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Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey
From Fouad Ajami, an acclaimed author and chronicler of Arab politics, comes a compelling account of how a generation of Arab intellectuals tried to introduce cultural renewals in their homelands through the forces of modernity and secularism. Ultimately, they came to face disappointment, exile, and, on occasion, death. Brilliantly weaving together the strands of a tumultuous century in Arab political thought, history, and poetry, Ajami takes us from the ruins of Beirut's once glittering metropolis to the land of Egypt, where struggle rages between a modernist impulse and an Islamist insurgency, from Nasser's pan-Arab nationalist ambitions to the emergence of an uneasy Pax Americana in Arab lands, from the triumphalism of the Gulf War to the continuing anguished debate over the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords.
For anyone who seeks to understand the Middle East, here is an insider's unflinching analysis of the collision between intellectual life and political realities in the Arab world today.
For anyone who seeks to understand the Middle East, here is an insider's unflinching analysis of the collision between intellectual life and political realities in the Arab world today.
368 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1998
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November 17, 2008
Written before September 11, Ajami's ever-relevant book asks why modern Arab society thinks so differently from others. This wasn't always so: Today's Arab society is the repudiation of a bygone liberalization among Arab thinkers, an opening up that faded after about 1967. But why did liberal trends end in the Arab world while they accelerated in other places?
The book takes a discursive approach, looking at the issue through four filters: Lebanese culture, the Iran-Iraq War, Egypt and its society, and the cold peace with Israel. The picture that emerges is of a social structure both paralyzed and mystified by Enlightenment ideas, unable to adapt them to the peculiar reality of Arab nation-states.
The result has been the emergence of political nihilism in the Arab world, exemplified by the incomprehensible pages of Egypt's Al-Ahram. Russia, we know, went through period of political nihilism in the late 19th century. But what's different with the Arabs is that this nihilism has become the permanent norm of the intelligentsia, a norm for which nothing could be more repugnant than the existing, compromised social order. This is a class whose only acceptable way of life does not exist, a society that lives in a dream world and acts accordingly.
Ajami shows how this mindset might be changed. For example, the book discusses an Egyptian professor, Abu Zeid, whose remarkable exegesis of the Mu'tazilah, an early Islamic philosophical movement, demonstrated the development of tolerant Islam early in its history. Along with his later study of the Islamic philosopher Ibn Arabi, this work demonstrated the adaptability of early Islam to the outside world.
Abu Zeid warns that in fact, no distinction between moderate and radical Islam is possible in the secular world. But he succeeds in removing Islam as a necessary factor in the current Arab intellectual crisis, thereby focusing the onus of reform more squarely on Arab society and away from Islam. That Abu Zeid was driven out of Egypt due to harassment that stemmed from his works is indicative of the depth of the current hostility to reform.
For readers, however, this book reveals a more hopeful layer to the Arab world than the one we now see, a different layer that allows for a reconciliation with the outside world. By exploring a generation of liberal, even radical Arab thinkers who lived in and shaped the early and mid-20th century, the book shows readers a possible future, a time when Arabs fit themselves seamlessly within the modern world.
I highly recommend Dream Palace of the Arabs for anyone, Arab or non-Arab, who wants to look at the Arab world in greater depth and with more context than what we normally see. A basic knowledge of the Middle East is necessary, because the approach of the book assumes you already know the rough sketch about 1948, 1967, the Lebanese Civil War, and so on. The benefit to reading the book is learning that solutions to the crises within Arab societies already exist -- solutions invented by the Arabs themselves.
The book takes a discursive approach, looking at the issue through four filters: Lebanese culture, the Iran-Iraq War, Egypt and its society, and the cold peace with Israel. The picture that emerges is of a social structure both paralyzed and mystified by Enlightenment ideas, unable to adapt them to the peculiar reality of Arab nation-states.
The result has been the emergence of political nihilism in the Arab world, exemplified by the incomprehensible pages of Egypt's Al-Ahram. Russia, we know, went through period of political nihilism in the late 19th century. But what's different with the Arabs is that this nihilism has become the permanent norm of the intelligentsia, a norm for which nothing could be more repugnant than the existing, compromised social order. This is a class whose only acceptable way of life does not exist, a society that lives in a dream world and acts accordingly.
Ajami shows how this mindset might be changed. For example, the book discusses an Egyptian professor, Abu Zeid, whose remarkable exegesis of the Mu'tazilah, an early Islamic philosophical movement, demonstrated the development of tolerant Islam early in its history. Along with his later study of the Islamic philosopher Ibn Arabi, this work demonstrated the adaptability of early Islam to the outside world.
Abu Zeid warns that in fact, no distinction between moderate and radical Islam is possible in the secular world. But he succeeds in removing Islam as a necessary factor in the current Arab intellectual crisis, thereby focusing the onus of reform more squarely on Arab society and away from Islam. That Abu Zeid was driven out of Egypt due to harassment that stemmed from his works is indicative of the depth of the current hostility to reform.
For readers, however, this book reveals a more hopeful layer to the Arab world than the one we now see, a different layer that allows for a reconciliation with the outside world. By exploring a generation of liberal, even radical Arab thinkers who lived in and shaped the early and mid-20th century, the book shows readers a possible future, a time when Arabs fit themselves seamlessly within the modern world.
I highly recommend Dream Palace of the Arabs for anyone, Arab or non-Arab, who wants to look at the Arab world in greater depth and with more context than what we normally see. A basic knowledge of the Middle East is necessary, because the approach of the book assumes you already know the rough sketch about 1948, 1967, the Lebanese Civil War, and so on. The benefit to reading the book is learning that solutions to the crises within Arab societies already exist -- solutions invented by the Arabs themselves.
April 20, 2011
Ajami is the rock star Middle East Studies scholar at an exceptionally wonderful graduate school, and I wanted to read his stuff. For those of us who watch current events in the Arab World, and say, "Where did all this secular leftism come from?" this book chronicles where it came from. Ajami compellingly tells the stories of the Arab intelligensia of the second-half of the 20th century. He explains differences within their thinking, devotes pages to poetic translations of their poetry and does a good job illuminating the sort of people I should have paid attention to when I minored in Middle Eastern Studies.
January 26, 2024
The Middle East is planet Earth’s permanent snafu. While the troubles there didn’t start in the 20th century, it is clear that the Arabic lands since World War II have been a continuation of their turbulent past and a sad precursor for where they are heading in the future. Fouad Ajami takes a look at modern Arabia and shows how it relates to the ideologies of Arab intellectuals in The Dream Palace Of the Arabs.
The Arabian lands span an arc across the globe from western Africa to Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula in the east. Most of what Ajami writes about is in the middle of this region with the heart of it all being in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. The work begins in post-World War II during the time of Arab Nationalism. Using the frustrating life of Syrian poet Khalil Hawi as an anchor for the narrative, Ajami shows where Arab Nationalism came from and why it failed. In the postwar world, Arab intellectuals were eager to break free from colonialism and European domination while they were simultaneously fascinated by European ideologies. Not just nationalism and modernism but also socialism, communism, capitalism, and even fascism became part of the intellectual lives of poets, novelists, college professors, and journalists. Any kind of “ism” that spread out of Europe at the time got embraced by this small class of educated people. It was Arab Nationalism and Pan-Arabism that eventually emerged as the most dominant forces. Pan-Arabism failed in its attempt to unite all the Arabic people under one ethnic umbrella, be they Muslim, Christian, Jew, or anything else. Tribalism and sectarianism proved to be stronger markers of identity than ethnicity. Regional differences were too vast and Arab Nationalism took over. Arab intellectuals pushed people to unite within national boundaries; it embraced the blood and soil element in fascism This was doomed to failure too because of so many sectarian differences. In addition a lot of Arabic people hated their leaders, making nationalism a dim hope. The dreams of Arabic unity shattered and Khalil Hawi committed suicide in despair.
Ajami continues on with Middle Eastern history in tandem with the poets Nizar Qabbani and Adonis. This section covers the time period from the 1960s or so up until the Gulf War when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Both poets continued on expressing their desire for Arab unity and their muted disgruntlement with the growing autocracy amongst Arab politicians. Three majr events disillusioned Arab intellectuals even further. One was the Iranian Revolution, the time when the Persian, non-Arab Muslims asserted themselves as the world leaders of Muslim ideology and political power. Even worse, the Iranians were predominantly Shia and this set off a long series of clashes between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Arabic lands. The next big obstacle to Arab unity was the oil industry boom on the Arabian Peninsula and the rise of the petrodollar. Suddenly Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwatitis, and Qataris saw themselves as richer and superior to the other people of poorer Arabic nations and they didn’t hesitate to show it. Then the rise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq dealt another blow to the intellectual’s dream of Arab unity. Iraq lost the war when they invaded Iran and when Hussein invaded Kuwait, the Saudis brought in America to fight off the attack. The impression left on the artists and scholars was that Arabic people were too weak to handle their own affairs and, even worse, members of their own ethnic group couldn’t be trusted or relied upon. A sense of dismay set in.
Ajami also goes into brief details about the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s. Up until that time, the west end of Beirut was akin to the Left Bank in Paris with chic cafes and the presence of the universities. It was a haven for progressive, upwardly mobile Middle Eastern people. Then the Palestinians invaded southern Lebanon and tried to force the Marontie Christians off their ancestral homeland. The Palestinians lost, but progressed onward to West Beirut and merged with the Iran-backed Hezbollah. West Beirut turned into a ghetto dominated by street gangs of Palestinian and Shia thugs. Anti-intellectualism went on the rise in the Middle East from then on.
Ajami move on to an analysis of Egypt in the eras of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Egypt, along with the rest of the Arabic nations, began a decline into autocratic governments, punishment for intellectuals who challenged their authority, and a rise in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, political Islam, and Islamic fundamentalism. The lives of Egyptian intellectuals became dampened by governmental persecution and terrorist attacks from fanatical Muslims, some of which were deadly. Ajami is actually quite sympathetic to Sadat, especially because of his efforts to make peace with Israel, but he is also critical of the increasingly totalitarian nature of his government. Ajami has no sympathy at all for Hosni Mubarak.
The final section of this book examines the role that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has in shaping the intellectual life, or I should say the anti-intellectualism, of contemporary Arabic society. While acknowledging the tragic displacement of the Palestinian people, Ajami is also critical of the way Arabs, particularly journalists and Muslim fascists have turned anti-Zionism into their primary ideology since the 1990s. He points out that Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin did everything they could to make peace with their neighbors, most of which, like the Jordanian royal family and the Egyptian government, had a low opinion of the Palestinians from the start, even laying claim to the land that is now owned by Israel. There was a time when Jordan claimed Palestine as their own territory and even denied that Palestinians had a right to their own nationality. Ajami also points out how Arabs turned against their leaders like Sadat and both King Abdullahs from Jordan for trying to make peace with Israel. He even points out how much Arabs hated Yasser Arafat for agreeing to the current borders of Gaza and the West Bank in a pragmatic attempt to prevent further wars with Israel. But the fascisitc elements in the Middle East got their way and the result has been a never ending cycle of attack and counter-attack in the so-called Holy Land ever since.
Fouad Ajami’s whole concept of The Dream Palace Of the Arabs is that Arabic intellectuals have been chasing after utopian solutions to their problems. When one naive ideology fails they move on to another naive ideology. Now these intellectuals have run out of ideologies and a lot of the poets have degenerated into writing vicious screeds against the Jews or retreating into a comforting and toothless womb of sentimental love poetry with no political ambition at all. Ajami’s writing is roundabout and never direct, but if you follow his argument carefully, you realize he is making an argument pragmatism. That means working with what you have within the realms of the possible. Arabs might not like the political choices they have, but if they are the only choices it is wise to do the best with what is there. Progress only happens in stages anyways. No savior or messiah is going to come and put eveything in order. No war is ever going to create stability or independence.
After living in the Middle East, I can supplement Ajami’s argument with my own observations regarding the anti-Jewish rhetoric and conspiracy theories that run rampant in the region. Arabic people have legitimate grievances against their autocratic governments, but censorship is heavy and criticizing their leaders is extremely dangerous. It is my contention that these politicians encourage the hatred of Jewish people and Israelis as a valve for releasing psychological pressures resulting from frustrated political desires while at the same time serving as a deflection away from the governments that are the actual source of people’s anger. It’s better for the government if people hate the Jews rather than the politicians. The unintended consequence is that instead of endangering the stability of Israel, the stability of the entire world is at risk due to radicalization and terrorism in the Arabian lands.
Fouad Ajami has a compelling perspective on the Arab intellectual and Arabic society in general. The worst thing I have to say about this book is that his indirect style of making an argument can be frustrating for the reader at times. While he has a definite point to prove, he never states it clearly and directly so that the effect is a kind of wishy-washy dance around what he wants to say. That indirect style may be the result of living under a repressive political regime, but then again it may just be the way people communicate in the Middle East, or maybe it is a little of both. There are also times when he includes references to literary works by Arabic authors simply because they are known outside the Middle East and not necessarily because their works lend anything of immediate value to Ajami’s thesis.
The Dream Palace Of the Arabs may not arrive at the conclusion that Arabic people want to hear. I imagine some people will uncritically hate this book simply because Fouad Ajami wants Arabs to have peaceful relations with Israel whereas he sees that politicians and journalists are making the situation worse for Palestinians, not better. I think what he has to say should be heard because the wars in the Middle East are resulting, so far, in nothing but eternal warfare. Simply put, Ajami is saying that Arabs need to get their feet on the ground, get their heads out of the clouds, overthrow the dictators, and come up with a better way to solve problems. It is a bitter pill for some to swallow, if they even bother to swallow it, but it is something that needs to be said anyhow.
The Arabian lands span an arc across the globe from western Africa to Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula in the east. Most of what Ajami writes about is in the middle of this region with the heart of it all being in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. The work begins in post-World War II during the time of Arab Nationalism. Using the frustrating life of Syrian poet Khalil Hawi as an anchor for the narrative, Ajami shows where Arab Nationalism came from and why it failed. In the postwar world, Arab intellectuals were eager to break free from colonialism and European domination while they were simultaneously fascinated by European ideologies. Not just nationalism and modernism but also socialism, communism, capitalism, and even fascism became part of the intellectual lives of poets, novelists, college professors, and journalists. Any kind of “ism” that spread out of Europe at the time got embraced by this small class of educated people. It was Arab Nationalism and Pan-Arabism that eventually emerged as the most dominant forces. Pan-Arabism failed in its attempt to unite all the Arabic people under one ethnic umbrella, be they Muslim, Christian, Jew, or anything else. Tribalism and sectarianism proved to be stronger markers of identity than ethnicity. Regional differences were too vast and Arab Nationalism took over. Arab intellectuals pushed people to unite within national boundaries; it embraced the blood and soil element in fascism This was doomed to failure too because of so many sectarian differences. In addition a lot of Arabic people hated their leaders, making nationalism a dim hope. The dreams of Arabic unity shattered and Khalil Hawi committed suicide in despair.
Ajami continues on with Middle Eastern history in tandem with the poets Nizar Qabbani and Adonis. This section covers the time period from the 1960s or so up until the Gulf War when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Both poets continued on expressing their desire for Arab unity and their muted disgruntlement with the growing autocracy amongst Arab politicians. Three majr events disillusioned Arab intellectuals even further. One was the Iranian Revolution, the time when the Persian, non-Arab Muslims asserted themselves as the world leaders of Muslim ideology and political power. Even worse, the Iranians were predominantly Shia and this set off a long series of clashes between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Arabic lands. The next big obstacle to Arab unity was the oil industry boom on the Arabian Peninsula and the rise of the petrodollar. Suddenly Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwatitis, and Qataris saw themselves as richer and superior to the other people of poorer Arabic nations and they didn’t hesitate to show it. Then the rise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq dealt another blow to the intellectual’s dream of Arab unity. Iraq lost the war when they invaded Iran and when Hussein invaded Kuwait, the Saudis brought in America to fight off the attack. The impression left on the artists and scholars was that Arabic people were too weak to handle their own affairs and, even worse, members of their own ethnic group couldn’t be trusted or relied upon. A sense of dismay set in.
Ajami also goes into brief details about the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s. Up until that time, the west end of Beirut was akin to the Left Bank in Paris with chic cafes and the presence of the universities. It was a haven for progressive, upwardly mobile Middle Eastern people. Then the Palestinians invaded southern Lebanon and tried to force the Marontie Christians off their ancestral homeland. The Palestinians lost, but progressed onward to West Beirut and merged with the Iran-backed Hezbollah. West Beirut turned into a ghetto dominated by street gangs of Palestinian and Shia thugs. Anti-intellectualism went on the rise in the Middle East from then on.
Ajami move on to an analysis of Egypt in the eras of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Egypt, along with the rest of the Arabic nations, began a decline into autocratic governments, punishment for intellectuals who challenged their authority, and a rise in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, political Islam, and Islamic fundamentalism. The lives of Egyptian intellectuals became dampened by governmental persecution and terrorist attacks from fanatical Muslims, some of which were deadly. Ajami is actually quite sympathetic to Sadat, especially because of his efforts to make peace with Israel, but he is also critical of the increasingly totalitarian nature of his government. Ajami has no sympathy at all for Hosni Mubarak.
The final section of this book examines the role that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has in shaping the intellectual life, or I should say the anti-intellectualism, of contemporary Arabic society. While acknowledging the tragic displacement of the Palestinian people, Ajami is also critical of the way Arabs, particularly journalists and Muslim fascists have turned anti-Zionism into their primary ideology since the 1990s. He points out that Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin did everything they could to make peace with their neighbors, most of which, like the Jordanian royal family and the Egyptian government, had a low opinion of the Palestinians from the start, even laying claim to the land that is now owned by Israel. There was a time when Jordan claimed Palestine as their own territory and even denied that Palestinians had a right to their own nationality. Ajami also points out how Arabs turned against their leaders like Sadat and both King Abdullahs from Jordan for trying to make peace with Israel. He even points out how much Arabs hated Yasser Arafat for agreeing to the current borders of Gaza and the West Bank in a pragmatic attempt to prevent further wars with Israel. But the fascisitc elements in the Middle East got their way and the result has been a never ending cycle of attack and counter-attack in the so-called Holy Land ever since.
Fouad Ajami’s whole concept of The Dream Palace Of the Arabs is that Arabic intellectuals have been chasing after utopian solutions to their problems. When one naive ideology fails they move on to another naive ideology. Now these intellectuals have run out of ideologies and a lot of the poets have degenerated into writing vicious screeds against the Jews or retreating into a comforting and toothless womb of sentimental love poetry with no political ambition at all. Ajami’s writing is roundabout and never direct, but if you follow his argument carefully, you realize he is making an argument pragmatism. That means working with what you have within the realms of the possible. Arabs might not like the political choices they have, but if they are the only choices it is wise to do the best with what is there. Progress only happens in stages anyways. No savior or messiah is going to come and put eveything in order. No war is ever going to create stability or independence.
After living in the Middle East, I can supplement Ajami’s argument with my own observations regarding the anti-Jewish rhetoric and conspiracy theories that run rampant in the region. Arabic people have legitimate grievances against their autocratic governments, but censorship is heavy and criticizing their leaders is extremely dangerous. It is my contention that these politicians encourage the hatred of Jewish people and Israelis as a valve for releasing psychological pressures resulting from frustrated political desires while at the same time serving as a deflection away from the governments that are the actual source of people’s anger. It’s better for the government if people hate the Jews rather than the politicians. The unintended consequence is that instead of endangering the stability of Israel, the stability of the entire world is at risk due to radicalization and terrorism in the Arabian lands.
Fouad Ajami has a compelling perspective on the Arab intellectual and Arabic society in general. The worst thing I have to say about this book is that his indirect style of making an argument can be frustrating for the reader at times. While he has a definite point to prove, he never states it clearly and directly so that the effect is a kind of wishy-washy dance around what he wants to say. That indirect style may be the result of living under a repressive political regime, but then again it may just be the way people communicate in the Middle East, or maybe it is a little of both. There are also times when he includes references to literary works by Arabic authors simply because they are known outside the Middle East and not necessarily because their works lend anything of immediate value to Ajami’s thesis.
The Dream Palace Of the Arabs may not arrive at the conclusion that Arabic people want to hear. I imagine some people will uncritically hate this book simply because Fouad Ajami wants Arabs to have peaceful relations with Israel whereas he sees that politicians and journalists are making the situation worse for Palestinians, not better. I think what he has to say should be heard because the wars in the Middle East are resulting, so far, in nothing but eternal warfare. Simply put, Ajami is saying that Arabs need to get their feet on the ground, get their heads out of the clouds, overthrow the dictators, and come up with a better way to solve problems. It is a bitter pill for some to swallow, if they even bother to swallow it, but it is something that needs to be said anyhow.
July 5, 2014
This book is Ajami's exploration of Arab intellectual currents in the 20th century, from nationalism to Islamism; touching on topics such as relations with Israel and the rise and fall of the Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
While I've long been skeptical of Ajami's politics his work shows him to be an intellectual worthy of respect, but I was not particularly impressed with this book. Perhaps it is because it feels a bit dated, but there was little insightful or surprising. Furthermore his prose had the unfortunate quality of being flowery without being beautiful; at times it almost seems to be rambling.
Nevertheless there are a few good insights. A significant complaint about him is that while he does an interesting job at examining Arab pathologies he seems wholly blind to Western ones. He can't get over his characterization of bombs falling on Iraq as "the foreigners gift" nor his insistence that Israel has abandoned its "stockade and tower Zionism" - an assertion that seems nowhere in evidence.
