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The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar
With our troops now committed until 2009, The Unexpected War exposes the poverty of Canadian foreign policy, arguing that Canada’s various military missions in Afghanistan have been ad hoc in nature and made on the basis of political calculations—often flawed—about Canadian–American relations. Drawing upon interviews with key decision makers and advisors, and a first-hand account by a former Defence Ministry insider, the book offers a gripping account of how Canada became embroiled in a new kind of war—fighting insurgency in a failed state.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2007
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About the author
Janice Gross Stein
35 books6 followersJanice Gross Stein is Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. She was the Massey Lecturer in 2001 and a Trudeau Fellow in 2003. She was awarded the Molson Prize by the Canada Council for an outstanding contribution by a social scientist to public debate. She is an Honorary Foreign Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a member of the Order of Canada and the Order of Ontario. She has received an Honorary Doctorate of Laws from the University of Alberta, McMaster University, the University of Cape Breton, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
August 13, 2020
I read this book as part of a research project, and it was very educational. The authors show a lot of familiarity with Ottawa and do a prodigious job of illustrating how byzantine the Canadian government can be. Certain departments are also stagnant and stuck in their ways. All of this has huge implications for architecting, not to mention carrying out, foreign policy initiatives. This was eminently true of the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan.
This is a 2007 text, and thus a primary source in its own right in understanding the war Canadians fought in Kandahar. Stein and Lang, as the title they chose implies, emphasize that Canada was carried along with events related to Afghanistan. It was the object, as countries often are, of 'mission creep'. What started out as a largely traditional peacekeeping role for Canada in Kabul eventually evolved into a conventional war in Kandahar in the south of Afghanistan. Although the Canadian effort in that country is mostly associated in the Canadian memory with the Harper government, it was actually the Liberal regime that originally committed Canada to the US Operation Enduring Freedom and then the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF). Liberals defined the original Canadian involvement in the mission and left an enduring mark on it. John MacCallum and Bill Graham are salient figures in this history. Their importance is rivalled by General Rick Hillier, the Chief of the Defence Staff who, starting in the period 2004-2005, radically altered the culture of the Canadian military in the crucible of the Afghanistan mission. Stein and Lang even suggest that Hillier was a policymaker instead of just a policy 'taker' - unusual influence in a non-political military like Canada's.
What Stein and Lang do brilliantly is place the decision-making in Ottawa about Afghanistan squarely in the context of Canada's overarching geopolitical concerns. Foremost among these is, of course, the country's relationship with the United States. Canada went along with the wave of sympathy for the United States in the wake of 9/11, and its original commitment to ISAF must be understood in that context. However, as time went on, the Canadian relationship with its American neighbour soured. For one thing, Canada was less than enthusiastic about participating in the American Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) initiative. Moreover, Canada refused to contribute to, or even morally support, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This hesitancy was borne as much from a lack of capability as principled opposition. Regardless, Ottawa was looking for a way to smooth things over with Washington, and the suggestion that Canada deploy an entire battle group to the most dangerous part of Afghanistan - Kandahar - presented itself as the perfect balm. Indeed, it came to be known in federal leadership circles as "the Afghanistan solution." It meshed very well with the Department of Foreign Affairs' search for a 21st-century foreign policy, and Rick Hillier's project to rebuild the Canadian military into a fighting force he envisioned after its near annihilation in the 1990s under Liberal government neglect.
There can be no doubt that Canadians fought extremely bravely and incurred relatively heavy casualties in Afghanistan in proportion to their numbers and the size of the country under whose flag they fought. Kandahar, because of its location on the Pashtun border with Pakistan and its identity as the Taliban's bastion, was the project no other country wanted. Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon were only too happy to hand responsibility for it over to Canada in order to free up troops for redeployment to Iraq. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were actually very decent to their Canadian counterparts and very understanding of Canada's military limitations, but appreciative of the effort Canada did make. Indeed, Canadians did some of the hardest fighting in Afghanistan, especially since Canadian forces did not have caveats preventing their troops from engaging the enemy and coming to the aid of allies. Many European countries, for historical reasons, had imposed such caveats on their troops in Afghanistan, severely hampering their combat effectiveness. Canadians have been inclined to see themselves as "peacekeepers," but as Stein and Lang emphasize repeatedly, this simply doesn't do justice to Canada's military history. Canadians have always been warriors first, and peacekeepers second. The "peacekeeping" image we are so proud of is a myth concocted in the 1990s that has certainly not aged well.
