Moral Responsibility: An Introduction

Key Concepts in Philosophy (Polity)

by Matthew Talbert

Most people would agree that a small child, or a cognitively impaired adult, is less responsible for their actions, good or bad, than an unimpaired adult. But how do we explain that difference, and how far can anyone be praised or blamed for what they have done?

In this fascinating introduction, Matthew Talbert explores some of the key questions shaping current debates about moral responsibility, including: What is free will, and is it required for moral responsibility? Are we responsible for the unforeseen consequences of our actions? Is it fair to blame people for doing what they believe is right? And are psychopaths open to blame?

As Talbert argues, we are morally responsible for our actions when they are related to us in particular ways: when our actions express our true selves, for example, or when we exercise certain kinds of control over them. It is because we bear these relationships to our actions that we are open to praise and blame.

Moral Responsibility will be an important resource for students and researchers in ethics, moral psychology, and philosophy of agency and of great interest to all those wishing to understand an important aspect of our moral practices.

Genres: Philosophy

192 pages, Paperback

First published February 1, 2016

Reviews

[Brandt · Rating 4 out of 5]

At face value the question seems simple: Should people (all?) be held morally responsible for their behavior? In the question itself, the term all had to be included to distinguish between cases that present a particular problem to the concepts of moral blame and moral praise. This book is an attempt to answer that question from the purview of Attributionism.

Although the book is touted as an introduction to questions that shape the contemporary debate about moral responsibility, it seems evident that this book does not stand alone. To clarify that statement, let me use the example of the novel The Lord of the Rings. The three-volume novel stands by itself; nevertheless, to understand much of it, there is a need to also read J.R.R. Tolkien’s previous work The Hobbit. One can still benefit and understand much of the story line in The Lord of the Rings without it; notwithstanding, to be complete, a reading of The Hobbit seems evident. Such is the case with this work. In many places, it can stand on its own; however, a foundation of previous readings on the topics of free will and determinism would benefit in understanding the work completely.

The main argument from Matthew Talbert seems to be that we are morally responsible for our actions if they relate to us in specified ways; viz., (i) if the actions are a true expression of our Self. And, (ii) if we express control over those actions. If these two conditions hold, then there is a good justification to hold a person morally responsible – of either praise or blame – in such circumstances.

Some key concepts that I found interesting about this book were:
The chapter (3) on History, Luck, and Skepticism. The quote of Karl Marx from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past,” was a great “primer” for the issues of character, value, and desires. Further, the elucidation of the role that moral luck plays in explaining why a person does what they do, instead of focusing on why the choices made give rise to consequences, shows the strange nature of thinking about causality. Moreover, the explanation of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s reason-response mechanism for responsibility viz. the three conditions, posit a somewhat logical understanding, or explanation, of moral responsibility.

Ultimately, Talbert’s point that:

When it comes to assessing a wrongdoer’s blameworthiness, it doesn’t matter whether she could have been expected to conduct herself differently or whether facts about her history and moral competence determined that she would regard her bad behavior as choiceworthy.

This appears correct. It has the structure of the sufficient condition that if a person has governed their behavior in a way that is at odds with others, then this behavior “ought to be weighed in practical reasoning” (p. 151). Therefore, the governing of one’s self appears to be compatible with the way the world may be determined.

[Kramer Thompson · Rating 3 out of 5]

A really excellent overview of the contemporary moral responsibility debate. Talbert covered a wide range of topics and managed to provide quite a lot of detail while remaining a breeze to read. A very enjoyable and informative book.