Due to its shortcomings I must say this is not a timeless work and it is not indispensable. A final thought though: he returns repeatedly to the theme of the benefit and necessity of accommodating oneself to power and ones circumstances, whether Shia minorities to Sunni leaders, Arabs to Pax Americana or Palestine to Israel - all must bend with the wind and sublimate themselves somewhat in order to survive. It's a fair if unpopular point, and one which is well evidenced in his own work and career.
While I've long been skeptical of Ajami's politics his work shows him to be an intellectual worthy of respect, but I was not particularly impressed with this book. Perhaps it is because it feels a bit dated, but there was little insightful or surprising. Furthermore his prose had the unfortunate quality of being flowery without being beautiful; at times it almost seems to be rambling.
Nevertheless there are a few good insights. A significant complaint about him is that while he does an interesting job at examining Arab pathologies he seems wholly blind to Western ones. He can't get over his characterization of bombs falling on Iraq as "the foreigners gift" nor his insistence that Israel has abandoned its "stockade and tower Zionism" - an assertion that seems nowhere in evidence.
Due to its shortcomings I must say this is not a timeless work and it is not indispensable. A final thought though: he returns repeatedly to the theme of the benefit and necessity of accommodating oneself to power and ones circumstances, whether Shia minorities to Sunni leaders, Arabs to Pax Americana or Palestine to Israel - all must bend with the wind and sublimate themselves somewhat in order to survive. It's a fair if unpopular point, and one which is well evidenced in his own work and career.
June 3, 2024
以色列作家激烈批评以色列的书读过好几本了，阿拉伯裔作家激烈批评阿拉伯世界的书，这还是我读过的第一本。
作者对于阿拉伯世界内部的世俗派和原教旨主义者、逊尼派和什叶派、产油国和非产油国、泛阿拉伯主义和本国的民族主义之间的纠葛与冲突，提供了大量有价值的信息和视角。相对而言，全书的前两章质量更高、更言之有物，后两章相对更空泛些，词藻略多于洞见。
然而，由于成书时间较早，作者对第一次海湾战争后美国政策的批评、对海湾国家的瓦哈比主义以及埃及面临的神权政治的风险的评估，如今看来都出现了不同程度的错算。但这个也无可厚非，毕竟没有人能够预测未来，而我们凭借的也不过是后见之明罢了。
究其核心，作者借用一部分阿多尼斯的观点批评道，无论形式和外壳如何变化，阿拉伯世界的政治思想一直是“党同伐异的工具，而非自我批评、自我审视的手段”，最终新的事物还是会退回到阿拉伯人最习惯的东西上去，那就是宗派和部族的纷争。因此，阿拉伯世界每每关于以色列的言行，总是受制于它们内部的困局和张力，总是在暗中回应着它们对自己的认识和期望。这确实是很有力的观点。我想，不明白这一点的外人，很大程度上恐怕也就无从理解如今巴以之间的死结何在了吧。
作者对于阿拉伯世界内部的世俗派和原教旨主义者、逊尼派和什叶派、产油国和非产油国、泛阿拉伯主义和本国的民族主义之间的纠葛与冲突，提供了大量有价值的信息和视角。相对而言，全书的前两章质量更高、更言之有物，后两章相对更空泛些，词藻略多于洞见。
然而，由于成书时间较早，作者对第一次海湾战争后美国政策的批评、对海湾国家的瓦哈比主义以及埃及面临的神权政治的风险的评估，如今看来都出现了不同程度的错算。但这个也无可厚非，毕竟没有人能够预测未来，而我们凭借的也不过是后见之明罢了。
究其核心，作者借用一部分阿多尼斯的观点批评道，无论形式和外壳如何变化，阿拉伯世界的政治思想一直是“党同伐异的工具，而非自我批评、自我审视的手段”，最终新的事物还是会退回到阿拉伯人最习惯的东西上去，那就是宗派和部族的纷争。因此，阿拉伯世界每每关于以色列的言行，总是受制于它们内部的困局和张力，总是在暗中回应着它们对自己的认识和期望。这确实是很有力的观点。我想，不明白这一点的外人，很大程度上恐怕也就无从理解如今巴以之间的死结何在了吧。
October 30, 2023
阿拉伯的现代化与中国一样令人感到痛苦而无解，各类知识分子都不断为此作出努力，却仍然无法摆脱思想与现实差距之间的困顿，也无法摆脱自己游离在东方与西方文化之间的真正身份认同。书中关于巴以冲突的描述终究还是太过天真，相信屈辱的和平就能够解决一切问题，而事实上巴勒斯坦人的苦难一日无法解决，巴以真正的和平就无法真正到来。不过作者对于阿拉伯国家对于巴以问题的态度倒是看得透彻，哪儿有所谓的阿拉伯民族主义呢，不过都是各自为营，为了埃及人的利益、约旦人的利益、海湾国家的利益，巴勒斯坦人的利益又算是什么呢😭
August 23, 2016
Kind of an odd book, but rewarding in significant ways. I read this because Ajami was very influential in America's thinking about the Middle East in the 1990's and early 2000's and has been a figure of controversy ever since. The book itself is both a history and critique of Arab nationalist intellectuals since the 1950's. He knows this group of people intimately and probably should have labelled the book "The Lost Generation." His generation grew up on the Nasserite dream of Arab unity in confronting Israel and West while building military and economic strength at home.
The chapter on the rise of Islamist politics in Egypt is probably the most interesting one. Ajami shows that the Arab nationalist regimes cut off all criticism against themselves as they consolidated power but allowed 2 outlets. One was Islamist political movements, which were too popularly rooted and culturally powerful for the regime to touch. Most of forms of civil society were suppressed. The other was criticism of Israel, which let intellectuals and others rant and rave as long as they didn't criticize the regime. Thus we saw the "Islamization" of society from the 70's onward and its bleeding into law and politics even as the regime tried to maintain a more secular character. Sadat ended up dead from this process after being assassinated by an Islamist radical in the military.
Ajami is careful not to argue that the rise of Islamist politics has taken the Arab intellectual world from reason to unreason. Rather, I think he sees both entities as deeply intellectually bankrupt. He particularly shows that the Arab intellectual class has fed on hatred of the Oslo Accords and the general movement of the Arab states towards accommodation with Israel. He shows that opposing this peace keeps the zombie of Arab unity and solidarity alive, while distracting Arab intellectuals from the far greater problems of their own society. This discussion helped me get a better grasp on why so many Arab intellectuals (and others) fixate so much on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
The overall image of the Arab intellectual world that Ajami projects is one with a dire need of change. Ajami has a strong Western orientation, and you can see the seeds of his support for the Iraq War in this book. He is most sympathetic to liberal Arab intellectuals in their fight against Arab nationalists and Islamists. He doesn't seem to think that the Arab world will "snap out of it" on its own if it remains caught between two illiberal poles. Probably his best advice is that moving the politics of countries like Egypt further away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a good move (hence his mostly sympathetic take on Anwar Sadat). This intractable conflict has only brought the Arab states defeat, humiliation, and distraction.
There are long and somewhat frustrating parts of this book that deal with Arab poets that I didn't much care for, although there were a few moments where Ajami's knowledge of Arab writing added some vividness to his points. Overall, the book is more hit than miss, but it's definitely not for a first time or even second time reader of Middle Eastern history and thought. Ajami isn't systematic in his argumentation or providing of background information, which makes the book uneven and eclectic. I recommend it for students of Arab history or of American politics re: the Middle East.
The chapter on the rise of Islamist politics in Egypt is probably the most interesting one. Ajami shows that the Arab nationalist regimes cut off all criticism against themselves as they consolidated power but allowed 2 outlets. One was Islamist political movements, which were too popularly rooted and culturally powerful for the regime to touch. Most of forms of civil society were suppressed. The other was criticism of Israel, which let intellectuals and others rant and rave as long as they didn't criticize the regime. Thus we saw the "Islamization" of society from the 70's onward and its bleeding into law and politics even as the regime tried to maintain a more secular character. Sadat ended up dead from this process after being assassinated by an Islamist radical in the military.
Ajami is careful not to argue that the rise of Islamist politics has taken the Arab intellectual world from reason to unreason. Rather, I think he sees both entities as deeply intellectually bankrupt. He particularly shows that the Arab intellectual class has fed on hatred of the Oslo Accords and the general movement of the Arab states towards accommodation with Israel. He shows that opposing this peace keeps the zombie of Arab unity and solidarity alive, while distracting Arab intellectuals from the far greater problems of their own society. This discussion helped me get a better grasp on why so many Arab intellectuals (and others) fixate so much on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
The overall image of the Arab intellectual world that Ajami projects is one with a dire need of change. Ajami has a strong Western orientation, and you can see the seeds of his support for the Iraq War in this book. He is most sympathetic to liberal Arab intellectuals in their fight against Arab nationalists and Islamists. He doesn't seem to think that the Arab world will "snap out of it" on its own if it remains caught between two illiberal poles. Probably his best advice is that moving the politics of countries like Egypt further away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a good move (hence his mostly sympathetic take on Anwar Sadat). This intractable conflict has only brought the Arab states defeat, humiliation, and distraction.
There are long and somewhat frustrating parts of this book that deal with Arab poets that I didn't much care for, although there were a few moments where Ajami's knowledge of Arab writing added some vividness to his points. Overall, the book is more hit than miss, but it's definitely not for a first time or even second time reader of Middle Eastern history and thought. Ajami isn't systematic in his argumentation or providing of background information, which makes the book uneven and eclectic. I recommend it for students of Arab history or of American politics re: the Middle East.
June 1, 2010
So far this is a beautifully written book which describes the lives of some of the key cultural leaders of the Pan-Arab and secular movements of the 50s-80s. Ajami blends history with a lyrical style which rings true to the convoluted and complex social and cultural threads of the time. I clearly need a better understanding of the history of those years (something we don't study in Arabic 101) but am thrilled with this introduction.
The book was lyrical and beautiful. Unfortunately, I became busy and couldn't finish it before it was recalled by the library. Well worth the read though!
The book was lyrical and beautiful. Unfortunately, I became busy and couldn't finish it before it was recalled by the library. Well worth the read though!
December 7, 2012
A good, interesting read, but not for the Middle East modern history novice. Fouad Ajami does a solid job of telling history through the eyes of culture and really captures the impact of colonialism and its long lasting ripple effect on more current history... But know it is pre-September 11th and seeing him often interviewed on tv during the last 2 years of Arab spring his pov has evolved even further. He is high on my 'would like to have coffee with' list.
August 17, 2018
Visions & Mirages
An interesting and cogent analysis of the emerging fault lines that pit liberalism, authoritianism and religious fundamentalism against each other in the Levant, made even more relevant by the events of the last few months that we've dubbed "The Arab Spring".
The first chapter is a short Prologue on the career of George Antonius and his entanglement with American Charles Crane and his foundation that funded most of his writing. The second chapter on "the Suicide of Khalil Hawi" explores the context of the life of this renowned poet, whom I think Ajami wishes to present as an archetype of the Arab world. Hawi begins as a common labourer from Scheib in the Lebanese mountains. Greek Orthodox by birth he became a follower of pan-Syrian rebel Anton Saadeh, who was rejected by the Syrian revolution of 1947 and executed as a traitor by the Lebanese government in 1949. Hawi then fell in love with pan-Arabism, only to become disillusioned by its factionalism and failures. There are also interesting asides here to the Beirut branch of the Khalidis and other notable families who influenced the development American University of Beirut where Hawi taught, and it's former President Malcolm Kerr who was assassinated by one Lebanese paramilitary group or another in 1988.
It's in the 3rd chapter, "In the Shape of the Ancestors" that Ajami hits full stride. Arab nationalism offered promises for many but deliverance for few. The Shiah Islamicists saw it as an extension of Sunni hegemony in secular garb; the Palestinians sought to export their revolutionary means, only to be rebuffed by the older order of free officers and oligarchs who had already had their revolutions and saw no need for another. And for the Arab poor, tribal leaders got the oil but the sprawled masses were denied the the benefits.
In all this Lebanon is seen as a microcosm for the whole. This fragile country of tenuous liaisons caught all winds. Khomeinism from Tehran found resonance in the rural Shiah poor. For the Sunnis, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was seen as Saladin, defending honour and keeping the Shia, US and Israel at bay. The PLO set up camp creating a nation within a nation determined to carry out its war against Israel from unwilling grounds. The younger generation, throwing off their peasant roots rejected what they saw as the timidness of their elders. The only aspect that Ajami barely mentions is the 20+ year occupation of Lebanon by Syria - there's a reference on pp139 to Assad's invasion of the capital. Beirut, once the Paris of the Middle East and the refuge of Arab intellectuals became a divided city of factions.
The final chapter, "The Orphaned Peace", an assessment of the attitudes of Arab elites towards the peace agreements with Israel between Egypt, Jordan and the Oslo accords with the PLO. Whereas Sadat was able to travel to Jerusalem, very few of the elite could bring themselves to follow, and to read the Arab press, heavily censored and directed by the government at the domestic level, one would hardly know that the two countries were not at war. (pp285 The few who tried, often relics of the liberal age that preceded Nasser were either hounded (in some cases killed or driven into exile) or ignored. King Hussein was better able to manage the opposition.
However it is Ajami's discussion of Arafat that I found most interesting. Edward Said called Arafat a Palestinian Quisling and claimed that he had colluded with Israeli security. In addition he accused Arafat's nine different security forces: "People have been tortured to death. Newspapers have been closed and opponents are being rounded up. And still he rules, and most of his people endure that rule silently or try to get a position in it." pp267 In return Arafat, in an attempt to refute the charges, banned Said's books. ;- Writing in 1998, Ajami seems to believe that Arafat might have changed and was willing to reduce his maximalist demands. It would be interesting to see if the author still held these views - I suspect he doesn't.
Views on Israel were also interesting. In 1994 Peres approached the Arab world as a technocrat, promoting "A New Middle East", one of trade and co-operation, which Arab critics rejected fearing Israel domination. The apparent problem is that before one can have a common market, one needs a market in the first place. Still Peres made diplomatic inroads - for example when he visited Qatar to make a deal for imports of natural gas, the Israeli national anthem was played in his honor. The Olso accords promised disentanglement with the Palestinians. Hamas responded with a wave of terror attacks that took the lives of 59 Israeli civilians. The defeat of Peres at the Israeli polls a few weeks later by Benjamin Netanyahu gave rise to a sigh of relief that the Arabs would not be asked to change their point of view. [IMV Netanyahu's style was quite different and risk averse in terms of security, he also offered the economic card as a key towards developing relations.] The Palace of Dreams, as unreal as it was still managed to persist in the Arab mindset.
"Dream Palace" is brilliant and illuminating. The 3rd chapter is beyond excellent and can be read quite well on its own.