Stein and Lang characterize Canada's strategy in Afghanistan as one based on three "Ds" - defence, developments, and diplomacy. All three had problems. From a defence standpoint, the collateral damage dealt to Afghan civilians, especially by NATO airstrikes, did huge damage to Canada's relationship with the Afghan people. The debacle over how Afghan detainees were treated by Canadian forces (namely, by handing them over to Afghan or US forces with more dubious human rights scruples) added to the complication. As for development, much of Canadian aid was "invisible" to the Afghans we were helping. This is because the funds were often channeled by the Canadian government through either intergovernmental organizations, or through the Afghan government. Part of Canadian and Allied strategy was to bolster the prestige of the Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan people, so they would esteem it and consider it legitimate. Unfortunately, this meant that Canada often didn't get the credit for the material contributions it made. Finally, on a diplomatic level, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence were seldom on the same page. The former was sluggish and generally ineffectual.
Something that I found quite remarkable about Canada's legacy in Afghanistan was that it was Ottawa, in particular, that insisted on turning ISAF over the NATO command in 2003. Why? The answer was quite simple. Bringing ISAF under NATO command made Brussels responsible for finding replacement troops that could take the place of Canadians once their rotation in Afghanistan was over. In other words, it alleviated the problem of Ottawa having to independently canvas for relief from other countries. This was originally a problem Canadian troops faced when they were stationed in Kabul in 2002-2003. However, it would become an even more acute issue when fighting intensified starting in 2006, and that in Kandahar.
All in all, this is a fine book.
This is a 2007 text, and thus a primary source in its own right in understanding the war Canadians fought in Kandahar. Stein and Lang, as the title they chose implies, emphasize that Canada was carried along with events related to Afghanistan. It was the object, as countries often are, of 'mission creep'. What started out as a largely traditional peacekeeping role for Canada in Kabul eventually evolved into a conventional war in Kandahar in the south of Afghanistan. Although the Canadian effort in that country is mostly associated in the Canadian memory with the Harper government, it was actually the Liberal regime that originally committed Canada to the US Operation Enduring Freedom and then the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF). Liberals defined the original Canadian involvement in the mission and left an enduring mark on it. John MacCallum and Bill Graham are salient figures in this history. Their importance is rivalled by General Rick Hillier, the Chief of the Defence Staff who, starting in the period 2004-2005, radically altered the culture of the Canadian military in the crucible of the Afghanistan mission. Stein and Lang even suggest that Hillier was a policymaker instead of just a policy 'taker' - unusual influence in a non-political military like Canada's.
What Stein and Lang do brilliantly is place the decision-making in Ottawa about Afghanistan squarely in the context of Canada's overarching geopolitical concerns. Foremost among these is, of course, the country's relationship with the United States. Canada went along with the wave of sympathy for the United States in the wake of 9/11, and its original commitment to ISAF must be understood in that context. However, as time went on, the Canadian relationship with its American neighbour soured. For one thing, Canada was less than enthusiastic about participating in the American Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) initiative. Moreover, Canada refused to contribute to, or even morally support, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This hesitancy was borne as much from a lack of capability as principled opposition. Regardless, Ottawa was looking for a way to smooth things over with Washington, and the suggestion that Canada deploy an entire battle group to the most dangerous part of Afghanistan - Kandahar - presented itself as the perfect balm. Indeed, it came to be known in federal leadership circles as "the Afghanistan solution." It meshed very well with the Department of Foreign Affairs' search for a 21st-century foreign policy, and Rick Hillier's project to rebuild the Canadian military into a fighting force he envisioned after its near annihilation in the 1990s under Liberal government neglect.
There can be no doubt that Canadians fought extremely bravely and incurred relatively heavy casualties in Afghanistan in proportion to their numbers and the size of the country under whose flag they fought. Kandahar, because of its location on the Pashtun border with Pakistan and its identity as the Taliban's bastion, was the project no other country wanted. Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon were only too happy to hand responsibility for it over to Canada in order to free up troops for redeployment to Iraq. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were actually very decent to their Canadian counterparts and very understanding of Canada's military limitations, but appreciative of the effort Canada did make. Indeed, Canadians did some of the hardest fighting in Afghanistan, especially since Canadian forces did not have caveats preventing their troops from engaging the enemy and coming to the aid of allies. Many European countries, for historical reasons, had imposed such caveats on their troops in Afghanistan, severely hampering their combat effectiveness. Canadians have been inclined to see themselves as "peacekeepers," but as Stein and Lang emphasize repeatedly, this simply doesn't do justice to Canada's military history. Canadians have always been warriors first, and peacekeepers second. The "peacekeeping" image we are so proud of is a myth concocted in the 1990s that has certainly not aged well.
Stein and Lang characterize Canada's strategy in Afghanistan as one based on three "Ds" - defence, developments, and diplomacy. All three had problems. From a defence standpoint, the collateral damage dealt to Afghan civilians, especially by NATO airstrikes, did huge damage to Canada's relationship with the Afghan people. The debacle over how Afghan detainees were treated by Canadian forces (namely, by handing them over to Afghan or US forces with more dubious human rights scruples) added to the complication. As for development, much of Canadian aid was "invisible" to the Afghans we were helping. This is because the funds were often channeled by the Canadian government through either intergovernmental organizations, or through the Afghan government. Part of Canadian and Allied strategy was to bolster the prestige of the Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan people, so they would esteem it and consider it legitimate. Unfortunately, this meant that Canada often didn't get the credit for the material contributions it made. Finally, on a diplomatic level, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence were seldom on the same page. The former was sluggish and generally ineffectual.
Something that I found quite remarkable about Canada's legacy in Afghanistan was that it was Ottawa, in particular, that insisted on turning ISAF over the NATO command in 2003. Why? The answer was quite simple. Bringing ISAF under NATO command made Brussels responsible for finding replacement troops that could take the place of Canadians once their rotation in Afghanistan was over. In other words, it alleviated the problem of Ottawa having to independently canvas for relief from other countries. This was originally a problem Canadian troops faced when they were stationed in Kabul in 2002-2003. However, it would become an even more acute issue when fighting intensified starting in 2006, and that in Kandahar.
All in all, this is a fine book.
September 11, 2009
This is a book for politicos. Extremely well researched review and analysis of the inside political decisions that resulted in the Canadian deployemnt to Afghanistan.
If by "tales from the battlefield" you mean the corridors of External Affairs, Langevin Block and NDHQ, this is the book for you. Engrossing. You couldn't make this stuff up
If by "tales from the battlefield" you mean the corridors of External Affairs, Langevin Block and NDHQ, this is the book for you. Engrossing. You couldn't make this stuff up
June 2, 2021
This was an unexpected good book. Authored by an academic and a civil servant, this book read more like it was written by a journalist. Not that I stand in awe of journalists, however when it comes to writing history, they seem to do a better job of bringing things to life than most academics.
The road to Canada's adventure in Afghanistan was certainly twisty. It is no wonder that Canadians had no idea how we got there or what we were doing. Neither did the decision makers. How Gross Stein and Lang followed the scent and illuminated the serpentine trail seems almost miraculous. They managed to track down the decisions by interviewing people who held very senior positions at the time. From Canada, these include former: Prime Ministers, Ministers of Defense, Deputy Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Defense Staff, Ambassadors, other Ministers and Deputy Ministers, representatives on NATO committees and many other senior people who were there. From other countries they were able to interview senior people including: former Secretary of Defense for the USA, Defense officials from the United Kingdom and NATO representatives from several other countries. Each of these people were able to add to the story of how Canada came to be in Kandahar.
After reading this book, I came away with a couple of clear opinions. First; the probability of a major war, like the 20th century wars, involving NATO is low. It is too likely to go nuclear. This is why we need to be part of Ballistic Missile Defense. Second; the world is more likely to see battlefields involving failed states like Afghanistan. Those locations will continue to be breeding grounds for terrorism and Canada should be ready to send its military to those locations for extended periods. We need to learn from Afghanistan. Our military was unprepared for Kandahar, the fighting, the IEDs and the need for armoured and air mobility. Finally, our civilian government needs to remove its blinders, partisanship and short term need to reverse previous administrations’ foreign direction. Canada needs to have a clear stable long term direction for a foreign policy, always remembering countries don’t have friends they have interests. We need to fund our military to meet or advance our foreign policy and the military needs to train to the same direction. As professional and disciplined as the Canadian Army was in Afghanistan, they were not prepared for the level of battle, need for armour or need for air medevac they faced.
My conclusions are not necessarily the authors’ conclusions; they leave the last words to Afghans. The last paragraph of the book, the last seven lines are a plea from a senior Afghan civil servant. “If you do not support a child, teach it how to walk, it cannot stand on its own two feet. Afghanistan is your child.”
Very good book; informative but not pedantic or data heavy. Everybody who has an interest in the working of Canada’s government or military should read this book. Four stars
The road to Canada's adventure in Afghanistan was certainly twisty. It is no wonder that Canadians had no idea how we got there or what we were doing. Neither did the decision makers. How Gross Stein and Lang followed the scent and illuminated the serpentine trail seems almost miraculous. They managed to track down the decisions by interviewing people who held very senior positions at the time. From Canada, these include former: Prime Ministers, Ministers of Defense, Deputy Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Defense Staff, Ambassadors, other Ministers and Deputy Ministers, representatives on NATO committees and many other senior people who were there. From other countries they were able to interview senior people including: former Secretary of Defense for the USA, Defense officials from the United Kingdom and NATO representatives from several other countries. Each of these people were able to add to the story of how Canada came to be in Kandahar.
After reading this book, I came away with a couple of clear opinions. First; the probability of a major war, like the 20th century wars, involving NATO is low. It is too likely to go nuclear. This is why we need to be part of Ballistic Missile Defense. Second; the world is more likely to see battlefields involving failed states like Afghanistan. Those locations will continue to be breeding grounds for terrorism and Canada should be ready to send its military to those locations for extended periods. We need to learn from Afghanistan. Our military was unprepared for Kandahar, the fighting, the IEDs and the need for armoured and air mobility. Finally, our civilian government needs to remove its blinders, partisanship and short term need to reverse previous administrations’ foreign direction. Canada needs to have a clear stable long term direction for a foreign policy, always remembering countries don’t have friends they have interests. We need to fund our military to meet or advance our foreign policy and the military needs to train to the same direction. As professional and disciplined as the Canadian Army was in Afghanistan, they were not prepared for the level of battle, need for armour or need for air medevac they faced.
My conclusions are not necessarily the authors’ conclusions; they leave the last words to Afghans. The last paragraph of the book, the last seven lines are a plea from a senior Afghan civil servant. “If you do not support a child, teach it how to walk, it cannot stand on its own two feet. Afghanistan is your child.”
Very good book; informative but not pedantic or data heavy. Everybody who has an interest in the working of Canada’s government or military should read this book. Four stars
July 23, 2020
This is a book for those who want to understand the policy decisions that led to Canada's involvement in the war in Afghanistan. There is no description of the actual fighting, and operations like Medusa are only mentioned briefly to illustrate the outcome of policy decisions.
None the less, it is a more interesting book than I expected. The authors interviewed many of the participants in the decision-making, and that brings this alive.
There is a dreadful clanger on the fourth page - "Shinook" helicopters - that alarmed me, and I still wonder how a former chief of staff to two former Ministers of Defence (i.e., Lang) could have missed this, but the book otherwise seems very credible and well-informed.
None the less, it is a more interesting book than I expected. The authors interviewed many of the participants in the decision-making, and that brings this alive.
There is a dreadful clanger on the fourth page - "Shinook" helicopters - that alarmed me, and I still wonder how a former chief of staff to two former Ministers of Defence (i.e., Lang) could have missed this, but the book otherwise seems very credible and well-informed.
January 2, 2026
As others noted, this is a political history. There is nothing on the actual military campaign. It just gets tedious. And the fear of the US being angry is informative and repetitive.
I skimmed sections of the book hoping for more.
I skimmed sections of the book hoping for more.
September 28, 2019
Certainly makes clear how ill equipped the Canadian government was making the decision to move from the relatively safe UN mission in Afghanistan to become part of the NATO led war in Khandahar. Interesting how the US manipulated Canada into the more aggressive role in Afghanistan as an alternative to participation in the ill fated invasion of Iraq.
December 3, 2011
There is more than one angle to this book : first, how the federal government does not work as well as it should, due to the lack of movement between departments by public servants who are stuck into a job classification preventing them from moving around, and due to its slavery to process over results (the authors do get it right); second, whether Western countries should try to help as best as they can (I believe we need to do so), or run away as soon as one of our citizens gets hurt (which seems to be the preference of the book's authors); third, is there a better future for Afghanistan ? In its conclusion, despite leaning towards leaving through most of the book, the authors reveal an Afghan's cry for help "We ask you not to repeat the mistakes you made in the 1990's, not to abandon Afghanistan again. If the international forces withdraw, Afghanistan will descend into chaos."
One possible solution which may need to be looked at seriously would be the creation of a new country, Pashtunistan, which would take away from both Afghanistan and Pakistan the areas where the Pashtus are the majority and allow both of these countries to move forward without the constant fear of tribal wars. Pashtunistan would still need to move away from tribal mentalities, but if we allow them to move so, they just might surprise the world and succeed. But the world, stuck into the belief that artificial borders must remain sacred, may not be quite ready to do so outside of Europe, where small states have been multiplying over the past two decades (sometimes without due cause).
One possible solution which may need to be looked at seriously would be the creation of a new country, Pashtunistan, which would take away from both Afghanistan and Pakistan the areas where the Pashtus are the majority and allow both of these countries to move forward without the constant fear of tribal wars. Pashtunistan would still need to move away from tribal mentalities, but if we allow them to move so, they just might surprise the world and succeed. But the world, stuck into the belief that artificial borders must remain sacred, may not be quite ready to do so outside of Europe, where small states have been multiplying over the past two decades (sometimes without due cause).
December 24, 2025
Damn Eggleton really got fired because of an ex-huzz that's crazy
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 7, 2009
Insightful, if hawkish, story of the Canadian mission. Surpisingly, made me think favorably of Paul Martin.
July 29, 2011
Great understanding of how Canada got involved in Afghanistan and where we were are as off 2007.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews