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Robert E. Lee's Civil War
Examines the military genius of Robert E. Lee and evaluates the performances of the generals from the North and South, including the military strategies used in the Civil War
338 pages, Paperback
First published April 20, 1999
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About the author
Bevin Alexander
14 books35 followersBevin Alexander is an American military historian and author. He served as an officer during the Korean War as part of the 5th Historical Detachment. His book Korea: The First War We Lost was largely influenced by his experiences during the war.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
September 22, 2013
Inside there is a great critical analysis of Robert E. Lee as general. However, the book is poorly written while the hero worship of Jackson is tiresome and leaves one with the impression that Alexander wishes Lee had deferred to Jackson on everything. Worse still are the author's constant statements about how Lee and others could have won decisive and sweeping victories by following a different course. This kind of hindsight becomes dull and shows that Alexander's analysis is actually limited and almost infantile, since it supposes that the the other side would simply stand by and be destroyed.
May 25, 2008
The best of the Bevin Alexander works that I have read, his analysis of Lee's actions as commander of The Army of Virginia call into doubt the sterling reputation he has as a battlefield commander.
One of Alexander's main points is that Lee's desire to attack in all situations, along with his style of direct frontal assault, bled the confederate army of soldiers it could ill afford to lose.
Alexander is also critical of Lee for his lack of progressive use of military engineering to better the position of his army and develop knowledge of the terrain where his army could end up fighting. Alexander finds this aspect of Lee especially confusing because Lee was an engineer by trade and had shown great skill as a military engineer during the Mexican War.
Finally, Alexander questions Lee's pattern of delegating responsibility for the most critical elements of a battle to his subordinates while providing them with, at times, vague direction (i.e. the 2nd and 3rd days at Gettysburg).
Certainly there are many people who would think this book is pure revisionist trash as Lee is beyond any criticism. Alexander goes at great to support Lee as the most important figure in the confederacy, praises him for his character and for how he handled the end of the war.
But as a battlefield commander, Alexander makes the case that Lee benefited more from the superior abilities of other CSA generals (Jackson, Longstreet) and from the ineptitude of some of his opponents (McClellan, Burnside, Pope, Hooker) than he did from his own battlefield skill.
One of Alexander's main points is that Lee's desire to attack in all situations, along with his style of direct frontal assault, bled the confederate army of soldiers it could ill afford to lose.
Alexander is also critical of Lee for his lack of progressive use of military engineering to better the position of his army and develop knowledge of the terrain where his army could end up fighting. Alexander finds this aspect of Lee especially confusing because Lee was an engineer by trade and had shown great skill as a military engineer during the Mexican War.
Finally, Alexander questions Lee's pattern of delegating responsibility for the most critical elements of a battle to his subordinates while providing them with, at times, vague direction (i.e. the 2nd and 3rd days at Gettysburg).
Certainly there are many people who would think this book is pure revisionist trash as Lee is beyond any criticism. Alexander goes at great to support Lee as the most important figure in the confederacy, praises him for his character and for how he handled the end of the war.
But as a battlefield commander, Alexander makes the case that Lee benefited more from the superior abilities of other CSA generals (Jackson, Longstreet) and from the ineptitude of some of his opponents (McClellan, Burnside, Pope, Hooker) than he did from his own battlefield skill.
October 30, 2009
This book is another in a set of critiques of Robert E. Lee's generalship during the Civil War. It also notes that he may have done far more for all concerned at the close of the war.
This is competently written and rather simplistically argued.
As many others, Alexander argues that Lee was far too aggressive and took offensive action too reflexively. He notes the bloodletting during the Seven Days and at Gettysburg as examples. His basic point (page ix):
"The key to understanding Lee as a commander is that he sought from first to last to fight an offensive war. . . . This offensive war, though it produced many spectacular clashes and campaigns which arouse fascination to this day, ultimately failed because Lee's methods and his strategy were insufficient to overcome the South's weakness in arms and manpower."
He juxtaposes Lee with Stonewall Jackson, who preferred defensive action--with rapid flank attacks and so on as preferable to frontal attacks. The examples in the book suggest that there may be something to this argument, but--again--the final analysis appears a bit simplistic.
However, the author also pays tribute to Lee at his surrender at Appomattox. Here, Lee urged his countrymen to return peacefully and give up the fight. In that sense, he was a strong voice for ending the war and binding the wounds of disunion.
This is worth taking a look at, but the argument is rather simplistic.
This is competently written and rather simplistically argued.
As many others, Alexander argues that Lee was far too aggressive and took offensive action too reflexively. He notes the bloodletting during the Seven Days and at Gettysburg as examples. His basic point (page ix):
"The key to understanding Lee as a commander is that he sought from first to last to fight an offensive war. . . . This offensive war, though it produced many spectacular clashes and campaigns which arouse fascination to this day, ultimately failed because Lee's methods and his strategy were insufficient to overcome the South's weakness in arms and manpower."
He juxtaposes Lee with Stonewall Jackson, who preferred defensive action--with rapid flank attacks and so on as preferable to frontal attacks. The examples in the book suggest that there may be something to this argument, but--again--the final analysis appears a bit simplistic.
However, the author also pays tribute to Lee at his surrender at Appomattox. Here, Lee urged his countrymen to return peacefully and give up the fight. In that sense, he was a strong voice for ending the war and binding the wounds of disunion.
This is worth taking a look at, but the argument is rather simplistic.
May 4, 2014
It is unfortunate that Bevin Alexander was never given command of an army: he knows, in every situation, what the right choice should have been!
Alexander's tendency to always know better becomes quickly tiresome. It detracts and distracts from his reasonable thesis, that whatever Lee's manifest strengths as a general, he failed to choose a strategy that best matched his available resources to the Confederacy's ultimate goal.
I think he is correct that the true measure of Lee's performance was obscured by a postwar hagiography that distorted reality. Yet he is himself quite in thrall of the view advanced by surviving Confederates that the war was fought primarily for a noble principle of States Rights, and that slavery was tangential. He repeats the idea that the South had given up on slavery by the end of the war and willingly relinquished it. He suggests that the North could have saved a lot of money by paying for compensated emancipation rather than the war. That Lincoln tried such an emancipation program in the slave states that remained faithful to the Union, and no one was interested, seems conveniently forgotten. From Alexander's vantage, South Carolina surely would have accepted what Maryland did not.
He also accepts the idea that the Confederates "respected property rights" in Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg campaign. I guess kidnapping free African-Americans wasn't a property crime, since they weren't property until they were abducted.
Alexander's tendency to always know better becomes quickly tiresome. It detracts and distracts from his reasonable thesis, that whatever Lee's manifest strengths as a general, he failed to choose a strategy that best matched his available resources to the Confederacy's ultimate goal.
I think he is correct that the true measure of Lee's performance was obscured by a postwar hagiography that distorted reality. Yet he is himself quite in thrall of the view advanced by surviving Confederates that the war was fought primarily for a noble principle of States Rights, and that slavery was tangential. He repeats the idea that the South had given up on slavery by the end of the war and willingly relinquished it. He suggests that the North could have saved a lot of money by paying for compensated emancipation rather than the war. That Lincoln tried such an emancipation program in the slave states that remained faithful to the Union, and no one was interested, seems conveniently forgotten. From Alexander's vantage, South Carolina surely would have accepted what Maryland did not.
He also accepts the idea that the Confederates "respected property rights" in Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg campaign. I guess kidnapping free African-Americans wasn't a property crime, since they weren't property until they were abducted.
November 27, 2017
I read Mr. Alexander's "Robert E. Lee's Civil War" this late summer. I thought the writing could be a little dry, but he did furnish a lot of good details and gave a good description of the armies as they faced each other at Appomattox, but his history lacked drama. What really disturbed me more is how he criticized Grant and Lee both. Certainly, both Generals made mistakes, anyone human would have, but I would have stayed away from judgement if I had been Mr. Alexander. He criticizes Grant for his frontal attacks and says that Grant should have tried to flank Lee. What did he think Grant was trying to do? From the Wilderness on Grant attempted to flank Lee and finally drove him into the trenches of Petersburg, which was exactly what Lee was attempting to avoid. Alexander also overlooks the fact that Grant was told my Lincoln himself, that his job was to destroy Lee's army, not take Richmond. Lee, on the other hand, was compelled to defend Richmond to the end, which he did. I could go into more detail, but I want to just say that I would recommend the book, but to be careful of judging Grant and Lee as Mr. Alexander did. Both are two of the great military geniuses of American history.
February 18, 2025
There's a bit of a dichotomy in the work—where the author seems to feel compelled to compliment Robert E. Lee, usually immediately after a paragraph explaining how Lee's latest military success was more down to the general idiocy of both sides resorting to Napoleanic tactics in a war with more advanced weaponry and Lee's general luck with timing, or more bizarrely after a section detailing how Lee was like a bull before a toreador whenever an army was before him, throwing lives away in sheer folly, from the start of his command until his surrender—but it is interesting and informative about the limitations of American military leadership of the time and how they often had the information that could have changed the course of the Civil War, but failed to act upon it.
October 26, 2023
The included maps were far better than those of most other histories I have read. And the author helpfully translates road names of the period into current state route numbers, a big help for those wanting to explore areas mentioned in the text.
I found that the subtext of ‘woulda, coulda, shoulda’ got a little old by the book’s end, but as an introductory overview, Robert E. Lee’s Civil War delivers.
I found that the subtext of ‘woulda, coulda, shoulda’ got a little old by the book’s end, but as an introductory overview, Robert E. Lee’s Civil War delivers.
August 17, 2020
The title is misleading. This book is nothing but a put down of Lee. According to the author, Robert E Lee, didn't know what he was doing.
June 4, 2025
A general summary of the Eastern Theater of the Civil War, which is of course, that area in which General Lee fought.
June 3, 2009
Alexander sets out to disprove what he refers to as the "elevation" of Lee's status to that of military genius. In doing so, he proves that if Lee wasn't a military genius neither were the generals (exception give by the author to Stonewall Jackson) serving under him or to the generals opposing him. He never came right out and called Lee incompetent but he did use that adjective in referring to Union General Ambrose Burnside. I'm not convinced that he made the point he attempted thus missing the objective of the book. The book analyzes and rehashes the maneuvers by Lee and his men and the Union Army they were up against in a readable fashion. He sites and explains in an easy to understand manner factors such as the use of the minie ball and trench warfare and their impact on the strategy of the war (which might have played in the "incompetence of some of the military leaders). Bevin Alexander does "elevate" Lee to the status of being the one person capable of bringing the South back to the Union in a peaceable manner siting his encouragement of his men to "be as good citizens as they were soldiers" and his tenure as the President of Washington College (Now Washington & Lee University) in Virginia.
March 17, 2016
Alexander sets out to disprove what he refers to as the "elevation" of Lee's status to that of military genius. In doing so, he proves that if Lee wasn't a military genius neither were the generals (exception give by the author to Stonewall Jackson) serving under him or to the generals opposing him. He never came right out and called Lee incompetent but he did use that adjective in referring to Union General Ambrose Burnside. I'm not convinced that he made the point he attempted thus missing the objective of the book. The book analyzes and rehashes the maneuvers by Lee and his men and the Union Army they were up against in a readable fashion. He sites and explains in an easy to understand manner factors such as the use of the minie ball and trench warfare and their impact on the strategy of the war (which might have played in the "incompetence of some of the military leaders). Bevin Alexander does "elevate" Lee to the status of being the one person capable of bringing the South back to the Union in a peaceable manner siting his encouragement of his men to "be as good citizens as they were soldiers" and his tenure as the President of Washington College (Now Washington & Lee University) in Virginia.
June 28, 2017
The book focuses mostly on the strategy used by Lee while commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, while providing a very brief overview of the campaigns and battles during this period (not the "fascinating detail" promised by the book flaps).
The author's commentary on Lee's decisions sometimes seem to depend on hindsight rather than on the information available to Lee at the time he had to make these decisions. For example, during the Seven Days Battles, Mr. Alexander's views on what Lee should have done would seem to depend on the Confederates having accurate maps of the area (which, if I remember correctly from other sources, they didn't have). Also, the author suggests in chapter six that McClellan "could [have] easily overwhelm" the 30,000 Confederates he though were present with Longstreet, with the 65,000 Union soldiers under his immediate command. However, a few pages later the author is describing how D.H. Hill was able to delay McClellan at South Mountain with only 5,000 men
The author's commentary on Lee's decisions sometimes seem to depend on hindsight rather than on the information available to Lee at the time he had to make these decisions. For example, during the Seven Days Battles, Mr. Alexander's views on what Lee should have done would seem to depend on the Confederates having accurate maps of the area (which, if I remember correctly from other sources, they didn't have). Also, the author suggests in chapter six that McClellan "could [have] easily overwhelm" the 30,000 Confederates he though were present with Longstreet, with the 65,000 Union soldiers under his immediate command. However, a few pages later the author is describing how D.H. Hill was able to delay McClellan at South Mountain with only 5,000 men
December 25, 2013
Interesting.
February 9, 2016
Book was very focused on military strategy. Very little story-telling, but focused on maneuvers and strategy.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews