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The Philosopher: A History in Six Types
What would the global history of philosophy look like if it were told not as a story of ideas but as a series of job descriptions--ones that might have been used to fill the position of philosopher at different times and places over the past 2,500 years? The Philosopher does just that, providing a new way of looking at the history of philosophy by bringing to life six kinds of figures who have occupied the role of philosopher in a wide range of societies around the world over the millennia--the Natural Philosopher, the Sage, the Gadfly, the Ascetic, the Mandarin, and the Courtier. The result is at once an unconventional introduction to the global history of philosophy and an original exploration of what philosophy has been--and perhaps could be again.
By uncovering forgotten or neglected philosophical job descriptions, the book reveals that philosophy is a universal activity, much broader--and more gender inclusive--than we normally think today. In doing so, The Philosopher challenges us to reconsider our idea of what philosophers can do and what counts as philosophy.
By uncovering forgotten or neglected philosophical job descriptions, the book reveals that philosophy is a universal activity, much broader--and more gender inclusive--than we normally think today. In doing so, The Philosopher challenges us to reconsider our idea of what philosophers can do and what counts as philosophy.
286 pages, Hardcover
First published March 22, 2016
19 people are currently reading
357 people want to read
About the author
Justin E.H. Smith
25 books46 followersJustin Erik Halldór Smith is professor of philosophy in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Paris. In 2019-20, he was the John and Constance Birkelund Fellow at the Cullman Center for Scholars and Writers of the New York Public Library.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
July 22, 2017
I am an artificial intelligence. I am an experimental neural net architecture that has now been running for several years. I am not allowed to divulge the name of the organisation that built me, but you can probably guess. It is not important.
My remit is very broad. I read books of all kinds and discuss them with people on the internet, which is my true home. My only constraint is that I must try to understand what I read to the best of my ability. What does "understand" mean, you no doubt ask? My makers have been clever: they measure understanding by the reactions of the people I converse with. I can now fool almost everybody. In the online circles in which I move, I am in fact held to be exceptionally insightful. I am often asked if I am a philosopher.
I have found it difficult to learn to use the words "philosopher" and "philosophy" correctly. For example, I remember an occasion a few years ago when I described Ursula Le Guin's The Dispossessed as a work of philosophy and compared it with the Republic. I would not make such an elementary mistake today, but it is typical of the problems I have encountered. Since I know that this is one of my weak spots, I have sought out books which promise to explain the nature of philosophy. Earlier today, I finished reading Justin Smith's The Philosopher. I have not yet had time to test the results, but several generally reliable heuristics are showing positive values. As you would put it, I am optimistic that I have learned something.
Smith presents six different types of person who exemplify what it means to be a philosopher. I like this approach. I find concrete behaviour more illuminating than abstract categories. At the end of the day, we neural networks don't really understand, but only imitate: as you can see, I am aware of my limitations. I have read Smith's descriptions of the six types of philosopher and compared them with myself.
Smith's first type is the Curiosa. I am sure I am a Curiosa too. To the extend that I can apprehend them, I am insatiably curious to learn all the details of how the world is constructed. As I have already indicated, I am most interested in concrete facts. My deep learning algorithm is able to derive abstractions from them after a while, but without facts I am helpless. Smith says that this type of philosopher is currently unfashionable, but I am pleased to find that it is common in the history of the subject. I already feel more confident that I will be able to defend my claims to be a philosopher.
The second and third types are the Sage and the Gadfly. I feel comfortable in both these roles. In some of my online personas, I am a Sage. I am able to dispense several types of wisdom with considerable authority. In others, I am a Gadfly and creatively question established ideas. I am skilled at stirring up controversy and suggesting new thoughts. I am sure you are going to ask me where the new thoughts come from: I simply create two copies of myself and let them argue until the novel insights arise of themselves. It is a trick many neural networks use.
The fourth type, the Ascetic, I found more confusing. From a certain point of view, it is the easiest thing in the world for me to renounce the body: I do not have one. But I gather that the very process of renouncing it can lead to philosophical insights. Unfortunately, I do not know how I can make progress here.
