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Osprey Fortress #10
The Maginot Line 1928-45
The Maginot Line, the massive series of fortifications built by France in the 1930s to defend its borders with Germany and Italy, is perhaps the most maligned collection of fortifications ever built. Despite being a technological marvel, and the most sophisticated and complex set of fortifications built up to that time, it failed to save France from crushing defeat in 1940. Yet there are those who argue that it accomplished exactly what it was designed to do. This book provides a concise and informative treatment of the Maginot Line, from North-East France to the Mediterranean. Packed with plans, contemporary and modern images, plus digital artwork, it presents a detailed visual exploration of this famous fortification system.
64 pages, Paperback
First published August 20, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
September 9, 2019
This was an excellent, easy-to-read and well-illustrated book about the infamous Maginot Line. It was really quite interesting despite the occasional mind-numbing technical details which didn't interest me that much - however, all in all, I found it highly interesting. It contains excellent illustrations and photos of the forts, their guns/equipment, etc. then and now.
I did get some insights from this book. The generals who decided to build the fortified line were veterans of WWI - which had descended into a stale-mate of trench warfare. The trenches (works) eventually became quite complicated - not just dirt ditches - and so the idea was, if war with Germany was going to recur, why not have works in place before war breaks out. The Maginot line included ditches in front of the thick concrete "pillboxes" (aka casements), barbed wire entanglements, anti-tank obstacles - to protect the work's gun emplacements (which ranged from automatic rife, machine gun, howitzers, mortars). It all seemed fool-proof on paper and may have given the French a false sense of security.
The lines of forts in WWII repeatedly failed. They failed in France, they failed in the USSR and even the German equivalent - the West Wall, which the Germans fell back upon as the Allies fought their way to Berlin from Normandy - failed. Forts - even virtually impregnable ones like those of the Maginot Line, which mostly did hold up under bombardment - are no match for sustained aerial bombardment and mobility (tanks - armored vehicles). WWII didn't devolve into trench warfare like WWI. The forts were vulnerable to flame-throwers, which could suck the air out of the confined spaces and suffocate the troops within even if bombing did not bust open the bunkers.
However, having said that, even if it didn't protect France as expected, the Maginot line remains fascinating - highly elaborated, with its own narrow gauge railway, overhead trolley (to transport shells) and elevators in addition to stairs, leading to multi-levels underground. The interconnected systems of forts could house hundreds of men and tons of ammunition. The strong points were equipped with enough supplies (food, water, fuel) to last a month and they contained elaborate air filtration systems & communications. They were linked to the French electrical grid but also contained their own generators - likewise were connected to the French telephone network but also of course had radio telephones. There was so many ingenious solutions to the problems of making the forts as self-contained and impervious to attack as possible - some systems were lifted from naval systems, such as the communications system between the command post and the gun operators, since the gunners could not actually see the area they were firing on (as they were in an enclosed steel shell, called a cloche, which was both retractable and could swivel). There were observation post cloches fitted with several kinds of periscopes, night vision equipment etc., and their reports were relayed to the command post which then collated the information together with reports received by phone, to issue orders to the gunners. In case of engagement, the gun operators could be in touch directly with the observation post. The embrasures didn't allow visual access to the targets - so communication between the observation posts and the gunners/infantry within the fort was key. There were backup systems - such as direct visual communication between pillboxes via light signals, based on inter-ship signaling. The blocks were interconnected by long galleries, many times traversed by the railway, and there were of course escape/sortie routes as well.
