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The Teachings of Vedanta According to Ramanuja
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This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.
As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
88 pages, Hardcover
First published February 19, 2015
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Against all of them he maintains that not only the world of matter, but even the individual souls have a real existence of their own and that neither of them are essentially the same as Brahman. Hence unconsciousness belongs only to matter, and ignorance and suffering only to the individual souls, and Brahman is eternally free from all imperfections. But still Brahman and the entire world form a unity; because both matter and individual souls have existence only as the ,body^ of Brahman, i. e. they can exist and be what they are and can act, only because Brahman is their Soul (atman) and the inwardly controlling Power (antaryamin). Apart from Brahman they are nothing.
Ramanuja remarks : — ,Every thing in this world, whether indivi- dual souls or material things, form the body of the Supreme Soul, and therefore He alone can be said to possess a body unconditionally.
If there is any leading thought in the Upanisads, it is that Brahman is the only Power that works in every part and constituent of the universe. It is through the power of Brahman that winds blow and fire burns, the rivers, the sun and moon, the days and nights follow their appointed course. Brahman is entered within to the tip of the nails. It is inside all the elements in the world, inside all the heavenly bodies, inside all the constituents of man, ruling and controlling from within. Brahman is also the power within all ,gods', our sense-organs work through the power of Brahman. Through Brahman we breathe our breath and think our thoughts. It is this thought of the immanence of Brah- man in the world and in man, over which the authors of the Upanisads break into perpetual ecstasies. It is the one anthem which they are never tired of singing.
Chapter I
Nature of Brahman:
So it will be convenient to divide R.'s teachings concerning the nature of Brahman under three heads, l) B. in its own nature, 2) B. as the Soul of the individual souls, and 3) B. as the Soul of the material world.
Brahman is defined in Su. i. 1. 2 as ,the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the worlds In order to understand exactly what R. means by this definition we must bear two things in mind : — Istly creation does not mean creation out of nothing, nor does dissolution mean dissolution into nothing; and 2ndly, creation, sustenance and dissolution are not brought about by an external agent; they are acts from inside, immanent.
The following considerations will make this point clear. R. knows nothing of absolute creation or of absolute dissolution.
As implied in the Antaryami-brahmana (,controls from within') R. defines ,body' as ,any substance which a conscious being (cetana) completely controls and supports for its own purpose and whose only nature consists in being subservient to the conscious being' (p. 286).
R. says, that the great truth which this section wants to teach is, that ,the world has B. for its soul' (p. x. 211) and that of this truth, ,thou art that' is only a special case, an illustration^ (p.x. 217, p. 349 Ved. Saftg, p. 32).
In common with all the schools of Indian Philosophy, R. believes in repeated creations^ and dissolutions of the world. ,The stream of creation is without beginning' (p. 384). At the end of each ,Kalpa' (i. e. a world-period) the world is dissolved, the "grosser substances dissolve themselves into subtler ones, till at last ultra-subtle matter, called jdarkness' (tamas^) is alone left. This so-called , darkness' too is related to B. as its ,body', but is so extremely subtle that it does not deserve to have a separate designation (p. 197) and is as it were non-existing (asatkalpa) (p. 202). When the world is in this state, B. is said to be, as in Ch. Up. vi. 2. 1, One only, without a second' (p. 190).
The chief thing to be noted in connexion with this text is that according to R. ,Existence etc' are attributes of B. and do not form its essence; in other words B. has existence etc. and not, as the non-dualists would say, B. is existence etc. ,It cannot be said that B. is „mere existence" (sanmatra)^ because existence is one element (arrisa) of B., and this existence is besides „distinguished" (saviiesa)' (p. 353). ,We say „a jar exists, a cloth exists" and thus we know that existence is a predicate of substances, and therefore it cannot itself be a substance or a cause' (p. 354). ,The same thing holds good of „knowledge" as of „existence"; „knowledge or consciousness" (anuhhutij jnana, avagati, sarrivid) is an attribute of a knowing subject and related to an object' (p. vm. 641, p. 440). ,We cannot possibly conceive of „knowledge" that is without a substrate (i. e. subject) or without an object' (ix. 48).
Hence all mention (in the Upanisads) of difference be- tween B. and soul refers to the essential difference between B. as the object distinguished and the soul as a distinguishing attribute. But the mention of unity between the two is equally valid, because a distinguishing attribute cannot exist apart from, and is bound to the thing distinguished (Sti. u. 3. 45, p. 574 sq.). Thus we see that by saying that individual soul is a part of B., R. means exactly the same thing as when he says that B. is the Soul and the individual soul the Body. The latter is only a ,mode' of the former.
I shall conclude this section also by quoting a passage (p. 572) in which R. expresses the relation of soul to God : — ,The soul is created by B., is controlled by it, is its body, is subservient to it,
is supported by it, is reduced to the ,8ubtle' condition by it (viz. in the , dissolution-state' of the world), is a worshipper of it, and de- pends on its grace for its welfare.
Both these explanations R. rejects as unsatisfactory, declaring himself in favour of the third, according to which the material world is related to B. in the same way as the individual souls are, viz. as part to whole, in the sense that the world is a distinguishing attribute (visesana) and B. the object distinguished (visista). B. and world are one, because an attribute cannot exist independently of the thing distinguished by it; but as an attribute is essentially different from the thing it distinguishes, so is the world essentially different from B. (Su. in. 2. 28).
But the material things have an origin (utpatti), whereas it (the origin) is denied of the souls. Because the change that takes place in the case of the souls when they pass from the , subtle' to the ,gross' state consists only in the expansion of their power of knowledge, which was con- tracted. But the material things, such as sky etc., undergo a change of their essential nature {svarupd-'nyathdhhava^. And a change of the essential nature is what is meant by origin {utpatti) (p. 530). Another reason why the material things must be considered to have an origin is that they are made up of parts {sdvayava)'^ and what is made up of parts cannot be eternal (several places in Su, i. 1. 8).
Before leaving this subject it will be interesting to note that R. does not consider ,time' to be a separate substance like , space'; but only an attribute of substances [paddrthavUesana) (p. 452). *footnote*
The world which is thus produced, is always of the same form as it had before the previous dissolution (p. 202). At the beginning of each creation B. recollects^ the arrangement of the world as it existed before, and creates accordingly (p. 201).
What kind of embodied souls are understood by the term ,unmoving beings' (sthavara)? The word sthdvara denotes the vegetable as well as the inorganic world. That the plants are believed to be the bodies, occupied by souls, is without question; as we can see from the frequently occuring expression ,Souls from Brahma down to grass' (cf. p. x 350); and on p. x 519 among the different kinds of souls he counts trees, bushes, creepers, grasses, and so on. But are stones and the like inhabited by souls? The following considerations make me think that R. does not make an exception of them. In order to denote all kinds of embodied souls R. very often uses the expression ,from Brahma down to unmoving things' (sthdvara) (cf. p. xiii 642).
Chapter II.
Nature of souls:
Hence the nature of the souls will be conveniently treated in two separate sections, the first dealing with the nature of the souls in themselves, and the second with that of the souls implicated in matter.
The attribute which belongs to the essence (sdrabhuta) of a soul is consciousness (jndna). On this account it is itself sometimes called (in the Upanisads) ^consciousness' (p. 543, Su. 29). But we must note that the soul is not consciousness itself (jnanamatram), but it is by its nature the subject of consciousness or knower {jndtf) (p. 538). In judgments like ,1 know' or ,1 am happy' that which is expressed by the term ,1' is the soul. It is of psychical nature (ajadd) and is to be known as ,1' in immediate self-experience (p. ix 109). The consciousness of ,1' is not a mere quality of the soul, that can pass away; it is the essence of the soul. The loss of the consciousness of ,1' would be the annihilation of the souF (p. ix 150). But , consciousness' is an attribute which expresses the essential nature of the soul (svarupa-nirupana-dharma), for no soul can exist without consciousness (p. 544). Even in dreamless sleep the soul is not without consciousness. Because though there is then no consciousness of objects, still the sense of ,V {aham-arthd) continues (p. IX 143, p. 545). Along withconsciousness R. frequently mentions jbliss' (ananda) as constituting the essential nature of souls (cf. p.xi 586). As in the case of B. (see above) this means that in the original natural state of the souls their consciousness is always of the agreeable kind (p. xii 667). In this state their knowledge is of the intuitive nature, i. e. not dependent on the senses (p. xiii 122).
But R, says ,if the activity belongs to something other than the soul, how could the soul be made to suffer the consequences of acts that are not its own?' But because the soul possesses the power to act, it is not necessary that it must always act; it acts or does not act just as it likes (p. 559, Su. 39); when the souls are conjoined to bodies, as a retribution for their karman, their actions are influenced by the qualities (sattva^ rajas, and tamas) belonging to the material of their bodies^ (p. 557). But when they are free from contact with matter, they can realize their wishes by their mere will (samkalpad eva) (p. 1028).
The possession by souls of „name and form" (i. e. a body) brought about by the connexion with matter, as a retribution for their good or bad deeds, is called Samsara (cycle of births and deaths)^ (p. xin 355). ,In the state of Samsara the essential nature of the soul does not undergo any transmutation as of clay into a pot; only the knowledge and bliss, which belong to the essence of their nature are contracted' (p. xi586).
As explained above the souls that are thus joined to bodies, are divided into four classes : l) celestial or superhuman beings, which include all kinds of demi-gods as well as demons and ghosts;^ 2) human beings; 3) animals including beasts, birds, crawling and creeping insects etc.; 4) stationary beings^ (sthdvara) (p. x 519).
The states in which the embodied souls exist are either of waking, or of dreaming, or of deep sleep, or of swoon...
Hence at this place will be considered the case only of those, who have to be born again.
The souls of the latter kind are roughly divided into two classes : l) those who have performed sacrifices and other good works (istapurte)] and 2) those who have not done what is enjoined, and done what is prohibited, i. e. the sinners (p. 637).
Chapter III.
Final Release:
The only means to attain release (moksa) or deathlessness (amrtatva) is the knowledge of the Supreme Person Svet. Up. iii. 8 (p. 157), But B. cannot be known by ordinary means of knowledge; it can be known only by the help of the Scriptures (p. x43l).
According to Samkara bondage or Samadra has no reality, and to know that it is an illusion is to attain release. According to R. Samsara is a reality, an actual implication into a really existing matter; and therefore release is something that must be actually accomplished. Just like Samkara, R. says ,The cessation of nescience {avidyd) is released and this cessation takes place only through the knowledge of B.' (p. vii56l). But the two understand these words in totally different ways.
This we see from the fact that the terms ^knowing' (yid) and ,meditating' (upas) are indiscriminately used in the Upanisads with regard to the same object, cf. Ch. Up. m.18. 1 &6, Br.Up.i. 4. 7, Ch.Up.iv. 1. 6 &iv. 2. 2 (p. vii 621). Now ^meditation' (dhyana) means uninterrupted steady remembrance. For this reason Ch. Up. vii. 26. 2 mentions ,remembrance' {smrti) as the means for release (p. 622). The parallel passage, Mu. Up. ii. 2. 8, mentions , seeing' (drsta) in the place of ,remembrance', which shows that the remembrance which leads to release must be so vivid that it acquires the nature of , seeing', i. e. of direct visual perception (pratyaksata) (pp. vii626&628). Only he can attain to the Supreme Person, who possesses the remembrance (of B.), which has acquired the nature of direct perception, and who has become extremely fond of it (i. e. of remembering B.) because of his most intense love of the object of his remembrance (viz. B.). This kind of steady re- membrance is known by the name of Bhakti (devoted attachment) (p. vii 630). jHence knowledge which is the means for attaining B. is meditation, practised day by day, made constantly intenser by re- petition, and continued till death' (p. vii 634).
