It Never Snows In September: The German View of MARKET-GARDEN and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944

by Robert Kershaw

Now available in B-format paperback, this excellently reviewed title records the German view of Operation 'Market Garden' and the Battle of Arnhem in September 1944.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Nonfiction, War, Military Fiction, Germany

436 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1990

About the author

Born in 1950 and a graduate of Reading University, Robert Kershaw joined the Parachute Regiment in 1973.

He served numerous regimental appointments until selected to command the 10th Battalion The Parachute Regiment (10 PARA). He attended the German Staff College (Fuhrungsakademie) spending a further two years with the Bundeswehr as an infantry, airborne and arctic warfare instructor. He speaks fluent German and has extensive experience with NATO, multinational operations and all aspects of operations and training.

His active service includes several tours in Northern Ireland, the First Gulf War and Bosnia. He has exercised in many parts of the world and served in the Middle East and Africa. His final army appointment was with the Intelligence Division at HQ NATO in Brussels Belgium.

On leaving the Army in 2006 he became a full-time author of military history as well as a consultant military analyst. He has written a paper on the military impact of HIV AIDS for Cranfield University and more recently was the historical editor for ParaData, an on-line archive for the Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces.

Reviews

[JD · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having read a few books about Operation Market Garden, this book was great as it gives you the other side of the battle from the Germans' perspective. It covers all the units, troop movements and engagements and is very well researched and detailed. But, at times it gets too detailed and the book losses momentum because of this. Still a good book and brings a lot to the Market Garden reading table.

[Dimitri · Rating 4 out of 5]

History shouldn't always be written by the winner, least of all the history of warfare. In the case of Market Garden I must say that the enemy view helps a LOT in understanding the pockets-on-a-string nature of the engagement.

Plus, Robert Kershaw can write . By the standards of military history, he's entered my list of authors whose 'turds still are a fun read'.

True to their training Kampfgruppen and assorted groups of German soldiers too motley to deserve the name rushed in to contain the airborne landings asap, wrestling the initiative away from the attackers by "grabbing a corner of the towel" in the best Prussian tradition.

A compliment to any Arnhem array.

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

Robert J. Kershaw's work is a history of the battles fought in southern Holland in September 1944 as part of Operation MARKET-GARDEN. The book is remarkable mainly because it recounts the events as seen through a human perspective and reflects the sights and experience of the ordinary German soldier.

In September 1944, the Allies believed, despite stiffening German resistance, that one more good push after the debacle in Normandy would bring "the whole crumbling German defence edifice down."
The front line was held by remnants of depleted Wehrmacht units. Allied thrusts were intended to improve local tactical positions, and deprive the weary German troops of any chance of rest in the line. "Some of the dead are so mutilated as to be unrecognizable," wrote a German sergeant. "One of our mates committed suicide by hanging. During the night British aircraft drop flares and attack with fighter bombers. We are in a hell of a fine place . . ."

Kershaw creates fascinating descriptions of the structure and psychological outlook of the Wehrmacht units defending southern Holland in September 1944. Those soldiers had undergone quite the transformation from the armies that had manned the Atlantic Wall (an extensive system of coastal defenses and fortifications built by the Nazi between 1942-1944, along the coast of continental Europe and Scandinavia) in June. "A number of different 'types' could be identified among the rank and file," writes the author.
Firstly, "and occupying paramount place", were the alte Hasen (veterans). Many had been previously wounded, some for the third or fourth time. These soldiers preferred after recuperation to return to the same unit, where they could reunite with friends and serve under known officers. Although small in number, this returnees were always greeted with pleasure. They were, describes Kershaw, "the most worthwhile reinforcements": veterans developed their own peculiar "front atmosphere" – a sense of established camaraderie intensified by danger – and, while working within the accepted duty framework, contributed the flexibility required to make an otherwise harsh and uncompromising system work. As Kershaw explains, thus they could generate the sense of "belonging" and "unit pride" essential to any combat
formation that was to have any staying power.
A second "element" were the young and inexperienced soldiers, born between 1924–26, now beginning to arrive in waves as replacements. Most were highly-motivated volunteers, convinced by their National Socialist education that they might achieve final victory. Few of them could boast even days of training, nothing to say of weeks. "Disciplined and willing, their conception of heroic service was to prove a bitter disappointment," comments the author.
Older age groups were also appearing for the first time: fathers of families of up to 40 years old were mixed with previous exemptions from service, such as the non-essential factory workers, small shop-keepers, and petty officials who had hoped to remain in the Reich until the end of the war. After a short training they "fitted in", often looking after the youngsters in their units "with the same fatherly concern they might have shown their own offspring".
Most problematic was the fourth group – the pressed or physically disabled soldiers. Pressed recruits, writes Kershaw, were virtually useless. Called "Hiwis", or Hilfswillige, they were Poles, Czechs or Alsace Germans often employed in logistic units. They were not suitable for combat and often deserted at the first available opportunity.
The weirdest group, however, was born from Goering's unexpected announcement to Hitler that the Luftwaffe was suddenly able to offer 20,000 men to alleviate the acute manpower shortage problem. Recruited primarily into the Luftwaffe-controlled Fallschirmjäger regiments, they were the potential pilots, observers, navigators and signallers who were "emptied from the now redundant Luftwaffe training schools in Germany". As Goering believed, although completely untrained for their role, they were to fight tenaciously, making up for inexperience with courage and zeal. "This collection of fresh youth, picked from among the best manpower in Germany, had yet to experience the carnage and disillusionment of combat as infantry soldiers," recounts Kershaw. Until they did, they were to prove formidable opponents. But first of all they had to be trained. Unit commanders did what they could in the scant time available. Yet, among those recruits, freshly detached from airforce staffs, signals, or from airfields, only the few veterans available were in a position to impart at least a rudimentary infantry training before they departed to the front.

As Kershaw further narrates, the difficulty with all the five types of soldiers entering service in September 1944 was to quickly train and assimilate them. Experience suggested that only unconditional obedience to orders enabled units to survive when engaged in protracted combat. Discipline was therefore harsh, "even draconian", whilst concepts of soldierly "duty and order" were extracted with no compromises. However, relays Kershaw, some varieties of unit, particularly the physically disabled, were "beyond all this": to qualify for admission into an "ear" battalion, for instance, a recruit had to prove he was deaf, had one or two ears missing or badly damaged, together with an additional minor disability such as a missing finger or rheumatism. Thus, the consequences at the front could be practically insurmountable: "Verbal orders could only be given by a frantic series of gestures. Inspecting the guard at night was a nerve-wracking and hazardous task since the men on duty could not hear anyone approach. Thus when suddenly confronted in the dark they fired first and attempted to find out who it was later. In one ear battalion, two sergeants of the guard had been killed this way shortly after the unit went into action. Casualties from artillery fire were also inordinately high because the men could not hear the sound of approaching shells and therefore took to shelter much too late," cites Kershaw POW interrogations.

He also explores an important question – what motivated these disparate and untrained elements in the German army in September 1944 to fight on, when the war at this stage had so clearly been lost.
The catastrophic defeats experienced by the Wehrmacht, both in the east and west, in the summer of 1944 served to emphasise the main factor holding it together until the end: an increasing awareness that the Homeland was now in danger. "This factor alone probably encouraged a will to resist more than the whole sum of National Socialist propaganda," comments Kershaw. Fears that the war may be lost were seldom stated openly, and certainly not mentioned by officers and NCOs to lower ranks; doubts about a happy outcome would have weakened resistance. While the only realistic happy outcome at this stage might be to defend the frontiers of the Reich and negotiate for the pre-war status quo, nobody could imagine the consequences of a total defeat. Even in the "shambles" of the Falaise pocket in Normandy, for example, a corporal had written to his wife on 18 August: ". . . All the other units pulled out without firing a shot and we were left to cover them . . . I wonder what will become of us. The pocket is nearly closed . . . I don't think I shall ever see my home again. However we are fighting for Germany and our children, and what happens to us matters not. I close with the hope that a miracle will happen soon and that I shall see my home again."

In any case, the German soldier's immediate concern was survival. A universal worry was not death, but worse - that one may not come out of the war sound in mind and limb. "Nobody wanted to die a hero's death or suffer mutilation at this stage," asserts Kershaw. "For most, and particularly the veterans, the nerve-racking period was waiting in assembly areas prior to going into battle." The green replacements were blissfully ignorant. In SS-Corporal Wolfgang Dombrowski words, "we believed the war was probably over. But you must realise that we lower ranks were only 18 to 19 years old. Our officers were 24 to 29. Still youngsters! Life's deeper issues did not concern us too much. We were prepared to fight on."

Aside from examining the German army of '44, Robert J. Kershaw provides a brilliant, meticulously detailed and graphic overview of Operation MARKET-GARDEN. While the reader won't find any information about the Allied logistics, the operation itself is excellently recreated through the eyes of the Nazi.

