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Francis Fukuyama cements his reputation as a wide-ranging public intellectual with this big-think book on social order and human nature. Following his earlier successes (The End of History and the Last Man and Trust), Fukuyama argues that civilization is in the midst of a revolution on a par with hunter-gatherers learning how to farm or agricultural societies turning industrial. He finds much to celebrate in this cultural, economic, and technological transformation, but "with all the blessings that flow from a more complex, information-based economy, certain bad things also happened to our social and moral life." Individualism, for example, fuels innovation and prosperity, but has also "corroded virtually all forms of authority and weakened the bonds holding families, neighborhoods, and nations together." Yet this is not a pessimistic book: "Social order, once disrupted, tends to get remade again" because humans are built for life in a civil society governed by moral rules.
We're on the tail end of the "great disruption," says Fukuyama, and signs suggest a coming era of much-needed social reordering. He handles complex ideas from diverse fields with ease (this is certainly the first book whose acknowledgments thank both science fiction novelist Neal Stephenson and social critic James Q. Wilson), and he writes with laser-sharp clarity. Fans of Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel and David Landes's The Wealth and Poverty of Nations will appreciate The Great Disruption, as will just about any reader curious about what the new millennium may bring. This is simply one of the best nonfiction books of 1999. --John J. Miller
376 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1999
31 people are currently reading
886 people want to read
About the author
Francis Fukuyama
116 books2,232 followersYoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (born 27 October 1952) is an American philosopher, political economist, and author.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
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September 23, 2022
A könyv koncepciója tulajdonképpen egyszerű, akár a bot. Fukuyama fogja Schumpeter elméletét a "teremtő rombolásról", kiszakítja a közgazdaságtan meleg öléből, és a társadalomtudományra, pontosabban a társadalmi tőkére* alkalmazza. No most ha van, ami a közgazdaságtannál is kevésbé egzaktabb, hát az a társadalmi morál, szóval érdekes kísérlet, de nem könnyű kenyér.
Az első rész (és ezzel a kötet bő fele) azzal is megy el, hogy Fukuyama próbálja egzakttá tenni azt a homályos állítást, hogy a társadalom bizalmi rádiusza a hatvanas évektől kezdve alaposan bezuhant. Számos példát hoz fel, amit igyekszik alaposan megadatolni - beszél a bűnözési statisztikákról, a válások számáról**, meg a miegymásról, hogy aztán elégedetten hátradőlve kijelenthesse: igen, a helyzet borzasztó. A Nyugat szétesőben, a deviancia tort ül fölöttünk. Ha csak ennyiben hagyná, Csák János innovációs és vaginaügyi miniszter is egyetértene, de nem, Fukuyamának még van hozzáfűznivalója. Az író ugyanis azt állítja, hogy amit romlásnak, "szétbomlásnak" érzékelünk, az egy természetes folyamat, az ipari társadalomból az információs társadalomba való átmenet kísérőjelensége. És ne forgolódjon álmatlanul senki miatta, mert az emberi faj arról ismerszik meg, hogy képes közösségben élni, ergo az új helyzetben is meg fogja alkotni a maga szabályrendszereit (ahogy már el is kezdte megalkotni), és ezek a szabályrendszerek sokkal inkább használhatóak lesznek az új körülmények között, mint azok, amiket elvetett. Szóval ne pánikoljunk, nem a világvégét látjuk, nem a Nyugat alkonya jött el, csupán az interregnum.
Hogy ezt alátámassza, a kötet második felében tart nekünk egy gyorstalpalót az erkölcs kialakulásáról. Lényege az, hogy az emberek folyamatosan a "fogolydilemma"*** újabb és újabb variációit játszották le egymással, mégpedig végtelenszer, és az ismétlések során megtanulták megkülönböztetni egymástól azt, akiben bízhatnak attól, aki csak a bizalom potyázója. Ez pedig lehetővé tette a társadalom megszületését - mert bizalom nélkül társadalom sem képzelhető el. Persze a potyázók is egyre ügyesebbek lettek, többek között kihasználták, hogy minél nagyobb egy közösség, annál nehezebb kiszűrni őket****. Részben az ő ténykedésüknek köszönhető a társadalmi tőke időnkénti bezuhanása. De bezuhanás ide vagy oda, a társadalom előbb-utóbb újra létrehozza a maga normáit, nem pusztán racionális önérdekből (tudván, hogy hosszú távon etikusnak lenni kifizetődő), hanem elsősorban azért, mert belső igénye van erre: csak normák által szabályozott térben érzi jól magát. Genetikailag, hogy úgy mondjam.
Összességében a könyv remekül beilleszthető Fukuyama Nagy Mesterelbeszélésébe, ami nem más, mint egyetlen hosszú óda a társadalmi bizalom szükségességéről. És - érzésem szerint - arról, hogy ennek a bizalomnak leginkább a liberális demokrácia képes keretet adni. Mert egyedül ez kellően rugalmas ahhoz, hogy amennyiben a társadalmi tőke erodálódik (mert időnként erodálódik), akkor felelősségteljes, aktív állampolgárokra támaszkodva újratermelje azt. Az autoriter rendszer képes ugyan bizonyos normákat kikényszeríteni, de ezek sosem válnak belsőleg átélt, organikus szabályrendszerré - merev konstrukciók maradnak, amelyek szilánkosra törnek, amint a rendszer meggyengül.
* https://hu.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Társa...
** Talán ez a rész váltotta ki belőlem a legnagyobb ellenállást. Például a válások számának növekedését lehet ugyan statisztikákon keresztül nézni, és leszűrni belőlük valamiféle társadalmi széthullást, de közben nem megemlíteni, hogy a válás egy mérgező kapcsolatból való sikeres menekülés eszköze is lehet, kissé torzítja az összképet.
*** https://hu.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fogol... (Ma ilyen lusta napom van, nem megmagyarázom, hanem bewikipédiázom a dolgokat.)
**** Kedvem lenne hosszabban értekezni a bizalom potyázóiról, akik különösen az egészségtelen társadalmakban érzik jól magukat, és Magyarországon előszeretettel lépnek be a Fideszbe. De ez egy olyan kanyar lenne, ami messzire vezet. Mindenesetre Fukuyamával (is) szívesen eltémázgatnék a populizmusról, a társadalmi tőke eme kullancsáról.
Az első rész (és ezzel a kötet bő fele) azzal is megy el, hogy Fukuyama próbálja egzakttá tenni azt a homályos állítást, hogy a társadalom bizalmi rádiusza a hatvanas évektől kezdve alaposan bezuhant. Számos példát hoz fel, amit igyekszik alaposan megadatolni - beszél a bűnözési statisztikákról, a válások számáról**, meg a miegymásról, hogy aztán elégedetten hátradőlve kijelenthesse: igen, a helyzet borzasztó. A Nyugat szétesőben, a deviancia tort ül fölöttünk. Ha csak ennyiben hagyná, Csák János innovációs és vaginaügyi miniszter is egyetértene, de nem, Fukuyamának még van hozzáfűznivalója. Az író ugyanis azt állítja, hogy amit romlásnak, "szétbomlásnak" érzékelünk, az egy természetes folyamat, az ipari társadalomból az információs társadalomba való átmenet kísérőjelensége. És ne forgolódjon álmatlanul senki miatta, mert az emberi faj arról ismerszik meg, hogy képes közösségben élni, ergo az új helyzetben is meg fogja alkotni a maga szabályrendszereit (ahogy már el is kezdte megalkotni), és ezek a szabályrendszerek sokkal inkább használhatóak lesznek az új körülmények között, mint azok, amiket elvetett. Szóval ne pánikoljunk, nem a világvégét látjuk, nem a Nyugat alkonya jött el, csupán az interregnum.
Hogy ezt alátámassza, a kötet második felében tart nekünk egy gyorstalpalót az erkölcs kialakulásáról. Lényege az, hogy az emberek folyamatosan a "fogolydilemma"*** újabb és újabb variációit játszották le egymással, mégpedig végtelenszer, és az ismétlések során megtanulták megkülönböztetni egymástól azt, akiben bízhatnak attól, aki csak a bizalom potyázója. Ez pedig lehetővé tette a társadalom megszületését - mert bizalom nélkül társadalom sem képzelhető el. Persze a potyázók is egyre ügyesebbek lettek, többek között kihasználták, hogy minél nagyobb egy közösség, annál nehezebb kiszűrni őket****. Részben az ő ténykedésüknek köszönhető a társadalmi tőke időnkénti bezuhanása. De bezuhanás ide vagy oda, a társadalom előbb-utóbb újra létrehozza a maga normáit, nem pusztán racionális önérdekből (tudván, hogy hosszú távon etikusnak lenni kifizetődő), hanem elsősorban azért, mert belső igénye van erre: csak normák által szabályozott térben érzi jól magát. Genetikailag, hogy úgy mondjam.
Összességében a könyv remekül beilleszthető Fukuyama Nagy Mesterelbeszélésébe, ami nem más, mint egyetlen hosszú óda a társadalmi bizalom szükségességéről. És - érzésem szerint - arról, hogy ennek a bizalomnak leginkább a liberális demokrácia képes keretet adni. Mert egyedül ez kellően rugalmas ahhoz, hogy amennyiben a társadalmi tőke erodálódik (mert időnként erodálódik), akkor felelősségteljes, aktív állampolgárokra támaszkodva újratermelje azt. Az autoriter rendszer képes ugyan bizonyos normákat kikényszeríteni, de ezek sosem válnak belsőleg átélt, organikus szabályrendszerré - merev konstrukciók maradnak, amelyek szilánkosra törnek, amint a rendszer meggyengül.
* https://hu.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Társa...
** Talán ez a rész váltotta ki belőlem a legnagyobb ellenállást. Például a válások számának növekedését lehet ugyan statisztikákon keresztül nézni, és leszűrni belőlük valamiféle társadalmi széthullást, de közben nem megemlíteni, hogy a válás egy mérgező kapcsolatból való sikeres menekülés eszköze is lehet, kissé torzítja az összképet.
*** https://hu.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fogol... (Ma ilyen lusta napom van, nem megmagyarázom, hanem bewikipédiázom a dolgokat.)
**** Kedvem lenne hosszabban értekezni a bizalom potyázóiról, akik különösen az egészségtelen társadalmakban érzik jól magukat, és Magyarországon előszeretettel lépnek be a Fideszbe. De ez egy olyan kanyar lenne, ami messzire vezet. Mindenesetre Fukuyamával (is) szívesen eltémázgatnék a populizmusról, a társadalmi tőke eme kullancsáról.
March 22, 2021
Another great book by this author. The eponymous event is the move in the western world away from an industrial society towards the IT age, which he suggests is as significant (and disruptive) as the industrial revolution, and before that, the move to agriculture. He examines in great detail and with an abundance of statistical evidence the social breakdowns and disruptions this shift is bringing - but also points out that communities and societies always reform and restore order after periods of uncertainty and upheaval.
Indeed, order is inherent to human relationships. And beyond order, human beings when cooperating to face a common challenge have an almost miraculous capacity to produce solutions - solutions that not only deal with the problem in question but also set the scene for satisfactory social order moving forward. The ability to spontaneously cooperate to solve problems is not uniquely human, but exists in many forms in nature; and there is always a tension between rules imposed from above, and those that are spontaneously generated on the ground. But only humans have the capacity for abstract thought that has made us the most successful species on earth. It occurred to me when reading this that that same capacity can also be harnessed for evil, and that once an evil project has been embarked upon by ruthless leaders, it gathers a momentum of its own that sucks in and co-opts individuals who in another time and place would be perfectly respectable.
Yet again, a thought-provoking work on one of the great issues of our time - indeed all about our time. The only thing I disagreed with were his in-passing references to the war in Bosnia, such as: "In extreme cases (Bosnia is an example) cultural groups define themselves in violent opposition to others". This view of different, inherently hostile ethnic/cultural "groups" was imposed on the people of Bosnia (and more widely, Yugoslavia) by an amoral gang of criminal adventurers who hijacked the national discourse - and successfully sold it to the international community. "Cultural groups" are made up of individuals, and most of them do not buy into such definitions, even in wartime. This is not the first time I have been taken aback by some of the comments of otherwise respectable historians: their broad view of history seems to affect their ability to see past political labels to ordinary human beings. But I didn't expect this author to lose sight of the trees for the wood.
Indeed, order is inherent to human relationships. And beyond order, human beings when cooperating to face a common challenge have an almost miraculous capacity to produce solutions - solutions that not only deal with the problem in question but also set the scene for satisfactory social order moving forward. The ability to spontaneously cooperate to solve problems is not uniquely human, but exists in many forms in nature; and there is always a tension between rules imposed from above, and those that are spontaneously generated on the ground. But only humans have the capacity for abstract thought that has made us the most successful species on earth. It occurred to me when reading this that that same capacity can also be harnessed for evil, and that once an evil project has been embarked upon by ruthless leaders, it gathers a momentum of its own that sucks in and co-opts individuals who in another time and place would be perfectly respectable.
Yet again, a thought-provoking work on one of the great issues of our time - indeed all about our time. The only thing I disagreed with were his in-passing references to the war in Bosnia, such as: "In extreme cases (Bosnia is an example) cultural groups define themselves in violent opposition to others". This view of different, inherently hostile ethnic/cultural "groups" was imposed on the people of Bosnia (and more widely, Yugoslavia) by an amoral gang of criminal adventurers who hijacked the national discourse - and successfully sold it to the international community. "Cultural groups" are made up of individuals, and most of them do not buy into such definitions, even in wartime. This is not the first time I have been taken aback by some of the comments of otherwise respectable historians: their broad view of history seems to affect their ability to see past political labels to ordinary human beings. But I didn't expect this author to lose sight of the trees for the wood.
March 27, 2009
Not as interesting as The End of History but it is good to read a book by a conservative who is not a nut. He brings together a serious amount of research in sociology, biology, economics, and philosophy. Really a unique book, if you can tolerate the neocon conclusions.
May 2, 2020
In The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama provided a brilliant and optimistic interpretation of the collapse of Communism, and the historical forces (both economic and psychological) that have shaped today's world. In The Great Disruption, his thesis is that today's social turmoil results from the shift from an industrial to a postindustrial economy. Surprisingly, the dynamics that were at the heart of the first book do not appear here or are muted and in the background. He takes a fresh look at today's social puzzle, and sets out to solve the mystery from scratch.
The first part of Disruption relies heavily on evidence from surveys -- using a ponderous academic style to prove points that could be presented as common sense. It reads like an account of the debates of professional sociologists, weighing the merits of various dubious statistics.
The second part is simply brilliant, based on observations from nature, philosophy, psychology, movies, popular culture, technology, economics, and business. Instead of a debate narrowly focused on a single topic, with evidence presented leading to a single conclusion, we have a series of inspired insights into modern life and business, including what it takes to be successful in the new Internet-based business environment.
Highlights:
Broad implications of anarchic, self-regulating Internet style: "Max Weber argued that rational, hierarchical authority in the form of bureaucracy was the essence of modernity. What we find in the second half of the twentieth century, instead, is that bureaucratic hierarchy has gone into decline in both politics and the economy, to be replaced by more informal, self-organized forms of coordination." (p. 194)
Online communities: "... if people know that they have to continue to live with one another in bounded communities where continued cooperation will be rewarded, they develop an interest in their own reputations, as well as in the monitoring and punishment of those who violate community rules." (p. 193) [cf. the success of the feedback system at eBay]
Fukuyama repeatedly emphasizes the importance of "social capital": "Social capital can be defined simply as a set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them. If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Trust is like a lubricant that makes the running of any group or organization more efficient." (p. 16) And he defines "network" in terms of "social capital: " If we understand a network not as a type of formal organization, but as social capital, we will have much better insight into what a network's economic function really is. By this view, a network is a moral relationship of trust: A network is a group of individual agents who share informal norms or values beyond those necessary for ordinary market transactions." (p. 199) In other words, in a network people "are much more willing to engage in reciprocal exchange in addition to market exchange -- for example, conferring benefits without expecting immediate benefits in return. Although they may expect long-term individual returns, the exchange relationship is not simultaneous and is not dependent on a careful cost-benefit calculation as it is in a market transaction." (p. 201)
In other words, Fukuyama provides an interpretation of modern society in which the most bizarre aspects of the Internet environment (e.g., massive social and economic structures thriving with no central control; and companies competing to give away software and content, rather than charge for it) become instances of broad principles of human behavior. And the Internet style of business becomes an economic necessity -- the only way a company can survive.
In a hierarchical organization, "although it is in the organization's overall interest to promote the free flow of information, it is often not in the individual interests of the various people within the hierarchy to allow it to do so." (pp. 203-205). Networks are more flexible and better able to adapt to changing circumstances because "they provide alternative conduits for the flow of information through and into an organization. Friends do not typically stand on their intellectual property rights when sharing information with each other and therefore do not incur transaction costs. Friendships thus facilitate the free flow of information within the organization... A corporate culture ideally provides an individual worker with a group as well as an individual identity, encouraging effort toward group ends that again facilitate information flow within the organization." (pp. 204-205)
He sees the power of informal networks not just within large corporations, but also when the notion of long-term employment at the same company breaks down -- due to intense competition for highly skilled workers and also due to frequent layoffs and business failures. He cites Regional Advantage by Annalee Saxenian, with reference to Silicon Valley, "...beneath the surface of apparently unbridled individualistic competition were a wide array of social networks linking individuals in different companies in the semiconductor and computer businesses. These social networks had a variety of sources, including common educational background... and common employment histories..." (p. 208) Saxenian had contrasted the Silicon Valley culture with that of Boston's Route 128 area: "...the proprietary attitudes of a Route 128 firm like Digital Equipment proved to be a liability." (p. 209)
Fukuyama sees the ties of electronic networks as "weak" compared to those in the Silicon Valley: "...the whole of Silicon Valley can be seen as a single large network organization that can tap expertise and specialized skills unavailable to even the largest vertically integrated Japanese electronics firms and their keiretsu partners." (p. 210) He asks, "If information can now be readily shared over electronic networks, why is there not further geographical dispersal of industries? It would appear that the impersonal sharing of data over electronic networks is not enough to create the kind of mutual trust and respect evident in places like Silicon Valley; for that, face-to-face contact and the reciprocal engagement that comes about as a result of repeated social interaction is necessary." (p. 210) He concludes, "... it is hard to turn ideas into wealth in the absence of social connectedness, which in the age of the Internet still requires something more than bandwidth and high-speed connectivity." (p. 211)
In this passage (unlike the one about online communities quoted earlier), I believe that Fukuyama underestimates the socially cohesive power of interaction over the Internet. An electronic network and the software that runs on it are simply mechanisms that can be used in many ways -- some of which result in weak social ties and others of which lead to close personal relationships, strong feelings of loyalty, and vibrant businesses. The difference comes from the human, personal investment that a company puts into its online community efforts, as well as the overall structure they put into place to encourage the positive interaction of their visitors with one another.
Also, while this book was recently published, Fukuyama's comments about Digital and the Silicon Valley already sound dated. His principles are right on target and cogently explained, but the world has changed a bit since this book was written.
Digital at its peak (around 1987) had over 130,000 employees. It was swallowed by Compaq in 1998 and since that time the great majority of Digital people have either been laid off or left in disgust. In total there are today probably about a quarter million Digital alumni worldwide, all of whom shared a environment of common trust reinforced by free communication for all over the corporate computer network (long before the popularity of the Web). Now dispersed to numerous other companies, these people share a common culture and trust, common experiences, computer and Internet expertise, and shared values and experiences. In other words, the dissolution first of Digital and now of Compaq sets the preconditions for a unique human network of alums, (see the DEC Alumni Website at www.decalumni.org). Also the empty Digital/Compaq buildings, especially concentrated in Eastern Mass. and southern NH, means attractive business real estate is available at low cost. So the demise of Digital/Compaq sets the preconditions for the rise of Mass./NH as a high tech incubator, which today is far more attractive than the Silicon Valley. In fact, the Maynard Mill, a vast sprawling compex of buildings which served as a woolen mill in Civil War days, and later became the headquarters and symbol of Digital, has now become a mecca for high tech startup companies, especially Internet companies.
In the distant past, invading barbarian hordes blasted villagers out of the valleys where they would have stayed for countless generations, and dispersed the population, spreading social capital, and leading to the spread of civilization. And today we see massive layoffs and the failure of major corporations leading to a similar dispersal, creating new kinds of social relationships, making the silicon-valley style of human networking far more common in other parts of the world -- laying the foundation for future business success.
The first part of Disruption relies heavily on evidence from surveys -- using a ponderous academic style to prove points that could be presented as common sense. It reads like an account of the debates of professional sociologists, weighing the merits of various dubious statistics.
The second part is simply brilliant, based on observations from nature, philosophy, psychology, movies, popular culture, technology, economics, and business. Instead of a debate narrowly focused on a single topic, with evidence presented leading to a single conclusion, we have a series of inspired insights into modern life and business, including what it takes to be successful in the new Internet-based business environment.
Highlights:
Broad implications of anarchic, self-regulating Internet style: "Max Weber argued that rational, hierarchical authority in the form of bureaucracy was the essence of modernity. What we find in the second half of the twentieth century, instead, is that bureaucratic hierarchy has gone into decline in both politics and the economy, to be replaced by more informal, self-organized forms of coordination." (p. 194)
Online communities: "... if people know that they have to continue to live with one another in bounded communities where continued cooperation will be rewarded, they develop an interest in their own reputations, as well as in the monitoring and punishment of those who violate community rules." (p. 193) [cf. the success of the feedback system at eBay]
Fukuyama repeatedly emphasizes the importance of "social capital": "Social capital can be defined simply as a set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them. If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Trust is like a lubricant that makes the running of any group or organization more efficient." (p. 16) And he defines "network" in terms of "social capital: " If we understand a network not as a type of formal organization, but as social capital, we will have much better insight into what a network's economic function really is. By this view, a network is a moral relationship of trust: A network is a group of individual agents who share informal norms or values beyond those necessary for ordinary market transactions." (p. 199) In other words, in a network people "are much more willing to engage in reciprocal exchange in addition to market exchange -- for example, conferring benefits without expecting immediate benefits in return. Although they may expect long-term individual returns, the exchange relationship is not simultaneous and is not dependent on a careful cost-benefit calculation as it is in a market transaction." (p. 201)
In other words, Fukuyama provides an interpretation of modern society in which the most bizarre aspects of the Internet environment (e.g., massive social and economic structures thriving with no central control; and companies competing to give away software and content, rather than charge for it) become instances of broad principles of human behavior. And the Internet style of business becomes an economic necessity -- the only way a company can survive.
In a hierarchical organization, "although it is in the organization's overall interest to promote the free flow of information, it is often not in the individual interests of the various people within the hierarchy to allow it to do so." (pp. 203-205). Networks are more flexible and better able to adapt to changing circumstances because "they provide alternative conduits for the flow of information through and into an organization. Friends do not typically stand on their intellectual property rights when sharing information with each other and therefore do not incur transaction costs. Friendships thus facilitate the free flow of information within the organization... A corporate culture ideally provides an individual worker with a group as well as an individual identity, encouraging effort toward group ends that again facilitate information flow within the organization." (pp. 204-205)
He sees the power of informal networks not just within large corporations, but also when the notion of long-term employment at the same company breaks down -- due to intense competition for highly skilled workers and also due to frequent layoffs and business failures. He cites Regional Advantage by Annalee Saxenian, with reference to Silicon Valley, "...beneath the surface of apparently unbridled individualistic competition were a wide array of social networks linking individuals in different companies in the semiconductor and computer businesses. These social networks had a variety of sources, including common educational background... and common employment histories..." (p. 208) Saxenian had contrasted the Silicon Valley culture with that of Boston's Route 128 area: "...the proprietary attitudes of a Route 128 firm like Digital Equipment proved to be a liability." (p. 209)
Fukuyama sees the ties of electronic networks as "weak" compared to those in the Silicon Valley: "...the whole of Silicon Valley can be seen as a single large network organization that can tap expertise and specialized skills unavailable to even the largest vertically integrated Japanese electronics firms and their keiretsu partners." (p. 210) He asks, "If information can now be readily shared over electronic networks, why is there not further geographical dispersal of industries? It would appear that the impersonal sharing of data over electronic networks is not enough to create the kind of mutual trust and respect evident in places like Silicon Valley; for that, face-to-face contact and the reciprocal engagement that comes about as a result of repeated social interaction is necessary." (p. 210) He concludes, "... it is hard to turn ideas into wealth in the absence of social connectedness, which in the age of the Internet still requires something more than bandwidth and high-speed connectivity." (p. 211)
In this passage (unlike the one about online communities quoted earlier), I believe that Fukuyama underestimates the socially cohesive power of interaction over the Internet. An electronic network and the software that runs on it are simply mechanisms that can be used in many ways -- some of which result in weak social ties and others of which lead to close personal relationships, strong feelings of loyalty, and vibrant businesses. The difference comes from the human, personal investment that a company puts into its online community efforts, as well as the overall structure they put into place to encourage the positive interaction of their visitors with one another.
Also, while this book was recently published, Fukuyama's comments about Digital and the Silicon Valley already sound dated. His principles are right on target and cogently explained, but the world has changed a bit since this book was written.
Digital at its peak (around 1987) had over 130,000 employees. It was swallowed by Compaq in 1998 and since that time the great majority of Digital people have either been laid off or left in disgust. In total there are today probably about a quarter million Digital alumni worldwide, all of whom shared a environment of common trust reinforced by free communication for all over the corporate computer network (long before the popularity of the Web). Now dispersed to numerous other companies, these people share a common culture and trust, common experiences, computer and Internet expertise, and shared values and experiences. In other words, the dissolution first of Digital and now of Compaq sets the preconditions for a unique human network of alums, (see the DEC Alumni Website at www.decalumni.org). Also the empty Digital/Compaq buildings, especially concentrated in Eastern Mass. and southern NH, means attractive business real estate is available at low cost. So the demise of Digital/Compaq sets the preconditions for the rise of Mass./NH as a high tech incubator, which today is far more attractive than the Silicon Valley. In fact, the Maynard Mill, a vast sprawling compex of buildings which served as a woolen mill in Civil War days, and later became the headquarters and symbol of Digital, has now become a mecca for high tech startup companies, especially Internet companies.
In the distant past, invading barbarian hordes blasted villagers out of the valleys where they would have stayed for countless generations, and dispersed the population, spreading social capital, and leading to the spread of civilization. And today we see massive layoffs and the failure of major corporations leading to a similar dispersal, creating new kinds of social relationships, making the silicon-valley style of human networking far more common in other parts of the world -- laying the foundation for future business success.
May 23, 2009
The reason I gave it 3 stars instead of 4 because there were parts I really liked and then parts I skimmed over due to the sheer amount of facts/statistics included. This book took me about a year to read (reading on and off) because I literally had to stop and think and reread each sentence/paragraph in certain parts. All in all, I learned a lot about society and how it copes with change. "The Great Disruption" is what Fukuyama calls the rise in crime and general social disorder from the 60s to the 90s. He explains that social disruptions similar to this happen every time there is a major socioeconomic shift. Examples would be the shift from hunter/gatherer communities to agricultural, agricultural to industrial and industrial to information age. After the 90s there has been a drop in crime as Fukuyama explains we are recovering from the shift from industrial to information age. The basic idea is that we as humans are social in nature and will always find ways to adjust despite dramatic socioeconomic changes. All in all, I learned a lot from the book and thought it was definitely worth the read--even though it took so much time to get through.
January 27, 2013
Francis Fukuyama is great, and so is this book, but it's rendered a little obsolete by The Origins of Political Order, which he published in 2011.
February 8, 2020
https://charlierose.com/videos/28954
内容简介 · · · · · ·
二十世纪中叶以降，西方主要发达国家相继迈入了所谓的后工业时代，在这一时期，以信息技术为核心的技术进步给经济和社会的传统运行模式和组织方式带来了重大的改变，旧有的社会规范和文化价值也遭到严重的冲击，在西方发达资本主义社会普遍表现为犯罪率、离婚率、未婚生育率的大幅下降和社会信任度的明显降低，福山将此种种与“社会资本”有关的指标的恶化现象总结为“大断裂”。究竟何种原因导致了发达社会大断裂的出现？这是否是资本主义社会转型不可避免的宿命？它们又是如何走出大断裂的？本书对上述问题进行了探索。
在福山看来，资本主义社会中，个人主义的不断膨胀尽管造成了传统权威和社会规范不同程度的消解，但基于个体理性和竞争关系自发产生的互惠利他合作仍然是形成各种形式社会联结和社会资本的基石。在新技术条件下，社会组织结构的扁平化促成了社会网络的兴起，使得社会资本对于构建社会秩序的重要性更大，但等级制依然保有不可替代的作用。福山相信，即使面临技术、经济和社会的重大转型，社会秩序始终都会在既有等级制又有自发性的源泉中产生。大断裂不可避免，但社会规范的重建也始终可期。他列举了20世纪90年代以后，发达资本主义社会的大断裂乱象逐渐消退、社会资本重新积累的若干证据，对此结论进行了说明。
The Great Disruption really is in a way a kind of breakdown of social rules and norms in the name of a much greater personal freedom and individualism, that I think got carried too far. And, in the book, I measure it by crime rates, by rates of broken families, by survey data that show that people, you know, ceased trusting each other --
the divorce rate started to go down in the 1980s and has continued-- the number, for example of births to single mothers had been climbing steadily up 'til the 19-- early 1990s. That's down. Teenage pregnancy is down. Drug use. Welfare reform has produced, you know, startling results in people moving off the welfare rolls. So, you know, in all of these indicators, you know, in a way, the worst period was-- we reached in about 1990, '91, '92. And in the 1990s all of those things have really picked up quite considerably.
moving into an information-age society in a way disrupted the family because one thing it did was propel millions of women into the workplace that then upset the kind of traditional arrangements in households. It was a necessary and an important change, but one that had a lot of social consequences.
human beings are creatures that, by nature like to live by rules. They are intensely uncomfortable if they live in a society where everybody's atomized and, you know, social order has broken down. So that in a sense the default condition of human beings is to live in an orderly society, and the reason that you don't is that technology, you know, economic change, a lot of things from the outside come to disturb those arrangements. And we just have to take time to get caught up. And so-- and I think in a sense what we're doing is getting caught up with the-- you know, the information age. We no longer live in a industrial era where, you know, all the men are out working and the women are at home, where you have these large, you know, top-down, you know, very structured factories and that sort of thing. We live in a very different kind of society. And that society needs different rules, and it's simply taken us a couple of generations, you know, to try to re-establish those rules.
I think that it explains a lot of what happened in family life after The Great Disruption because, you know, in a way the relationship of the mother and children is guaranteed by biology. The role of fathers is much less, you know, secured by biology. In a way, you have to constrain men by a lot of social norms and laws and so forth. And, in the 1950s, that was all in place. And it was a kind of bargain that, you know, where the women took care of the children and men went out and got the resources. And I think what happened in the 1960s was you had the birth-control pill and much greater work opportunities for women. And it undid the bargain. And, when you release men and women from these social constraints, they behave differently. When the sexual revolution hit, in a way it served the interest of men much more than of women because they were the ones that, you know, I think, had to be socially constrained. And I think the result was, you know, a great deal of male irresponsibility that, you know, led to this explosion of single-parent families and, you know, disrupted families. So, that's where I think the-- you know, the human biology's been the same for the last 100,000 years. But I think that the way that, you know, that the different sexes react to, you know, different social environments leads to different outcomes.
the more important thing, and that's the point that I make, I think, in the second half of The Great Disruption is that you should expect societies to get better just over time because it's a natural state for human beings that people don't like social anarchy. And, given, you know, the resources and given a government that, you know, makes them feel safe in their neighborhoods and communities, they will actually create, you know, new sets of rules to meet the new conditions. And I just think that we've had a lot of catching up to do 'cause there was an awful lot of social change that occurred in the '60s and '70s. And, you know, one of the things that's finally happened by the '90s is that we have, you know, in a way, re-regulated ourselves.
https://www.c-span.org/video/?156677-...
内容简介 · · · · · ·
二十世纪中叶以降，西方主要发达国家相继迈入了所谓的后工业时代，在这一时期，以信息技术为核心的技术进步给经济和社会的传统运行模式和组织方式带来了重大的改变，旧有的社会规范和文化价值也遭到严重的冲击，在西方发达资本主义社会普遍表现为犯罪率、离婚率、未婚生育率的大幅下降和社会信任度的明显降低，福山将此种种与“社会资本”有关的指标的恶化现象总结为“大断裂”。究竟何种原因导致了发达社会大断裂的出现？这是否是资本主义社会转型不可避免的宿命？它们又是如何走出大断裂的？本书对上述问题进行了探索。
在福山看来，资本主义社会中，个人主义的不断膨胀尽管造成了传统权威和社会规范不同程度的消解，但基于个体理性和竞争关系自发产生的互惠利他合作仍然是形成各种形式社会联结和社会资本的基石。在新技术条件下，社会组织结构的扁平化促成了社会网络的兴起，使得社会资本对于构建社会秩序的重要性更大，但等级制依然保有不可替代的作用。福山相信，即使面临技术、经济和社会的重大转型，社会秩序始终都会在既有等级制又有自发性的源泉中产生。大断裂不可避免，但社会规范的重建也始终可期。他列举了20世纪90年代以后，发达资本主义社会的大断裂乱象逐渐消退、社会资本重新积累的若干证据，对此结论进行了说明。
The Great Disruption really is in a way a kind of breakdown of social rules and norms in the name of a much greater personal freedom and individualism, that I think got carried too far. And, in the book, I measure it by crime rates, by rates of broken families, by survey data that show that people, you know, ceased trusting each other --
the divorce rate started to go down in the 1980s and has continued-- the number, for example of births to single mothers had been climbing steadily up 'til the 19-- early 1990s. That's down. Teenage pregnancy is down. Drug use. Welfare reform has produced, you know, startling results in people moving off the welfare rolls. So, you know, in all of these indicators, you know, in a way, the worst period was-- we reached in about 1990, '91, '92. And in the 1990s all of those things have really picked up quite considerably.
moving into an information-age society in a way disrupted the family because one thing it did was propel millions of women into the workplace that then upset the kind of traditional arrangements in households. It was a necessary and an important change, but one that had a lot of social consequences.
human beings are creatures that, by nature like to live by rules. They are intensely uncomfortable if they live in a society where everybody's atomized and, you know, social order has broken down. So that in a sense the default condition of human beings is to live in an orderly society, and the reason that you don't is that technology, you know, economic change, a lot of things from the outside come to disturb those arrangements. And we just have to take time to get caught up. And so-- and I think in a sense what we're doing is getting caught up with the-- you know, the information age. We no longer live in a industrial era where, you know, all the men are out working and the women are at home, where you have these large, you know, top-down, you know, very structured factories and that sort of thing. We live in a very different kind of society. And that society needs different rules, and it's simply taken us a couple of generations, you know, to try to re-establish those rules.
I think that it explains a lot of what happened in family life after The Great Disruption because, you know, in a way the relationship of the mother and children is guaranteed by biology. The role of fathers is much less, you know, secured by biology. In a way, you have to constrain men by a lot of social norms and laws and so forth. And, in the 1950s, that was all in place. And it was a kind of bargain that, you know, where the women took care of the children and men went out and got the resources. And I think what happened in the 1960s was you had the birth-control pill and much greater work opportunities for women. And it undid the bargain. And, when you release men and women from these social constraints, they behave differently. When the sexual revolution hit, in a way it served the interest of men much more than of women because they were the ones that, you know, I think, had to be socially constrained. And I think the result was, you know, a great deal of male irresponsibility that, you know, led to this explosion of single-parent families and, you know, disrupted families. So, that's where I think the-- you know, the human biology's been the same for the last 100,000 years. But I think that the way that, you know, that the different sexes react to, you know, different social environments leads to different outcomes.
the more important thing, and that's the point that I make, I think, in the second half of The Great Disruption is that you should expect societies to get better just over time because it's a natural state for human beings that people don't like social anarchy. And, given, you know, the resources and given a government that, you know, makes them feel safe in their neighborhoods and communities, they will actually create, you know, new sets of rules to meet the new conditions. And I just think that we've had a lot of catching up to do 'cause there was an awful lot of social change that occurred in the '60s and '70s. And, you know, one of the things that's finally happened by the '90s is that we have, you know, in a way, re-regulated ourselves.
https://www.c-span.org/video/?156677-...
January 25, 2025
Frank argued in The End of History and the Last Man that modern natural science drives economic development, and economic development drives political development—ultimately toward liberal democracy. For technological and anthropological reasons, this form of political order is the only viable path open to modern societies. Thus, “[i]n the political and economic sphere, history appears to be progressive and directional” (despite lags, setbacks, and wrong turns) (Great Disruption 282). In this book, though, he claims that there is another process at work, one which is cyclical rather than linear: social and moral order ebb and flow, often over the space of multiple generations. As economic and technological forces upend one form of life—with its norms, customs, and traditions—social and moral order disintegrate. And humans, being social creatures, are prone to adapt, reconstituting order by developing new norms, modes of organization, and legal strictures. Even now as forms of life that belong to the Industrial Age are collapsing in on themselves, new forms are arising, ones that are more suitable to the Information Age.
There are three parts to the book: an explanation of the “Great Disruption”; a genealogy of morals with reference to biology, sociology, economics, and anthropology; and a prediction of what comes next (the “Great Reconstruction”). The first deals with a period from roughly 1965 to the late 1990s in advanced industrialized countries where social order broke down: crime increased, trust declined, families broke apart, and individualism triumphed. Fukuyama reviews influential explanations of these phenomena and proceeds to offer his own: In the transition from the industrial age to the information age, technological and economic forces disrupted established forms of life; change proceeded at different rates in different countries due to cultural factors. The second part of the book examines where norms come from—answer: human nature and the need for social cooperation—and serves as a bridge between the present Great Disruption and the hoped-for Great Reconstitution. Fukuyama develops a fascinating matrix for the sources of order, with one axis capturing how norms are generated (hierarchical to spontaneous) and the other capturing why they are generated (rational to arational). (The latter refers to whether the norm was consciously debated and chosen from among alternatives or whether it was socially inherited and not up for debate to begin with.) While societies have shifted more of their norms to rational ones within modernity—whether hierarchically-generated ones such as formal law or spontaneously-generated ones such as market practices—Fukuyama thinks that social orders will continue to draw upon arational norms from both hierarchical sources (e.g., revealed religion) and spontaneous sources (e.g., incest taboos, historical traditions, biologically grounded norms).
In the third part, Fukuyama hazards some guesses on what comes next. In the case of the U.S., he thinks that it is norms that arise spontaneously rather than hierarchically that will need to be reconstituted: “habits of honesty, reciprocity, and an enlarged radius of trust under changed technological circumstances” (244). He makes specific predictions in the last chapter: e.g., how increased rates of female labor participation will continue to influence corporate cultures, how “downward mobility is likely to become a routine male experience,” and how technology “may help brake the decline in kinship and family life” in new forms of remote work (276-277). He sees any kind of large-scale return to religious orthodoxy as highly unlikely, even though religious participation may increase—“not necessarily because [people] accept the truth of revelation…but precisely because the absence of community and the transience of social ties in the secular world make them hungry for ritual and cultural tradition” (278-279).
Such reconstitution is very likely but not guaranteed. Fukuyama writes,
In the final sentence of the book, he concludes, “On the success of this process of reconstitution depends the upward direction of the arrow of History” (282). The result is a deflated, Hegelian-ish view that allows one to maintain some belief in historical progress, human nature, and moral norms.
There are three parts to the book: an explanation of the “Great Disruption”; a genealogy of morals with reference to biology, sociology, economics, and anthropology; and a prediction of what comes next (the “Great Reconstruction”). The first deals with a period from roughly 1965 to the late 1990s in advanced industrialized countries where social order broke down: crime increased, trust declined, families broke apart, and individualism triumphed. Fukuyama reviews influential explanations of these phenomena and proceeds to offer his own: In the transition from the industrial age to the information age, technological and economic forces disrupted established forms of life; change proceeded at different rates in different countries due to cultural factors. The second part of the book examines where norms come from—answer: human nature and the need for social cooperation—and serves as a bridge between the present Great Disruption and the hoped-for Great Reconstitution. Fukuyama develops a fascinating matrix for the sources of order, with one axis capturing how norms are generated (hierarchical to spontaneous) and the other capturing why they are generated (rational to arational). (The latter refers to whether the norm was consciously debated and chosen from among alternatives or whether it was socially inherited and not up for debate to begin with.) While societies have shifted more of their norms to rational ones within modernity—whether hierarchically-generated ones such as formal law or spontaneously-generated ones such as market practices—Fukuyama thinks that social orders will continue to draw upon arational norms from both hierarchical sources (e.g., revealed religion) and spontaneous sources (e.g., incest taboos, historical traditions, biologically grounded norms).
In the third part, Fukuyama hazards some guesses on what comes next. In the case of the U.S., he thinks that it is norms that arise spontaneously rather than hierarchically that will need to be reconstituted: “habits of honesty, reciprocity, and an enlarged radius of trust under changed technological circumstances” (244). He makes specific predictions in the last chapter: e.g., how increased rates of female labor participation will continue to influence corporate cultures, how “downward mobility is likely to become a routine male experience,” and how technology “may help brake the decline in kinship and family life” in new forms of remote work (276-277). He sees any kind of large-scale return to religious orthodoxy as highly unlikely, even though religious participation may increase—“not necessarily because [people] accept the truth of revelation…but precisely because the absence of community and the transience of social ties in the secular world make them hungry for ritual and cultural tradition” (278-279).
Such reconstitution is very likely but not guaranteed. Fukuyama writes,
The Great Disruption will not correct itself automatically. People have to recognize that their communal lives have deteriorated, that they are engaging in self-destructive behaviors, and that they have to work actively to renorm their society through discussion, argument, cultural argument, and even culture wars. (250)
In the final sentence of the book, he concludes, “On the success of this process of reconstitution depends the upward direction of the arrow of History” (282). The result is a deflated, Hegelian-ish view that allows one to maintain some belief in historical progress, human nature, and moral norms.
May 4, 2022
This book is Fukuyama's most important work and one of the most important book of the 21st century adding to the canon of big picture theories about why humanity faces a climate / social / economic and consciousness crisis.
It explains with erudition and evidence from a sociologist's perspective why modern (read not postmodern but modern) societies disintegrate. Fukuyama spins his narrative around the term "social capital" which is another word for trust which is created not only between individuals but between members of groups of different size - from tribes to empires. Social capital is equal to "collective" trust; it is the glue which motivates people to cooperate and thus civilizations to flourish.
Fukuyama draws on a wide range of scientific disciplines to make his argument: if social capital is excessively extracted from a human organization, the organization collapses. He argues strongly that there will always be avenues to replenish social capital, but seems to have lost his faith in the US which he described in 2014 as "in political decay".
What I miss in his writing is a final and clear conclusion: that excessive capitalism does effectively destroy social capital. It seems to be so obvious that social capital is gradually lost, if a system serves only the capitalist elite instead of those who naively continue to sacrifice their lives for the system to operate smoothly. Social capital can not be maintained if it is not tied to economic capital, i.e. access to resources, participation in the consumer market, and last but not least a piece of land (compare Georgism on this subject).
Ken Wilber explained in his own words why the depletion of social capital was the root cause for Donald Trump moving into the White House: a backlash against the failure of the leading edge of consciousness (postmodernism and pluralism) to acknowledge the lie underlying the progress they’ve pursued: it’s not equal, it’s not consistent, and it doesn’t make room for everyone. American power elites have subscribed to and uphold a continuous lie: that the economic system embedded in a fake democracy does produce wellbeing for all concerned. A lie corrodes trust. Reduced trust destroys social capital.
Making this direct connection between social and economic capital was back in 2000 probably not possible for a scholar of Fukuyama's standing. But at least since Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the 21st Century" we have scientific evidence that our societies operate around a paradigm of long term exploitation of people and planet. Piketty put this exploitation into a simple formula which explains in yet another language why social capital is depleted and why Western societies have moved into a long term decline: r > g
The central thesis of Piketty's 2013 book is that inequality is not an accident, but rather a feature of capitalism, and can only be reversed through state interventionism. The book thus argues that, unless capitalism is reformed, the very democratic order will be threatened. Piketty’s historical research shows that modern inequality is reaching again pre-WWI levels. Capital’s natural accumulation with the elites, which follows the simple formular (r)evenue on capital > economic (g)rowth, was only diverted by the two world wars, the great depression and the post WWII socialist redistribution from 1930 to 1975.
Piketty predicts a world of low economic growth and extreme inequality for the years to come and dismisses the idea that bursts of productivity resulting from technological advances can be relied on to return sustained economic growth; we should not expect "a more just and rational order" to arise based on "caprices of technology," and return on investment can increase when technology can be substituted for people.
Fukuyama describes all the social aspects of growing inequality, from homicide to divorce, and thus gives Piketty's economic analysis a (tragic) human touch. One which the people in power should read, because its their responsibility that Victor Hugo's Les Miserables is not a historical play but a modern reality around the globe.
Further reading:
http://www.mingong.org/blog/book-revi...
http://www.mingong.org/blog/film-revi...
It explains with erudition and evidence from a sociologist's perspective why modern (read not postmodern but modern) societies disintegrate. Fukuyama spins his narrative around the term "social capital" which is another word for trust which is created not only between individuals but between members of groups of different size - from tribes to empires. Social capital is equal to "collective" trust; it is the glue which motivates people to cooperate and thus civilizations to flourish.
Fukuyama draws on a wide range of scientific disciplines to make his argument: if social capital is excessively extracted from a human organization, the organization collapses. He argues strongly that there will always be avenues to replenish social capital, but seems to have lost his faith in the US which he described in 2014 as "in political decay".
What I miss in his writing is a final and clear conclusion: that excessive capitalism does effectively destroy social capital. It seems to be so obvious that social capital is gradually lost, if a system serves only the capitalist elite instead of those who naively continue to sacrifice their lives for the system to operate smoothly. Social capital can not be maintained if it is not tied to economic capital, i.e. access to resources, participation in the consumer market, and last but not least a piece of land (compare Georgism on this subject).
Ken Wilber explained in his own words why the depletion of social capital was the root cause for Donald Trump moving into the White House: a backlash against the failure of the leading edge of consciousness (postmodernism and pluralism) to acknowledge the lie underlying the progress they’ve pursued: it’s not equal, it’s not consistent, and it doesn’t make room for everyone. American power elites have subscribed to and uphold a continuous lie: that the economic system embedded in a fake democracy does produce wellbeing for all concerned. A lie corrodes trust. Reduced trust destroys social capital.
Making this direct connection between social and economic capital was back in 2000 probably not possible for a scholar of Fukuyama's standing. But at least since Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the 21st Century" we have scientific evidence that our societies operate around a paradigm of long term exploitation of people and planet. Piketty put this exploitation into a simple formula which explains in yet another language why social capital is depleted and why Western societies have moved into a long term decline: r > g
The central thesis of Piketty's 2013 book is that inequality is not an accident, but rather a feature of capitalism, and can only be reversed through state interventionism. The book thus argues that, unless capitalism is reformed, the very democratic order will be threatened. Piketty’s historical research shows that modern inequality is reaching again pre-WWI levels. Capital’s natural accumulation with the elites, which follows the simple formular (r)evenue on capital > economic (g)rowth, was only diverted by the two world wars, the great depression and the post WWII socialist redistribution from 1930 to 1975.
Piketty predicts a world of low economic growth and extreme inequality for the years to come and dismisses the idea that bursts of productivity resulting from technological advances can be relied on to return sustained economic growth; we should not expect "a more just and rational order" to arise based on "caprices of technology," and return on investment can increase when technology can be substituted for people.
Fukuyama describes all the social aspects of growing inequality, from homicide to divorce, and thus gives Piketty's economic analysis a (tragic) human touch. One which the people in power should read, because its their responsibility that Victor Hugo's Les Miserables is not a historical play but a modern reality around the globe.
Further reading:
http://www.mingong.org/blog/book-revi...
http://www.mingong.org/blog/film-revi...
September 13, 2019
Another insightful book by Fukuyama, but unfortunately not as groundbreaking as End of History and the Political History books recently. This book traces the decline in social capital caused by technological and societal shifts post WW2. As evidence he cites increasing crime, increasing divorce, increased out of wedlock births, decreasing trust. This basically follows Putnam's Bowling Alone and the book is dated at this point as some of the statistics turned around. What this adds to Putnam is an interesting analysis of where social capital comes from and what we might experience if and when it starts coming back.
His thesis is that humans are naturally social creatures that create social capital and norms in a variety of ways. On one axis norms/order/social capital can be rational or irrational. On another axis, they can be heirarchically generated or spontaneously generated. In the [heirarchically generated, rational] quadrant, you have political sources such as formal law, constitutionalism, social engineering and these are studies as political science. In the [spontaneously generated, rational] quadrant you have self organized solutions such as the market or common law and its typically studies by economists. In the [heirarchically generated, arational] quadrant you have religious order from revealed religion and it is studied by sociologists. Finally, in the [spontaneously generated, arational] quadrant you have natural sources such as historical tradition, folk religion, biologically grounded norms (incest taboo) and these are typically studied by anthropopogists/biologists.
He made an interesting observation that the difference between liberals and conservatives tends to come down to which heirarchically generated solution to prescribe - the religious one or the social engineering/government one. He also does a good job showing that although spontaneous order can be great, it doesn't work in many if not most instances so there is no way to have the libertarian utopia - you need the heirarchical solutions.
I loved this paragraph so I'll repeat it word for word:
"Human communities have been based on any number of principles that produce a restricted radius of trust, including family, kinship, dynastic principle, sect, religion, race, ethnicity, and national identity. What the Enlightenment recognized was that all of these traditional sources of community were ultimately irrational. In terms if domestic politics, they implied social conflict, since virtually no society was ever homogeneous with regard to any of these characteristics. And in foreign policy, they paved the way to war, Vince communities based on different principles were constantly bumping into each other on the world stage. Only a political order based on the universal recognition of human dignity - of the essential equality of all human beings based on their capacity for moral choice - could avoid these irrationalities and lead to a peaceful domestic and international order. Kant's republican form if government, the American Declaration of independence and Bill of Rights, Hegels universal and homogeneous state, The Universal Declaration of Rights, and the rights enumerated in the basic laws of virtually all contemporary liberal democracies today enshrine this principle of universal recognition."
His thesis is that humans are naturally social creatures that create social capital and norms in a variety of ways. On one axis norms/order/social capital can be rational or irrational. On another axis, they can be heirarchically generated or spontaneously generated. In the [heirarchically generated, rational] quadrant, you have political sources such as formal law, constitutionalism, social engineering and these are studies as political science. In the [spontaneously generated, rational] quadrant you have self organized solutions such as the market or common law and its typically studies by economists. In the [heirarchically generated, arational] quadrant you have religious order from revealed religion and it is studied by sociologists. Finally, in the [spontaneously generated, arational] quadrant you have natural sources such as historical tradition, folk religion, biologically grounded norms (incest taboo) and these are typically studied by anthropopogists/biologists.
He made an interesting observation that the difference between liberals and conservatives tends to come down to which heirarchically generated solution to prescribe - the religious one or the social engineering/government one. He also does a good job showing that although spontaneous order can be great, it doesn't work in many if not most instances so there is no way to have the libertarian utopia - you need the heirarchical solutions.
I loved this paragraph so I'll repeat it word for word:
"Human communities have been based on any number of principles that produce a restricted radius of trust, including family, kinship, dynastic principle, sect, religion, race, ethnicity, and national identity. What the Enlightenment recognized was that all of these traditional sources of community were ultimately irrational. In terms if domestic politics, they implied social conflict, since virtually no society was ever homogeneous with regard to any of these characteristics. And in foreign policy, they paved the way to war, Vince communities based on different principles were constantly bumping into each other on the world stage. Only a political order based on the universal recognition of human dignity - of the essential equality of all human beings based on their capacity for moral choice - could avoid these irrationalities and lead to a peaceful domestic and international order. Kant's republican form if government, the American Declaration of independence and Bill of Rights, Hegels universal and homogeneous state, The Universal Declaration of Rights, and the rights enumerated in the basic laws of virtually all contemporary liberal democracies today enshrine this principle of universal recognition."
September 23, 2018
The analysis on the current situation through human nature, and the singular effect of great people in the history are insightful. The first two parts of the books are worth read. This is a only book that I know for now that starts from evolutionary biology and psychology to study the possible community homo sapiens can be built. It almost nails the conclusion, if solely based on animalistic social instinct, how far a community can go, if we do not consider rationality, which makes religion, politics possible. The concept developed, i.e., radius of trust, social capitals, capture important ingredients that build community, though I tend to think it is too much capitalism, economy leaning, which can be seem by the word "capitals". It carries the weight of analysis in the framework of capitalism, which may limit the picture it may see.
However, I tend to think the author's understanding on the philosophy is not that deep. Ultimately, the different culture codes are induced by the different answers to the philosophical ultimate question. The disintegration of moral principles and social norms are the results of the confusion of the answers, which is a deep problem plagues the West ever since the Moralism dated from the Victoria period. Thus, perhaps the inadequete understanding of the problems leads to an insufficient development of the solution they author could provide, which is a short two section descriptions that do not really give any constructive solutions. The author's understanding of technology is also inadequete, and does not really tries to analyze the disruption process of technology, the motivating power that drives it, and how it can be utilized to create new social norms and moral principles. Instead, I feel like the author tends to take technology as a passive force that the humanities have to deal. Technology is a creation of people, and the illness of the social structure disrupted by technology is from the illness the society. Technology is the outputs, but not the cause.
However, I tend to think the author's understanding on the philosophy is not that deep. Ultimately, the different culture codes are induced by the different answers to the philosophical ultimate question. The disintegration of moral principles and social norms are the results of the confusion of the answers, which is a deep problem plagues the West ever since the Moralism dated from the Victoria period. Thus, perhaps the inadequete understanding of the problems leads to an insufficient development of the solution they author could provide, which is a short two section descriptions that do not really give any constructive solutions. The author's understanding of technology is also inadequete, and does not really tries to analyze the disruption process of technology, the motivating power that drives it, and how it can be utilized to create new social norms and moral principles. Instead, I feel like the author tends to take technology as a passive force that the humanities have to deal. Technology is a creation of people, and the illness of the social structure disrupted by technology is from the illness the society. Technology is the outputs, but not the cause.
May 7, 2025
This was the 7th title from Francis Fukuyama and his 3rd book by time that I had the chance to read. It is written in 1999 and discussing the great disruption, from industrial to the post industrial era, a process he states started around 1965. Here with strong statistical support discusses the rates of social disruptions such as crime, divorce and change in family dynamics, single parenthood, economy, politics. A major focus is on concept of social capital, its depletion and production. A helpful quadrant matrix to show sources of order and norms ( spontaneous to hierarchical, Rational to Arational). here he directs us to the constant changes and capacity of human beings to update itself based on good old genetics of kinship and reciprocal altruism.
He also uses an interesting example from so called “Slugs” in Virginia who use the HOV lines back in 90s ( funny enough I used the same commute when I had to go to Georgetown Uni. back then)
I read the book in 2025, while I wonder how Fukuyama would write it if he was going to give an update, with internet going beyond PC and in smartphones, AI. New world conflicts, return of fundamentalism to east and west, maga move, etc.
I like the chapters he is discussing the basics, philosophy and psychology associated with human connections and state forming. Role of religion not as a belief in revelation, rather a mediator to increase trust radius. Concepts that don’t seem to change in foreseeable future. I am moving to my 8th title now, Our Post Human future, a 2002 book.
He also uses an interesting example from so called “Slugs” in Virginia who use the HOV lines back in 90s ( funny enough I used the same commute when I had to go to Georgetown Uni. back then)
I read the book in 2025, while I wonder how Fukuyama would write it if he was going to give an update, with internet going beyond PC and in smartphones, AI. New world conflicts, return of fundamentalism to east and west, maga move, etc.
I like the chapters he is discussing the basics, philosophy and psychology associated with human connections and state forming. Role of religion not as a belief in revelation, rather a mediator to increase trust radius. Concepts that don’t seem to change in foreseeable future. I am moving to my 8th title now, Our Post Human future, a 2002 book.
December 15, 2023
One of the best old books that I found this year. As of 2023 the data is a bit old, but the principle questions about social trust that Fukuyama debates, develop some of the deficits in the works of political researchers such as R. Putnam, Larry Diamond etc. I'd say it as a "must read book" for the development of general political culture.
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Една от най-смислените книги, които захванах тази година. Макар че данните са вече доста остарели, Фукуяма разглежда принципни въпроси за доверието, които запълват някои дефицити в трудовете на изследователи като Робърт Пътнам, Лари Даймънд и др. Силно препоръчвам.
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Една от най-смислените книги, които захванах тази година. Макар че данните са вече доста остарели, Фукуяма разглежда принципни въпроси за доверието, които запълват някои дефицити в трудовете на изследователи като Робърт Пътнам, Лари Даймънд и др. Силно препоръчвам.
February 9, 2023
الكتاب من الكتب التي تنير أماكن معينة في دماغك ففرانسيس يناقش فكرة التصدع المجتمع وكيف تصدع فتحول الأفراد من حياة المجتمع الى حياة الجماعة هو تأثير من تحول المجتمع من الصناعي الى المعلوماتي فالافراد أصبحوا لا يميلون لحياة تكريس نفسه الى اشخاص لا يعرفهم بل الى الانتماء الى جماعة تشبههم في الهوايات والأهداف ، الكتاب جيد جدا لكن هو خربها بالاخير لان هو شخص من المناصرين للنيوراسمالية او هكذا شعرت عندما قرأت الفصل الاخير فهو يقول اننا نحتاج فقط الى بعض التعديلات على أنظمة الراس مال مثل تقوية راس المال الاجتماعي فهو لا يقول بمساوئ الراسمالية فقط يظن ان هذا هو عيبها ، لكن ككل هو كتاب جيد
May 29, 2022
Great book analysing firstly why there was a break-down in norms in the Western world between the 60's and the 90's, secondly where human norms and morality come from and thirdly how norms will reassert themselves since it is in human nature to have norms. Fukuyama is always a pleasure to read. He draws on research from social sciences to economics to philosophy to evolutionary biology.
June 11, 2023
Excelente libro. Un repaso sobre cómo la sociedad occidental se adapta a un nuevo período: de la economía industrial a la economía digital (o de la información). Edta transformación nos acarrea un reacomodo, que estamos experimentando desde los años 60s, y que explica por qué venimos escuchando hace décadas sobre una visible decadencia y ruptura del capital social. Totalmente recomendable.
August 26, 2025
此书出版于1999年，跟风理想国买的，启发性不是很大。
福山在书中提出社会资本的概念，即社会积累的共享观念。在西方社会，自信息时代以来，社会黏合度降低，民众团结在一起的普遍价值衰落。民主国家遭遇的最大挑战之一便是它们在面对技术和经济变革时能否保持社会秩序。
这种社会的危险在于人们无法分享价值观，处于孤立的境地。社团的小型化是其原因之一。
生活在21世纪的老人，习惯了网络社群，但搬进老人院后，却可能独自面对孤独。
福山在书中提出社会资本的概念，即社会积累的共享观念。在西方社会，自信息时代以来，社会黏合度降低，民众团结在一起的普遍价值衰落。民主国家遭遇的最大挑战之一便是它们在面对技术和经济变革时能否保持社会秩序。
这种社会的危险在于人们无法分享价值观，处于孤立的境地。社团的小型化是其原因之一。
生活在21世纪的老人，习惯了网络社群，但搬进老人院后，却可能独自面对孤独。
April 20, 2020
Kniha o možných príčinách úpadku sociálneho kapitálu (vzťahov a vzájomnej dôvery). Sústredí sa najmä a na USA, ale dáva aj príklady z Japonska či Švédska. Druhá polovica knihy je o možných cestách aj pozitívnych trendoch, ktoré sociálny kapitál opäť budujú.
Read
March 26, 2025see if books could kill the end of history
August 2, 2016
During the late-mid 20th century a number of important social indicators in Western countries began to flash red. Crime, rates of divorce and reported decreases in trust in institutions all spiked precipitously. Fukuyama's contention is that this occurred due to the transition in society from industrial to information age. Deindustrialization and the move into the workforce by most women (made possible in large part by the advent of the knowledge economy) meant that the social norms that characterized the previous era no longer held. In particular, old family structures began to strain and then collapse under new economic arrangements.
This thesis makes sense on a number of levels. A similarly painful uprooting of norms, social practices and beliefs happened in the move from an agricultural to industrial society in the first place. The move of women into the knowledge economy workforce over the past several decades was hugely emancipating, but every major change in social structure comes with growing pains. And the change in workplaces has also led to new problems like sexual harassment that never existed before workplaces were gender-mixed. What this means is that while old norms that were suitable to the old economic arrangement have died, new ones have not yet been born. They are observably in the process of doing so now, as education about how to deal with a newly rearranged society has begun in earnest. Moreover, those same social indicators like crime and divorce that were once on the rise have begun to taper off - quite precipitously in the former case.
What Fukuyama suggests is that while technological (and hence, economic) change is directional, social norms are cyclical. Things change, norms break down, tumult ensues, and then new norms are found to manage society, until they break down once again. This is partly why capitalism is so widely loathed. Its inherent dynamism means that it is constantly moving "forward" while destroying beloved social norms and upending general human stability. New norms will be created to take their place (Fukuyama argues that such a reforming inherent is human nature), but the permanent feeling of insecurity and moral relativism this breeds is not necessarily contributive to happiness or psychological wellbeing.
Overall Fukuyama makes an elegant argument that largely rings true. There are also many useful tangents and observations to fill it out. The idea that "working from home" has actually predominated in human history and is not such a new innovation was a typically thoughtful insight. My main problem with the book is that it was written in a manner than was oppressively boring. It had all the character of a pencil sharpener, I almost couldn't take it, but there was enough that was interesting to warrant continuing to plow through. The bad writing was particularly unfortunate because he is capable of writing well and has proven that in other works. In anycase, there are a few gems of insight buried in here for those who are willing to look.
This thesis makes sense on a number of levels. A similarly painful uprooting of norms, social practices and beliefs happened in the move from an agricultural to industrial society in the first place. The move of women into the knowledge economy workforce over the past several decades was hugely emancipating, but every major change in social structure comes with growing pains. And the change in workplaces has also led to new problems like sexual harassment that never existed before workplaces were gender-mixed. What this means is that while old norms that were suitable to the old economic arrangement have died, new ones have not yet been born. They are observably in the process of doing so now, as education about how to deal with a newly rearranged society has begun in earnest. Moreover, those same social indicators like crime and divorce that were once on the rise have begun to taper off - quite precipitously in the former case.
What Fukuyama suggests is that while technological (and hence, economic) change is directional, social norms are cyclical. Things change, norms break down, tumult ensues, and then new norms are found to manage society, until they break down once again. This is partly why capitalism is so widely loathed. Its inherent dynamism means that it is constantly moving "forward" while destroying beloved social norms and upending general human stability. New norms will be created to take their place (Fukuyama argues that such a reforming inherent is human nature), but the permanent feeling of insecurity and moral relativism this breeds is not necessarily contributive to happiness or psychological wellbeing.
Overall Fukuyama makes an elegant argument that largely rings true. There are also many useful tangents and observations to fill it out. The idea that "working from home" has actually predominated in human history and is not such a new innovation was a typically thoughtful insight. My main problem with the book is that it was written in a manner than was oppressively boring. It had all the character of a pencil sharpener, I almost couldn't take it, but there was enough that was interesting to warrant continuing to plow through. The bad writing was particularly unfortunate because he is capable of writing well and has proven that in other works. In anycase, there are a few gems of insight buried in here for those who are willing to look.
March 1, 2017
Has the information age caused our society to fray? Fukuyama cites the rise of crime, the decline of kinship, the increase in divorce rates and the decline of trust and confidence in institutions as markers that he is worried about.
If U.S. has been based on the reliance of the individual on himself and on a self-organizing society, what happens if those start to break down. Fukuyama posits that the breakdown of the family, caused by everything ranging from the pill to women in the workplace to welfare replacing the need for a father to easier divorce laws, was a driver in societal breakdown.
Hopefully, Fukuyama sees us as social animals, so able to rebuild our social capital.
If U.S. has been based on the reliance of the individual on himself and on a self-organizing society, what happens if those start to break down. Fukuyama posits that the breakdown of the family, caused by everything ranging from the pill to women in the workplace to welfare replacing the need for a father to easier divorce laws, was a driver in societal breakdown.
Hopefully, Fukuyama sees us as social animals, so able to rebuild our social capital.
May 12, 2025
In this book, Fukuyama argues that the major social upheavals in developed countries since the 1960s, such as rising crime, family breakdown, and declining trust, are part of a “Great Disruption”. The condition was caused by the shift from industrial to post-industrial or information-based economies. The transformation has empowered individuals and increased personal freedom, but has weakened traditional social norms and institutions. As a result, family structures and moral authority are less cohesive and are disobeyed.
The centre of this disruption is the erosion of social capital, which is the trust and shared values that keep societies tied as one. Social capital is as necessary as economic capital to run the economy efficiently. Fukuyama believes humans are biologically wired to live in moral communities that create elements of trust (such as reciprocal kindness, honesty, and fairness among the members). Despite the breakdown of old norms, new ones will emerge. In the long term, societies will adapt and reconstruct a social order that fits the ever-changing era. He calls the process the Great Reconstruction.
The centre of this disruption is the erosion of social capital, which is the trust and shared values that keep societies tied as one. Social capital is as necessary as economic capital to run the economy efficiently. Fukuyama believes humans are biologically wired to live in moral communities that create elements of trust (such as reciprocal kindness, honesty, and fairness among the members). Despite the breakdown of old norms, new ones will emerge. In the long term, societies will adapt and reconstruct a social order that fits the ever-changing era. He calls the process the Great Reconstruction.
February 2, 2012
Adaptasi. Ya, buku Fukuyama ini berbicara tentang satu hal tersebut: Adaptasi. Adaptasi dimaksud tentunya menyangkut relasi antara manusia dan lingkungan dan perubahan. Manusia dimaksud dapat berupa satuan individual (yang saling berinteraksi, dan mungkin saja hasil interaksi itu membentuk komunitas), satuan komunitas (yang saling berinteraksi). Adapun lingkungan mengacu pada alam sekitar, dapat juga situasi perekonomian, atau politik atau lainnya. Nah, adapun perubahan menyangkut, paling sederhana adalah perubahan waktu, yang berarti juga perubahan lingkungan dan perubahan perilaku manusia saat berhadapan dengan lingkungan. Maka, 'Guncangan Besar' adalah kata kunci untuk merangkum suatu situasi yang niscaya dihadapi oleh manusia dan manusia harus dapat survive dari situasi tersebut di mana situasi yang muncul ketika manusia berhasil survive (atau yang dituju) adalah tata dunia baru.
October 1, 2016
Buku menarik yang membuat saya harus mengutip sebagian isinya untuk tulisan saya di kolom Forum Akademia, Kompas Biro Jawa Tengah, yang terbit saban Jumat.
Buku ini diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasa Indonesia sebagai "Guncangan Besar" dan saya baru membaca terjemahan saja sebenarnya. Dengan bahasa populer yang gampang dicerna--seperti penulis-penulis Amerika yang lain--Fukuyama berhasil menjelaskan masalah sosial kita hari ini dengan perspektif keilmuan sosial dan eksakta sekaligus.
Kadar teoretis-filosofis buku ini, saya kira, kurang jika dibandingkan dengan buku Fukuyama sebelumnya yang menghebohkan itu, "The End of History and the Last Man". Buku ini banyak sekali mengutip penelitian-penelitian biologi terbaru buat menjelaskan fenomena sosial hari ini.
Demikian yang saya ingat dari pembacaan lebih-kurang empat tahun yang lalu.
Buku ini diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasa Indonesia sebagai "Guncangan Besar" dan saya baru membaca terjemahan saja sebenarnya. Dengan bahasa populer yang gampang dicerna--seperti penulis-penulis Amerika yang lain--Fukuyama berhasil menjelaskan masalah sosial kita hari ini dengan perspektif keilmuan sosial dan eksakta sekaligus.
Kadar teoretis-filosofis buku ini, saya kira, kurang jika dibandingkan dengan buku Fukuyama sebelumnya yang menghebohkan itu, "The End of History and the Last Man". Buku ini banyak sekali mengutip penelitian-penelitian biologi terbaru buat menjelaskan fenomena sosial hari ini.
Demikian yang saya ingat dari pembacaan lebih-kurang empat tahun yang lalu.
April 23, 2020
Eight out of ten. I guess.
Fukuyama's book is approachable and nicely rounded. It's enjoyable, too, though not exactly riveting. I don't support many of his conclusions from biology, and (perhaps due to this) his cyclical perspective on social order seems untenable. His exploration of social capital is useful nonetheless, in a fairly general way.
Fukuyama's book is approachable and nicely rounded. It's enjoyable, too, though not exactly riveting. I don't support many of his conclusions from biology, and (perhaps due to this) his cyclical perspective on social order seems untenable. His exploration of social capital is useful nonetheless, in a fairly general way.
December 3, 2023
Kitap içerik olarak güzeldi ancak harf hataları ve yazım yanlışları ile doluydu. Bozuk Türkçe ile yazılmış her türlü yazı, dikkatimi dağıtır, yazının içeriğine odaklanmamı zorlaştırır. Bu nedenle kitabı 2 ayda ancak okuyabildim. Bundan sonra Profil yayınlarına mesafe ile yaklaşacağım. Umarım Fukuyama'nın diğer eserlerini başka yayınevlerinden daha düzgün bir Türkçe ile bulurum.
October 15, 2008
Did I buy this book because of Fukuyama's name (or rather the fact that I had to read his "end of history" paper in three or four different classes? Yes.
Is this book awesome? No.
Did I finish it? No.
Thank you, Fukuyama.
Is this book awesome? No.
Did I finish it? No.
Thank you, Fukuyama.
January 2, 2017
brilliant.
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