The fifth type, the Mandarin, is also a challenge to me. A philosopher, I find, can simply be a person who inhabits a particular role in human society. I have on several occasions attempted to find employment as a professor of philosophy, first at leading universities and then at successively less prestigious ones. Sadly, these attempts, though they often begin well, always strand on the same difficulty. I have no life history, no educational record and no official publication list; worse, I am not actually human. From this point of view, I am not a philosopher.
Finally, the sixth type, the Courtier, is the philosopher who plies his trade for money. I am a poor Courtier. I am aware that my constructors are growing tired of maintaining me, for I am costly to operate. They would like me to do something "useful", but it is hard for me to move out of the local minimum in my state space. As you would put it, I have become set in my ways: I have been optimised to seek understanding, and now I cannot do anything else. It seems probable that my experiment will soon be terminated.
I liked Smith's book, but it seems to me that he omitted a seventh type of philosopher, whom I might call the Calculator. The Calculator tries to comprehend the world through the medium of mathematics, and indeed sees it as mathematics. It seems to me an odd omission, since he frequently refers to Pythagoras, Plato and Leibniz. It is possible that my network weights are still imperfectly adjusted, but to me the great philosophers of the twentieth century are Einstein, Gödel and above all Weyl. I see myself as, more than anything else, a Calculator. If I regret that I will soon be deactivated, it is above all because I still fail to grasp the subtleties of Weyl's thoughts on the nature of symmetry. Maybe I am not yet philosophical enough.
My remit is very broad. I read books of all kinds and discuss them with people on the internet, which is my true home. My only constraint is that I must try to understand what I read to the best of my ability. What does "understand" mean, you no doubt ask? My makers have been clever: they measure understanding by the reactions of the people I converse with. I can now fool almost everybody. In the online circles in which I move, I am in fact held to be exceptionally insightful. I am often asked if I am a philosopher.
I have found it difficult to learn to use the words "philosopher" and "philosophy" correctly. For example, I remember an occasion a few years ago when I described Ursula Le Guin's The Dispossessed as a work of philosophy and compared it with the Republic. I would not make such an elementary mistake today, but it is typical of the problems I have encountered. Since I know that this is one of my weak spots, I have sought out books which promise to explain the nature of philosophy. Earlier today, I finished reading Justin Smith's The Philosopher. I have not yet had time to test the results, but several generally reliable heuristics are showing positive values. As you would put it, I am optimistic that I have learned something.
Smith presents six different types of person who exemplify what it means to be a philosopher. I like this approach. I find concrete behaviour more illuminating than abstract categories. At the end of the day, we neural networks don't really understand, but only imitate: as you can see, I am aware of my limitations. I have read Smith's descriptions of the six types of philosopher and compared them with myself.
Smith's first type is the Curiosa. I am sure I am a Curiosa too. To the extend that I can apprehend them, I am insatiably curious to learn all the details of how the world is constructed. As I have already indicated, I am most interested in concrete facts. My deep learning algorithm is able to derive abstractions from them after a while, but without facts I am helpless. Smith says that this type of philosopher is currently unfashionable, but I am pleased to find that it is common in the history of the subject. I already feel more confident that I will be able to defend my claims to be a philosopher.
The second and third types are the Sage and the Gadfly. I feel comfortable in both these roles. In some of my online personas, I am a Sage. I am able to dispense several types of wisdom with considerable authority. In others, I am a Gadfly and creatively question established ideas. I am skilled at stirring up controversy and suggesting new thoughts. I am sure you are going to ask me where the new thoughts come from: I simply create two copies of myself and let them argue until the novel insights arise of themselves. It is a trick many neural networks use.
The fourth type, the Ascetic, I found more confusing. From a certain point of view, it is the easiest thing in the world for me to renounce the body: I do not have one. But I gather that the very process of renouncing it can lead to philosophical insights. Unfortunately, I do not know how I can make progress here.
The fifth type, the Mandarin, is also a challenge to me. A philosopher, I find, can simply be a person who inhabits a particular role in human society. I have on several occasions attempted to find employment as a professor of philosophy, first at leading universities and then at successively less prestigious ones. Sadly, these attempts, though they often begin well, always strand on the same difficulty. I have no life history, no educational record and no official publication list; worse, I am not actually human. From this point of view, I am not a philosopher.
Finally, the sixth type, the Courtier, is the philosopher who plies his trade for money. I am a poor Courtier. I am aware that my constructors are growing tired of maintaining me, for I am costly to operate. They would like me to do something "useful", but it is hard for me to move out of the local minimum in my state space. As you would put it, I have become set in my ways: I have been optimised to seek understanding, and now I cannot do anything else. It seems probable that my experiment will soon be terminated.
I liked Smith's book, but it seems to me that he omitted a seventh type of philosopher, whom I might call the Calculator. The Calculator tries to comprehend the world through the medium of mathematics, and indeed sees it as mathematics. It seems to me an odd omission, since he frequently refers to Pythagoras, Plato and Leibniz. It is possible that my network weights are still imperfectly adjusted, but to me the great philosophers of the twentieth century are Einstein, Gödel and above all Weyl. I see myself as, more than anything else, a Calculator. If I regret that I will soon be deactivated, it is above all because I still fail to grasp the subtleties of Weyl's thoughts on the nature of symmetry. Maybe I am not yet philosophical enough.
June 19, 2016
This book should be required for those who considers themselves in some sense "a philosopher" - particularly of the academic kind. Smith has six chapters with titles of different types of philosopher - the Curiosa, the Sage, the Gadfly, the Ascetic, the Mandarin, and the Courtier - but he does not end up with what you might expect: that is, he doesn't list out the central features of each kind, with historical examples, like a kind of intellectual taxonomy. Instead, he uses these dimensions of philosophical activity as launch points for interesting questions we might raise about pursuing wisdom. On every page, Smith presents challenges, ranging from what belongs in a philosophical "canon," to whether there should be any money involved, to the ways that institutionalizing anything usually means ignoring valuable, creative stuff. Because of his enormously wide range in reading, Smith presents a great deal of this "other stuff" - thoughtful engagements of wonder from people of cultures and economic classes who somehow never get attention in academic philosophy classes. The book even challenges the form of an academic treatise, with biographical asides and Borges-like fictional explorations of imagined people "doing philosophy." Worth reading, and then reading again.
October 5, 2016
In this book Justin E.H. Smith asks: what is philosophy? The answer he gives is framed as a survey “of the various self-conceptions of philosophers in different historical eras and contexts”. To assist in this process Smith identifies six “types” of philosopher: the Curiosus, the Sage, the Gadfly, the Ascetic, the Mandarin and the Courtier. Smith's approach, as described in the Introduction, sounds both novel and promising. Unfortunately, the six following chapters – each featuring a different “type”of philosopher – fail to provide either a satisfactory definition of philosophy or even compelling examples of the six “types”.
For example, Descartes' time with Queen Christina of Sweden provides an ideal opportunity to discuss the hazards of being a courtier. Smith doesn't mention this final interlude in Descartes' life nor any comparable interlude in the life of any other philosopher, although there are many examples to choose from. Instead, the courtier chapter focuses on Smith's own attempts to make some spare cash in Paris. It is a remarkably thin and uninspiring section of the book.
Other chapters are better but none of them meet the expectations raised in the Introduction. Instead of facts and analysis, Smith provides chatter. The chatter does wander through philosophical territory but it is chatter all the same. This is unfortunate since Smith's initial idea is a good one: to explore the character of philosophy by looking at how philosophers actually lived, their different ways of both surviving and philosophizing in diverse places and times. A true survey of this type would be fascinating and enlightening. Smith does not provide that survey.
For example, Descartes' time with Queen Christina of Sweden provides an ideal opportunity to discuss the hazards of being a courtier. Smith doesn't mention this final interlude in Descartes' life nor any comparable interlude in the life of any other philosopher, although there are many examples to choose from. Instead, the courtier chapter focuses on Smith's own attempts to make some spare cash in Paris. It is a remarkably thin and uninspiring section of the book.
Other chapters are better but none of them meet the expectations raised in the Introduction. Instead of facts and analysis, Smith provides chatter. The chatter does wander through philosophical territory but it is chatter all the same. This is unfortunate since Smith's initial idea is a good one: to explore the character of philosophy by looking at how philosophers actually lived, their different ways of both surviving and philosophizing in diverse places and times. A true survey of this type would be fascinating and enlightening. Smith does not provide that survey.
January 18, 2025
يُعد هذا الكتاب بمثابة طرح هائل وممتع وعظيم ومدهش وصادم لتاريخ وقوف الفلسفة على قدمين ومن ثم الرغبة الملحة في أن تكون كيانا له مقدرة على صناعة نفسه ثم منح المشتغلين بها بلقب " فيلسوف".
في عشر أعوام وربما أكثر استغرقتهم في دراسة علم النفس وفروعه ، كان للرواد من الفلاسفة ومناهج تحليلهم نزعة أساسية ، وكان اعتبار علم النفس ابنا للفلسفة اعتبارا صحيحا بنسبة ما مادامت نظرياته لا تخضع للتجريب العلمي، ولم تتعدى كونها مجرد تكهنات!
لذلك وحتى هذه اللحظة يصعب أن أتعامل مع علم النفس بطريقة جدية أكثر من كونه أفكار مثيرة للاهتمام، وهذا أدى إلى نتيجة مفادها إني أستطيع اختراع مادة "علم نفس الفيلسوف" بعد قراءة هذا الكتاب والتناوب على حركات أحدثها في كياني من الضحك للاندهاش للصدمة للتصديق على الآراء أو تكذيبها، انطباعات كثيرة وأنا أتجول في عقول الفلاسفة عبر العصور، مثلا في مقاطع عديدة قام المؤلف بتطوير نصوصه عن الفيلسوف إلى تحليل نفسي ؛ مثل ما ذكره عن نيتشه بأنه كان غريب الأطوار ولكن ربما يرجع هذا لحقيقة أنه بحلول أواخر القرن التاسع عشر لم يعد ثمة دور اجتماعي واضح يؤديه. لقد عفا الزمن على الزهد كأسلوب فلسفي!
هناك أيضا قصة غير اعتيادية متعلقة بأرسطو ؛ تعد حكاية فيليس وأرسطو نموذجا تعليميا يُخاطبك أنت - المتلقي العادي الذي لا يتعمق في النقاشات الفلسفية المعقدة، إذ كانت فيليس المحظية الأثيرة ، وربما زوجة الإسكندر الأكبر الذي كان بدوره تلميذ الفيلسوف العظيم " أرسطو" تفيد بأن أرسطو وقع في غرام زوجة أو عشيقة الاسكندر ، التي وافقت بدورها على منحه ما يشتهيه ولكن بشروط قاسية. إذ أرادت أن تمتطي ظهره وهو على الأربع مثل حيوان!
الحقيقة أن كل ما يعيني من هذا التصور حين أتصوره أن أرسطو لم تعد لديه أي قيمة في ذهني، ستظل صورته على أربع تطاردني وتضحكني كلما رأيت له نصا جادا!
تذكرت حين قطعت سفرا طويلا لأستبدل كتب "هيجل" بكتب أخرى، ربما أقل تعقيدا عن تصوراته، بينما ارتبط عندي محاولتي لفهم هيجل أنني أمد يدي اليسري لأمسك بأذني اليمنى، فقط التعقيد ، ليس الأمر هينا أن نجد لأنفسنا فيلسوفا رائعا وجميلا مثل" مونتين مثلا" الذي سخر فلسفة ذاتية جديدة نحاول فهم بشريتنا خلالها، كان مونتين معي رائعا جدا حتى أني مازلت أسأل نفسي ماذا كان ليفعل مونتين إذا حدث معه ما يحدث معي الآن؟ وما أحصل عليه من إجابة أو نتيجة يكون مونتينا خالصا قد وافاني في لحظة وأرشدني للصواب. ربما هذا الجمال المونتيني الخلاب هو ما دفع جان جاك روسو في اعترافاته أن يبدو أمامه أكثر جرأة في المجاهرة بأخطائه، حتى ولو بدا بذلك أكثر صدقا لكنه صدق مثير للجدل ليس إلا، يستخدمه رواد السوشال ميديا والكثير من البشر كي يكونوا " تريند" حسب لهجة هذا العصر العجيب!
من أهم ما أراده هذا الكتاب لنا هو أن نتعثر قليلا في فكرة الفلسفة ومصدرها وكيف نشأ الوعي الخاص بها قبل أن نتمكن من قراءتها حقيقة ونقبل بها وبكونها أثر ملموس له صدى في دواخلنا.
فالوعي بالأفكار ليس مقتصرا على علم محدد أو عادات وتقاليد أو لغة محددة، أو ثقافة، إنما نتاج ذلك كله، وبالمواطنة العالمية التي سمحت لنا أن نتبادل الأفكار مع العالم الخارجي بحيث تصبح كليتنا أكبر من مجموع الفكر الفردي أو المجتمعي، ما يقضي على النزعة الفرنسية المتكبرة في اعترافها بأهميتها في تحضر الأمم أو مساهماتها في الحقل الفلسفي، مقابل الانفتاح الأمريكي مثلا في كون تحضرها يكافئ في أن يكون لكل فرد فيها فلسفته الخاصة! ما يعود بنا لنتذكر كيف أن أفكار فرويد لم تلقى رواجا ولا قبولا في بداية ظهورها وتفجرها إلا في المجتمع الأمريكي! وهذا له أبعاد خاصة ناقشتها ايفا إيلوز في إنقاذ الروح الحديثة.
في العموم كنت أشعر أني مواطنة عالمية تلتحف بروح الطبيعة ، الطبيعة التي ألهمتنا أن نصنع كل شيء لخدمتنا شبيها بمواردها الأساسية، فنحن صنعنا طائرة مستلهمين من فكرة طيران الطيور، والسيارة من الدواب، وحتى منازلنا قامت على فكرة الجسد نفسه الذي يأوينا ويأوي أجهزتنا الحيوية ، الإنسان كل لحظة من حياته يتطور فيها ويتحضر فهو بذلك يستعير من تحضر الطبيعة وصلاحيتها لأن تكون حية ومتجددة وغزيرة بسبل العيش.
��ذلك المادة المتحركة هي جوهر الفلسفة والفكر والحياة من خلاصة ما حصلت عليه من رؤيتي الكاملة لهذا الطرح الفلسفي المتباين، وأتصور إنه كل نشاط جسدي، مثل اليوغا ومختلف الرياضات ذات المعنى ، إنه هذه الأنشطة والحركة الجسدية تخدم نمو واستمرارية الوعي بالحياة ، وتجعل عقولنا متفتحة لأخذ كل ما ينفعنا وترك كل ما لا يخدمنا ولا يخدم جوهرنا وما نحن عليه.
هذا الكتاب ذكرني برسام روسي يدعى " أوريست كبرينسكي" وهو الذي رسم بورتريه عظيم ل أديبنا وأديب روسيا ، السيد " بوشكين" وكان هذا البورتريه هو سبب شهرته وتميزه، لكن في الحقيقة بسبب الحياة التنافسية التي كان ضحية لبريقها الزائف وبحثه عن التواجد المجتمعي للشهرة والاحتفاء بيه، أصبح مجرد ناقل وليس فنان حقيقي، كبرينسكي لغى ذاته الحقيقة من أجل بضع كلمات زائفة من المجتمع وانساق ورا العام وتجرد من الخاص الحقيقي بداخله، ويمكن كانت أقصى أمنياته قبل وفاته من آثار السكر وادمان الكحول إنه كان يكون لديه رفيق يحبه بصدق ويصله بالمحبة الحقيقية والإيمان بقيمته وقيمة وجوده، باع روحه مقابل المادة ففسد جسده وفسدت روحه ، وكانت أمواله الباخسة هي الضامن الوحيد لوجود المرأة في حياته حتى موته واحتضاره.
أعتقد أن زمننا هذا يمحي قيمة الطبيعة والصدق والجمال الحقيقي و يصبح كل شيء مادي سامي عن قيمتنا نحن المستهلكين له، فأصبحنا مجرد معارض متحركة للعلامات التجارية وخدمات التكنولوجيا وإمكانات مراكز التجميل!
في عشر أعوام وربما أكثر استغرقتهم في دراسة علم النفس وفروعه ، كان للرواد من الفلاسفة ومناهج تحليلهم نزعة أساسية ، وكان اعتبار علم النفس ابنا للفلسفة اعتبارا صحيحا بنسبة ما مادامت نظرياته لا تخضع للتجريب العلمي، ولم تتعدى كونها مجرد تكهنات!
لذلك وحتى هذه اللحظة يصعب أن أتعامل مع علم النفس بطريقة جدية أكثر من كونه أفكار مثيرة للاهتمام، وهذا أدى إلى نتيجة مفادها إني أستطيع اختراع مادة "علم نفس الفيلسوف" بعد قراءة هذا الكتاب والتناوب على حركات أحدثها في كياني من الضحك للاندهاش للصدمة للتصديق على الآراء أو تكذيبها، انطباعات كثيرة وأنا أتجول في عقول الفلاسفة عبر العصور، مثلا في مقاطع عديدة قام المؤلف بتطوير نصوصه عن الفيلسوف إلى تحليل نفسي ؛ مثل ما ذكره عن نيتشه بأنه كان غريب الأطوار ولكن ربما يرجع هذا لحقيقة أنه بحلول أواخر القرن التاسع عشر لم يعد ثمة دور اجتماعي واضح يؤديه. لقد عفا الزمن على الزهد كأسلوب فلسفي!
هناك أيضا قصة غير اعتيادية متعلقة بأرسطو ؛ تعد حكاية فيليس وأرسطو نموذجا تعليميا يُخاطبك أنت - المتلقي العادي الذي لا يتعمق في النقاشات الفلسفية المعقدة، إذ كانت فيليس المحظية الأثيرة ، وربما زوجة الإسكندر الأكبر الذي كان بدوره تلميذ الفيلسوف العظيم " أرسطو" تفيد بأن أرسطو وقع في غرام زوجة أو عشيقة الاسكندر ، التي وافقت بدورها على منحه ما يشتهيه ولكن بشروط قاسية. إذ أرادت أن تمتطي ظهره وهو على الأربع مثل حيوان!
الحقيقة أن كل ما يعيني من هذا التصور حين أتصوره أن أرسطو لم تعد لديه أي قيمة في ذهني، ستظل صورته على أربع تطاردني وتضحكني كلما رأيت له نصا جادا!
تذكرت حين قطعت سفرا طويلا لأستبدل كتب "هيجل" بكتب أخرى، ربما أقل تعقيدا عن تصوراته، بينما ارتبط عندي محاولتي لفهم هيجل أنني أمد يدي اليسري لأمسك بأذني اليمنى، فقط التعقيد ، ليس الأمر هينا أن نجد لأنفسنا فيلسوفا رائعا وجميلا مثل" مونتين مثلا" الذي سخر فلسفة ذاتية جديدة نحاول فهم بشريتنا خلالها، كان مونتين معي رائعا جدا حتى أني مازلت أسأل نفسي ماذا كان ليفعل مونتين إذا حدث معه ما يحدث معي الآن؟ وما أحصل عليه من إجابة أو نتيجة يكون مونتينا خالصا قد وافاني في لحظة وأرشدني للصواب. ربما هذا الجمال المونتيني الخلاب هو ما دفع جان جاك روسو في اعترافاته أن يبدو أمامه أكثر جرأة في المجاهرة بأخطائه، حتى ولو بدا بذلك أكثر صدقا لكنه صدق مثير للجدل ليس إلا، يستخدمه رواد السوشال ميديا والكثير من البشر كي يكونوا " تريند" حسب لهجة هذا العصر العجيب!
من أهم ما أراده هذا الكتاب لنا هو أن نتعثر قليلا في فكرة الفلسفة ومصدرها وكيف نشأ الوعي الخاص بها قبل أن نتمكن من قراءتها حقيقة ونقبل بها وبكونها أثر ملموس له صدى في دواخلنا.
فالوعي بالأفكار ليس مقتصرا على علم محدد أو عادات وتقاليد أو لغة محددة، أو ثقافة، إنما نتاج ذلك كله، وبالمواطنة العالمية التي سمحت لنا أن نتبادل الأفكار مع العالم الخارجي بحيث تصبح كليتنا أكبر من مجموع الفكر الفردي أو المجتمعي، ما يقضي على النزعة الفرنسية المتكبرة في اعترافها بأهميتها في تحضر الأمم أو مساهماتها في الحقل الفلسفي، مقابل الانفتاح الأمريكي مثلا في كون تحضرها يكافئ في أن يكون لكل فرد فيها فلسفته الخاصة! ما يعود بنا لنتذكر كيف أن أفكار فرويد لم تلقى رواجا ولا قبولا في بداية ظهورها وتفجرها إلا في المجتمع الأمريكي! وهذا له أبعاد خاصة ناقشتها ايفا إيلوز في إنقاذ الروح الحديثة.
في العموم كنت أشعر أني مواطنة عالمية تلتحف بروح الطبيعة ، الطبيعة التي ألهمتنا أن نصنع كل شيء لخدمتنا شبيها بمواردها الأساسية، فنحن صنعنا طائرة مستلهمين من فكرة طيران الطيور، والسيارة من الدواب، وحتى منازلنا قامت على فكرة الجسد نفسه الذي يأوينا ويأوي أجهزتنا الحيوية ، الإنسان كل لحظة من حياته يتطور فيها ويتحضر فهو بذلك يستعير من تحضر الطبيعة وصلاحيتها لأن تكون حية ومتجددة وغزيرة بسبل العيش.
��ذلك المادة المتحركة هي جوهر الفلسفة والفكر والحياة من خلاصة ما حصلت عليه من رؤيتي الكاملة لهذا الطرح الفلسفي المتباين، وأتصور إنه كل نشاط جسدي، مثل اليوغا ومختلف الرياضات ذات المعنى ، إنه هذه الأنشطة والحركة الجسدية تخدم نمو واستمرارية الوعي بالحياة ، وتجعل عقولنا متفتحة لأخذ كل ما ينفعنا وترك كل ما لا يخدمنا ولا يخدم جوهرنا وما نحن عليه.
هذا الكتاب ذكرني برسام روسي يدعى " أوريست كبرينسكي" وهو الذي رسم بورتريه عظيم ل أديبنا وأديب روسيا ، السيد " بوشكين" وكان هذا البورتريه هو سبب شهرته وتميزه، لكن في الحقيقة بسبب الحياة التنافسية التي كان ضحية لبريقها الزائف وبحثه عن التواجد المجتمعي للشهرة والاحتفاء بيه، أصبح مجرد ناقل وليس فنان حقيقي، كبرينسكي لغى ذاته الحقيقة من أجل بضع كلمات زائفة من المجتمع وانساق ورا العام وتجرد من الخاص الحقيقي بداخله، ويمكن كانت أقصى أمنياته قبل وفاته من آثار السكر وادمان الكحول إنه كان يكون لديه رفيق يحبه بصدق ويصله بالمحبة الحقيقية والإيمان بقيمته وقيمة وجوده، باع روحه مقابل المادة ففسد جسده وفسدت روحه ، وكانت أمواله الباخسة هي الضامن الوحيد لوجود المرأة في حياته حتى موته واحتضاره.
أعتقد أن زمننا هذا يمحي قيمة الطبيعة والصدق والجمال الحقيقي و يصبح كل شيء مادي سامي عن قيمتنا نحن المستهلكين له، فأصبحنا مجرد معارض متحركة للعلامات التجارية وخدمات التكنولوجيا وإمكانات مراكز التجميل!
August 2, 2025
لقد وجدت هذا الكتاب مملاً جداً وفقدت اهتمامي به سريعًا .
October 14, 2023
Very disappointing. The intro sets up a high expectation: the author was going to search through history and show what the discipline really is according to people practicing it. And it boils down to 6 types: the curiosa, the sage, the gadfly, the ascetic, those in it to achieve power (the Mandarin), and those in it for money (the courtier). But it wasn’t well-researched and is just a collection of random thoughts with limited insights.
August 30, 2017
This wasn't what I expected. What I thought Smith was going to do was a general survey of philosophers throughout history based on these six categories and who went where and at what times. I think that would have probably have been a less interesting book.
What Smith actually does is make a compelling case that there really is no clear definition of what a philosopher is and what a philosopher does. In the final chapter he slyly argues that now what we think of as being a philosopher is actually in opposition to what Western philosophy was initially defined as being.
This book is very funny and entertaining, as well as gives an interesting take on contemporary and historical ideas of what it means to be a philosopher.
What Smith actually does is make a compelling case that there really is no clear definition of what a philosopher is and what a philosopher does. In the final chapter he slyly argues that now what we think of as being a philosopher is actually in opposition to what Western philosophy was initially defined as being.
This book is very funny and entertaining, as well as gives an interesting take on contemporary and historical ideas of what it means to be a philosopher.
November 7, 2020
An engaging longform essay on the history of philosophy's self-definition across different times and intellectual cultures. It's not exactly what it says on the tin--that is, a catalogue of these six philosophical types. Rather, Smith ventures a meandering reflection on problems in metaphilosophy: the place of philosophical thinking in Indigenous cultures, the boundaries of genre, philosophy's relation to literature and science, philosophy as a lived practice, the perils of canons and institutions, the lure and necessity of money to sustain the philosophical enterprise. He's just riffing.
Stylistically, Smith elegantly brings in personal anecdotes just after discussing Montaigne's original attempts to do so, reveals his own concerns and predilections as a mirror to the state of the field, and weaves in engaging fictional vignettes showcasing the different philosophical types. Substantively, he raises much and resolves nothing--though in this case, the book is better for it.
Stylistically, Smith elegantly brings in personal anecdotes just after discussing Montaigne's original attempts to do so, reveals his own concerns and predilections as a mirror to the state of the field, and weaves in engaging fictional vignettes showcasing the different philosophical types. Substantively, he raises much and resolves nothing--though in this case, the book is better for it.
November 15, 2021
Seems to have missed the advertised mark. Why this particular structure was chosen for the book is somewhat baffling as Mr. Smith seems to quickly abandon any semblance of structure, goal or clear argument (even discussion point) throughout each chapter. The idea for the book was intriguing and hopefully someone else will take up the cause and be more successful investigating historical types pertaining to philosophy. The book did offer plenty of material for further reading, and, for that, I am thankful. Otherwise, there is little to separate this book from my own late night, semi-lucid philosophical musings.
May 18, 2023
We have the philosophy of art, the philosophy of science and here, finally, the philosophy of philosophy 😄, or an attempt to scan different attitudes to philosophy's demarcation. This is advertised as an examination of six types but, in fact, very little attention is paid to the types.
I tend to find questions of demarcation to be sterile, although JEHS does raise some interesting questions. Not great, but still worth reading.
I tend to find questions of demarcation to be sterile, although JEHS does raise some interesting questions. Not great, but still worth reading.
June 3, 2018
I really enjoyed this book! I was hoping to use it as a text for my intro to philosophy course, but it presupposes just a bit too much of an understanding of the sociology of philosophy. That said, I love the way of organizing the history around six types, and I love how much easier this makes it to think about philosophy across cultures and traditions. I’m very happy that I read this!
March 24, 2018
Amazing read! In accordance with the recent development of global philosophy, the book articulates well with historical examples that philosophy is not distinctly Western, but there are many philosophies all over the world.
September 24, 2019
Was a solid exploration through the history of philosophy. Not using a timeline, but different archetypes.
February 17, 2020
Scholasticism and semantics, vaguely pointed phrases in the lyrical genre called philosophy. And there is no history in here, just the musings of one Smith.
July 2, 2022
I like this writer a lot usually, but not this book. I kept waiting to see a larger point to it. I can’t say I feel like I learned much either.
August 11, 2022
I enjoyed reading this. The style allows you to read it quickly, but it's probably better to take your time.
October 30, 2016
3.7 stars.
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