On September 17, an Allied force of 1,545 transport planes and 478 gliders had taken off from airfields around Swindon, Newbury and Grantham. They were escorted by 1,131 fighters. "The stream was 16km wide and 150km in length. Nothing like it had ever been seen before," describes the author. Although the Germans in Holland, used to Allied bombardment, were not alarmed at first, the massive nature of this airborne onslaught gradually became apparent in radio messages from the front. SS dispatch rider Alfred Ziegler was wistfully regarding the landscape north of Arnhem. (He was, as he claimed, "an imaginative fellow, always contemplating things", a characteristic which as a soldier often got him into trouble.) When the transport planes lumbered into sight and began dropping parachutists, he jocularly remarked to his first Sergeant: "They're dropping from the heavens, and it won't be long before we're up there and join them!"
Many, like SS-Lieutenant-Colonel Harzer, saw the British parachutes in the sky over Arnhem, but concluded that it could not be proved at this stage that a large-scale operation was underway, and "sat down quietly to lunch".
SS-Captain Hans Moeller was out walking with his adjutant on "a Sunday with a wonderful blue sky and cirrocumulus clouds above the western horizon". He called to his companion to share his admiration of "such a beautiful spectacle". They were enjoying the stroll. However, as Moeller relates, the scene gradually took on a more sinister hue. "Screwing up their eyes", the commander and the adjutant tried to focus on a strange phenomenon taking shape in the distance:
"These can't be cirrocumulus clouds, these are parachutes!" "Others stopped too, including civilians; everybody seemed captivated and gazed in that direction, where more and more 'fluffy clouds' were appearing," narrates Kershaw. Lieutenant Enthammer wondered too: "That cannot be. It never snows in September! They must be parachutists!" (Here we learn where the book's bizarre title is derived from.)
Field Marshal Model, the commander of Army Group B, was sitting down to lunch with his staff in the Hotel Tafelberg in Arnhem. At about 14:00 his chief of staff Colonel von Tempelhoff excused himself to answer an urgent telephone call. As soon as he left "a succession of explosions accompanied by a deafening roar led to a mad scramble to take cover beneath the dining table," writes Kershaw. After a second series of explosions further away, everyone ran outside to see what was happening. The sky was "black with aircraft". Von Tempelhoff, "disheveled and evidently ruffled", shouted his report: "What an absolute swine! There are one to two parachute divisions right on top of us!"

During the first hour or two, German commanders could not even begin to estimate the size and scope of the Allied operation. Moeller, "driving frantically to his divisional headquarters", tried to collect his thoughts: "What did the future have in store for us? What was going on?"
"A total of 331 British aircraft with 319 gliders and 1,150 American planes towing 106 gliders had aid an airborne 'carpet', concentrating over three zones between Eindhoven and Arnhem," describes Kershaw. Over a period of one hour and 20 minutes, approximately 20,000 parachute and glider-borne infantry landed in good order far behind German lines.

It certainly does not snow in September. The war had reached the Reich, and the blow moreover, had come as a total surprise...

Robert J. Kershaw continues his work with an impressive hour-by-hour account of the battle for the Arnhem bridgehead, which is impossible to summarize in a review. He brilliantly intertwines the suffering of the soldiers caught up in MARKET-GARDEN, the anxiety of the German commanders, and the surprising twists of the sanguinary battle.

What is important to note is that, as Kershaw argues, one of the greatest impacts the battle had upon the German homeland was the overwhelmingly growing awareness of Allied air superiority. The air-landings at Arnhem had changed the status of the lower Rhine communities, causing the area to become an active combat zone.
At the beginning of the war Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering had declared "if ever an enemy plane flies over German soil, I shall henceforth be known by the name 'Hermann Meier[ 'meier' – administrator of a manor, independent peasant]'". "The Luftwaffe supremo had been Hermann Meier for a long time already," remarks Kershaw with a tinge of humor. "'Meier' lost even more credibility as the airborne armadas of 4,600 aircraft hove into sight." Whatever desperate counter-measures were fielded by the Luftwaffe, soldiers and population alike realised just how impotent the Luftwaffe had become. Largely grounded on airfields for lack of fuel, many aircraft were destroyed on the ground without a chance of fighting back. As far as the Germans were concerned, 'Meier's' cause had long since been given up as lost.

IT NEVER SNOWS IN SEPTEMBER is truly an outstanding history. It has it all: graphic descriptions, insightful analysis, pulse-pounding action, a large set of rare photographs, and easily graspable maps. Robert J. Kershaw's style is compelling and fluid; his research is obviously extremely well-done. This book deserves nothing short of five stars.

[Nick · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a difficult review for me to write. It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 is an incredibly detailed look at the 1944 Allied Airborne Operation from the German point-of-view. The amount of research performed by Robert Kershaw is impressive. If I were rating this book on the research alone it would receive five stars. The book addresses both operational and tactical levels of the action across the entire Market-Garden Area of Operation, to include personal accounts at all levels of the battlefield. Unfortunately Mr. Kershaw's research is off-set by a number of factors which truly detracted from the quality of the book.

"It Never Snows in September" suffers from exceptionally poor editing - both from a typesetting and content perspective. It should be noted I read the Kindle version which I understand suffers from additional typesetting issues that the original hardcover did not display. I don't believe the publishing staff proofread the book after it was converted to the Kindle format as there were numerous spelling and punctuation errors you'd normally encounter with books which have been initially converted to an electronic format. These errors were especially aggravating because Mr. Kershaw's writing style can be terse with respect to inter-sentence references. In a few instances the punctuation errors created difficulties understanding the author's narrative. For typesetting this book receives one star.

I discovered from reading reviews of the original hardcover publication it included many pictures and full color maps. The Kindle version is devoid of all pictures. Not that the lack of pictures is that big of a detractor, but if the original publication of the book had them why not include them in the Kindle version? There are maps included in the Kindle version. Don't let the lack of maps in the table of contents fool you. You need to go on a bit of a hunt; the maps are at the very end of the book after the appendices and source listings albeit not in color, rather B&W. It would have been very nice to know that these maps existed before I read three quarters of the book! Even after discovering their existence I was disappointed in the low resolution of the maps. When I zoomed in on the maps to be able to read them the place names became so fuzzy they were almost illegible.

I was shocked at the content editing and review. As a professional historian I would have expected much higher editorial standards. The lack thereof throws a question of belief across all of the research presented in the book. For content editing this book receives one star. Here are a few examples -

While describing the equipment of a Wehrmacht heavy battalion the term "20mm quadruple guns" was used. What the heck kind of weapon is that? Are we referring to anti-aircraft guns? The rest of the equipment within the battalion use standard military weapon language, 81mm mortar, etc. This is just a really poor choice of unconventional titling.

An example of poor usage of English, "Both divisions had probably been reduced to a corps total of 6,000 or 7,000 men." Upon initial read it sounds like the author is describing the reduction of a division down to a corps size, rather than stating the II SS Corps had been reduced to a total 6,000 or 7,000 men between the two divisions.

In another instance the term "teeth arm elements" are used with no description as to what comprises these elements. "Teeth arm elements" is not standard American military terminology. Perhaps it is an British military term?

Here is an example of the poor inter-sentence reference issues which plague this book, "Members of this, the 176 Infantry Division, were manning the line to the left of Erdmann's Parachute Division. Another unit soon to be embroiled in the Market-Garden battles was of similar quality." Is the author referring to the 176 Infantry Division? Erdmann's Parachute Division? Or another division which isn't mentioned?

Here is an imminent example of the poor content editing. Writing about the initial air drops, "The armada, now at drop height, flew steadily north-eastwards disgorging its loads: the 101 (US) Airborne Division in the area of Son, Veghel and Eindhoven, the 82 (US) Airborne Division around Grave and Groesbeek, and 1st British Airborne Division east of Arnhem." East of Arnhem? Really? What map of Holland is the author using?

Reference to Hotel Tafelberg in Arnhem. Normally Hotel Tafelberg is referenced as being in Oosterbeek, not Arnhem. Although one could use this reference if referring to the greater Arnhem area. However, in a detailed account such as "It Never Snows in September" the geographical reference should be as accurate as possible. Arnhem is to general in this case.

One last editorial example for the review, but not the last you'll find in this book, "Nine hours after the airlandings around Groesbeek, the first burst of automatic fire shattered the eerie stillness of Nijmegen by night. It was 1000." The landings of the 82 Airborne at Groesbeek occurred at 1345. Nine hours later would have put the local time at 2245 - definitely night as stated by the author, but not 1000!

In addition to the editing issues there are a few challenges I have to what is written. For example -

The author refers to a "betrayal legend" which arose after the war. The "betrayal legend" is never discussed. Unless the reader is up on the history of this Operation the insight into what this legend is about will never be understood.

The author believes - contrary to many other military historians - that landing the 1st British Airborne closer to the Arnhem bridge would not have lent itself to a higher probability of mission success. The author believes the reaction times of the 9th & 10th SS Panzer Divisions would have been quicker. I wished Mr. Kershaw would have expanded upon this theory. Yes, the SS Panzer Divisions would have been closer, but the British would have immediately taken up defensive positions in an urban setting vice being caught in either open ground or wooded areas. Knowing the kind of fight Frost's 2 PARA put up keeping the Germans at bay from the north end of the Arnhem bridge, it would have been interesting to see what the majority of the division would have been able to do invested in Arnhem proper. I don't believe the 9th & 10th SS Panzer Divisions would have had any easier time with the 1st British Airborne. As a matter of fact I believe the Germans may have had a rougher time of it.

A pet peeve - Heinz Harmel, Commanding Officer 10th SS Panzer Division, was promoted to Brigadefuhrer (Allied equivalent to Brigadier General) on 9 September 1944. Mr. Kershaw continually refers to Harmel's rank throughout the book as a Colonel.

Finally this book is not for the casual reader wanting general information on the Market Garden Operation. Nor should it be the first book for a serious student of the subject. I highly recommend reading a general overview of the Operation such as A Bridge Too Far by Cornelius Ryan, which will provide the required background to better understand what is taking place in "It Never Snows in September".

I also recommend getting a good map of the area of operations. Even with the maps provided in the hardcover version, they will not be sufficient to cover many of the individual actions described in this book.

With a little work this book could have easily had four to five stars. I put the majority of the blame for the lower score on the publisher and editorial staff - or total lack thereof. If you are a serious student of the Market Garden Operation this is an invaluable reference, as you will have the background understanding to know what is taking place and be able to readily overlook many of the content editing errors. All others beware!

[Randy Reigstad · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is not a book for the casual reader. The first thing you need to do is go to the store buy some maps of western Europe, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, a notebook and a good pencil, which I did none of. I have read a number of WW2 books but none of them the German side of the battle. Now I wish I had started sooner. My next read will be The Rise of Germany by James Holland. Being I've reached the age of 83 I'm very fortunate to be able to see the words in the book. Reading has always been my passion and will continue till I can't see the words. I really enjoyed this book, again it illuminates the uselessness of war, I had uncles in WW2, it affected the rest of their lives.

Randy Reigstad

[Jeff Dawson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Five Stars.

I can't say enough about this excellent work. The most telling part of this historical account is where the pivotal part of the battle occurred from the German side and it wasn't Arnhem.

Many of the accounts I've read over the years discussed how it was Bittrick's II SS Corp that thwarted the operation. This to was addressed. Yes, Bittrick's forces where there, but it wasn't they that made first contact with Urquart and the 1st British airborne. It was the adhoc forces hastily organized by the commanders on the ground to set-up defensive positions until Model recovered from the initial shock of the airborne drops on September 17, 1944. Model was an excellent officer but why would he think he was the target? If he'd been captured, how would the British extract him and how would it hasten the wars end?

Why would the Germans fight so tenaciously so late in the war? They were defending their homeland as would any soldier, even if the situation appeared hopeless.

This book is a testament to all men who serve their country. It depicts the human spirit from the most barbaric to humane. It addresses the fog of war and how no matter what plans are being laid out in the safe confines of headquarters, it is the men on the ground who bear the brunt of executing orders no matter how nonsensical they appear.

In today's army, do our leaders and soldiers command the qualities of those who fought so desperately to obtain their objectives (British/German) or defend a position as these men did? For the soldiers, an emphatic yes! Our leaders? History will answer that question.

The only complaint I have is for the publisher. The book I have was re-published in 2008. They need to back and clean-up the editing. The first three quarters of the book was well done. In the last quarter, I felt the sensation the book was being rushed to the presses with all the misspelled words. An easy fix if they'll take the time.

An excellent addition for any military historian.

[carl theaker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book on the German perspective of Market Garden; great photos interspersed
with the text, some color maps, good organization, appendix with order of battle.

Gives you a feeling of how desperate the German counterattacks were and how
successful they were with so little resources. Also a good view of what they
thought of the Americans, not stuff you see in the John Wayne movies.

[Marcus · Rating 5 out of 5]

For those interested in operation Market-Garden (I'm one of those people), this book is an invaluable source of information "from the other side of the hill". Keep in mind that content of this book focuses on operational level of German response to the operation, so the text material deals mainly with actions undertaken by units of at least company size. However, the individual German soldier is not forgotten by the author, who uses snippets of diaries, letters and interviews to convey the personal experiences of men who took part in that battle.

Text material is excellently supported by some of the best maps I've seen in a book about World War II, as well as a multitude of relevant photographs (some published for the very fist time).

I would recommend for this book to be read together with Middlesbrook's "Arnhem 1944". In combination, those two books provide a superb overview of this unique and tragic attempt to end World War II in Europe before end of 1944.

[Perato · Rating 2 out of 5]

2,5 stars rounded down for reasons not necessary the books fault.

The book is what the title tells us, German view of Market-Garden. Because the German side of the battle was very chaotic in terms of fighting forces and having to respond to multitude of different airborne attacks, the actual book feels chaotic too. Not necessarily the books fault, but I was constantly baffled about what was the book talking about, it was hard to keep track of all the kampfguppes and units. The poor and few maps didn't help at all, they could've used heavy redrawing and increase in scale. I felt that I got the battle somewhat organized in my mind after Beevor's and Ryans' books, but now I'm again at loss.

Also the book has one of my pet peeves, talking about photos taken by war correspondents, yet not having the mentioned photos in the book to look at. My edition (Crecy 2019) has no pictures at all, and only maps in glossy pages in the middle. The end of the book has German order of battle's in appendix.

Considering the book is 30 years old and printed and reprinted plenty of times, you would think they would've ironed out he typos and unnecessary tautology.

I'm sure to give it another read in another time to be absolutely sure that it wasn't just me being tired while reading it, but I'm definitely going to read it only after immediately reading another book with better maps.

[Singleton Mosby · Rating 4 out of 5]

Best book I've read so far about the German side of the battle. A lot of personal accounts interwoven with a well researched background. Recommended.

[Rich Taylor · Rating 4 out of 5]

I rate Martin Middlebrook as the best military historian that I have read. In the introduction to his superb 'Arnhem' book he states tat he will not address the German side of the battle because Kershaw has already done suc a good job that there is nothing to add. High praise indeed - and justly deserved.

A very detailed book, with finely judged emphasis and plenty of first hand accounts, telling a side of the story that is poorly explored elsewhere. Excellent analyis and conclusions. A really good counterpoint to Middlebrook.

[William J. · Rating 4 out of 5]

In September 1944 the Allies launched Operation Market-Garden. A lot has been written about it and a famous movie made about it, "A Bridge Too Far." This book by Robert J. Kershaw presents the German view of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem. Although a British Officer of the Parachute Regiment, Kershaw is fluent in German and attended the German Staff Course so he is well qualified to present this perspective.
If there is a better example of what Clausewitz calls Friction and the Fog of War, I have not come across it in my reading. "Clausewitz terms "friction" the "only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper." (119) Friction is caused mainly by the danger of war, by war's demanding physical efforts, and by the presence of unclear information or the fog of war."(http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/c...). German Soldiers were constantly fighting without information as to the enemies strength and capabilities. There was no radio communications among units trying to coordinate attacks because there were no radios. Units were created ad hoc by senior commanders as they rushed reinforcements to stop the Allied progress. Units exhausted and retreating from the Normandy invasion going to Germany to refit were stopped and sent to Arnhem to fight. Troops were exhausted, low of food and had few heavy weapons. Naval forces, Luftwaffe trainees and school cadres were sent as infantry without proper training or leadership. Infantry and tank training school cadres and students were sent to the front. Railway guards and police were mobilized to fight. All were sent into battle piecemeal. It is a wonder they succeeded. The author describes an "ear" battalion where to qualify one had to be deaf, had one or both ears missing together with additional disabilities such as missing a finger (Kershaw, p.p. 51-52). The Germans succeeded in containing the attack through improvisation, excellent staff work, some good tactical leadership and the determination of the individual German soldier.
The author estimates that somewhere between 5,000 and 8,000 German soldiers died in this battle although the official figure is 3,750. The British Airborne Division lost 7,212, the American 82nd Airborne Division lost 1,432, the 101st Airborne Division lost, 2,110, XXX Corps lost 1,480. It was a high price to pay for both sides.
My friend Historian, Bill Speer recommended this book and he was right, it is a good read! It gives an enlightening perspective to this battle. I recommend it to anyone interested in WWII and military history.

[Deckmaster · Rating 5 out of 5]

Quite the intriguing retelling of operation Market-Garden told from the point of view of the Germans, because as we all know history is written by the victor. It is really fascinating to see how the Germans managed to defeat the allies despite suffering the defeat in France literally just days before. It says a lot about the Germans conducting war at such a superior level. As the author points out it had a lot to do with improvisation but still a lot of skill was need to merge the disparate fighting forces in battle-worthy Kampfgruppen. As Oberführer Walter Harzer, acting commander of the 9. SS-Panzer-Division Hohenstaufen during the battle, points out that it was a victory of the common recruit of the Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine or RAD who didn't even had basic infantry training. Yet they stopped an elite British paratrooper division.

The book also has a lot of personal stories of the soldiers that partook in the fighting. I found them to be quite interesting and worth reading.

The only thing that distracts from the reading are large amount of typos. Come on, the book was published in 1990 and my edition is from 2022 (with the StuH 42 on the cover). For 30 years nobody made an attempt to correct the various typos?

Still I give it 5 stars because Mr. Kershaw knows how to tell a tale. I'll be reading other books that he has published and I highly recommend this one to anybody interested in the German pov of the battle.

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

A rare Perspective of the ill-fated MARKET-GARDEN operation from the German side. Written originally as part of a tool to support NATO learning during the Cold War, it focuses on the strategic approach and unit level movements. It does not cover the individual soldiers’ perspective in any real detail, where individuals are quoted this tends to be in reference to unit movements.

However, this is a significant contribution to the historiography of the war and the Operation in particular. Challenging the traditional western Allies centric perspective as to why the operation failed. Yes the Allies made mistakes, the delay in the 82nd taking Nijmegen Bridge, the poor planning by 1st Airborne, and the split drops were significant. But so was the speed of the German response, the blocking by Chill of XXX Corps route, the tactical approach of feeding in troops to counter the airborne forces. There were certainly mistakes made, especially at Arnhem Bridge, but Kershaw demonstrates that the Allies did not simply defeat themselves, but their objectives were defeated by the Germans too.

This paperback version is presented in a (personally) annoying style of two columns per page, and the maps included are difficult to interpret or help contextualise the narrative

[Sue · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very unique book in that it's almost exclusively from the point of view of the Germans in this costly battle. The author makes a strong argument that the Allies failure in most of their objectives wasn't due so much to poor planning and ignoring of intelligence (as movies and some historians imply) than it was to the brilliant commanding of a small handful of German commanders who improvised to counter the surprise attacks. Despite a lack of trained combat-ready troops or proper equipment, they managed to not only prevent a total rout, but rally and defeat far superior paratroop forces. The book also contains some new-to-me photos from private German collections.

My only complaint, and it's a minor one, is that I was hoping for more first-person accounts. If you love pouring over details of almost hour-to-hour strategical maneuvering, this is the book for you! I'll admit, however, that I often found myself skimming paragraphs because that didn't interest me so much.

It's a worthy book if you're interested in this battle, purely for the alternate and rather revealing point of view.

[Maikel · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is really a great book to read tp understand Market-Garden more.

Yet no 5 stars because some town names were not correct.

The book could use some small maps in the chapters to better understand some situations rather than all in the middle of the book.

Nice to see everything in ‘small’ chapters. Although sometimes a little bit too much information to plough through.

I have already ordered Arnhem the Street from Robert. Excited to continue reading.

Yet still there are questions remaining about why the Allies stick to the original plan so much. Why didn’t they drop a small force at Driel already to secure the ferry? Or cut the whole operation in a couple phases to improvise/adjust targets and routes.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was an excellent and detailed account of the Arnhem campaign from the German standpoint. Kershaw looks at the battle from the battalion and even company level. Unfortunately the great narrative detail was hampered by a set of wholly inadequate maps, which made the action hard to follow. If you are going to read this, have Google Maps open and ready to use.

[Allen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Operation Market-Garden from the German perspective. Really interesting, the Germans were masters at throwing ad hoc units together. It also shines a light on how the course of the battle was affected by the lack of intelligence on the ground on both sides - - units frequently had no idea where the enemy was or how many of them there were.

[Frederick · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is very interesting and very thorough. This battle ended badly for the Allies but the German soldiers fought desperately to gain that victory. This is from the German's point of view. People who watched 'Band of Brothers' or 'A Bridge Too Far' will enjoy the change in point of view.

[Valzebub · Rating 4 out of 5]

In all the WWII books I've read, this is the first from the Axis point of view. Very interesting to see how the Germans viewed this battle. Lots of pictures and insight I'd never seen before. A very worthwhile read for any WWII buff.

[Bill V · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a valuable read as it focuses on the German perspective of the war. I didn't find it as interesting compared to other titles on Operation Market-Garden but any student of the battle should read this.

[John Fletcher · Rating 5 out of 5]

Searing account of the battle. Etched on my memory.

[Wil Schiffers · Rating 5 out of 5]

De verloren slag bij Arnhem uitvoerig beschreven!

[Christopher Rush · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book for an online book club. Here are some slightly modified versions of my posts for that discussion. The first part was written about 5 weeks before pt. 2.

Pt. 1
I admit I am only about half-way through, but I have enjoyed it a good deal. At first, I wasn't quite as thrilled, since I had just read The Zimmerman Telegram by Barbara Tuchman, and Robert Kershaw's style is quite different from Tuchman's, which was initially distracting. Soon, however, I got over that personal niggle and started getting into the book much better. I seem to enjoy the beginning and endings of the chapters more than the middle, since they read to me more narrative/story-like than the middle sections of troop movements and German unit names that provoke a "who was that again?" reaction within me at times.

Without in any way trying to sound derogatory, one aspect that impressed me was Kershaw's way of "humanizing" the Germany army. Again, I'm not saying I never thought the Germans were humans, but often, especially in my public school upbringing, WW2 was basically "the Allies were good, the Axis were bad," and thus reading an authentic account of the Germans' intellectual and emotional lives during the battles was refreshing. I particularly found the military antagonisms against the political leaders intriguing, since one rarely hears about variation of thought or loyalty within the ranks (other than Valkyrie, of course).

Though I am unsure at times if Kershaw is attempting to write a military after action report sprinkled with occasional narration or a narration of the battle with extensive troop movement authenticity, I am enjoying the read and the exercise of reading it. I look forward to finishing up soon once the school year ends in a few days.

Pt. 2
The two main things that stuck out in the final few chapters were a) the horrors of combat, especially flame-thrower combat, and b) the potential futility of combat from the soldier's perspective. Certainly the ironies of the battle and its aftermath are strong emphases from the author at the end of the book, and thus it is easy to get that point. The horrors of combat, likewise, come out even more clearly toward the end of the book, since a great deal of the middle of the book seems to me more focused on the movements of troops and back-and-forth nature of the conflicts. The brief section on the effects of flamethrower is rather haunting, especially the depiction of the burned soldier. It's not something I'll be forgetting anytime soon.

Like most wargamers, I have a certain affinity for the study of history, though this has not been a major factor in my gaming resurgence in the last couple of years. As such, most of my knowledge of WW2 has come either from movies or old time radio broadcasts (Jack Benny, Fibber McGee and Molly), and thus I haven't read too many books about WW2, having a got a basic "grasp" of the major ideas - or so I thought. I had never heard of MARKET-GARDEN before reading this book, which belies my earlier belief I knew a good deal about WW2. I'm glad I read it, even though it's not something I would have just picked on to read on my own.

I really appreciated Kershaw's penultimate chapter, as it wrapped up the entire conflict from a broader view, bringing together a lot of the ideas he had scattered around in the narration of the battles. His attempt at asking questions of the battle's meaning for today - or at least its applicability - was interesting, but it also seemed somewhat outdated, considering the significant global changes even in the 25-some years since the book originally came out. Do any of his conclusions even apply today? Perhaps, but the ever-shifting nature of warfare in the 21st century may not require the military situations Kershaw envisions. As always, though, I could be completely wrong, especially since I don't have much military context for his conclusions or the present state of affairs. Even so, as I said, I'm glad I read this book.

[Jim Pfluecke · Rating 5 out of 5]

This amazing book provides a high level of detail about the German efforts to stop the allied airborne (and ground) attack in Holland in late 1944. While not perhaps the best introduction to these battles, it has plenty to offer to both the novice and the obsessed.

Kershaw begins with the retreat from Normandy to illustrate the combat readiness (or lack thereof, mostly), equipment and training of the Germans who participated in this fighting. He then delves into the battles themselves, with a lot of information, including detailed appendices, on the organization and creation of the various German combat formation. The level of detail, often focused further in by quotations, tend to be on the company level, and while it covers many of the major confrontations, does not give a house to house account. I think the level of focus is excellent and allowed me to get a good view of what the German commanders were dealing with.

A central theme running through the book (and revisited in the end as a why to draw lessons for NATO commanders in the late 1980's who were planning to combat potential Soviet airborne attacks) is the organization of the German response. He discusses in detail the formation of kampfgroups (mispelled, I know) out of platoon, company, and batallion sized units of Wehrmacht, SS, Navy, Lufftwaffe, logistics, and supply units. He points out that this coordination and rapid response, and not bad luck, was the ultimate cause of the failure of Market Garden.

Spread throughout the book are numerous quotations from memoirs, interviews, diaries, etc, giving a human face to the events. I read the hardcover version, which had dozens of photographs.

[Nathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

A heavily researched and detailed account of the German side of the Battle of Arnhem and surrounds in September 1944.

Kershaw does his best to untangle the confusion of the Germans' initial response to the attack, but even so it is only about halfway through that it starts to make sense and starts getting orderly. I actually liked this aspect, since it does drive home the ad hoc and ever changing nature of what was going on. But it is certainly not one for the neophyte.

However, while generally excellent, this book is let down by two things: a lack of maps and some rather poor editing/typesetting. The latter is certainly a printing/publishing error of this articular volume (which may be a print on demand) but the former just makes things even more confusing. This edition really needs a good basic map of the area involved, with a blow-up map of Arnhem town and perhaps Nijmegan as well.

Finally, Kershaw makes fairly frequent mention of some photos that a veteran gave him as part of his research. It would have been great if those shots had made it into the book as plates.

Rated PG for slightly sanitised battle violence throughout. 3/5

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

The difficulty with reading Ryan's "A Bridge to Far" or Middlebrook's "Arnhem" (both excellent books) is you don't get the full sense of what's happening on the other side. It wouldn't matter so much in histories of many other battles, but Operation Market-Garden was notable for its confusion. As a result, the understanding of the whole story particularily benefits from the German viewpoint.
Kershaw takes a logical method of breaking the battle down into pieces, and has added new insights to each section of the battle. Some parts are slightly sketchier than others, but I suppose that's due to the lack of available information. The book also has several series of photographs, though Kershaw takes the somewhat annoying tack of describing each photograph in the text as well -- one picture is worth a thousand words. Lastly, the author disputes the theory that the British 1st Airborne would have held the Arnhem bridge if they had landed closer to it.

[Dr.J.G. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some episodes of history are more than unforgettable, they are thrilling every time one thinks of them. One such is the battle of the bulge, when the allied forces were further out than could be logistically supported and German forces unexpectedly turned around to strike back, and the allies were surrounded on almost all sides with almost no option but to surrender or be massacred - and yet the commander famously replied "nuts" to the proposal of surrender from the Germans, barely taking the cigar out of his mouth for saying that much calmly, immediately, nonchalantly.

Patton was in Italy and was informed of the bulge and the urgency - and he drove his army in an impossible drive across to the battlefront in Ardennes near Belgian border in time to save the situation, the men, the battle and the war.

Title of this book from German perspective comes from the observation of the perplexed German "It never snows in September, it must be paratroopers" which it was.

[David · Rating 2 out of 5]

I wanted to like this book, but after about 50 pages I decided it wasn't worth the effort. Egregious and obvious editing and/or proofreading errors were disheartening. E.g., the very first page, in display type, sets the date as September 2, 1994 (but what's 50 years among friends?); on page six, we're told the Germans fleeing from Normandy have been retreating WESTWARD for two weeks (I suppose some of them could have been retreating westward, but MOST clearly were fleeing south and eastward); and then there's the reference to the map on page 34 -- doesn't exist (the map, not page 34).

And then there was a lack of clarity -- lots of detail but little "thread" to tie it together. All-in-all, seems like an amateur effort. Too bad, as the subject is fascinating. Probably lots of good info in there -- but how trustworthy?

[Stan Bebbington · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great deal has been written about Arnhem and the massive Airborne drop of a bridge too far over the years since 1944. The book is printed in both English and Dutch on alternative pages. It maintains a focus on the immediate impact of the airborne forces on the local Dutch people and the horrors of war introduced into a Dutch town already hit by occupation and shortages of food. It is written by the Dutch and copes sympathetically with the plight of the allied forces as they are slowly defeated by an unexpectedly better equipped German Army. It is copiously illustrated. The value is in the emphasis on the Dutch experience. It is produced by the Gemeentearchief Arnhem (Arnhem Archive)