The struggle to capture Monte Cassino, the impregnable heights barring the Allied advance on Rome in 1944, was the longest land battle fought in Western Europe in World War II and among the most costly. In four separate assaults over the course of the grim six-month epic, more than 105,000 men from the Allied armies and at least 80,000 Germans became casualties, and, between the attacks, the armies of both sides endured conditions of appalling privation. In John Ellis' classic account of the battle, few of the Allied commanders, except for the Free French General Juin, emerge with credit. But the author has nothing but admiration and compassion for the courage and endurance of the common soldiers whose experiences he vividly recreates in the pages of this narrative.
John Ellis was born in Bradford and educated at the Universities of Sussex and Manchester. He was a lecturer in the latter's department of Military Studies. His books include The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II; The Social History of the Machine Gun, Eye-Deep in Hell, an account of trench life in the Great War; Cassino: The Hollow Victory; and Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War.
"These bonds I have presented as a victory of the human spirit and triumphant affirmation of man's ability to actually live out the Christian ideal. But it should never be forgotten that such bonds were only forged in the smithies of hell itself, where also hundreds of thousands of men were slaughtered, millions maimed and as many more driven to the very extreme of mental torment. One should ponder well whether it was ever worth it. And one should above all beware of letting this victory of the human spirit persuade one that war is therefore enobling, and so feed a mood that can only beckon us towards the precipice. For then that victory will have been the hollowest of them all." -John Ellis
Author John Ellis' moving epilogue, a fitting honor to courage and sacrifice in the condemnable context of war, concludes what is, without question in my mind, one of the greatest books ever written about World War II.
Cassino: The Hollow Victory... is, in some ways, as frustrating to read as the titanic, ineffectual battle for Monte Cassino itself: fragmentary and heavily laden with strategic detail that can confuse and disorient. This is one of those books where it's best not to worry overmuch about keeping track of all the numbered regiments and their positions and just go with the flow, immersing yourself in the hellishness of what's being described. The book's faults are insignificant next to its awesome achievements.
In terms of completeness of description, analytical savvy, and meticulous and wide-ranging and sourced research of the battles from the experiences of the mud-laden grunts on the ground to the strategic and tactical maneuvers of the high command this has to be the definitive book about the epochal events of the four battles of Monte Cassino that preceded the Allied conquest of Rome in 1944.
The battles at Monte Cassino are classic studies in the military hubris that damaged the entire Allied War effort, led to the unneccessary deaths of thousands, prolonged the Italian campaign and allowed the defending Germans to display incredible resilience, tactical brilliance and resourcefulness.
More than anything this book is a fitting monument to the men on both sides; painstakingly documenting their efforts as fully and fairly as possible to ensure that their struggles are not forgotten.
Reading this on the heels of finishing David Hapgood's Monte Cassino... provides an eye-opening revelation about how two books on ostensibly the same subject can be so different in approach and emphasis. Hapgood's book focuses mostly on the fate of the ill-fated Monte Cassino monastery and its residents and devotes relatively little ink to the adjacent battles themselves, whereas Ellis focuses almost entirely in incredible detail on the battles with little attention paid to the issue of the monastery (though he definitely does not ignore it and lays out all the issues surrounding its controversial bombing). Both these books taken together provide an in-depth 3-D view of the overall events.
The book begins by describing the tensions that marked the Anglo-American alliance, the mutual suspicions among the Americans, Brits and their commanders and political leaders vis a vis the political battles and egomaniacal power struggles over how and where the war should be waged and by whom. It was these tensions that sparked infighting and often downright insubordination throughout the chain of command that helped turn the Monte Cassino campaign into a fiasco with dire consequences for the ordinary soldiers on the ground. General Mark Clark, commander of the American Fifth Army, in his insistence on butting the heads of his soldiers against the impregnable defensive position of Monte Cassino instead of following the more sensible suggestions of the French Gen. Juin led to senseless suicide missions--including the first poorly planned crossing of the Rapido River which led to the appalling losses of the 36th Texas Infantry Division.
Although the Allies won Monte Cassino and Rome, the victory was a Pyrrhic one; that is, a battle so costly that continuing to fight with such losses would eventually lead to defeat. The Allies never achieved their objective to destroy the German 10th Army, instead allowing its fragments to escape and regroup and build a new defensive position north of Rome. Gen. Clark is properly excoriated for his obsession of shaping the battle to serve his own egomaniacal desire to march into Rome first and have his glorified photo opp to immortalize his conquest. Ironically, whatever temporal glory it gave him, history has judged him harshly. Clark's superior, Gen. Alexander is also called to task by Ellis for his poor control of the chain of command and strategic blunders.
Apart from the excellent analysis of the command decisions, the book's real heart is in its descriptions of the hardships and privations suffered by the soldiers, and by its accounts of incredible heroism and, under the circumstances, understandable instances of cowardice. German soldiers cited say that Monte Cassino was worse than Stalingrad in terms of environmental harshness and battle intensity. The book provides as harrowing an account of the realities of combat as I've read.
Whatever perceptions the soldiers may have had about "sunny Italy" were quickly laid to rest as they suffered the hardships of rain, cold, frostbite, mud, trenchfoot, flies, frozen canteens, soaked clothes, rats, the inescapable stench of corpses and human waste and even hazards unique to Italy, such as wires on vineyard posts that could decapitate an unwary tank commander. Churchill's statement from his lofty position that Italy represented "the soft underbelly of Europe" was one based in ignorance. Conditions there in fact were no different than Verdun in WWI, and unlike there soldiers often had no place to hide among the flint stones; suffering shell shock from their own opening artillery barrages while exposed to enemy fire on all sides. Mules depended on for supplies in such treacherous hill country also were frequent casualties. As one soldier in an Indian brigade summed up the choices to a comrade: "One way you get shot...the other you slip to your death."
The only high Allied commander who seems to have emerged from the battles of Monte Cassino in a glowing historical light is Alphonse Juin, the French general of brilliant tactical and strategic insight and a burning desire to show his indifferent and skeptical Allied colleagues that his French fighters were ready to erase the disgraces of 1940, which they did, dispute being ill-used by Juin's superiors. Ellis also details the heroic efforts of the troops from India, Morocco, Tunisia, Poland, and New Zealand (including the Maoris), whose stories are often forgotten in the standard WWII narrative. The stories of the Polish troops were especially tragic, as they were fighting for a cause and a homeland about to be subsumed by Stalin, and whose willingness to fight put them in suicidal situations. One of the inspiring tales of the battle is the vindication of Gen. Fred Walker's Texans, who, months after their Rapido River disaster, spearheaded the breakout that led the charge to Rome.
German heroism is also detailed, and Ellis does a good job of describing the various weaponry and construction involved in creating the formidable Gustav Line that so vexed the Allies at Monte Cassino.
The book liberally cites the memoirs and diaries of the high command, mid-level commanders, and everyday soldiers from all parts of the battles to give a very realistic and personal feel for events that often feel remote.
The book is monumental and incredible and made me understand the sacrifices of men in war better than any other that I've read. The New York Times Book Review called this "A masterpiece of its kind," and I can't disagree.
------- (KR@KY, reposted with minor edit, 2-25-17)
This book was first published in 1984 and is still one of the better researched books covering the fighting around Cassino in Italy in 1944. In over 587 pages the author covers nearly ever facet of the fighting both from the Allied side and the Axis. From the soldier in the ruined villages and trenches to the Top Brass wondering what to do next. This is a well researched and well presented account and the story moves along with numerous maps and B&W photos to assist the reader. This is as good an account you will get covering this battle.
John Ellis provides a detailed account of the four battles of Cassino and Operation Diadem. He is critical of the military leadership, starting with Alexander, but also includes Freyberg, Clark, and Leese. There was too much focus on Cassino and the Liri valley with offensives being carried out in penny-packets rather than en-masse. Juin’s French Expeditionary Corp is singled out as an example of good leadership and aggressive offensive behaviour. Unlike the 8th Army, when the Germans counter-attacked, the FEC went back hard at them keeping them off-balance. The 8th Army was more cautious and regrouped after each counter-attack.
He’s critical of Clark pivoting his break out of Anzio by following the Turtle rather than the Buffalo line of attack. By going directly to Rome, he accuses Clark of missing the opportunity to kill a lot of Germans. However, Ellis doesn’t think that Clark could have ever encircle 10th Army based on the plan that Alexander had put together. The German leadership was too good to allow themselves to get trapped. During Operation Diadem, the 8th Army is criticised for being too slow and not keeping up with the FEC or US divisions.
In conclusion, Ellis sees the Italian Campaign as being useful in that it kept key German leaders (Kesselring, etc) and some of the German’s best divisions away from Normandy. However, in the end he sees Cassino as a Hollow Victory because they missed the opportunity of capturing / killing more Germans. It ended up just being repeated again and again fighting up to the Gothic line and up to the Po Valley for the rest of the war.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
*** 1/2 The nature of the campaign makes the book a bit of a slog sometimes, but on the other hand the slog comes to life, complete with the unexpectedly dreadful Italian weather that made even Stalingrad veterans kesselsick.
Mark Clark's obsession with capturing Rome over the German 10th Army is intertwined with the poor logistical planning of his British counterpart Leese: more vehicles than roads in the Liri valley wrecked the speed method of Juin's French troops.
Very detailed specifics of who did what, where, when and how. Totally engrossing in places but only if you like that kind of detail. I was particularly interested in Polish II Corps trials and tribulations. What a brave bunch of soldiers they all were and from so many different nations. I hadn’t realised that the French battalions had played such an important part.
One of the best books on the Italian campaign. Ellis gives us the Tommy's and GI's ground view of the fighting along with the 20000 foot view from the Generals. For a British historian, he's quite fair to the Americans and General Clark, and is willing to criticize the 8th army to a certain extent. Overall, its an excellent analysis and description of the battle.
My only real criticism is his rather odd, crabbed view of the Rapido river Disaster. He spends 20 pages on it, but nitpicks at the performance of Walker and the 36th division, somehow implying that if they'd done this or that small thing right, or had attacked with more "Spirit" ( or better planning) the result would've been different. Its a rather romantic, some would say, typically English view. The Germans had the sector locked down, mined, and their mortars and artillery zeroed in. Short of massive air and artillery support, nothing the 36th did or didn't do would've made a diffeence. Attacking with more "Spirit" or "Drive" would've simply added to the casualty list.
Later on, the 36th would perform one of the few brilliant Anglo-American manuevers of the Rome-Casino-Anzio campaign by finding a gap in the German line, and powering through it in a night attack - and breaking the German line wide-open. So, I doubt Ellis' critical attittude toward Walker and the 36th was warranted.
Otherwise, it stand with Carlos D'este's book on Anzio as the premiere history of the campaign.
A very well written history of the battle of Cassino. It really opened my eyes, I had no idea it was such a long, and hard fought battle. John Ellis' narrative gives an excellent account of the whole thing, from the level of politicians, through to senior commanders, right down to the troops on the ground on both sides. A very good read.