Thus the knowledge that leads to final release has two elements : firstly the possession of the right knowledge of the nature of B. as taught in the Upani- sads; and secondly, being able to realise always the immediate pre- sence of B. (Brahma-sdksatkdra) by repeated meditations on its nature.
All such karman increases in us the qualities of rajas and tamas, which oppose the quality of pure sattva, which is needed in order that the true knowledge may arise in us (p. vii 672). Hence before we attain the true knowledge of B. it is necess- ary that all the undesirable karman is destroyed; and this can be done only by perfoi'ining the prescribed religious duties without de- siring a reward for them (p. vii 674)or as R. puts it in another place (p. X 313), with the sole object of propitiating the Supreme Person.
Then according to Br, Up. in. 5 there are three conditions which help the rise of Vidya, viz. l) learning (panditya), 2) being like a child (bdlya), 3) sageness (mauna). Firstly, one must possess learn- ing, i. e, one must have the knowledge of the pure and perfect nature of B. and get it fixed through hearing and thinking and through increasing the quality of sattva in oneself by means of devotion to the Supreme Person (p. 899). Then secondly one must be like a child, which means that one must be free from self-conceit, and not that one has to assume all the ways of a child, such as wilful be- haviour, and so on (p. 902 f.). And lastly one must be a sage, i. e. one must be able to practise concentrated meditation on B. (p. 900).
Following the Vdkyakdra (i. e. Tafika) R. mentions seven con- ditions as helpful to the attainment of Vidya. They are l) keeping the body unpolluted by unclean food (viveka),'^ 2) absence of attach-
ment (yimoka), 3) repeated reflection (abhydsa), 4) performance of religious works (kriyd), 5) good conduct (kalydna), 6) freedom from dejection {anavasddd) and 7) freedom from exultation (anuddharsa) (pp. VII 634 f.).
In all the Vidyas the meditator must meditate on B., not as different from himself, but as his Soul, i. e. he must consider B. related to himself in the same way as he is related to his own body (p. 915). In some of the Vidyas B. is represented under some symbol {Pratika)'^ but the only adequate symbol for B. is an individual soul, as freed from all connexion with matter. Hence only those who meditate on B. either directly or under the symbol of an individual soul, disconnected from matter, are led to final re- lease; whereas those who meditate on B. under some other symbol are not (p. 1000). The meditations are to be practised in a sitting posture (p. 925). There is no particular time or place fixed for them. They can be practised at any time and at any place, which are suited for the concentration of mind (p. 927).
According to Vedanta karman is divided into two portions, l) prdrabdha (what has commenced to operate) and 2) samcita (accumulated). Our bodies and surroundings as well as all our present experiences are the consequences of the prarahdha portion of our karman. Besides this portion there is a whole, beginningless mass of our karman, which is called samcita. It is karman only of the latter class that is destroyed through the rise of the Vidya. The prdrabdha karman, on the other hand, persists; and only after suffer- ing its full consequences can one attain final release. For the retribution of the prdrabdha karman, the present life may be sufficient, or it be to be born ^ may necessary again (p. 945).
Though B. is omnipresent, the Vidvan must go to a definite place in order to completely get rid of nescience' (p. 997). Here he is freed from all connection with matter i. e. attains final release.
The released souls can also go at will to all the different material worlds (yikdraloka) and freely enjoy all the pleasures in them (Ch. Up. VII. 25. 2) (p. 1043). But the joys they enjoy there are not limited and passing. Because they do not look upon the objects of their enjoyment by themselves, and as such, liable to change (yikdra), but as the manifestations of B.'s glory (p. 1044), When one is still subject to karman and therefore looks upon the world as different from B., the world seems painful or at best of limited pleasure. But when one is freed from karman and can look upon the world as the manifestation of B.'s glory, the same world seems full of bHss (p. xin 468).
The released souls, being completely freed from the bondage of karman and having their power of knowledge no more contracted, find their highest joy in the communion with the infinitely bliss- ful B., who has been the sole object of their love; and consequently they cannot wish for anything else or want to do something that might put them back again into samsara. The Supreme Person too most intensely loves those, who have perfectly reaHsed His nature {jnanin) (Glta vii. 17—18), and therefore having got them once. He will never wish to send them back. Hence when the souls are once released, they do not again return to samsara (p. 1048).
Ramanuja remarks : — ,Every thing in this world, whether indivi- dual souls or material things, form the body of the Supreme Soul, and therefore He alone can be said to possess a body unconditionally.
If there is any leading thought in the Upanisads, it is that Brahman is the only Power that works in every part and constituent of the universe. It is through the power of Brahman that winds blow and fire burns, the rivers, the sun and moon, the days and nights follow their appointed course. Brahman is entered within to the tip of the nails. It is inside all the elements in the world, inside all the heavenly bodies, inside all the constituents of man, ruling and controlling from within. Brahman is also the power within all ,gods', our sense-organs work through the power of Brahman. Through Brahman we breathe our breath and think our thoughts. It is this thought of the immanence of Brah- man in the world and in man, over which the authors of the Upanisads break into perpetual ecstasies. It is the one anthem which they are never tired of singing.
Chapter I
Nature of Brahman:
So it will be convenient to divide R.'s teachings concerning the nature of Brahman under three heads, l) B. in its own nature, 2) B. as the Soul of the individual souls, and 3) B. as the Soul of the material world.
Brahman is defined in Su. i. 1. 2 as ,the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the worlds In order to understand exactly what R. means by this definition we must bear two things in mind : — Istly creation does not mean creation out of nothing, nor does dissolution mean dissolution into nothing; and 2ndly, creation, sustenance and dissolution are not brought about by an external agent; they are acts from inside, immanent.
The following considerations will make this point clear. R. knows nothing of absolute creation or of absolute dissolution.
As implied in the Antaryami-brahmana (,controls from within') R. defines ,body' as ,any substance which a conscious being (cetana) completely controls and supports for its own purpose and whose only nature consists in being subservient to the conscious being' (p. 286).
R. says, that the great truth which this section wants to teach is, that ,the world has B. for its soul' (p. x. 211) and that of this truth, ,thou art that' is only a special case, an illustration^ (p.x. 217, p. 349 Ved. Saftg, p. 32).
In common with all the schools of Indian Philosophy, R. believes in repeated creations^ and dissolutions of the world. ,The stream of creation is without beginning' (p. 384). At the end of each ,Kalpa' (i. e. a world-period) the world is dissolved, the "grosser substances dissolve themselves into subtler ones, till at last ultra-subtle matter, called jdarkness' (tamas^) is alone left. This so-called , darkness' too is related to B. as its ,body', but is so extremely subtle that it does not deserve to have a separate designation (p. 197) and is as it were non-existing (asatkalpa) (p. 202). When the world is in this state, B. is said to be, as in Ch. Up. vi. 2. 1, One only, without a second' (p. 190).
The chief thing to be noted in connexion with this text is that according to R. ,Existence etc' are attributes of B. and do not form its essence; in other words B. has existence etc. and not, as the non-dualists would say, B. is existence etc. ,It cannot be said that B. is „mere existence" (sanmatra)^ because existence is one element (arrisa) of B., and this existence is besides „distinguished" (saviiesa)' (p. 353). ,We say „a jar exists, a cloth exists" and thus we know that existence is a predicate of substances, and therefore it cannot itself be a substance or a cause' (p. 354). ,The same thing holds good of „knowledge" as of „existence"; „knowledge or consciousness" (anuhhutij jnana, avagati, sarrivid) is an attribute of a knowing subject and related to an object' (p. vm. 641, p. 440). ,We cannot possibly conceive of „knowledge" that is without a substrate (i. e. subject) or without an object' (ix. 48).
Hence all mention (in the Upanisads) of difference be- tween B. and soul refers to the essential difference between B. as the object distinguished and the soul as a distinguishing attribute. But the mention of unity between the two is equally valid, because a distinguishing attribute cannot exist apart from, and is bound to the thing distinguished (Sti. u. 3. 45, p. 574 sq.). Thus we see that by saying that individual soul is a part of B., R. means exactly the same thing as when he says that B. is the Soul and the individual soul the Body. The latter is only a ,mode' of the former.
I shall conclude this section also by quoting a passage (p. 572) in which R. expresses the relation of soul to God : — ,The soul is created by B., is controlled by it, is its body, is subservient to it,
is supported by it, is reduced to the ,8ubtle' condition by it (viz. in the , dissolution-state' of the world), is a worshipper of it, and de- pends on its grace for its welfare.
Both these explanations R. rejects as unsatisfactory, declaring himself in favour of the third, according to which the material world is related to B. in the same way as the individual souls are, viz. as part to whole, in the sense that the world is a distinguishing attribute (visesana) and B. the object distinguished (visista). B. and world are one, because an attribute cannot exist independently of the thing distinguished by it; but as an attribute is essentially different from the thing it distinguishes, so is the world essentially different from B. (Su. in. 2. 28).
But the material things have an origin (utpatti), whereas it (the origin) is denied of the souls. Because the change that takes place in the case of the souls when they pass from the , subtle' to the ,gross' state consists only in the expansion of their power of knowledge, which was con- tracted. But the material things, such as sky etc., undergo a change of their essential nature {svarupd-'nyathdhhava^. And a change of the essential nature is what is meant by origin {utpatti) (p. 530). Another reason why the material things must be considered to have an origin is that they are made up of parts {sdvayava)'^ and what is made up of parts cannot be eternal (several places in Su, i. 1. 8).
Before leaving this subject it will be interesting to note that R. does not consider ,time' to be a separate substance like , space'; but only an attribute of substances [paddrthavUesana) (p. 452). *footnote*
The world which is thus produced, is always of the same form as it had before the previous dissolution (p. 202). At the beginning of each creation B. recollects^ the arrangement of the world as it existed before, and creates accordingly (p. 201).
What kind of embodied souls are understood by the term ,unmoving beings' (sthavara)? The word sthdvara denotes the vegetable as well as the inorganic world. That the plants are believed to be the bodies, occupied by souls, is without question; as we can see from the frequently occuring expression ,Souls from Brahma down to grass' (cf. p. x 350); and on p. x 519 among the different kinds of souls he counts trees, bushes, creepers, grasses, and so on. But are stones and the like inhabited by souls? The following considerations make me think that R. does not make an exception of them. In order to denote all kinds of embodied souls R. very often uses the expression ,from Brahma down to unmoving things' (sthdvara) (cf. p. xiii 642).
Chapter II.
Nature of souls:
Hence the nature of the souls will be conveniently treated in two separate sections, the first dealing with the nature of the souls in themselves, and the second with that of the souls implicated in matter.
The attribute which belongs to the essence (sdrabhuta) of a soul is consciousness (jndna). On this account it is itself sometimes called (in the Upanisads) ^consciousness' (p. 543, Su. 29). But we must note that the soul is not consciousness itself (jnanamatram), but it is by its nature the subject of consciousness or knower {jndtf) (p. 538). In judgments like ,1 know' or ,1 am happy' that which is expressed by the term ,1' is the soul. It is of psychical nature (ajadd) and is to be known as ,1' in immediate self-experience (p. ix 109). The consciousness of ,1' is not a mere quality of the soul, that can pass away; it is the essence of the soul. The loss of the consciousness of ,1' would be the annihilation of the souF (p. ix 150). But , consciousness' is an attribute which expresses the essential nature of the soul (svarupa-nirupana-dharma), for no soul can exist without consciousness (p. 544). Even in dreamless sleep the soul is not without consciousness. Because though there is then no consciousness of objects, still the sense of ,V {aham-arthd) continues (p. IX 143, p. 545). Along withconsciousness R. frequently mentions jbliss' (ananda) as constituting the essential nature of souls (cf. p.xi 586). As in the case of B. (see above) this means that in the original natural state of the souls their consciousness is always of the agreeable kind (p. xii 667). In this state their knowledge is of the intuitive nature, i. e. not dependent on the senses (p. xiii 122).
But R, says ,if the activity belongs to something other than the soul, how could the soul be made to suffer the consequences of acts that are not its own?' But because the soul possesses the power to act, it is not necessary that it must always act; it acts or does not act just as it likes (p. 559, Su. 39); when the souls are conjoined to bodies, as a retribution for their karman, their actions are influenced by the qualities (sattva^ rajas, and tamas) belonging to the material of their bodies^ (p. 557). But when they are free from contact with matter, they can realize their wishes by their mere will (samkalpad eva) (p. 1028).
The possession by souls of „name and form" (i. e. a body) brought about by the connexion with matter, as a retribution for their good or bad deeds, is called Samsara (cycle of births and deaths)^ (p. xin 355). ,In the state of Samsara the essential nature of the soul does not undergo any transmutation as of clay into a pot; only the knowledge and bliss, which belong to the essence of their nature are contracted' (p. xi586).
As explained above the souls that are thus joined to bodies, are divided into four classes : l) celestial or superhuman beings, which include all kinds of demi-gods as well as demons and ghosts;^ 2) human beings; 3) animals including beasts, birds, crawling and creeping insects etc.; 4) stationary beings^ (sthdvara) (p. x 519).
The states in which the embodied souls exist are either of waking, or of dreaming, or of deep sleep, or of swoon...
Hence at this place will be considered the case only of those, who have to be born again.
The souls of the latter kind are roughly divided into two classes : l) those who have performed sacrifices and other good works (istapurte)] and 2) those who have not done what is enjoined, and done what is prohibited, i. e. the sinners (p. 637).
Chapter III.
Final Release:
The only means to attain release (moksa) or deathlessness (amrtatva) is the knowledge of the Supreme Person Svet. Up. iii. 8 (p. 157), But B. cannot be known by ordinary means of knowledge; it can be known only by the help of the Scriptures (p. x43l).
According to Samkara bondage or Samadra has no reality, and to know that it is an illusion is to attain release. According to R. Samsara is a reality, an actual implication into a really existing matter; and therefore release is something that must be actually accomplished. Just like Samkara, R. says ,The cessation of nescience {avidyd) is released and this cessation takes place only through the knowledge of B.' (p. vii56l). But the two understand these words in totally different ways.
This we see from the fact that the terms ^knowing' (yid) and ,meditating' (upas) are indiscriminately used in the Upanisads with regard to the same object, cf. Ch. Up. m.18. 1 &6, Br.Up.i. 4. 7, Ch.Up.iv. 1. 6 &iv. 2. 2 (p. vii 621). Now ^meditation' (dhyana) means uninterrupted steady remembrance. For this reason Ch. Up. vii. 26. 2 mentions ,remembrance' {smrti) as the means for release (p. 622). The parallel passage, Mu. Up. ii. 2. 8, mentions , seeing' (drsta) in the place of ,remembrance', which shows that the remembrance which leads to release must be so vivid that it acquires the nature of , seeing', i. e. of direct visual perception (pratyaksata) (pp. vii626&628). Only he can attain to the Supreme Person, who possesses the remembrance (of B.), which has acquired the nature of direct perception, and who has become extremely fond of it (i. e. of remembering B.) because of his most intense love of the object of his remembrance (viz. B.). This kind of steady re- membrance is known by the name of Bhakti (devoted attachment) (p. vii 630). jHence knowledge which is the means for attaining B. is meditation, practised day by day, made constantly intenser by re- petition, and continued till death' (p. vii 634).
Thus the knowledge that leads to final release has two elements : firstly the possession of the right knowledge of the nature of B. as taught in the Upani- sads; and secondly, being able to realise always the immediate pre- sence of B. (Brahma-sdksatkdra) by repeated meditations on its nature.
All such karman increases in us the qualities of rajas and tamas, which oppose the quality of pure sattva, which is needed in order that the true knowledge may arise in us (p. vii 672). Hence before we attain the true knowledge of B. it is necess- ary that all the undesirable karman is destroyed; and this can be done only by perfoi'ining the prescribed religious duties without de- siring a reward for them (p. vii 674)or as R. puts it in another place (p. X 313), with the sole object of propitiating the Supreme Person.
Then according to Br, Up. in. 5 there are three conditions which help the rise of Vidya, viz. l) learning (panditya), 2) being like a child (bdlya), 3) sageness (mauna). Firstly, one must possess learn- ing, i. e, one must have the knowledge of the pure and perfect nature of B. and get it fixed through hearing and thinking and through increasing the quality of sattva in oneself by means of devotion to the Supreme Person (p. 899). Then secondly one must be like a child, which means that one must be free from self-conceit, and not that one has to assume all the ways of a child, such as wilful be- haviour, and so on (p. 902 f.). And lastly one must be a sage, i. e. one must be able to practise concentrated meditation on B. (p. 900).
Following the Vdkyakdra (i. e. Tafika) R. mentions seven con- ditions as helpful to the attainment of Vidya. They are l) keeping the body unpolluted by unclean food (viveka),'^ 2) absence of attach-
ment (yimoka), 3) repeated reflection (abhydsa), 4) performance of religious works (kriyd), 5) good conduct (kalydna), 6) freedom from dejection {anavasddd) and 7) freedom from exultation (anuddharsa) (pp. VII 634 f.).
In all the Vidyas the meditator must meditate on B., not as different from himself, but as his Soul, i. e. he must consider B. related to himself in the same way as he is related to his own body (p. 915). In some of the Vidyas B. is represented under some symbol {Pratika)'^ but the only adequate symbol for B. is an individual soul, as freed from all connexion with matter. Hence only those who meditate on B. either directly or under the symbol of an individual soul, disconnected from matter, are led to final re- lease; whereas those who meditate on B. under some other symbol are not (p. 1000). The meditations are to be practised in a sitting posture (p. 925). There is no particular time or place fixed for them. They can be practised at any time and at any place, which are suited for the concentration of mind (p. 927).
According to Vedanta karman is divided into two portions, l) prdrabdha (what has commenced to operate) and 2) samcita (accumulated). Our bodies and surroundings as well as all our present experiences are the consequences of the prarahdha portion of our karman. Besides this portion there is a whole, beginningless mass of our karman, which is called samcita. It is karman only of the latter class that is destroyed through the rise of the Vidya. The prdrabdha karman, on the other hand, persists; and only after suffer- ing its full consequences can one attain final release. For the retribution of the prdrabdha karman, the present life may be sufficient, or it be to be born ^ may necessary again (p. 945).
Though B. is omnipresent, the Vidvan must go to a definite place in order to completely get rid of nescience' (p. 997). Here he is freed from all connection with matter i. e. attains final release.
The released souls can also go at will to all the different material worlds (yikdraloka) and freely enjoy all the pleasures in them (Ch. Up. VII. 25. 2) (p. 1043). But the joys they enjoy there are not limited and passing. Because they do not look upon the objects of their enjoyment by themselves, and as such, liable to change (yikdra), but as the manifestations of B.'s glory (p. 1044), When one is still subject to karman and therefore looks upon the world as different from B., the world seems painful or at best of limited pleasure. But when one is freed from karman and can look upon the world as the manifestation of B.'s glory, the same world seems full of bHss (p. xin 468).
The released souls, being completely freed from the bondage of karman and having their power of knowledge no more contracted, find their highest joy in the communion with the infinitely bliss- ful B., who has been the sole object of their love; and consequently they cannot wish for anything else or want to do something that might put them back again into samsara. The Supreme Person too most intensely loves those, who have perfectly reaHsed His nature {jnanin) (Glta vii. 17—18), and therefore having got them once. He will never wish to send them back. Hence when the souls are once released, they do not again return to samsara (p. 1048).
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