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The Rent-Seeking Society
The fifth volume in
The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock
consists of six parts, each part expounding on a separate component of the field. Part 1, “Rent Seeking: An Overview,” brings together two papers that focus on problems of defining rent-seeking behavior and outline the nature of the ongoing research program in a historical perspective. Part 2, “More on Efficient Rent Seeking,” contains four contributions in which Tullock elaborates on his 1980 article on efficient rent seeking. Part 3, “The Environments of Rent Seeking,” consists of eight papers that collectively display the breadth of the rent-seeking concept. Part 4, “The Cost of Rent Seeking,” comprises seven papers that address several important issues about the cost of rent seeking to society as a whole. Part 5 is Tullock’s short monograph Exchanges and Contracts, in which he develops a systematic theory of exchange in political markets. In Part 6, “Future Directions for Rent-Seeking Research,” Tullock focuses on the importance of information in the political marketplace.
This work has been carefully constructed to build on the inaugural volume in this collection and to ease students through the field in a clear and concise manner.
Charles K. Rowley is Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He is also General Director of the Locke Institute.
The entire series includes:
Volume 1: Virginia Political Economy
Volume 2: The Calculus of Consent
Volume 3: The Organization of Inquiry (November 2004)
Volume 4: The Economics of Politics (February 2005)
Volume 5: The Rent-Seeking Society (March 2005)
Volume 6: Bureaucracy (June 2005)
Volume 7: The Economics and Politics of Wealth Redistribution (July 2005)
Volume 8: The Social Dilemma: Of Autocracy, Revolution, Coup d'Etat, and War (December 2005)
Volume 9: Law and Economics (December 2005)
Volume 10: Economics without Frontiers (January 2006)
This work has been carefully constructed to build on the inaugural volume in this collection and to ease students through the field in a clear and concise manner.
Charles K. Rowley is Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He is also General Director of the Locke Institute.
The entire series includes:
Volume 1: Virginia Political Economy
Volume 2: The Calculus of Consent
Volume 3: The Organization of Inquiry (November 2004)
Volume 4: The Economics of Politics (February 2005)
Volume 5: The Rent-Seeking Society (March 2005)
Volume 6: Bureaucracy (June 2005)
Volume 7: The Economics and Politics of Wealth Redistribution (July 2005)
Volume 8: The Social Dilemma: Of Autocracy, Revolution, Coup d'Etat, and War (December 2005)
Volume 9: Law and Economics (December 2005)
Volume 10: Economics without Frontiers (January 2006)
344 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 2005
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August 28, 2016Good intro to Public Choice Economics American Style. Defines Rent Seeking well, and helps to untangle the way that Economic Rent as profit from effort is distinct from rent created through the exclusion of others.
Probably best read against Schumpeter's account of how Monopolies form as Economies mature. Also should be read against Henry George, Poverty and Progress, about the role of Land in monopoly formation.
Both David Harvey and Jo Stiglitz have returned to these kinds of themes of late, so these ideas about natural resources and rent seeking are finding new relevance.
Probably best read against Schumpeter's account of how Monopolies form as Economies mature. Also should be read against Henry George, Poverty and Progress, about the role of Land in monopoly formation.
Both David Harvey and Jo Stiglitz have returned to these kinds of themes of late, so these ideas about natural resources and rent seeking are finding new relevance.
July 29, 2017
Rent-seeking is the idea that a few special interested parties, whether groups or individuals, obtain privileges which allow them to extract a rent. The rent is the income derived due to the special privilege, it is not income via wealth producing methods. The more a society has rent-seeking, the more produce is taken away from other sources, hindering the society’s allocation of resources. Rent-seeking, in Tullock’s view, is a result of a policy that has more costs to society than benefits.
Rent-seekers will do as much as they can to obtain their special privilege, but the special privilege is not a certainty. Tullock uses the main example of lobbying efforts that allow for a chance to obtain a special privilege which provides a rent. Others will lobby to avoid paying a rent, procuring exemptions in laws that would hinder them. Overall, rent-seeking takes away resources away from the economy to use for socially destructive purposes, even though a particular group will gain from their rent-seeking effort. Tullock’s research helped economists understand that the loss to society from rent-seeking is far more than thought of previously.
The problem with this story is that rent-seeking is seen only as a result, rather than a process. Many examples were provided showing how the rent-seeking efforts were undertaking, but the process itself is not rent-seeking. Tullock does point out that if some rent is required, that there are more efficient ways of benefiting the special interest groups than the way the groups are currently being benefited. The reason for the inefficient method in practice, as explained is due to the problem that the more efficient way would not be politically feasible. It would have helped the book should he better explain the process and their undercurrents than just a myriad of specific examples.
History does play a role in the explanation of the rent-seeking behavior, such as England. England having at one point most of the national product go to rent-seekers while later changing the institutions to prevent massive rent-seeking. Culture and history should have played a more prominent role in explain the property right changes that occurred to make certain societies more or less prone to rent-seeking. The information incentives of voters was a major explanation of rent-seeking.
Tullock used game theory and a few models to illustrate the problem of rent-seeking. The game was insightful for understanding rent-seeking, but unless some basic game theory is known prior to reading the book, the reading of those parts would be more difficult. Most of the book are eloquently and stark examples of rent-seeking behavior.
Rent-seekers will do as much as they can to obtain their special privilege, but the special privilege is not a certainty. Tullock uses the main example of lobbying efforts that allow for a chance to obtain a special privilege which provides a rent. Others will lobby to avoid paying a rent, procuring exemptions in laws that would hinder them. Overall, rent-seeking takes away resources away from the economy to use for socially destructive purposes, even though a particular group will gain from their rent-seeking effort. Tullock’s research helped economists understand that the loss to society from rent-seeking is far more than thought of previously.
The problem with this story is that rent-seeking is seen only as a result, rather than a process. Many examples were provided showing how the rent-seeking efforts were undertaking, but the process itself is not rent-seeking. Tullock does point out that if some rent is required, that there are more efficient ways of benefiting the special interest groups than the way the groups are currently being benefited. The reason for the inefficient method in practice, as explained is due to the problem that the more efficient way would not be politically feasible. It would have helped the book should he better explain the process and their undercurrents than just a myriad of specific examples.
History does play a role in the explanation of the rent-seeking behavior, such as England. England having at one point most of the national product go to rent-seekers while later changing the institutions to prevent massive rent-seeking. Culture and history should have played a more prominent role in explain the property right changes that occurred to make certain societies more or less prone to rent-seeking. The information incentives of voters was a major explanation of rent-seeking.
Tullock used game theory and a few models to illustrate the problem of rent-seeking. The game was insightful for understanding rent-seeking, but unless some basic game theory is known prior to reading the book, the reading of those parts would be more difficult. Most of the book are eloquently and stark examples of rent-seeking behavior.
March 12, 2023
Rec from Larry S
Great intuition on transitional gains of policies. David Friedman: “It’s hard for the government to even give anything away.”
When Larry explained this intuition to me it blew my mind and it’s straight from Tullock
Great intuition on transitional gains of policies. David Friedman: “It’s hard for the government to even give anything away.”
When Larry explained this intuition to me it blew my mind and it’s straight from Tullock
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews