things are like in themselves? It is not merely incredible that what is there is in itself a skeletal abstract structure: it does not so much as make sense to say that.” [p95] That’s not an argument – it’s more of a protest or a complaint – and it is flawed in a number of ways.
Firstly, how much is enough? Why should metaphysics apologise for providing many deeply satisfying answers to our concerns about the human condition because it fails, in the process, to provide similarly satisfying answers to questions about the universe as it is on a scale where we are frankly not significant, and for that matter, why – other than for aesthetic reasons – is it so intolerable that the answers to some vastly challenging questions can only be expressed mathematically? Is this not like the protest that if we could read the thoughts of a lion we would not understand them? There’s a clue in his very wording – ‘a description that is independent of our mode of thought’ seems pretty unlikely to be reduced easily to plain speech. Why are we not delighted to have uncovered better explanations in the language of Science and mathematics? The largest hole, the glaring indicator of a weak argument, I suggest, is that Dummett has produced a fresh example of the God of the Gaps; a God with little useful work to do; He does not even have to know that much in Dummett’s version.
Any extended chain of reasoning has the defect that it is so often possible to devise a different arrangement of the same material leading inexorably to a different conclusion, producing two or more competing camps each utterly convinced of its own reasoning. I find it so infuriating whenever I am faced with people unable to grasp this basic principle; a persuasive argument need not be the only possible reading of the evidence and rhetoric (on a bad day) is the art of devising a persuasive argument for whatever arbitrary end suits the occasion. (People argue this way all the time – this is what I think you said, this is what I think you meant, this is what I think that must imply, I hate you!) The worst offenders emphasize loudly the best links in their chain to distract attention from the gaps. I don’t (like to) accuse Dummett of such egregious offences, but I need to explain my reflexive rejection of long chains of reasoning in general and this one in particular. I’m sure others better qualified than I am would do a more comprehensive job.
Mainly, though, I do not even choose to see the final chapter as a culmination, let alone a necessary one, to what went before; I see an assortment, perhaps a very orderly one, with many attractive elements, but not a pyramid. Please do read it and tell me what you think.
What I liked and enjoyed was the clear, systematic explanation of important concepts in metaphysics, with some very concise and enlightening remarks on other philosophers, including Wittgenstein, Russell and especially Frege. It is always informative to hear confident and firm opinions from someone who is not intimidated by great names because it provides clear landmarks in my own mental landscape; I am not sure that I would ever have tried to read someone like Frege, despite encountering his name so often. Along the way there were also quite a number of remarks on lesser side issues which gave passing pleasure. I loved this book even though I will go on to say why I disagree with it.
What I found myself resisting was the attempt to present this material as a cumulative argument, as though constructing a logical edifice from firm foundations to a luminous peak. I did not so much mind the labour involved in cross referencing from later to earlier material and the difficulty of holding the key steps in awareness throughout; I always make pencil marks to guide me back to key lines and the first time I reached the end of the book I had a natural inclination to revert straight back to page one and chapter one - something I would not do unless I enjoyed it; it is a book I am likely to dip into again in the future.
It was partly the firm impression that I was being hurried along to accept some logical steps that, with respect, do not follow with quite the intended force. (I fully accept that my qualifications are inferior to Dummett’s, by an order of magnitude that is vast, but for the moment it is me he is trying to persuade here, so that’s his problem, not just mine.) By the time Dummett imposes God on his last chapter he has certainly failed to carry me with him, except that I may well borrow some of his very clever arguments for more useful ends.
He writes: “The concept of the world as a whole is correlative to that of God as standing over against the world. If that contrast is removed, no room remains for distinguishing the world as it is in itself from the world as we experience it and find it to be.” [p96] He is asking if there can be sound without someone there to hear it, a world without someone to witness it. His arguments all seem to me to support (or be compatible with) the firm conclusion that yes, there can be, and that Science enables us to describe such a world (the Climate Emergency suggests that the world will find out sooner rather than later if it can get by without us) but he seems to me simply to dislike that conclusion.
“We are striving to find a description of the physical universe that is independent of our modes of thought... When our descriptions have been completely purified, however, all that we are and can be left with are abstract mathematical models... As a scientific explanation this is perfectly satisfactory but what has happened to our ambition to know what things are like in themselves? It is not merely incredible that what is there is in itself a skeletal abstract structure: it does not so much as make sense to say that.” [p95] That’s not an argument – it’s more of a protest or a complaint – and it is flawed in a number of ways.
Firstly, how much is enough? Why should metaphysics apologise for providing many deeply satisfying answers to our concerns about the human condition because it fails, in the process, to provide similarly satisfying answers to questions about the universe as it is on a scale where we are frankly not significant, and for that matter, why – other than for aesthetic reasons – is it so intolerable that the answers to some vastly challenging questions can only be expressed mathematically? Is this not like the protest that if we could read the thoughts of a lion we would not understand them? There’s a clue in his very wording – ‘a description that is independent of our mode of thought’ seems pretty unlikely to be reduced easily to plain speech. Why are we not delighted to have uncovered better explanations in the language of Science and mathematics? The largest hole, the glaring indicator of a weak argument, I suggest, is that Dummett has produced a fresh example of the God of the Gaps; a God with little useful work to do; He does not even have to know that much in Dummett’s version.
Any extended chain of reasoning has the defect that it is so often possible to devise a different arrangement of the same material leading inexorably to a different conclusion, producing two or more competing camps each utterly convinced of its own reasoning. I find it so infuriating whenever I am faced with people unable to grasp this basic principle; a persuasive argument need not be the only possible reading of the evidence and rhetoric (on a bad day) is the art of devising a persuasive argument for whatever arbitrary end suits the occasion. (People argue this way all the time – this is what I think you said, this is what I think you meant, this is what I think that must imply, I hate you!) The worst offenders emphasize loudly the best links in their chain to distract attention from the gaps. I don’t (like to) accuse Dummett of such egregious offences, but I need to explain my reflexive rejection of long chains of reasoning in general and this one in particular. I’m sure others better qualified than I am would do a more comprehensive job.
Mainly, though, I do not even choose to see the final chapter as a culmination, let alone a necessary one, to what went before; I see an assortment, perhaps a very orderly one, with many attractive elements, but not a pyramid. Please do read it and tell me what you think.
April 25, 2018
Volumetto molto chiaro e agile, a patto che si segua con attenzione tutti i passaggi. Un chiaro esempio di come la filosofia analitica possa essere accessibile a tutti, senza rinunciare al rigore dell'esposizione.
I due concetti chiave espressi nel titolo sono strettamente legati al linguaggio: il pensiero, per Dummett, è strutturato sotto forma di linguaggio. Quindi, ogni fatto del mondo può essere espresso attraverso un enunciato. Ogni enunciato ha un senso e tale senso viene espresso dalla proposizione: vari enunciati possono esprimere la stessa proposizione, ciò accade, ad esempio, quando si passa da una lingua all'altra. Il senso di una frase viene acquisito ereditandolo dalla comunità in cui si vive: il linguaggio è sempre un fattore sociale.
Per Dummett il vero problema della filosofia non è spiegare il significato dei vari enunciati, ma che cosa significa "significare". Analizzare ciò che rende possibile la significazione. Allora: un enunciato è comprensibile se può essere verificato, cioè se esiste un sistema che permette di osservare se l'enunciato sia vero o falso. Il sistema deve esistere, indipendentemente dal fatto se l'enunciato possa materialmente essere verificato o meno. Quindi, una frase comprensibile è una frase che, a determinate condizioni, potrebbe risultare vera. Infatti, il sistema di verificazione è indipendente dal significato dell'enunciato, per tale motivo possono risultare comprensibili enunciati che non possono essere verificati nell'immediato. Questo perché il bambino impara gli strumenti di verificazione prima su enunciati decidibili, poi successivamente impara tutti quegli elementi che vanno ad alterare l'enunciato, rendendolo indecidibile: cioè, in teorie gli si potrebbero applicare i metodi di verificazione, ma in pratica ciò non è possibile. Questo accade soprattutto quando si ragiona su spazi o tempi infiniti o non misurabili.
La verificabilità non è una cosa assoluta: dipende dal tempo. Un enunciato che è verificabile in un determinato momento, potrebbe non esserlo più in un momento successivo. Un enunciato al passato potrebbe essere verificato solo se nel presente esistono elementi che permettono la verificazione. In caso contrario, quell'enunciato un tempo verificabile, non lo sarà più. Lo stesso vale per il futuro, che è simmetrico rispetto al passato: se nel presente ci sono gli elementi che ci portano a verificare che una cosa accadrà sicuramente nel futuro, allora si potrà considerare vero un enunciato al futuro. Per tale motivo, per Dummett la realtà è cumulativa: è un accumulo di fatti verificabili che aumentano con il passare del tempo, poiché quando un enunciato futuro potrà essere finalmente verificato, allora quell'enunciato andrà a sommarsi ai fatti reali.
Alla luce di ciò, la realtà è qualcosa che esiste solo se c'è un linguaggio capace di esprimerla: per tale motivo la realtà cambia a secondo di come cambia il linguaggio. La cosa in sé è irraggiungibile, ciononostante l'uomo si prefissa questo tipo di conoscenza e cerca di sviluppare strumenti di verifica che possano avvicinarlo sempre d più a tale conoscenza. Per questo, migliorando gli strumenti di verifica si affina anche la realtà dell'uomo stesso.
Dummett termina il volume riflettendo su Dio: Dio è colui che può osservare le cose in sé. E visto che la realtà dipende dal linguaggio, il quale è il pensiero, allora affinché la realtà sia in sé c'è bisogno di un essere che possa pensarla in quanto cosa in sé e questo essere è Dio. Il pensiero di Dio fa essere le cose così come sono, perciò è detto il Creatore. E se questo atto permette alle cose di essere come sono, allora bisogna intendere che il pensare di Dio sia anche un volere che le cose siano come sono. Per questo Dio è un essere che pensa e vuole, quindi agisce: il suo agire è il pensare e volere che le cose siano come sono.
Il libero arbitrio è possibile poiché l'uomo può sempre contraddire la volontà immediata di Dio, ma non quella assoluta. Dummett, però, ci tiene a sottolineare che l'esistenza di Dio non deve far credere che tutto ciò che esiste debba essere necessariamente verificabile: infatti, possono esserci elementi di indeterminazione, poiché noi non possiamo verificare tutto. E, quindi, chi si pone dal punto di vista del determinismo, compie il grave peccato di hybris, cioè il volersi porre allo stesso posto di Dio, il quale conosce tutto così come è.
I due concetti chiave espressi nel titolo sono strettamente legati al linguaggio: il pensiero, per Dummett, è strutturato sotto forma di linguaggio. Quindi, ogni fatto del mondo può essere espresso attraverso un enunciato. Ogni enunciato ha un senso e tale senso viene espresso dalla proposizione: vari enunciati possono esprimere la stessa proposizione, ciò accade, ad esempio, quando si passa da una lingua all'altra. Il senso di una frase viene acquisito ereditandolo dalla comunità in cui si vive: il linguaggio è sempre un fattore sociale.
Per Dummett il vero problema della filosofia non è spiegare il significato dei vari enunciati, ma che cosa significa "significare". Analizzare ciò che rende possibile la significazione. Allora: un enunciato è comprensibile se può essere verificato, cioè se esiste un sistema che permette di osservare se l'enunciato sia vero o falso. Il sistema deve esistere, indipendentemente dal fatto se l'enunciato possa materialmente essere verificato o meno. Quindi, una frase comprensibile è una frase che, a determinate condizioni, potrebbe risultare vera. Infatti, il sistema di verificazione è indipendente dal significato dell'enunciato, per tale motivo possono risultare comprensibili enunciati che non possono essere verificati nell'immediato. Questo perché il bambino impara gli strumenti di verificazione prima su enunciati decidibili, poi successivamente impara tutti quegli elementi che vanno ad alterare l'enunciato, rendendolo indecidibile: cioè, in teorie gli si potrebbero applicare i metodi di verificazione, ma in pratica ciò non è possibile. Questo accade soprattutto quando si ragiona su spazi o tempi infiniti o non misurabili.
La verificabilità non è una cosa assoluta: dipende dal tempo. Un enunciato che è verificabile in un determinato momento, potrebbe non esserlo più in un momento successivo. Un enunciato al passato potrebbe essere verificato solo se nel presente esistono elementi che permettono la verificazione. In caso contrario, quell'enunciato un tempo verificabile, non lo sarà più. Lo stesso vale per il futuro, che è simmetrico rispetto al passato: se nel presente ci sono gli elementi che ci portano a verificare che una cosa accadrà sicuramente nel futuro, allora si potrà considerare vero un enunciato al futuro. Per tale motivo, per Dummett la realtà è cumulativa: è un accumulo di fatti verificabili che aumentano con il passare del tempo, poiché quando un enunciato futuro potrà essere finalmente verificato, allora quell'enunciato andrà a sommarsi ai fatti reali.
Alla luce di ciò, la realtà è qualcosa che esiste solo se c'è un linguaggio capace di esprimerla: per tale motivo la realtà cambia a secondo di come cambia il linguaggio. La cosa in sé è irraggiungibile, ciononostante l'uomo si prefissa questo tipo di conoscenza e cerca di sviluppare strumenti di verifica che possano avvicinarlo sempre d più a tale conoscenza. Per questo, migliorando gli strumenti di verifica si affina anche la realtà dell'uomo stesso.
Dummett termina il volume riflettendo su Dio: Dio è colui che può osservare le cose in sé. E visto che la realtà dipende dal linguaggio, il quale è il pensiero, allora affinché la realtà sia in sé c'è bisogno di un essere che possa pensarla in quanto cosa in sé e questo essere è Dio. Il pensiero di Dio fa essere le cose così come sono, perciò è detto il Creatore. E se questo atto permette alle cose di essere come sono, allora bisogna intendere che il pensare di Dio sia anche un volere che le cose siano come sono. Per questo Dio è un essere che pensa e vuole, quindi agisce: il suo agire è il pensare e volere che le cose siano come sono.
Il libero arbitrio è possibile poiché l'uomo può sempre contraddire la volontà immediata di Dio, ma non quella assoluta. Dummett, però, ci tiene a sottolineare che l'esistenza di Dio non deve far credere che tutto ciò che esiste debba essere necessariamente verificabile: infatti, possono esserci elementi di indeterminazione, poiché noi non possiamo verificare tutto. E, quindi, chi si pone dal punto di vista del determinismo, compie il grave peccato di hybris, cioè il volersi porre allo stesso posto di Dio, il quale conosce tutto così come è.
April 2, 2013
This book was a fantastic exposition of the Dummett's semantic theory, as well as a rather succinct critique of the truth-conditional theories of meaning that are still rather popular. Dummett explains, in detail, his reasons for rejecting the universal validity of the law of excluded middle; and by entailment, his rejection of classical logic in favor of his brand of intuitionistic logic. The last two chapters are interesting looks at Dummett's view on objective reality (reality as it is in itself), and God.
February 19, 2022
Totally out of step with contemporary philosophy, yet clearly analytic in influence and orientation. The book's thesis is fascinating, and the prose isn't nearly as difficult as I'd expected.
February 12, 2010
For the first half of this book Dummet seems to be heading towards the same mistakes that Russell makes but by the end you realise that Dummet is a much more modern mathematician and says some interesting things about the indefiniteness of maths: and therefore our perception of reality, but I still can't help feeling that for an Oxford lecturer it's a bit strange that he has ignored his predecessors Strawson and Grice.
The book also finishes with a rather tired old argument for god that once again leaves me feeling that the influence of Spinoza is far greater than is ever acknowledged.
This brilliantly readable book has done exactly what I hoped in clarifying my own opinions on the subject of thought and reality.
September 28, 2012
Ontological empiricism is not stupid. Existence precedes essence. This just reminds me of Oliveira from Cortazars Hopscotch: essentially a long, didactic, explanation of how we can't be sure that things are actually how they are. Cartesian philosophy is the way to go. Sorry Dummet, metaphysics is pointless.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews