The Construction of Reality in the Child

by Jean Piaget

Studies the development of sensorimotor intelligence in the child between birth and two years

Genres: Psychology, Education, Nonfiction, Parenting, Science, Brain, Developmental Psychology

386 pages, Hardcover

First published June 28, 1954

About the author

Jean Piaget (1896 - 1980) was a Swiss philosopher, natural scientist and developmental theorist, well known for his work studying children, his theory of cognitive development, and his epistemological view called "genetic epistemology." In 1955, he created the International Centre for Genetic Epistemology in Geneva and directed it until his death in 1980. According to Ernst von Glasersfeld, Jean Piaget was "the great pioneer of the constructivist theory of knowing."

Reviews

[J.D. Steens · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, Piaget outlines how the developing child (0-2 years) comes to understand the basic categories of the world: object, space, causality and time. Initially, the external world is an extension of the child's activity and inherent egocentrism. Using Piaget's terminology, the child assimilates that world to itself and imposes itself on it. The world has its own reality, however, and, in effect, pushes back and resists the child's actions upon it. Through a dialectical exchange, the world forces the child to adjust (accommodate) its action to fit the requirements of that world. In the course of this dialectical interaction, the child learns that objects occupy space, that this material world is a series of cause-effect relationships, and that such a series is temporal (occurs in time). In this way, the child decenters and differentiates himself from the world and begins to see it objectively without egocentric distortions. This development occurs at the level of physical activity, through stages, with each stage defined by a typical structure (a group of stable mental/physical actions), that build on prior structures. This process pulls the child outside of itself and, thereby, allows it to interact with the world in more satisfying ways because its actions now are tailored to fit what the world requires. Ironically, the child moves from one form of unity with the world (the world as an extension of the egocentric self, but whose activity does not fit what the world requires) to an objectified unity (where the world is experienced as separate from the self, but actions now fit what the world requires).

This same process at the sensorimotor level is repeated in the subsequent two developmental periods, dealing first with concrete thought followed by abstract thought. At each developmental period, the child penetrates deeper into the nature of the world, moving from understanding it physically (how to use the world to satisfy needs and desires) to concrete thought (here and now representations of the world), to abstract thought in the late teen years where the focus is on distant understanding of time and space.

Piaget sees this development occurring naturally, but neglects - in the sense that Piaget is silent or he does not stress - the underlying forces that make this dialectical interaction occur. On the one side, the child is motivated to interact with the physical and social world to satisfy need and, later, in thought, to resolve dissonance in order to understand the world more accurately and to satisfy what is important to the self. Piaget does not stress this affective component, and he does not describe the external world in terms of an autonomous force that resists the child's actions. These two forces operate dialectically and force the child to alter its assimilation structures so that it can effectively and accurately engage (accommodate) that world appropriately. Piaget also does not discuss the role of memory in this whole process. When the world pushes back and forces the child to alter his behavior, there is a learning component that gets locked into memory so that new assimilation structures are made more or less permanent that then can be applied to the same, or new or similar, situations.

Piaget's prose is dry and even deadly, but boiled down to its essence, without getting sidetracked by non-important disagreements over details (e.g., at what precise age structures change), Piaget outlines the biological basis for how we become adults in thought (construct reality), and how we as adults understand and relate to the world.

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

PIAGET BEGINS TO IDENTIFY VARIOUS ‘STAGES’ IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHILD

Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are known as "genetic epistemology."

He wrote in the Introduction to this 1954 book, “The study of sensorimotor or practical intelligence in the first two years of development has taught us how the child, at first directly assimilating the external environment to his own activity, later, in order to extend his assimilation, forms an increasing number of schemata which are both more mobile and better able to intercoordinate. Side by side with this progressive involvement of the assimilatory schemata runs the continuous elaboration of the external universe, in other words, the convergent development of the explicatory function... Thus, at the beginnings of assimilatory activity, any object whatever presented by the external environment to the subject’s activity is simply something to suck, to look at, or to grasp: such assimilation is at this stage centered solely on the assimilating subject.” (Pg. ix)

He continues, “We must now study the second aspect of the evolution of sensorimotor intelligence… In general it may be said that during the first months of life, as long as assimilation remains centered on the organic activity of the subject, the universe presents neither permanent objects, nor objective space, nor time interconnecting events as such, nor causality external to the personal actions. If the child really knew himself, we should have to maintain that solipsism exists.” (Pg. x-xi)

He suggests, “It is possible that during this third stage the object is still not the same to the child as it is to us: a substantial body, individualized and displaced in space without depending on the action context in which it is inserted. Thus the object is, perhaps, to the child, only a particularly striking aspect of the total picture in which it is contained.” (Pg. 69)

Later, he explains, “if, during this third state, space begins to be objectified to the extent that it is externalized, it is not yet in any way an immobile environment in which the body evolves… If the child locates objects in relation to his body and as a function of his acts of prehension, he does not locate them in relation to each other and does not postulate their permanence outside his field of action. He has, therefore, no criterion at his disposal for differentiating the displacements of his own body from those of external bodies. Space at this stage is always imbued with a sort of solipsism or at least egocentrism, but an egocentrism unaware of itself.” (Pg.169-170)

He summarizes, “this interaction of things and the intelligence, whose genetic progress demonstrates existence on the plane of individual acquisitions, is prepared by an earlier interaction of the environment and hereditary biological processes, although no positive analysis can yet account for its mechanism.” (Pg. 246)

He asserts, “If our hypotheses are correct, the evolutionary process with which causality of the first five stages complies with that of a gradual dissociation starting from an initial state of undifferentiation in which efficacy and phenomenalism are indissolubly united. The primitive universe (of the earliest stages) is a confused totality of sensory images of which seems to be subject simultaneously to obey certain given regulations (phenomenalism) and to extend certain attitudes of desire and effort (efficacy). When during the third stage the child begins to act upon things through the intermediary of prehension, the situation remains the same, except that two poles begin to stand out in opposition to one another among the causal sequence of which the subject becomes aware.” (Pg. 325-326)

He says of the ‘fourth stage’: “Spatialization results from similar progress made by the intelligence, since the most advanced coordination of schemata entails a proportionate making of relationships among objects. Finally, except with regard to the realm of representations which transcend the field of immediate perception, the child henceforth conceives of his own body as being inserted in the external causal series, that is, as subject to the action of things as well as a source of actions which operate upon them.” (Pg. 330-331)

Of the sixth stage, he comments, “For the first time the subject can really place himself as an element, at once both cause and effect, in the context of a universe which transcends him everywhere. This making of relationships, supplanting the radical egocentrism of primitive efficacy, has certainly been prepared by those of the fifth; it becomes effective only with the beginnings of representation peculiar to the present stage.” (Pg. 337)

He acknowledges, “with regard to the actions performed by the child on his own body, Hume is obviously right: the baby discovers little by little that his desires govern the movements of his hands or legs but he does not at all understand the ‘how’ of the operation. But must we, like Hume, draw from this self-evident and general phenomenalism of the earliest stages of causality the conclusion that causal connection stems from the force of habit? We do not think so. To be sure… the elementary causal relations are all due to the mechanism of circular reaction, first primary, then secondary, and if circular reaction could be reduced to the simple concept of habit, Hume would be right. But circular reaction involves an element of organization or active repetition which transcends habit… the motive power of circular reaction does not involve any ‘process of the understanding’ when this motive power consists in an act of assimilation tending to produce an interesting result, that is tending to rediscover an effect identical to that which was just perceived or felt? Obviously one cannot.” (Pg. 351)

He reports, “if one draws in front of a child two concentric circles one of which describes a big circle and the other a much smaller one, and if one makes two automobiles of the same dimensions cover these trajectories at the same time, the youngest subjects cannot avoid believing that the automobile following the small circle went ‘faster’ than the other. ‘Faster’ in this means ‘more easily,’ ‘with less effort,’ etc., but the child does not take into account the relation between time and the space covered. For adults, on the contrary, speed is measured by this relation, and the expression ‘faster’ loses its subjective meaning. So also, the expressions ‘more time’ or ‘less time’ have no objective meaning for little children and acquire it for adults, etc.” (Pg. 428)

This book will be of interest to those studying Piaget’s concepts of child development.

[Saroj]

for research work