The French lost 5 million soldiers in WWI, and were outnumbered in population almost 2:1 by the Germans by the time WWII rolled around. The Germans also had a higher birth rate. Why did France catastrophically fold in WWII? It is possible the population just didn't want to lose millions of men again; also, the vast sums of money spent on the Maginot line could have been more effectively used instead to beef up armor (tanks) and the air force. Actually, the Maginot Line works (ouvrages) held up quite well under the German assault. Unfortunately, the Germans poured in through in a gap in the Line that the French had thought didn't need to be as heavily fortified because they thought its rough forest terrain made it impassible. The French also made a serious mistake along their side of the Rhine. The fortified structures they built there (blockhouses) there weren't as strong as elsewhere along the line (NW France and SE France - along the Alps) and prior to invasion the Germans quietly moved up camouflaged anti-aircraft guns to their side of the river and the day of the invasion pounded those pillboxes to smithereens in about 35 seconds (as the author says) - thus clearing the way for their forces to cross the Rhine and invade France. Morale may have been a factor in the Allied rout in the North as the Germans swept through neutral Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg, to pour into France despite the line and the English and French troops. Perhaps the Germans seemed unbeatable at that point. Within a month of the invasion of France, the French were requesting an armistice. Most of France was occupied for five years, with a puppet government installed in the Southern third of the country. Ironically, the Germans later used the Maginot line themselves on their retreat back to Germany after D-Day. Today, some of the forts are restored and are museums - tourist attractions. The topic is endlessly interesting since the loss of France was a turning point in the war - an unimaginable defeat for the Allied (French and British) armies. This is a fascinating book for anyone interested in the Second World War and military engineering etc.
Some quotes:
"Planning and Building the Line"
"In the North East [France] ... was faced with a clean slate. For hundreds of years, it had relied on permanent fortifications as the basis for border security, but because the newly regained Alsace-Lorraine region in the east had been part of Germany from 1870 to 1918, its current borders with Germany were completely undefended by modern fortifications."
"Marshal Petain strongly believed that to the west of Thionville the Ardennes Forest in Luxembourg and eastern Belgium presented such a significant and easily defended barrier that the Germans would not seriously contemplate attacking through it."
"The Structure of the Maginot Line"
"North-eastern France"
"The terrain along the Franco-German border varies from gently rolling ground to fairly hilly country, but it is generally passable by at least infantry along its entire length."
"The line was located 5-10 km from the border."
"The ouvrage command post"
"In order to provide the most secure and reliable communications possible an extensive network of buried phone lines connected all the Maginot Line works together. The telephone network was supplemented by a radio network, but it proved troublesome and unreliable in practice. The antennas were a major problem. They were generally situated on the face of artillery case-mate or entrance blocks, but the reception was less than optimal and they could fairly easily be damaged by hostile fire."
"An ouvrage normally drew its electric power from the French national power grid through buried cables, but it was also provided with up to four large diesel-driven generator sets for use in case of a failure of the external power supply."
"As an additional backup, ouvrages were interconnected so that, in an emergency, one ouvrage could provide power to another."
"Entrance blocks"
"In cases where it was necessary for the gallery level of the ouvrage to be lower than the entrance blocks, the connection between an entrance block and the rest of the ouvrage was by either a vertical shaft or an inclined shaft. Vertical shafts were provided with lifts while inclined shafts were provided with cable railways. Both the lifts and the inclined railways serving the entrance blocks for ammunition and supplies were large enough to accommodate cars of the ouvrage's railway."
"The Maginot Line in the Alps"
"A feature unique to the Alps was the aerial cable-way entrance found in gros ouvrages whose access road was exposed to enemy fire. The cable-way entrance was sometimes part of the main entrance block and sometime a separate block. In either case the block served as the uphill terminus of an aerial cable-way that was used to carry supplies to the ouvrage."
"Corsica"
"Corsica was viewed by the French as an unsinkable aircraft carrier guarding he key shipping routes to its North African colonies. consequently, defenses for it were included in the original Maginot Line program. A total of 24 works were built, sited to defend likely points of invasion."
"The Myth of the Maginot Line"
"There are indications that the French government made efforts to exaggerate their [fortifications] strength and extent in an attempt to increase their effectiveness as as deterrent."
"...some sections of the German military had a much clearer understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Maginot Line than did the general public. It is not known how the Germans obtained the information on which these reports were based. Certainly, spying played a significant role, but some information may also have been obtained from those directly involved in building the fortifications. Construction had required more labor than was available from the French work force. As a result, large numbers of foreign laborers had been employed including many from Germany."
"The Maginot Line at War"
"The Phony War"
"...Allied strategy was primarily defensive in nature, relying on blockade, economic strangulation, and fortification to wear down Germany and lay the groundwork for an Allied offensive sometime in the future."
"The Allies were confident that the strength of the Maginot Line would deter Germany from directly attacking France."
"But not everyone was so sanguine. General Sir Alan Brooke, a corps commander it he British Army, paid two visits to Maginot Line ouvrages in late 1939 and ealry 1940 and set down his impressions in his diary: "[T]here is no doubt that the whole conception of the Maginot Line is a stroke of genius. And yet! It gives me but little feeling of security, and I consider that the French would have done better to invest the money in the shape of mobile defenses such as more and better aircraft and more heavy-armored divisions rather than to sink all this money into the ground.""
"Belgium and Holland, although neutral, had not neglected their defenses and both had constructed extensive fortified positions to defend against an attack by Germany. Crucially however, Belgium had concentrated its fortifications in the more open and industrial northern part of the country leaving the Ardennes Forest area in the south only lightly defended."
"Blitzkrieg and the Battle of France"
"...the main thrust was to be made by the full concentration of Germany's armored and mechanized forces through Luxembourg and the Ardennes Forest with the goal of bypassing the Allies' fortifications and breaking through their front line where it was weakest."
"Success or failure?"
"...while popular imagination seized on the Maginot Line as an abject failure that had failed to protect France, the real failure was one of leadership, most importantly, the inability of the French high command of the 1920s and 1930s to recognize and adapt to the changes that technology had brought to warfare. Ultimately, perhaps the two biggest failings of the Maginot Line were, as General Sir Alan Brooke had so prophetically observed during the "Phony War," that it diverted resources, primarily money, that might have been better utilized in strengthening the French armed forces, and that the myth of the Maginot Line engendered a false sense of security and complacency on the part of the French."
"1940-45"
"During their occupation, the Germans converted the support areas of a number of ouvrages into bombproof underground factories. They also removed some weapons and equipment for use in their Atlantic Wall fortifications, but on the whole, they did little to alter the condition of the Maginot Line."
I did get some insights from this book. The generals who decided to build the fortified line were veterans of WWI - which had descended into a stale-mate of trench warfare. The trenches (works) eventually became quite complicated - not just dirt ditches - and so the idea was, if war with Germany was going to recur, why not have works in place before war breaks out. The Maginot line included ditches in front of the thick concrete "pillboxes" (aka casements), barbed wire entanglements, anti-tank obstacles - to protect the work's gun emplacements (which ranged from automatic rife, machine gun, howitzers, mortars). It all seemed fool-proof on paper and may have given the French a false sense of security.
The lines of forts in WWII repeatedly failed. They failed in France, they failed in the USSR and even the German equivalent - the West Wall, which the Germans fell back upon as the Allies fought their way to Berlin from Normandy - failed. Forts - even virtually impregnable ones like those of the Maginot Line, which mostly did hold up under bombardment - are no match for sustained aerial bombardment and mobility (tanks - armored vehicles). WWII didn't devolve into trench warfare like WWI. The forts were vulnerable to flame-throwers, which could suck the air out of the confined spaces and suffocate the troops within even if bombing did not bust open the bunkers.
However, having said that, even if it didn't protect France as expected, the Maginot line remains fascinating - highly elaborated, with its own narrow gauge railway, overhead trolley (to transport shells) and elevators in addition to stairs, leading to multi-levels underground. The interconnected systems of forts could house hundreds of men and tons of ammunition. The strong points were equipped with enough supplies (food, water, fuel) to last a month and they contained elaborate air filtration systems & communications. They were linked to the French electrical grid but also contained their own generators - likewise were connected to the French telephone network but also of course had radio telephones. There was so many ingenious solutions to the problems of making the forts as self-contained and impervious to attack as possible - some systems were lifted from naval systems, such as the communications system between the command post and the gun operators, since the gunners could not actually see the area they were firing on (as they were in an enclosed steel shell, called a cloche, which was both retractable and could swivel). There were observation post cloches fitted with several kinds of periscopes, night vision equipment etc., and their reports were relayed to the command post which then collated the information together with reports received by phone, to issue orders to the gunners. In case of engagement, the gun operators could be in touch directly with the observation post. The embrasures didn't allow visual access to the targets - so communication between the observation posts and the gunners/infantry within the fort was key. There were backup systems - such as direct visual communication between pillboxes via light signals, based on inter-ship signaling. The blocks were interconnected by long galleries, many times traversed by the railway, and there were of course escape/sortie routes as well.
The French lost 5 million soldiers in WWI, and were outnumbered in population almost 2:1 by the Germans by the time WWII rolled around. The Germans also had a higher birth rate. Why did France catastrophically fold in WWII? It is possible the population just didn't want to lose millions of men again; also, the vast sums of money spent on the Maginot line could have been more effectively used instead to beef up armor (tanks) and the air force. Actually, the Maginot Line works (ouvrages) held up quite well under the German assault. Unfortunately, the Germans poured in through in a gap in the Line that the French had thought didn't need to be as heavily fortified because they thought its rough forest terrain made it impassible. The French also made a serious mistake along their side of the Rhine. The fortified structures they built there (blockhouses) there weren't as strong as elsewhere along the line (NW France and SE France - along the Alps) and prior to invasion the Germans quietly moved up camouflaged anti-aircraft guns to their side of the river and the day of the invasion pounded those pillboxes to smithereens in about 35 seconds (as the author says) - thus clearing the way for their forces to cross the Rhine and invade France. Morale may have been a factor in the Allied rout in the North as the Germans swept through neutral Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg, to pour into France despite the line and the English and French troops. Perhaps the Germans seemed unbeatable at that point. Within a month of the invasion of France, the French were requesting an armistice. Most of France was occupied for five years, with a puppet government installed in the Southern third of the country. Ironically, the Germans later used the Maginot line themselves on their retreat back to Germany after D-Day. Today, some of the forts are restored and are museums - tourist attractions. The topic is endlessly interesting since the loss of France was a turning point in the war - an unimaginable defeat for the Allied (French and British) armies. This is a fascinating book for anyone interested in the Second World War and military engineering etc.
Some quotes:
"Planning and Building the Line"
"In the North East [France] ... was faced with a clean slate. For hundreds of years, it had relied on permanent fortifications as the basis for border security, but because the newly regained Alsace-Lorraine region in the east had been part of Germany from 1870 to 1918, its current borders with Germany were completely undefended by modern fortifications."
"Marshal Petain strongly believed that to the west of Thionville the Ardennes Forest in Luxembourg and eastern Belgium presented such a significant and easily defended barrier that the Germans would not seriously contemplate attacking through it."
"The Structure of the Maginot Line"
"North-eastern France"
"The terrain along the Franco-German border varies from gently rolling ground to fairly hilly country, but it is generally passable by at least infantry along its entire length."
"The line was located 5-10 km from the border."
"The ouvrage command post"
"In order to provide the most secure and reliable communications possible an extensive network of buried phone lines connected all the Maginot Line works together. The telephone network was supplemented by a radio network, but it proved troublesome and unreliable in practice. The antennas were a major problem. They were generally situated on the face of artillery case-mate or entrance blocks, but the reception was less than optimal and they could fairly easily be damaged by hostile fire."
"An ouvrage normally drew its electric power from the French national power grid through buried cables, but it was also provided with up to four large diesel-driven generator sets for use in case of a failure of the external power supply."
"As an additional backup, ouvrages were interconnected so that, in an emergency, one ouvrage could provide power to another."
"Entrance blocks"
"In cases where it was necessary for the gallery level of the ouvrage to be lower than the entrance blocks, the connection between an entrance block and the rest of the ouvrage was by either a vertical shaft or an inclined shaft. Vertical shafts were provided with lifts while inclined shafts were provided with cable railways. Both the lifts and the inclined railways serving the entrance blocks for ammunition and supplies were large enough to accommodate cars of the ouvrage's railway."
"The Maginot Line in the Alps"
"A feature unique to the Alps was the aerial cable-way entrance found in gros ouvrages whose access road was exposed to enemy fire. The cable-way entrance was sometimes part of the main entrance block and sometime a separate block. In either case the block served as the uphill terminus of an aerial cable-way that was used to carry supplies to the ouvrage."
