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Napoleon's peninsular marshals
An interesting look at the Armies in Spain during the Napoleonic era.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
224 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 1973
5 people want to read
About the author
Richard Humble
105 books3 followersRichard Humble read Military History at Oriel College, Oxford. Now retired after 17 years as a Prison Teacher, he is a published author of 44 books on history for both adult and children's readership.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 19, 2025
This was a relatively short one, but one that was well worth the read. The author's intention here is to shed some light on the French marshals in Spain. I feel like this worked served that purpose well because I began to see the Peninsular War from different angles.
He starts the book by stating that by rights the defeat of the French in Spain ought to have been easy, but it was not. This was the first revelation, because normally the great numerical strength of the French is emphasized in most works.
Humble points out the other typical observation regarding this, namely that the French were hopelessly dispersed and incapable of cooperating. This, he says, should have made the isolated segments of the French Army in Spain simple to defeat.
On the face of it you would think that this is exactly what happened. I had, in truth, picked up this book because I was at a loss to explain why it was that the marshals were all defeated by Wellington. Not one of them ever defeated him.
Some accounts, like that of Marshall-Cornwall in Napoleon As Military Commander, suggest that Napoleon surrounded himself with incompetents on purpose, to keep control in his own hands and to make himself appear even greater. This explanation has the great attraction of explaining why Napoleon kept them around, and why they all failed in Spain.
But Humble does not accept this argument. One of the great strengths of this work is that he briefly describes the successes of the marshals in other theaters. Men like Ney, Massena, Marmont, and Suchet all won impressive victories in Italy and Germany, or against the Russians. Ney's anabasis in Russia is a particular highlight here.
Unfortunately I feel that Humble did not sufficiently establish why they failed in Spain. Part of the reason, I think, is arrogance. This is particularly the case at Busaco, where Massena made a very clumsy and amateurish attack on a strong position, and suffered predictable results.
One might say this was also the case at Talavera. It is difficult to blame the French at this point, since they had beaten the Spanish easily enough and had not faced the stolidity of the British. But after these sharp defeats the French ought to have started to wise up.
Humble does not seem to suggest that Wellington abandoned Busaco on purpose, as Grehan does in Torres Vedras. He also places greater emphasis on the operations of Suchet in breaking the deadlock of 1811 and allowing Wellington to adopt the strategic offensive at last.
Humble does not think much of Jourdan, interestingly since he cites Glover's work on Joseph Bonaparte where Jourdan is given much more positive evaluation. Soult is the villain for both, however.
Here Humble admits that Soult is problematic is that he was obviously a capable general, but his avarice and pettiness made him perhaps the least cooperative and least congenial marshal in Spain. It is bizarre that Napoleon considered him the 'only military brain' on the French side.
As Humble rightly points out, Soult was defeated again and again by Wellington. He lost to the Iron Duke more than anybody, and as Glover points out with satisfaction, after Soult took command following Vitoria, where he boasted that at last a real general was in charge, he proved just as incapable of defeating Wellington as Joseph and Jourdan had.
Yet, Soult's attack at Albuera was especially inspired and it should have succeeded, if Soult had known how to press his advantage.
Suchet shines here as an administrator and as a pacifier of eastern Spain, but Humble notes that Suchet never had to face Wellington. One doubts he would have done much better in that case.
Massena is regarded as the best marshal, which is a sentiment I've long held myself. Many think that Davout is the best (it is worth noting Davout was never in Spain), but Massena was all grit and guts.
At Fuentes de Onoro Humble argues that Massena was on the very cusp of victory, but his orders were, characteristically, disobeyed by his subordinates, who claimed that they were following Napoleon's orders.
Whether Massena was really on the verge of victory is open to question, but it is worth recalling that Wellington feared Massena most of all.
Marmont is regarded as perhaps the best marshal and the one who performed best against Wellington. He made a serious tactical mistake at Salamanca which was severely punished by Wellington, leaving Marmont badly wounded in the process. Humble thinks that it is unfair to overlook Marmont's record of maneuver against Wellington.
The most exciting part of the book, however, involved the campaign directly under Napoleon's supervision. The arrival of Napoleon and the marshals in Spain is a dramatic story worthy of fiction, as is Moore's heroic march to Sahagun and his success in deflecting Napoleon from Lisbon. This chapter was absolutely riveting and sadly far too short.
Much of the information in this book would be well-known to students of the Peninsular War, so there is nothing very provocative or groundbreaking. But this book is well-written and a solid work giving a more positive perspective on the French marshals. They were far from incompetents who had no hope against Wellington. Marmont and Soult even succeeded in concentrating overwhelming force against him, but failed to take advantage of it.
Unfortunately, I did not feel that the book answered the big question satisfactorily. If the French marshals were so good, why did none of them ever defeat Wellington? We can say at Talavera and Busaco it was because they underrated the British and overrated themselves, but after that they should have adapted, but evidently did not. Or at least not well enough. It is a frustrating conundrum.
He starts the book by stating that by rights the defeat of the French in Spain ought to have been easy, but it was not. This was the first revelation, because normally the great numerical strength of the French is emphasized in most works.
Humble points out the other typical observation regarding this, namely that the French were hopelessly dispersed and incapable of cooperating. This, he says, should have made the isolated segments of the French Army in Spain simple to defeat.
On the face of it you would think that this is exactly what happened. I had, in truth, picked up this book because I was at a loss to explain why it was that the marshals were all defeated by Wellington. Not one of them ever defeated him.
Some accounts, like that of Marshall-Cornwall in Napoleon As Military Commander, suggest that Napoleon surrounded himself with incompetents on purpose, to keep control in his own hands and to make himself appear even greater. This explanation has the great attraction of explaining why Napoleon kept them around, and why they all failed in Spain.
But Humble does not accept this argument. One of the great strengths of this work is that he briefly describes the successes of the marshals in other theaters. Men like Ney, Massena, Marmont, and Suchet all won impressive victories in Italy and Germany, or against the Russians. Ney's anabasis in Russia is a particular highlight here.
Unfortunately I feel that Humble did not sufficiently establish why they failed in Spain. Part of the reason, I think, is arrogance. This is particularly the case at Busaco, where Massena made a very clumsy and amateurish attack on a strong position, and suffered predictable results.
One might say this was also the case at Talavera. It is difficult to blame the French at this point, since they had beaten the Spanish easily enough and had not faced the stolidity of the British. But after these sharp defeats the French ought to have started to wise up.
Humble does not seem to suggest that Wellington abandoned Busaco on purpose, as Grehan does in Torres Vedras. He also places greater emphasis on the operations of Suchet in breaking the deadlock of 1811 and allowing Wellington to adopt the strategic offensive at last.
Humble does not think much of Jourdan, interestingly since he cites Glover's work on Joseph Bonaparte where Jourdan is given much more positive evaluation. Soult is the villain for both, however.
Here Humble admits that Soult is problematic is that he was obviously a capable general, but his avarice and pettiness made him perhaps the least cooperative and least congenial marshal in Spain. It is bizarre that Napoleon considered him the 'only military brain' on the French side.
As Humble rightly points out, Soult was defeated again and again by Wellington. He lost to the Iron Duke more than anybody, and as Glover points out with satisfaction, after Soult took command following Vitoria, where he boasted that at last a real general was in charge, he proved just as incapable of defeating Wellington as Joseph and Jourdan had.
Yet, Soult's attack at Albuera was especially inspired and it should have succeeded, if Soult had known how to press his advantage.
Suchet shines here as an administrator and as a pacifier of eastern Spain, but Humble notes that Suchet never had to face Wellington. One doubts he would have done much better in that case.
Massena is regarded as the best marshal, which is a sentiment I've long held myself. Many think that Davout is the best (it is worth noting Davout was never in Spain), but Massena was all grit and guts.
At Fuentes de Onoro Humble argues that Massena was on the very cusp of victory, but his orders were, characteristically, disobeyed by his subordinates, who claimed that they were following Napoleon's orders.
Whether Massena was really on the verge of victory is open to question, but it is worth recalling that Wellington feared Massena most of all.
Marmont is regarded as perhaps the best marshal and the one who performed best against Wellington. He made a serious tactical mistake at Salamanca which was severely punished by Wellington, leaving Marmont badly wounded in the process. Humble thinks that it is unfair to overlook Marmont's record of maneuver against Wellington.
The most exciting part of the book, however, involved the campaign directly under Napoleon's supervision. The arrival of Napoleon and the marshals in Spain is a dramatic story worthy of fiction, as is Moore's heroic march to Sahagun and his success in deflecting Napoleon from Lisbon. This chapter was absolutely riveting and sadly far too short.
Much of the information in this book would be well-known to students of the Peninsular War, so there is nothing very provocative or groundbreaking. But this book is well-written and a solid work giving a more positive perspective on the French marshals. They were far from incompetents who had no hope against Wellington. Marmont and Soult even succeeded in concentrating overwhelming force against him, but failed to take advantage of it.
Unfortunately, I did not feel that the book answered the big question satisfactorily. If the French marshals were so good, why did none of them ever defeat Wellington? We can say at Talavera and Busaco it was because they underrated the British and overrated themselves, but after that they should have adapted, but evidently did not. Or at least not well enough. It is a frustrating conundrum.
September 26, 2015
A perfectly fine read if you are interested in the era. I am a devotee of Bernard Cornwell's Sharpe books and it is part of my attempt to learn more about the peninsular war; this fit the bill admirably. Humble is a nice writer and the conclusions he draws about the various marshals are both interesting and insightful. He does, somewhat annoyingly, get all googley eyed whenever he mentions Wellington (but this is a trait shared by every other British military historian I've ever read so perhaps he can be pardoned!)
Definitely not an introduction to this period in history but a fine addition to an already working knowledge of this theatre of the Napoleanic wars.
Definitely not an introduction to this period in history but a fine addition to an already working knowledge of this theatre of the Napoleanic wars.
June 16, 2025
A 3* is by no means a bad rating for this charming read, which I enjoyed greatly. The 70s is a strange time for history-writing, it's not quite the era of the professional historian yet and Humble's narrative here feels more like being spoken to by a tour guide than your thoughtful historians of today; this I quite like at times. His own opinions shine very clearly through the text - his writing style is light and jaunty - and there are frequent allusions to other periods of history, which evidently borrow from his separate writings on those subjects. I didn't greatly enjoy the decision taken to spend essentially the first half of the book, setting the scene of the Peninsular War (which the historian even says is ground so covered it hardly warrants doing!) and then providing summaries of each of the Peninsular marshals. I've read plenty of lengthy books on the Pensinular War and it's not a case of needing to flesh out a full length story; the war itself is expansive enough to cover over many hundred pages, but only half of this book on the Peninsular marshals is really about that. The descriptions we do get are fairly brief (therefore) but I was expecting that from the book and fancied a more general overview than a detailed breakdown of each battle. You can read this book in one sitting. Humble's actual explanations of Wellington + the Marshals' strategy are interesting and effective, the core descriptions of the battles tell you enough, and I enjoyed his explanation of how ultimately destructive Napoleon's strategic direction was to the Peninsular campaign. Humble is clearly no fan of Napoleon and critiques him frequently - not undeservedly at times. Rather than being a book about the characters of the Peninsular marshals, this is far more a book about how their inability to cooperate hinders the army's ability to capitalise on opportunities.
While I enjoyed this, it'd be a tricky one to recommend. Possibly for a newcomer to the topic, the lengthy introductions at the start would be appreciated, but for anyone familiar with the Napoleonic war then really only 1/2 this book is of relevance. Its slightly old-fashioned - but passionate and engaging - style is, however, highly enjoyable.
While I enjoyed this, it'd be a tricky one to recommend. Possibly for a newcomer to the topic, the lengthy introductions at the start would be appreciated, but for anyone familiar with the Napoleonic war then really only 1/2 this book is of relevance. Its slightly old-fashioned - but passionate and engaging - style is, however, highly enjoyable.
October 19, 2016
This is not a great book, but it does tell you about some of the men who served Napoleon in the Peninsula. I already knew about most of them from reading other books so I was hoping for some extra knowledge on Suchet in particular. Unfortunately I didn't get it, so my questions about this marshal still have to be answered.
If you want an elementary overview of the French Marshals in the Peninsula, this is fine. You can find books on men like Soult, Massena and Ney, which will cover their storied careers.
If you want an elementary overview of the French Marshals in the Peninsula, this is fine. You can find books on men like Soult, Massena and Ney, which will cover their storied careers.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews