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Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant's Philosophy
This collection of essays brings together the central lines of thought in Onora O'Neill's work on Kant's philosophy, developed over many years. Challenging the claim that Kant's attempt to provide a critique of reason fails because it collapses into a dogmatic argument from authority, O'Neill shows why Kant held that we must construct, rather than assume, the authority of reason, and how this can be done by ensuring that anything we offer as reasons can be followed by others, including others with whom we disagree. She argues that this constructivist view of reasoning is the clue to Kant's claims about knowledge, ethics and politics, as well as to his distinctive accounts of autonomy, the social contract, cosmopolitan justice and scriptural interpretation. Her essays are a distinctive and illuminating commentary on Kant's fundamental philosophical strategy and its implications, and will be a vital resource for scholars of Kant, ethics and philosophy of law.
- GenresPhilosophy
262 pages, Paperback
First published December 31, 2015
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About the author
Onora O'Neill
33 books32 followersOnora Sylvia O'Neill, Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve CH CBE FBA FRS (born 23 August 1941) is a philosopher and a crossbench member of the House of Lords.
The daughter of Sir Con Douglas Walter O'Neill, she was educated partly in Germany and at St Paul's Girls' School, London before studying philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University. She went on to complete a doctorate at Harvard University, with John Rawls as supervisor. During the 1970s she taught at Barnard College, the women's college in Columbia University, New York City. In 1977 she returned to Britain and took up a post at the University of Essex; she was Professor of Philosophy there when she became Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge in 1992.
She is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, a former President of the British Academy 1988–1989 and chaired the Nuffield Foundation 1998–2010. In 2003, she was the founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA). In 2013 she held the Spinoza Chair of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. Until October 2006, she was the Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, and she currently chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
(from Wikipedia)
The daughter of Sir Con Douglas Walter O'Neill, she was educated partly in Germany and at St Paul's Girls' School, London before studying philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University. She went on to complete a doctorate at Harvard University, with John Rawls as supervisor. During the 1970s she taught at Barnard College, the women's college in Columbia University, New York City. In 1977 she returned to Britain and took up a post at the University of Essex; she was Professor of Philosophy there when she became Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge in 1992.
She is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, a former President of the British Academy 1988–1989 and chaired the Nuffield Foundation 1998–2010. In 2003, she was the founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA). In 2013 she held the Spinoza Chair of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. Until October 2006, she was the Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, and she currently chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
(from Wikipedia)
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January 2, 2020
Lots of this book is excellent; the exegesis and explanations of Kant are useful and thought provoking, even where heavily technical. My major concern, though, is that the book's treatment of some work in contemporary philosophy (in particular the idea of "rational autonomy") is... pretty bad.
The book is no doubt worth a read for someone interested in Kant's idea of autonomy, authority, and the grounding of reason. That's why I set out to read it, and I found what I was looking for.
It is no doubt true that Kant's notion of autonomy is different than the contemporary notion of autonomy as understood in (e.g.) medical ethics. It is also true that many philosophers wrongly conflate Kant's use of autonomy with contemporary understandings of rational autonomy. One can see this difference in the subject of the "auto" prefix in each. Autonomy in Kant's use (at least on O'Neill's view) is a property of reason; reason is autonomous, in virtue of being self-vindicating, self-sustaining, etc. Autonomy in the contemporary use is a property of agents and (more particularly) a way for systems to regard agents.
There are lots of reasons to criticize the contemporary views of rational autonomy; I won't dwell on them here. But the idea that they're somehow deficient in comparison to Kant's views is... well... pretty silly. They're trying to achieve a different goal, and to do so in the pursuit of a different end (namely, respecting the wishes of patients when our actions have authority over those patients). If anything, the relevant point of contrast here is in the Kantian notion of freedom (which O'Neill talks about some towards the end of the book, but does not recognize).
To be honest, I found that failure pretty disappointing, as someone who looks up to O'Neill as a scholar, because the turn towards patient autonomy is so important in medical ethics and because it developed during O'Neill's lifetime in a political context in which she was actively involved. She really should know better. Though, obviously, this does not undercut the value of the book as a piece of Kant scholarship, since these deficiencies can largely be ignored.
The book is no doubt worth a read for someone interested in Kant's idea of autonomy, authority, and the grounding of reason. That's why I set out to read it, and I found what I was looking for.
It is no doubt true that Kant's notion of autonomy is different than the contemporary notion of autonomy as understood in (e.g.) medical ethics. It is also true that many philosophers wrongly conflate Kant's use of autonomy with contemporary understandings of rational autonomy. One can see this difference in the subject of the "auto" prefix in each. Autonomy in Kant's use (at least on O'Neill's view) is a property of reason; reason is autonomous, in virtue of being self-vindicating, self-sustaining, etc. Autonomy in the contemporary use is a property of agents and (more particularly) a way for systems to regard agents.
There are lots of reasons to criticize the contemporary views of rational autonomy; I won't dwell on them here. But the idea that they're somehow deficient in comparison to Kant's views is... well... pretty silly. They're trying to achieve a different goal, and to do so in the pursuit of a different end (namely, respecting the wishes of patients when our actions have authority over those patients). If anything, the relevant point of contrast here is in the Kantian notion of freedom (which O'Neill talks about some towards the end of the book, but does not recognize).
To be honest, I found that failure pretty disappointing, as someone who looks up to O'Neill as a scholar, because the turn towards patient autonomy is so important in medical ethics and because it developed during O'Neill's lifetime in a political context in which she was actively involved. She really should know better. Though, obviously, this does not undercut the value of the book as a piece of Kant scholarship, since these deficiencies can largely be ignored.
Displaying 1 of 1 review