"Corsica"
"Corsica was viewed by the French as an unsinkable aircraft carrier guarding he key shipping routes to its North African colonies. consequently, defenses for it were included in the original Maginot Line program. A total of 24 works were built, sited to defend likely points of invasion."
"The Myth of the Maginot Line"
"There are indications that the French government made efforts to exaggerate their [fortifications] strength and extent in an attempt to increase their effectiveness as as deterrent."
"...some sections of the German military had a much clearer understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Maginot Line than did the general public. It is not known how the Germans obtained the information on which these reports were based. Certainly, spying played a significant role, but some information may also have been obtained from those directly involved in building the fortifications. Construction had required more labor than was available from the French work force. As a result, large numbers of foreign laborers had been employed including many from Germany."
"The Maginot Line at War"
"The Phony War"
"...Allied strategy was primarily defensive in nature, relying on blockade, economic strangulation, and fortification to wear down Germany and lay the groundwork for an Allied offensive sometime in the future."
"The Allies were confident that the strength of the Maginot Line would deter Germany from directly attacking France."
"But not everyone was so sanguine. General Sir Alan Brooke, a corps commander it he British Army, paid two visits to Maginot Line ouvrages in late 1939 and ealry 1940 and set down his impressions in his diary: "[T]here is no doubt that the whole conception of the Maginot Line is a stroke of genius. And yet! It gives me but little feeling of security, and I consider that the French would have done better to invest the money in the shape of mobile defenses such as more and better aircraft and more heavy-armored divisions rather than to sink all this money into the ground.""
"Belgium and Holland, although neutral, had not neglected their defenses and both had constructed extensive fortified positions to defend against an attack by Germany. Crucially however, Belgium had concentrated its fortifications in the more open and industrial northern part of the country leaving the Ardennes Forest area in the south only lightly defended."
"Blitzkrieg and the Battle of France"
"...the main thrust was to be made by the full concentration of Germany's armored and mechanized forces through Luxembourg and the Ardennes Forest with the goal of bypassing the Allies' fortifications and breaking through their front line where it was weakest."
"Success or failure?"
"...while popular imagination seized on the Maginot Line as an abject failure that had failed to protect France, the real failure was one of leadership, most importantly, the inability of the French high command of the 1920s and 1930s to recognize and adapt to the changes that technology had brought to warfare. Ultimately, perhaps the two biggest failings of the Maginot Line were, as General Sir Alan Brooke had so prophetically observed during the "Phony War," that it diverted resources, primarily money, that might have been better utilized in strengthening the French armed forces, and that the myth of the Maginot Line engendered a false sense of security and complacency on the part of the French."
"1940-45"
"During their occupation, the Germans converted the support areas of a number of ouvrages into bombproof underground factories. They also removed some weapons and equipment for use in their Atlantic Wall fortifications, but on the whole, they did little to alter the condition of the Maginot Line."
May 31, 2025
Fantastic overview of the production of the Maginot line. A British person visiting was super impressed but put it best, perhaps it would have been better to put these resources into tanks and mobile attack/defense pieces (that was before the war). Obviously hindsight demonstrated the inadequacies of the thinking and the reasons it failed are outlined. Still, it was an engineering marvel and impressive if not doomed to fail. A better offense beat the good defense. I really enjoyed everything about this book. Highly recommend.
June 15, 2025
Really appreciated the detail and information about the building of this impressive (if not doomed) set of fortifications. The technology, cost, and manpower are mind boggling. Illustrations add a ton and appreciated all the pictures. If you are interested in this topic, highly recommend.
October 12, 2019
Osprey Publishing Fortress publication.
It is worth to visit the place.
It is worth to visit the place.
August 31, 2013
Certainly not a block-buster, but a nice and knowledgeable introduction to the most impressive fortresses ever built. The attention to detail shown by those constructing these monsters is illustrated while the text does not succumb to minutiae.
December 31, 2014
Great overview of the defenses of the Maginot line, including how they failed (and where they succeeded). Really good descriptions of how they were envisioned to be used, and as always the illustrations are top notch.
August 31, 2015
Great photos and info. Would liked to have seen more drawings and cross sections.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews