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Afghanistan: The Bear Trap
How did the horrendous situation in Afghanistan, with all its implications for recent events and the present time, come to pass? What was the role of the CIA and Pakistani intelligence in the creation of what became the Taliban? What are the implications for the future and lessons from the past for American forces today?This highly controversial book reveals one of the greatest military, political and financial secrets of recent times. It is nothing less than the true, if fantastic, account of how Pakistan and the USA covertly controlled the largest guerrilla war of the 20th Century, dealing to the Soviet Russian presence in Afghanistan a military defeat that has come to be called 'Russia's Vietnam'.This compelling book, put together with great skill by the military author, Mark Adkin, is essential reading for anyone interested in the truth behind the Soviets' Vietnam, and the reasons why, to this day, the war in Afghanistan still drags on despite the victory that the Mujahideen were denied when the Soviets withdrew.
256 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1992
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October 17, 2019Read this many years ago.The Soviet invasion of Pakistan's neighbour Afghanistan put Pakistan in a difficult position,the Russian bear was at the door.Would it advance further and threaten Pakistan itself ? Military dictaotor General Zia ul Haq chose to turn Pakistan into a front line state,as the US tried to turn Afghanistan into the Soviets' Vietnam.It was a risky policy,the consequences for Pakistan could have been catastrophic.But at the time,it seemed to have come off.The Soviets,after spending years in Afghanistan,had to withdraw.This is a military man's account of the operations that helped bring about their withdrawal,with a lot of help from the CIA and the Saudis.Pakistan would still pay a price.Millions of Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan,making it their permanant home.General Zia ul Haq would pay with his life,and in the author's view,the KGB was involved.At the time,however,there was much triumphalism in Pakistan,that the Soviet Union had been brought to its knees.The US chose to walk away after the Soviet withdrawal,leaving the Afghans to their own devices,only to return as an invader itself after 9/11,and to become mired itself in Afghanistan.Pakistan would be dragged into that conflict as well,with catastrophic consequences.
October 12, 2019
Brigadier Yousaf served in the Afghan Bureau from 1983 to 1987, under General Akhtar, during which, he was in-charge of equipping and training the Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle against Soviet invasion, ultimately making Afghanistan a bear trap for Soviet Union. In this book, he has tried to map out the strategies, techniques, a guerrilla style of warfare, and the training which was needed to carry out ambushes, assassinations and raids deep into Afghanistan territory. The book outlines some important points;
- Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in hope to reach warm waters i.e Gwadar Port, as the Pakistani military leadership assessed at that time; and fearing an invoke of Islamic Insurgency and fundamentalism in soviet Afghanistan.
- Soviet troops were highly demoralized, poorly trained and poorly backed up by their administration. Despite these short-comings, soviet union and their Afghan communist allies clung up to the war for a long, long time. Until CIA provided Mujahideen with Stinger missile, after which Soviet helicopters were falling everyday. The story of the fall of first helicopter and the video making by a Mujahid, which made it's way to President Reagan is really enjoyable.
- The training of Mujahideen, by ISI soldiers. It is written in exceptional detail, with maps referring to Guerrilla tactics, and attacks.
- The role of CIA in providing billions of funds, and ammunition, backed up by Saudi Arabia. The CIA wanted to take over the training process and distribution of armaments all by itself, but General Akhtar never allowed it. Thus, America never liked him, and wanted him gone, which was ultimately done by Zia ul Haq in 1987, at the peak of Afghan war, as he wanted to take the victory credit for himself, maybe.
- Despite abundance of military aid, the ISI also never trusted CIA's intentions, and viewed America as calculating and untrustworthy.
- America jumped in the Afghan Jehad for the sole reason of avenging Vietnam, and to sit on the throne of one superpower. As soon as the soviets departed, the American aid in the form of ammunition was stopped. With the tragedy of Ojhri Camp in 1988, thousands of tons of rockets and other ammo exploded in the form of fire works all over Rawalpindi, the Mujahideen were short-stocked to stand their ground.
- The US firstly helped the Mujahideen only to yank out the rug of victory under their feet at the last minute. They opposed fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan, but 5 years of civil war, and the fundamentalists took over anyway.
All in all, the book covers Aghan Jehad and what was happening in 1980s from every aspect. It's factual, readable and an insider's account. Biases are there, and the book could have been written a bit better, as repetition of events is there which is really annoying.
Ps: No matter how much we praise our military and ISI for breaking down Soviet union in Afghanistan, we can't deny the huge price Pakistan had to pay for it's role; in the form of increased extremism, the huge flux of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, sectarianism, endless law and order problems, and corruption of elites. These grave implications posed an internal and external security threat, and the price is still being paid.
- Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in hope to reach warm waters i.e Gwadar Port, as the Pakistani military leadership assessed at that time; and fearing an invoke of Islamic Insurgency and fundamentalism in soviet Afghanistan.
- Soviet troops were highly demoralized, poorly trained and poorly backed up by their administration. Despite these short-comings, soviet union and their Afghan communist allies clung up to the war for a long, long time. Until CIA provided Mujahideen with Stinger missile, after which Soviet helicopters were falling everyday. The story of the fall of first helicopter and the video making by a Mujahid, which made it's way to President Reagan is really enjoyable.
- The training of Mujahideen, by ISI soldiers. It is written in exceptional detail, with maps referring to Guerrilla tactics, and attacks.
- The role of CIA in providing billions of funds, and ammunition, backed up by Saudi Arabia. The CIA wanted to take over the training process and distribution of armaments all by itself, but General Akhtar never allowed it. Thus, America never liked him, and wanted him gone, which was ultimately done by Zia ul Haq in 1987, at the peak of Afghan war, as he wanted to take the victory credit for himself, maybe.
- Despite abundance of military aid, the ISI also never trusted CIA's intentions, and viewed America as calculating and untrustworthy.
- America jumped in the Afghan Jehad for the sole reason of avenging Vietnam, and to sit on the throne of one superpower. As soon as the soviets departed, the American aid in the form of ammunition was stopped. With the tragedy of Ojhri Camp in 1988, thousands of tons of rockets and other ammo exploded in the form of fire works all over Rawalpindi, the Mujahideen were short-stocked to stand their ground.
- The US firstly helped the Mujahideen only to yank out the rug of victory under their feet at the last minute. They opposed fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan, but 5 years of civil war, and the fundamentalists took over anyway.
All in all, the book covers Aghan Jehad and what was happening in 1980s from every aspect. It's factual, readable and an insider's account. Biases are there, and the book could have been written a bit better, as repetition of events is there which is really annoying.
Ps: No matter how much we praise our military and ISI for breaking down Soviet union in Afghanistan, we can't deny the huge price Pakistan had to pay for it's role; in the form of increased extremism, the huge flux of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, sectarianism, endless law and order problems, and corruption of elites. These grave implications posed an internal and external security threat, and the price is still being paid.
February 29, 2012
I read this some years ago, so my review will be a bit impressionistic. The author is very high up in the Pakistani intelligence (ISI) and was in charge of executing the Pakistani logistics in the campaign against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
There is a bit too much about military strategy and tactical maneuvers here. But there is also plenty about the finances, the transportation of the nuts, bolts, and guns, the relationship between the CIA, ISI, the Mujhideen, and the Saudis, and the various tensions amongst the engaged parties.
In a nutshell this is the Pakistani version of what Ghost Wars does. What I recall most is that (1) there is little doubt that the US tried to entice the Soviets into invading Afghanistan -- hence the title of the book. With great narrative details,the book confirms the claim made by Zbigniew Brzezinski (Jimmy Carter's national security adviser) of having initiated the Soviet invasion. (Yes, you read that right.) The remarkable interview with Brzezinski can be read here: http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles...
(2) The book shows the wide reach of the ISI who were able to launch operations even within the Soviet Union itself.
(3) It defends the logic of giving US aid (matched by Saudi funds) to what critics call the most "fundamentalist" of the Mujahideen groups (Gulbadeen Hekmetyar) and what Yousaf calls the most "efficient killer" of Soviet troops.
If you are interested in this war, this may be one of the few books written from a this perspective.
There is a bit too much about military strategy and tactical maneuvers here. But there is also plenty about the finances, the transportation of the nuts, bolts, and guns, the relationship between the CIA, ISI, the Mujhideen, and the Saudis, and the various tensions amongst the engaged parties.
In a nutshell this is the Pakistani version of what Ghost Wars does. What I recall most is that (1) there is little doubt that the US tried to entice the Soviets into invading Afghanistan -- hence the title of the book. With great narrative details,the book confirms the claim made by Zbigniew Brzezinski (Jimmy Carter's national security adviser) of having initiated the Soviet invasion. (Yes, you read that right.) The remarkable interview with Brzezinski can be read here: http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles...
(2) The book shows the wide reach of the ISI who were able to launch operations even within the Soviet Union itself.
(3) It defends the logic of giving US aid (matched by Saudi funds) to what critics call the most "fundamentalist" of the Mujahideen groups (Gulbadeen Hekmetyar) and what Yousaf calls the most "efficient killer" of Soviet troops.
If you are interested in this war, this may be one of the few books written from a this perspective.
August 9, 2011
The author, then a Brigadier of the Pakistan Army, handled the Afghan bureau of Pakistan's spy agency, the ISI, during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Coming from an ex-spy who worked with an organisation known for secrecy, his account is surprisingly detailed. Does it also tell us how the ISI might have attempted to handle its incursions into Kashmir?
The account is straightforward, a planner-trainer-soldier's version of a momentous effort lasting a decade. But one does detect attempts to give some elements a spin. For instance, it is hard to believe that the Soviets would have indulged in such indiscriminate scorched-earth bombing of the civilian population, a stratagem that could have achieved nothing but to pit the entire population against the Soviet Army. Surely, the Soviets understood as well as anyone else that no insurgency has ever been surmounted without people's support. Having said that, I must also admit - in contradiction to my own disbelief! - that the record of Pakistan's Army in Waziristan has been no different. So, perhaps there is enough room for making such obvious strategic errors.
The Soviets come across as less than competent, which is perhaps rather harsh. The Soviet soldier was poorly paid and kitted, tells the author, and a far cry from the resolute patriot that defended Leningrad. This was a war he did not identify with.
The mujahideen emerge as extraordinarily brave, capable of suffering unimaginable privations and steeped in vengefulness. They have also been portrayed as poor strategists and extremely fractious in their efforts. Indeed, it was the weight of their disunity that eventually prevented the fall of Kabul.
The CIA is painted as an agency focussed on ensuring that the Soviets were repaid for Vietnam - and eventually succeeded in that goal. They supplied billions of dollars worth of weapons and equipment, mostly purchased from other countries - including China - and eventually relented to supply a weapon that arguably triggered the Soviet withdrawal - the Stinger anti-aircraft missile. But the Americans too do not come unscathed at Mohammad Yousaf's hands; they lacked understanding of the ground realities, the author tells us.
General Zia also comes across as a scheming but small-minded leader who succumbed to US pressures and kicked the Director general of ISI General Akhtar upstairs when the Americans wanted him too, even though the moment was inopportune from the point of view of winning the war.
The two fascinating chapters in the book relate to the assassination of General Zia. The theory behind the plane crash is developed meticulously and while the author stops short of naming names, the finger is unerringly pointed at the KGB and KHAD combine, with help from within the Pakistan Army.
The other relates to the 'end' of the war. As the Soviets withdrew (under Gorbachev's tutelage, thus making him a darling of the West), it was in their interest to ensure that the mujahideen did not roll over the Communist regime of Najibullah and take over Kabul. Ironically, this was in the interest of the US too! They did not want a fundamentalist regime to assume power. They had driven the Soviets out and that was the end of their interest in the mujahideen. A speedy and smooth withdrawal of the Soviets was in their interest - that would ensure a 'victory'. The author claims that several factors magically combined to help the Americans and Soviets achieve these goals. The Director General of ISI who wanted it otherwise was replaced, the author retired, the successors were inclined to toe the US line, the huge 10000-ton arms and ammunition dump at Ojhri blew up thus choking replenishments for the mujahideen planning to launch attacks on the withdrawing Soviets and the mujahideen planned and executed a poor assault on Jalalabad, resulting in defeat at the hands of the Afghan Army.
A useful account!
The account is straightforward, a planner-trainer-soldier's version of a momentous effort lasting a decade. But one does detect attempts to give some elements a spin. For instance, it is hard to believe that the Soviets would have indulged in such indiscriminate scorched-earth bombing of the civilian population, a stratagem that could have achieved nothing but to pit the entire population against the Soviet Army. Surely, the Soviets understood as well as anyone else that no insurgency has ever been surmounted without people's support. Having said that, I must also admit - in contradiction to my own disbelief! - that the record of Pakistan's Army in Waziristan has been no different. So, perhaps there is enough room for making such obvious strategic errors.
The Soviets come across as less than competent, which is perhaps rather harsh. The Soviet soldier was poorly paid and kitted, tells the author, and a far cry from the resolute patriot that defended Leningrad. This was a war he did not identify with.
The mujahideen emerge as extraordinarily brave, capable of suffering unimaginable privations and steeped in vengefulness. They have also been portrayed as poor strategists and extremely fractious in their efforts. Indeed, it was the weight of their disunity that eventually prevented the fall of Kabul.
The CIA is painted as an agency focussed on ensuring that the Soviets were repaid for Vietnam - and eventually succeeded in that goal. They supplied billions of dollars worth of weapons and equipment, mostly purchased from other countries - including China - and eventually relented to supply a weapon that arguably triggered the Soviet withdrawal - the Stinger anti-aircraft missile. But the Americans too do not come unscathed at Mohammad Yousaf's hands; they lacked understanding of the ground realities, the author tells us.
General Zia also comes across as a scheming but small-minded leader who succumbed to US pressures and kicked the Director general of ISI General Akhtar upstairs when the Americans wanted him too, even though the moment was inopportune from the point of view of winning the war.
The two fascinating chapters in the book relate to the assassination of General Zia. The theory behind the plane crash is developed meticulously and while the author stops short of naming names, the finger is unerringly pointed at the KGB and KHAD combine, with help from within the Pakistan Army.
The other relates to the 'end' of the war. As the Soviets withdrew (under Gorbachev's tutelage, thus making him a darling of the West), it was in their interest to ensure that the mujahideen did not roll over the Communist regime of Najibullah and take over Kabul. Ironically, this was in the interest of the US too! They did not want a fundamentalist regime to assume power. They had driven the Soviets out and that was the end of their interest in the mujahideen. A speedy and smooth withdrawal of the Soviets was in their interest - that would ensure a 'victory'. The author claims that several factors magically combined to help the Americans and Soviets achieve these goals. The Director General of ISI who wanted it otherwise was replaced, the author retired, the successors were inclined to toe the US line, the huge 10000-ton arms and ammunition dump at Ojhri blew up thus choking replenishments for the mujahideen planning to launch attacks on the withdrawing Soviets and the mujahideen planned and executed a poor assault on Jalalabad, resulting in defeat at the hands of the Afghan Army.
A useful account!
February 21, 2022
This is the First hand experience of a soldier (brig M, Yousaf )from the war front ,commanding afghan bureau of ISI. He wrote up the very details of different operations with maps and other strategic information .
Entrance of soviet forces to Afghanistan opened doors of opportunities to many people hailing from different walks of life ..
Be it Zia struggling for his face-saving " In 1979 Zia had just provoked worldwide consternation and condemnation by executing his former prime minister;………By supporting a Jehad, albeit unofficially, against a communist superpower he sought to regain sympathy in the west."
Be it America ready to take revenge of Vietnam from soviet
Be it Arms manufacturers selling their outdated weapons "A number of countries, and many people, saw the guerrilla resistance as a splendid opportunity to sell off arms that nobody else wanted, Weapons that were obsolete or obsolescent, even ones that were dangerous to fire. "
Be it Pakistan struggling for influence in Afghanistan
and when it come to the end and mujahideen were supposed to take over Taliban ,consistent events occur culminating in civil war and those people who (supposedly) defeated soviet couldn't take Kabul from Najaeeb. writer tried to link these events to show that both USA and soviet were agreed somewhat to have a nationalist moderate government instead of fundamentalists ,which, both considered a threat " both the superpowers wanted a stalemate in battle field"
I particularly liked one sentence summing up state of affairs in millitry state like pakistan . In response to Ojrhi camp explosions "Both Generals Akhtar and Gul continued in their careers. It was the Prime Minister who lost his job."
general hameed gul who repeatedly would claim now then what he defeated soviets is badly busted by his colleague
"His two-year involvement with the Jehad must have been a bitter experience for him. He came at a time when military victory was in sight; he left when Mujahideen defeat was distinctly possible."
I don't agree with the writer about most of his views but at the end of book i felt as he has written what I was thinking (though omitted last line which says a war that was almost, and should have been, won.)
"Although I am reluctant to admit it, I feel the only winners in the war in Afghanistan are the Americans. For the Soviet Union even their military retreat has been turned into a huge political success, The losers are most certainly the people of Afghanistan. It is their homes that are heaps of rubble, their land and fields that have been burnt and sown with millions of mines, it is their husbands, fathers and sons who have died in the war "
Entrance of soviet forces to Afghanistan opened doors of opportunities to many people hailing from different walks of life ..
Be it Zia struggling for his face-saving " In 1979 Zia had just provoked worldwide consternation and condemnation by executing his former prime minister;………By supporting a Jehad, albeit unofficially, against a communist superpower he sought to regain sympathy in the west."
Be it America ready to take revenge of Vietnam from soviet
Be it Arms manufacturers selling their outdated weapons "A number of countries, and many people, saw the guerrilla resistance as a splendid opportunity to sell off arms that nobody else wanted, Weapons that were obsolete or obsolescent, even ones that were dangerous to fire. "
Be it Pakistan struggling for influence in Afghanistan
and when it come to the end and mujahideen were supposed to take over Taliban ,consistent events occur culminating in civil war and those people who (supposedly) defeated soviet couldn't take Kabul from Najaeeb. writer tried to link these events to show that both USA and soviet were agreed somewhat to have a nationalist moderate government instead of fundamentalists ,which, both considered a threat " both the superpowers wanted a stalemate in battle field"
I particularly liked one sentence summing up state of affairs in millitry state like pakistan . In response to Ojrhi camp explosions "Both Generals Akhtar and Gul continued in their careers. It was the Prime Minister who lost his job."
general hameed gul who repeatedly would claim now then what he defeated soviets is badly busted by his colleague
"His two-year involvement with the Jehad must have been a bitter experience for him. He came at a time when military victory was in sight; he left when Mujahideen defeat was distinctly possible."
I don't agree with the writer about most of his views but at the end of book i felt as he has written what I was thinking (though omitted last line which says a war that was almost, and should have been, won.)
"Although I am reluctant to admit it, I feel the only winners in the war in Afghanistan are the Americans. For the Soviet Union even their military retreat has been turned into a huge political success, The losers are most certainly the people of Afghanistan. It is their homes that are heaps of rubble, their land and fields that have been burnt and sown with millions of mines, it is their husbands, fathers and sons who have died in the war "
March 26, 2013
Speaking of the bear trap. I am on page 67 or so. Just finished a
chapter called "The Infidels". Naturally, it describes the Soviet
strategy, troop location and supply lines. Yousaf goes by a standard
military playbook: his troops strengths and weaknesses, enemy's
strengths and weaknesses (supply lines), and then the plan of
battle. Everything is assessed from the military standpoint, no shades
of gray or compunctions: a village is a source of recruits and food, a
city is a target communists are the enemy, mujahedin are the troops. If
the enemy deserves a praise is because they fight well, not if they do
something good for the occupying country like supporting education for
girls or upholding land reform. Or that "the troops" are the worst
kind of religious fanatics. Some of the commanders are just labeled
"fundamentalist" and praised for their fighting spirit. Politics are
important insofar as it concerns the troop disposition. Everything is
divided into competing spheres of interest. The read makes me a bit
more squeamish as I might have been the target for one of Yousaf's
"trainees".
Also, Yousaf is a typical right-wing brass -- provides cheesy
inspirational quotes from the military leaders and "great men" like
Churchill. Hello-o-o. He is the guy who screwed your country over.
All that said, either Yousaf or his co-author has a good writing
style. The prose is not stilted or filled with military jargon and
cliches. Also, what Yousaf set out to do, he does clearly and, eghem,
professionally: the troop dispositions, the military provisions and
the organization of logistics of leading a guerrilla army.
A couple of interesting observations. Yousaf characterizes the
mujahedin war as essentially primitive raids: the objective is to
capture the supplies and weapons which are highly prized.
Also, Yousaf holds no illusions about the motivations for US help --
the US wanted to bleed the soviet union the way they bled in the Viet
Nam and they did not care much for either Afghanistan and the
Mujaheden. Oh and Yousaf was the guy who dealt with Charlie Wilson and
arranged his visit to Afghanistan.
---------
Allahu o Akbar. I finished the Bear book. The author is thoroughly
convinced that what he did was absolutely right including sending his
goons deep into Soviet territory to blow up factories. Despite obvious
moral issues, he is actually a decent writer. The book is engaging yet
simply written, a good study into the logistics, strengths and
limitations of guerrilla warfare
Interestingly, there not a peep about foreign Arab fighters in the book.
chapter called "The Infidels". Naturally, it describes the Soviet
strategy, troop location and supply lines. Yousaf goes by a standard
military playbook: his troops strengths and weaknesses, enemy's
strengths and weaknesses (supply lines), and then the plan of
battle. Everything is assessed from the military standpoint, no shades
of gray or compunctions: a village is a source of recruits and food, a
city is a target communists are the enemy, mujahedin are the troops. If
the enemy deserves a praise is because they fight well, not if they do
something good for the occupying country like supporting education for
girls or upholding land reform. Or that "the troops" are the worst
kind of religious fanatics. Some of the commanders are just labeled
"fundamentalist" and praised for their fighting spirit. Politics are
important insofar as it concerns the troop disposition. Everything is
divided into competing spheres of interest. The read makes me a bit
more squeamish as I might have been the target for one of Yousaf's
"trainees".
Also, Yousaf is a typical right-wing brass -- provides cheesy
inspirational quotes from the military leaders and "great men" like
Churchill. Hello-o-o. He is the guy who screwed your country over.
All that said, either Yousaf or his co-author has a good writing
style. The prose is not stilted or filled with military jargon and
cliches. Also, what Yousaf set out to do, he does clearly and, eghem,
professionally: the troop dispositions, the military provisions and
the organization of logistics of leading a guerrilla army.
A couple of interesting observations. Yousaf characterizes the
mujahedin war as essentially primitive raids: the objective is to
capture the supplies and weapons which are highly prized.
Also, Yousaf holds no illusions about the motivations for US help --
the US wanted to bleed the soviet union the way they bled in the Viet
Nam and they did not care much for either Afghanistan and the
Mujaheden. Oh and Yousaf was the guy who dealt with Charlie Wilson and
arranged his visit to Afghanistan.
---------
Allahu o Akbar. I finished the Bear book. The author is thoroughly
convinced that what he did was absolutely right including sending his
goons deep into Soviet territory to blow up factories. Despite obvious
moral issues, he is actually a decent writer. The book is engaging yet
simply written, a good study into the logistics, strengths and
limitations of guerrilla warfare
Interestingly, there not a peep about foreign Arab fighters in the book.
December 12, 2015
The author himself sums up the war( Russia's Vietnam) against the Russians in Afghanistan quite succulently at the end of chapter 5.
'The balance of CIA's contributions have played a vital role in the conduct of the Afghan Jehad. Without the backing of the US and Saudi Arabia the Soviets would still be entrenched in that country. Without the intelligence provided by the CIA many battles would have been lost, and without the CIA's training of our Pakistani instructors the Mujahideen would have been fearfully I'll-equipped to face, and ultimately defeat a super power.
This is probably the best book written on the role of ISI in Russia's Vietnam. The author has written a very courageous account of his last posting as the operational and logistical head of the ISI's Afghan operation. Pakistani army has managed to produce many fine officers, exhibiting leadership and daring to voice their independent opinion which is the hallmark of any proud and self assured leader. Whether their opinion is right or wrong is besides the point. The author's deduction that both arch enemies were against the formation of an Islamic government in Afghanistan is very relevant considering the recent chaotic events in the Middle East.
The book also sheds light on the relationship between USA and the Pakistan Army as well as PA relationship with the Fundamentalists in Afghanistan. Americans needed a motivated PA to do their bidding in Afghanistan, while PA got the job done using Afghani Islamists. It's ironic that any kind of blowback wasn't considered by either the American masters of their PA partners once the objective was achieved, but I cannot blame the author of knowing the outcomes me of his actions as he was just following orders.
I also wonder at the huge opportunity lost when I consider the alternate. Imagine the talent and skilled professionals which could have been produced by any other Pakistani institution if given half a chance. It's a crime that the only Institute developed in Pakistan has been the PA at the cost of all other industries. It's a bit like cricket against all other sports in the country.
'The balance of CIA's contributions have played a vital role in the conduct of the Afghan Jehad. Without the backing of the US and Saudi Arabia the Soviets would still be entrenched in that country. Without the intelligence provided by the CIA many battles would have been lost, and without the CIA's training of our Pakistani instructors the Mujahideen would have been fearfully I'll-equipped to face, and ultimately defeat a super power.
This is probably the best book written on the role of ISI in Russia's Vietnam. The author has written a very courageous account of his last posting as the operational and logistical head of the ISI's Afghan operation. Pakistani army has managed to produce many fine officers, exhibiting leadership and daring to voice their independent opinion which is the hallmark of any proud and self assured leader. Whether their opinion is right or wrong is besides the point. The author's deduction that both arch enemies were against the formation of an Islamic government in Afghanistan is very relevant considering the recent chaotic events in the Middle East.
The book also sheds light on the relationship between USA and the Pakistan Army as well as PA relationship with the Fundamentalists in Afghanistan. Americans needed a motivated PA to do their bidding in Afghanistan, while PA got the job done using Afghani Islamists. It's ironic that any kind of blowback wasn't considered by either the American masters of their PA partners once the objective was achieved, but I cannot blame the author of knowing the outcomes me of his actions as he was just following orders.
I also wonder at the huge opportunity lost when I consider the alternate. Imagine the talent and skilled professionals which could have been produced by any other Pakistani institution if given half a chance. It's a crime that the only Institute developed in Pakistan has been the PA at the cost of all other industries. It's a bit like cricket against all other sports in the country.
December 10, 2017
What better book can be than this to know about Soviet-Afghan War, straight from the horse's mouth. Author Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf aptly describes this war as Russia's Vietnam, though the casualities suffered by Russians was far less. The author sheds light on the role of ISI and the Pakistani government under President Zia Ul Haq in this war and the support they received from United States and Saudi Arabia and the relationships they shared. More than just fighting on ground the war also involved huge logistics and supply chain management which was handled by the ISI division headed by the author. He also details out the strategies of sabotage and destruction inside the Soviet Afghanistan carried out by the Afghan tribals trained and armed by them and the mindset of the Afghan Fighter. All the tribal commanders handling operations on ground owed their allegiance to some or the other Afghan political forces ranging from moderates to hardcore Islamic extremists which took refuge inside Pakistan. Brigadier Yousaf describes the uphill task of dealing with multiple stakeholders i.e. political parties, commanders, Saudis, CIA etc and manage funding, weapon's training, arms logistics, planning to carry out operations inside the Afghanistan.
March 2, 2015
This book provides a reliable insider account of the war that bled USSR, but as far as structure of the book and manner of narration go I find it lacking. Unlike good military histories, it is highly repetitive and the author fails to provide a structured account of the progress of the war. The author's biases are often visible, which is normal with a personal account.Nevertheless, I would recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding Afghan history and the present imbroglio.
February 2, 2011
Story of the soviet defeat at the hands of the mujahadin, ISI,with backing from CIA, from the man who coordinated the efforts. Great insight into the historical dynamic between the mujahadin and the PAK ISI. Useful for understanding the mentality of the Afghan warlord and how difficult it is to organize and hold together such a group.
July 16, 2021
"Political memories are conveniently short" - Brig. Yusuf
Depending upon one's ideo-political leanings, there are many ways this memior could be read as: A chargesheet against ISI, a description of herioc stand against an unrelenting superpower, manual of guerilla warfare strategy.
The book begins with introduction (and in Zia's case, demise) of the three architects of Soviet-Afghan war, or Afghan Jihad as it is more (in?)famously known in Pakistan: Brig. Yusuf (ISI, author), Gen. Akhtar (DG ISI) , Gen. Zia (COAS dictator-president). Then we get to meet our friends from CIA and different Parties e.g. Hekmatyar, Ahmed Massoud, Rabbani etc.
After setting up this stage, the large part of book then deals with formation and operation of Afghan Bureau of ISI which was used for distributing funds and arms (received with thanks from Saudi + US govt.), providing training and strategic support to the different 'Mujahideen' factions at the comically named Ojhri Camp. Later parts deals with logistics of arms distribution, communication, infiltration, and sabotage. Author provides several examples of guerella ops being sucessfull, partially-successful, and complete failures.
There's also an unmistakable deja vu when read in context of current US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Author details how politicking and infighting b/w the different Mujahdeen factions and the Parties they were affiliated with made any large coordinated efforts to attack and hold territorites impossible. How the US, Soviet Union, and neighbouring countries scrambled together to prevent a military takeover of Kabul. How they were worried about a Khomenei style Sunni-extremist govt in Kabul. Their fears would come true in the culmination of Afghan Civil War and formation of the Taliban regime.
Author alludes to, but doesn't directly deal with the direct effects of this war on Pakistan, which were: Millions of impoverished regugees, popularity of jihadist doctrine, economic turmoil, secterian violence, deep mistrust of govt in FATA, KPK, and Baluchistan. This could be because of his military vantage point (these were considered 'civilian' issues), but any book about Afghan war is incomplete without these discussions.
At times I found the writing to be repetitive and resembling more of a ramble than a carefully edited book. Lastly, I found the endless allusions to the proverbial 'Russian Bear' less than amusing.
Depending upon one's ideo-political leanings, there are many ways this memior could be read as: A chargesheet against ISI, a description of herioc stand against an unrelenting superpower, manual of guerilla warfare strategy.
The book begins with introduction (and in Zia's case, demise) of the three architects of Soviet-Afghan war, or Afghan Jihad as it is more (in?)famously known in Pakistan: Brig. Yusuf (ISI, author), Gen. Akhtar (DG ISI) , Gen. Zia (COAS dictator-president). Then we get to meet our friends from CIA and different Parties e.g. Hekmatyar, Ahmed Massoud, Rabbani etc.
After setting up this stage, the large part of book then deals with formation and operation of Afghan Bureau of ISI which was used for distributing funds and arms (received with thanks from Saudi + US govt.), providing training and strategic support to the different 'Mujahideen' factions at the comically named Ojhri Camp. Later parts deals with logistics of arms distribution, communication, infiltration, and sabotage. Author provides several examples of guerella ops being sucessfull, partially-successful, and complete failures.
There's also an unmistakable deja vu when read in context of current US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Author details how politicking and infighting b/w the different Mujahdeen factions and the Parties they were affiliated with made any large coordinated efforts to attack and hold territorites impossible. How the US, Soviet Union, and neighbouring countries scrambled together to prevent a military takeover of Kabul. How they were worried about a Khomenei style Sunni-extremist govt in Kabul. Their fears would come true in the culmination of Afghan Civil War and formation of the Taliban regime.
Author alludes to, but doesn't directly deal with the direct effects of this war on Pakistan, which were: Millions of impoverished regugees, popularity of jihadist doctrine, economic turmoil, secterian violence, deep mistrust of govt in FATA, KPK, and Baluchistan. This could be because of his military vantage point (these were considered 'civilian' issues), but any book about Afghan war is incomplete without these discussions.
At times I found the writing to be repetitive and resembling more of a ramble than a carefully edited book. Lastly, I found the endless allusions to the proverbial 'Russian Bear' less than amusing.
June 18, 2020
Insightful first-hand account of how the 7 Afghan Mujahideen Parties were able to defeat the Soviets using guerilla warfare to make the invaders bleed out from a thousand cuts, under the leadership of Pakistan's ISI intelligence Agency, with funds from the CIA, Saudia Arabia, and private Arab donors, as well as arms from various "red"/communist friendly nations (to disguise the direct involvement of the US and Pakistan, so as to avoid direct confrontation with the USSR- in the words of Pakistani President General Zia ul Haq "the water in Afghanistan must boil at the right temperature”).
It was interesting to see both the logistical and operational aspects of covert warfare so characteristic of the cold war. There is much to be learned about foreign policy and military tactics from this book.
It also leads the reader to some viable alternative theories regarding the “accidental” incidents of the weapons explosion at Ojhri camp in Rawalpindi which killed 100 Pakistani civilians as well as the plane crash which killed Zia ul Haq.
It was interesting to see both the logistical and operational aspects of covert warfare so characteristic of the cold war. There is much to be learned about foreign policy and military tactics from this book.
It also leads the reader to some viable alternative theories regarding the “accidental” incidents of the weapons explosion at Ojhri camp in Rawalpindi which killed 100 Pakistani civilians as well as the plane crash which killed Zia ul Haq.
March 8, 2018
read it a long time ago and came out of it mesmerized. Also could connect its fallout and the collateral damage this thing has done for a whole region.
While powers play the game to quench their thirsts... the real sufferers are the common people... and in this case they are still suffering greatly and not only in Afghanistan.....
While powers play the game to quench their thirsts... the real sufferers are the common people... and in this case they are still suffering greatly and not only in Afghanistan.....
July 9, 2018
Good book and scary when look at the parallels to what is occurring in Afghanistan today. The difference being the US is trying to leave a capable partner and not just subsidize a corrupt government (though there is some of that occurring).
February 8, 2022
The book is from the perspective of American Spy official and so the biases are understandable. Intresting details are shared about the dynamics between various rebel groups and how CIA took advantage of it.
August 5, 2019
Truth... Which shouldn't be out there.
January 16, 2020
This book helped me to know about USSR- Afghan war (1979-1989) and also the involvment of Pakistan and US in this guerrilla war.
June 20, 2021
Want to read
January 9, 2024
Good one. Brings in detailed inside story of Pakistan military in helping Mujahedeens with American covert aid to fight Russian occupation of Afghanistan.
December 15, 2021
Many people may find this book thrilling as it recounts the beginning of a war that was fought by the "soldiers of God" and their "Godless" allies and supporters. Of course, the author is a soldier and looks at everything from a soldier's perspective, and therefore, never hesitates to rejoice proudly when he tells how he managed to kill hundreds of people in one operation or how he planned the destruction of a specific bridge or factory inside cities. "Kabul must burn" as he quotes his war master general Akhtar Abdurrahman; never considering the hundreds and thousands of innocent lives that would be consumed by that fire. Overall, the book can be described as eye-opening, especially for people like myself who, although the very victim of these wars, had only knew what was told by others. It provides a loophole to look into the minds of Pakistani officials and weight their regards for Afghanistan and its inhabitants.
May 31, 2020
This is probably the best book ever written on Afghan-Soviet War 1979-89. The author himself was the man in charge of day to day activities taking place inside Afghanistan. M.Yusuf describes the whole event succinctly in which hundreds and thousands have lost their lives in a meaningless war raged by the Communists in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
Like the author, I also personally blame today's situation of Afghanistan on the venomous Communist ideology that not only brought misery for the Afghans but also for many other states around the world.
Like the author, I also personally blame today's situation of Afghanistan on the venomous Communist ideology that not only brought misery for the Afghans but also for many other states around the world.
May 25, 2013
The book from no less than a brigadier of Pakistan Army who served in ISI during Afghan-Soviet war. Primarily it is a first hand account of Pakistan Army's and CIA's involvement in the war. It is also a testament that CIA and ISI help build the Jihadist in the region for their ends. CIA brings all the resources (human and material) and ISI executes impeccably. The writer divulges operational details in a subtle manner.
February 21, 2015
Excellent book from someone who saw it all first hand. Its amazing how all the arguments in Pakistan being made today are exactly the same (against the refugees) that were planted by the KGB and KHAAD. A must read to understand why that Soviet evil had to be rooted out. Its the only book for understanding that since there are only small spinets about what the Soviets did there. This book is mainly about how the guerilla war was conducted both tactically and strategically.
September 11, 2016
Not a book that I would normally pick, but it was loaned to me by my former boss, so I figured it had to be useful reading. A lil technical (in the military sense) for me, but very illuminating about the evolution of the (political) situation in Afghanistan which started the long tail that we are still seeing.
April 19, 2007
My random trips to the book store scored me this one. Usually I'll check the bargin section at the Barnes & Noble to see what history books they in Hardback. Afghanistan the Bear Trap covers the involvemnet of the Pakistani and American intelligence agencies involvemnet with the Mujahideen.
July 13, 2012
was astonished to read that how much money and effort US put into afghan war, i have true sympathy for the russians who inspite of being the overlords in afghanistan provided gas and electricity to villages.
March 29, 2020
One of the best books on the Soviet Afghan war. It covers all the major aspects of war including weakness of Soviet soldiers their war strategies and tactics alongwith gurilla fightings of Afghan Mujahdeen.
May 10, 2011
This book gives a good account of events that led to the disintegration of USSR. A good read.
July 26, 2015
Afghan warlords are introduced the way they really were/are respectively. How they were created and then played against one another.
October 1, 2016
The story in our backyard you always wanted to know, I liked this book because of the influence of the events that are mentioned in the book have had on Southeast Asian countries.
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