An interesting and cogent analysis of the emerging fault lines that pit liberalism, authoritianism and religious fundamentalism against each other in the Levant, made even more relevant by the events of the last few months that we've dubbed "The Arab Spring".
The first chapter is a short Prologue on the career of George Antonius and his entanglement with American Charles Crane and his foundation that funded most of his writing. The second chapter on "the Suicide of Khalil Hawi" explores the context of the life of this renowned poet, whom I think Ajami wishes to present as an archetype of the Arab world. Hawi begins as a common labourer from Scheib in the Lebanese mountains. Greek Orthodox by birth he became a follower of pan-Syrian rebel Anton Saadeh, who was rejected by the Syrian revolution of 1947 and executed as a traitor by the Lebanese government in 1949. Hawi then fell in love with pan-Arabism, only to become disillusioned by its factionalism and failures. There are also interesting asides here to the Beirut branch of the Khalidis and other notable families who influenced the development American University of Beirut where Hawi taught, and it's former President Malcolm Kerr who was assassinated by one Lebanese paramilitary group or another in 1988.
It's in the 3rd chapter, "In the Shape of the Ancestors" that Ajami hits full stride. Arab nationalism offered promises for many but deliverance for few. The Shiah Islamicists saw it as an extension of Sunni hegemony in secular garb; the Palestinians sought to export their revolutionary means, only to be rebuffed by the older order of free officers and oligarchs who had already had their revolutions and saw no need for another. And for the Arab poor, tribal leaders got the oil but the sprawled masses were denied the the benefits.
In all this Lebanon is seen as a microcosm for the whole. This fragile country of tenuous liaisons caught all winds. Khomeinism from Tehran found resonance in the rural Shiah poor. For the Sunnis, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was seen as Saladin, defending honour and keeping the Shia, US and Israel at bay. The PLO set up camp creating a nation within a nation determined to carry out its war against Israel from unwilling grounds. The younger generation, throwing off their peasant roots rejected what they saw as the timidness of their elders. The only aspect that Ajami barely mentions is the 20+ year occupation of Lebanon by Syria - there's a reference on pp139 to Assad's invasion of the capital. Beirut, once the Paris of the Middle East and the refuge of Arab intellectuals became a divided city of factions.
The final chapter, "The Orphaned Peace", an assessment of the attitudes of Arab elites towards the peace agreements with Israel between Egypt, Jordan and the Oslo accords with the PLO. Whereas Sadat was able to travel to Jerusalem, very few of the elite could bring themselves to follow, and to read the Arab press, heavily censored and directed by the government at the domestic level, one would hardly know that the two countries were not at war. (pp285 The few who tried, often relics of the liberal age that preceded Nasser were either hounded (in some cases killed or driven into exile) or ignored. King Hussein was better able to manage the opposition.
However it is Ajami's discussion of Arafat that I found most interesting. Edward Said called Arafat a Palestinian Quisling and claimed that he had colluded with Israeli security. In addition he accused Arafat's nine different security forces: "People have been tortured to death. Newspapers have been closed and opponents are being rounded up. And still he rules, and most of his people endure that rule silently or try to get a position in it." pp267 In return Arafat, in an attempt to refute the charges, banned Said's books. ;- Writing in 1998, Ajami seems to believe that Arafat might have changed and was willing to reduce his maximalist demands. It would be interesting to see if the author still held these views - I suspect he doesn't.
Views on Israel were also interesting. In 1994 Peres approached the Arab world as a technocrat, promoting "A New Middle East", one of trade and co-operation, which Arab critics rejected fearing Israel domination. The apparent problem is that before one can have a common market, one needs a market in the first place. Still Peres made diplomatic inroads - for example when he visited Qatar to make a deal for imports of natural gas, the Israeli national anthem was played in his honor. The Olso accords promised disentanglement with the Palestinians. Hamas responded with a wave of terror attacks that took the lives of 59 Israeli civilians. The defeat of Peres at the Israeli polls a few weeks later by Benjamin Netanyahu gave rise to a sigh of relief that the Arabs would not be asked to change their point of view. [IMV Netanyahu's style was quite different and risk averse in terms of security, he also offered the economic card as a key towards developing relations.] The Palace of Dreams, as unreal as it was still managed to persist in the Arab mindset.
"Dream Palace" is brilliant and illuminating. The 3rd chapter is beyond excellent and can be read quite well on its own.
March 7, 2023
四五十年代那一辈世俗主义知识分子悲哀的发现独立后的阿拉伯国家并没有实现伊斯兰教与世俗化的结合，新一代的年轻人反而回到了原教旨主义的怀抱，军阀寡头的横行更是一个驱之不掉的痼疾，穆斯林社会的自省和改革遥遥无期，正如儒教社会的改革一样有漫长的路要走。哈利勒哈维的悲哀在于他是一个希腊正教徒，在穆斯林和马龙派逐渐得势的黎巴嫩没有容身之地，他眼睁睁的看着阿拉伯民族主义以各种形式破灭，沦为大大小小的军阀独裁者的旗帜，无论是纳赛尔，霍梅尼还是萨达姆，并不是真正为阿拉伯转型负责任的领袖，只是一个个考迪罗而已，他的死不过是理想幻灭后的必然结果。阿拉伯国家在后纳赛尔时代陷入了矛盾，艳羡西方文明却又迷醉于中世纪的荣耀，仇视西方势力却不得不依靠他们来保护自己免受同胞国家侵略，不期待制度革新而期待强人政治，最终堕入失败。
阿多尼斯在这一点比哈维清醒，然而他找的救世之策仍然是宗教狂热，不禁让人愕然，他们还是没有走出中世纪。
阿多尼斯，哈基姆以后的阿拉伯年轻一代知识分子仍然沉醉在阿拉伯民族主义兴盛的时代，没有意识到与以色列和解和和平相处是大势所趋，他们撰文攻击《奥斯陆协议》和那些与以色列和平相处的阿拉伯人士，这样闭塞的眼光只能导致阿拉伯在现代社会中愈发落后。书中提到埃及的文盲率高达50%，如果以宗教信徒进行统计，我相信穆斯林占文盲队伍的绝大部分，相比较基督教的宗教改革，犹太教重视教育，不得不说伊斯兰教真的已经成了老古董了。
阿多尼斯在这一点比哈维清醒，然而他找的救世之策仍然是宗教狂热，不禁让人愕然，他们还是没有走出中世纪。
阿多尼斯，哈基姆以后的阿拉伯年轻一代知识分子仍然沉醉在阿拉伯民族主义兴盛的时代，没有意识到与以色列和解和和平相处是大势所趋，他们撰文攻击《奥斯陆协议》和那些与以色列和平相处的阿拉伯人士，这样闭塞的眼光只能导致阿拉伯在现代社会中愈发落后。书中提到埃及的文盲率高达50%，如果以宗教信徒进行统计，我相信穆斯林占文盲队伍的绝大部分，相比较基督教的宗教改革，犹太教重视教育，不得不说伊斯兰教真的已经成了老古董了。
April 25, 2020
This book has a slow start, but if you can push past the first section, the last two or three are deeply intriguing. "The Dream Palace of the Arabs" does require a hearty amount of background knowledge, but the questions it asks are important; questions such as "Can democracies thrive in the Arab world?" and "How does art reflect the values of the culture that produces it?". I read this book for a class, but still, I would recommend it to anybody looking for insight into Arabic politics, writing, and art in the 20th century.
May 2, 2024
You need to do some homework or know a lot of Middle Eastern history going into this and if you do there's a lot to think about here. If you don't, you're going to get lost in the weeds. But, as a second go around on this book I definitely got more out of it this time and have a much better appreciation for the nuance of the region and complexity of the history.
November 5, 2019
Ajami leads the reader on a guided tour of modern Arab frustrations, showcasing attempts at description and prescription made by the generation of poets, essayists, and novelists who faced the defeat of secular nationalism and the ongoing battle to define Arab modernity.
November 17, 2022
阿拉伯+民族主义 似乎有点可笑。译者后半部分不给自己加戏后 整体翻译好了很多。我真的很讨厌一个作家写自己身边作家的事情，也讨厌一个导演拍电影圈的那点破事。满是自怜自叹。
July 2, 2023
可能是对阿拉伯人的历史了解还比较少，中间有一部分讲述政治人物阅读起来比较困难，但相对来说各位作家的人生经历就比较了解，尤其喜欢阿多尼斯那部分：我认识到，语言就像人，也有蒙难的时候。语言所能蒙受的最大苦难莫过于刚写完就化作僵尸的部分，沦为堆砌而成的空洞文字。
March 13, 2024
3.5.新千年以前的作品，虽然书中的内容还在当下现实里回响，但作为一个刚刚开始接触这个话题的读者，不得不提醒自己要谨慎。
不太能适应作者的风格，有时候能顺畅地读下来，有时候觉得上下文太跳跃，而且这种跳跃、交错开来的句子并不会让人产生什么整体的感受，就是很莫名地岔开了新话题。提到了很多本土评论和作品，看完后对阿多尼斯印象好深，想去读他的诗和文章了。
这版有好多错别字！无语。
不太能适应作者的风格，有时候能顺畅地读下来，有时候觉得上下文太跳跃，而且这种跳跃、交错开来的句子并不会让人产生什么整体的感受，就是很莫名地岔开了新话题。提到了很多本土评论和作品，看完后对阿多尼斯印象好深，想去读他的诗和文章了。
这版有好多错别字！无语。
March 30, 2025
3.5 stars. I have complex feelings about this book to be expounded later.
June 25, 2025
囫囵吞枣地读完了，算是给自己上的一节开题课吧。对中东的了解只存在于偶尔关注到的新闻里。希望今后能读到一些关于这个主题更通俗些的书吧
November 13, 2017
In this book, Ajami traces the history of the revolutions that shook the Middle Eastern world from the time of Khalil Hawi to the 1990s. It explores the changing ideas of nationalism and the legacy of the west in the Arab psyche that shaped the political sphere. Central to the narrative are the vivid characters and historical figures behind the movements, from the Lebanese socialist leader Saadah to the more peaceful Egyptian prime minister Sadat. In addition to the political leaders, Ajami spends a good amount of time discussing the leading poets, philosophers, and intellectuals of the time, such as Khalil Hawi and Abu Zeid. The Arab intellectuals seek endlessly for their illusory “dream palace” - a world in which their ideas of secular modernity are realized and embraced by the rest of the Arabs. Ajami makes the observation that while the intellectuals did not govern politically, they “structured a moral universe that hemmed in the rulers and limited their options” (285). However much they influenced Arab thought, there was ever a disconnect between intellectual life and political reality, and the “dream palace of the Arabs” was never fully realized.
The book begins with an account of the life of an ill-fated poet, Khalil Hawi, who would for his entire life struggle between hope and despair for the Arab people. Ajami comments that Hawi had an “inferiority complex with the West and deification of it” (62), a feeling which is conveyed in his poetry from River of Ashes: “We are from Beirut, alas, we were born / With borrowed faces and with borrowed minds / Our thoughts are born whores in the market places, / Then spend their lives pretending to be virgins” (82).
Ajami begins with the biography of Khalil Hawi, and as the book unfolds, it becomes clear that the poet’s life cleverly mirrors the narrative the author tells of the struggles of the Middle Eastern world. Hawi struggled to break free of both the tangible poverty of his parents’ past and the ideas that held his parents’ generation back. He believed in an imminent revolution that would liberate the Lebanese people. His Lebanese nationalism turned into Arab nationalism, and he saw, like the rest of the Arab people, both ideas fail when confronted with the reality of politics. Hawi, at the end of his life, believed that modernity was a false promise, and that the Arabs would never awaken from their sleep. This seems to line up with what the other Arab intellectuals were dealing with at the end of the book, with the loss of Beirut.
Yet the question remains: Was modernity achieved? Hawi believed that the battle over literature was the battle for the future of the Arabs. Adonis believed that true modernity comes from the creation of original material. Ajami highlights these points by interweaving accounts of the revolts with poetry, which indicates that the author agrees with the two poets and thinks their poetry is worthy to be read. The author does not explicitly answer this question, but repeatedly points us to the literature and philosophy of the Arabs. Even though their ideas were not politically viable, the intellectuals did produce original and beautiful work, and this could be the beginning of true modernity. If accurate, my reading could contain the answer to the foundation of the Dream Palace of the Arabs that we have all been looking for, as well as the means to render the above excerpt from River of Ashes a paradox.
The book begins with an account of the life of an ill-fated poet, Khalil Hawi, who would for his entire life struggle between hope and despair for the Arab people. Ajami comments that Hawi had an “inferiority complex with the West and deification of it” (62), a feeling which is conveyed in his poetry from River of Ashes: “We are from Beirut, alas, we were born / With borrowed faces and with borrowed minds / Our thoughts are born whores in the market places, / Then spend their lives pretending to be virgins” (82).
Ajami begins with the biography of Khalil Hawi, and as the book unfolds, it becomes clear that the poet’s life cleverly mirrors the narrative the author tells of the struggles of the Middle Eastern world. Hawi struggled to break free of both the tangible poverty of his parents’ past and the ideas that held his parents’ generation back. He believed in an imminent revolution that would liberate the Lebanese people. His Lebanese nationalism turned into Arab nationalism, and he saw, like the rest of the Arab people, both ideas fail when confronted with the reality of politics. Hawi, at the end of his life, believed that modernity was a false promise, and that the Arabs would never awaken from their sleep. This seems to line up with what the other Arab intellectuals were dealing with at the end of the book, with the loss of Beirut.
Yet the question remains: Was modernity achieved? Hawi believed that the battle over literature was the battle for the future of the Arabs. Adonis believed that true modernity comes from the creation of original material. Ajami highlights these points by interweaving accounts of the revolts with poetry, which indicates that the author agrees with the two poets and thinks their poetry is worthy to be read. The author does not explicitly answer this question, but repeatedly points us to the literature and philosophy of the Arabs. Even though their ideas were not politically viable, the intellectuals did produce original and beautiful work, and this could be the beginning of true modernity. If accurate, my reading could contain the answer to the foundation of the Dream Palace of the Arabs that we have all been looking for, as well as the means to render the above excerpt from River of Ashes a paradox.
December 29, 2025
This book was beautifully written and so compelling. I was specifically moved by Khalil Hawi’s story, and I greatly enjoyed the poetic style used to describe the poet’s life.
December 21, 2015
This is a great introduction to the strange factions of the Arab world. Fouad Ajami describes how two generations of poets and other intellectuals went from supporting a pan-Arab world of letters and freedom, to decrying peace and pushing for war.
This is a story of the Middle East blended through poets and writers. As dictatorships arose elsewhere, exiles flooded into Lebanon and Beirut became a center of literature, poetry, and the dissident arts. He quotes “Palestinian-Jordainian diplomat and author Hazem Nusseibah” about the new generation:
But their failure led to a dark cynicism. After Khalil Hawi (who is profiled in the first section of the book) committed suicide, “the romantic poet Nizar Qabbani” wrote that
Ajami is probably too optimistic at the end, seeing in the very limited abhorrence of the enthusiasm for Ahmad Musa Daqamsa’s 1997 massacre of seventh and eighth grade Israeli schoolgirls (the book was published in 1998) evidence that “in a culture of nationalism where dissent from the prevailing norms had not been easy, many had found their courage and their voice.”
A whole world had slipped through the fingers of two generations of Arabs who had come into their own in the 1950s and 1960s. A city that had once been their collective cultural home, Beirut, had been lost to them. A political culture of Arab nationalism, which had nurtured them, which had come to them sure of itself and had been accepted whole and unexamined, had led down a blind alley and had been made an instrument and cover for despotism and a plaything of dictators. No ship of sorrow could take these two generations back to the verities of their world. This campaign against the new peace would give the men and women of the pan-Arab tradition a chance to reclaim lost ground.
This is a story of the Middle East blended through poets and writers. As dictatorships arose elsewhere, exiles flooded into Lebanon and Beirut became a center of literature, poetry, and the dissident arts. He quotes “Palestinian-Jordainian diplomat and author Hazem Nusseibah” about the new generation:
“They believed in the blending of what was the best in the newly discovered Arab heritage and in contemporary Western civilization and culture, and they foresaw no serious problem which might impair the process of amalgamation.”
But their failure led to a dark cynicism. After Khalil Hawi (who is profiled in the first section of the book) committed suicide, “the romantic poet Nizar Qabbani” wrote that
The new jahiliyya [ignorance] is darker than the old. It has annulled the role of the poet because it wants people on their knees. It wants them to crawl. The “sultans of today” want only supporters and sycophants, and this has had the effect of emasculating the language.
Ajami is probably too optimistic at the end, seeing in the very limited abhorrence of the enthusiasm for Ahmad Musa Daqamsa’s 1997 massacre of seventh and eighth grade Israeli schoolgirls (the book was published in 1998) evidence that “in a culture of nationalism where dissent from the prevailing norms had not been easy, many had found their courage and their voice.”
September 27, 2011
I guess The Dream Palace of the Arabs by Fouad Ajami is supposed to help us understand the politics, culture, and recent history of the Islamic culture. This book is a bit difficult to classify, since it is multifaceted: a sort of personal perspective of the Arab situation by an American Arab with cultural and diplomatic history mixed with political analysis. I felt that he spent too much time discussing the impact of cultural persons on the political situation. But I guess that was one of his points; how modern, forward thinking, secular intellectuals were beaten back and thwarted by fundamentalist forces. In addition, my knowledge of the history of the region is a bit thin, and I felt the author expected his readers to be more familiar with the pre-WWII history. However, it was enlightening about how certain modern events have shaped contemporary Middle East: the six days war, the Iranian Revolution in 82, the assassination of Sadat and the regression of Egypt from a more secular society to a more religious conservative Islamic society, the fall of Beirut, The first Gulf War, the Peace Accord of 93’, etc… That being said, it was easier to read than the more dense, more academic Clash of Civilizations.
July 10, 2012
The Arabs had hoped that after they were freed from European colonialism, they would be able to live in a free society. Between the two world wars, Arab society was tolerant and cosmopolitan and the future looked bright. The hope was that secular liberalism would reform traditional Sunni rule to produce a better society. Ajami describes this optimistic period and the subsequent disillusionment from the perspective of Arab poets. The forces for secular liberalism were defeated by military rule and the rise of political Islam. Ajami contrasts the city Arabs, whose culture was based not only on Islam, but also on the Phoenicians, Romans, Greeks, and Copts, with the Desert Arabs, who had nothing but oil money and Islamic fundamentalism. Ajami spends some time discussing the American University of Beirut, which was founded by American Protestants. It contributed more to the secular, liberal, cosmopolitan nature of Beirut, than did the Maronite Christians or traditional Sunni aristocracy.
January 8, 2009
A nice introduction to the attempts of the Arab intelligentsia of the recent past to realize the dreams of the enlightenment taken for granted in the west. Pretty depressing overall to read an insiders account of the failure of this group to move Arab culture in the direction of their dreams. Would that the Arab world looked today like this author dreamed it would. I would love to spend time in the Beruit of his youth, the Cairo of yesteryear, the Baghdad of some lost and forgotten dream past. What a beautiful culture waiting to happen! The book dragged in parts and moved me in parts. What surprised me was my own ridiculous stereotypes that were smashed by this author. I want to visit and spend time in an Arab society that is informed and animated by the dreams of the authors protagonists!
May 14, 2025
This book was all over the place. I mean, the first chapter was dedicated to the Lebanese poet, Khalil Hawi, and his journey through universities, political ideologies (Syrian nationalism & Arab Nationalism) and his complete depressing life. All of which, led him to take his hunting rifle and end his life off his balcony in Beirut, the day of the June 6 invasion of Lebanon.
Apart from Hawi, Ajami explores individual Arabs, instead of explaining the Arab dream.
I think Ajami should’ve dedicated this book towards looking at the advent and demise of Arab nationalism, explore different thoughts and give us a glimpse of how Arabs flourish during the Nasser years.
But overall, an alright book.
Apart from Hawi, Ajami explores individual Arabs, instead of explaining the Arab dream.
I think Ajami should’ve dedicated this book towards looking at the advent and demise of Arab nationalism, explore different thoughts and give us a glimpse of how Arabs flourish during the Nasser years.
But overall, an alright book.
December 21, 2014
For people, like Shimon Peres, who see an ocean of opportunities in Israel-Arab peace, this book presents a mountain of obstacles standing in the way. The cold peace with Egypt and Jordan is apparently rooted in maximalist dreams of Israel distraction shared by 99.9% of Arab men of letters. Sobering account that could be summarized -- "Not Yet!" Let's wait for another 30 years so that Arabs could realize that disappearing oil revenues and growing population leave them no choice but joining the modern world, and no better partner than Israel.
Dec. 2014
Dec. 2014
May 29, 2008
Written in an opaque style that I suppose is meant to illustrate the poetry and ambiguity of the Arabic language. The book traces the failed efforts of Arab intellectuals to encourage the spread of modernity and secularism and the price they paid for making their attempts. You get a feel for the clash between intellectual liberalism and conservative theology in the Mid East that has extended for decades.
September 6, 2012
This author was recommended to me as an expert on Lebanon and its complexities, and I don't doubt it. However, this book was very scholarly. I read the section about Lebanese poet and Arab nationalist Khalil Hawi. Indisputably well-written, but more academic than I was hoping for, and it was a chore to read rather than a pleasure. I checked this book out twice from the library, but just couldn't manage to finish it.
July 29, 2008
This book has helped me understand the news out of the middle east much better. Obviously, the situation there is fluid. This book makes an attempt to describe the motivations behind various arab groups, their relationships with their neighbors, and the dreams of an Arab intellectual class and how those dreams have been destroyed. Great writing and some amazing historical characters chosen.
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