With the recent announcement that the U.S. and Cuba would be normalizing relations with each other for the first time since the Revolution of 1959, this book could not come at a more perfect time. Starting with the last years of the Eisenhower administration, the authors show the series of missteps and failed opportunities that have characterized U.S.-Cuba relations. And, to be quite honest, the U.S. doesn't come off looking very good here. Often times the U.S. would make promises and then break them or demand unreasonable preconditions before negotiating. Not only that, but there would be times when the Cubans would say something that, had the U.S. diplomats thought about what they were saying, they may have acted in a different, way. For example, during Cuba's intervention in Africa, Cuba would say again and again that they would not abandon their allies in Angola, but wanted to be a part of bringing about a political solution. However, the U.S. would be so occupied with getting Cuba out of Angola that they wouldn't even consider bringing them into the political process until the very end when it couldn't be avoided. Had they seized on it sooner, they could've killed two birds with one stone. But the Cubans don't always come off all that great here either as they would oftentimes begin the process of negotiating with the U.S.,then do something in another realm that would shutdown the negotiations, like intervening in Africa. Thus, both sides have made serious missteps in trying to heal the divide between them. Leogrande and Kornbluh's great gift is bringing us into the midst of these secret negotiations, oftentimes filled with suspicion and doubt, yet always with a tinge of hope for something better. At times it can be as dry as one of the government memos they scanned into the book or quoted, but it is always fascinating to see how close they get to the brass ring to only have the other shoe drop soon afterwards. This book is also handicapped in its assessment of Pres. Obama's overtures to Cuba as it was published in Oct. 2014, two months before the announcement that the two countries would begin the normalization process, months before Raul Castro and Pres. Obama met at the Summit of the Americas, and even longer before the U.S.'s move to remove Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror. Even though it is a book about mistakes, it also shows the good that tough-minded diplomats and hard-nosed diplomacy can do when your thinking out of the box, something that is seriously lacking in America's current debates about foreign policy. As the U.S. and Cuba begin to heal the divide between them in an official capacity, I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the past and future of these two countries.