The Greenback Era is not a financial history; rather, it is an attempt to locate the source of political power in the crucial Reconstruction years through a socio-economic study of American financial conflict during the years 1865 to 1879.Originally published in 1964.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
I read this book because the whole greenback debate of the late nineteenth century continued to baffle me. The fact that one of the most important political issues of the era could involve the merits of silver over gold, or of greenbacks over national bank notes, or even more esoteric issues like "convertible bonds" and "species principle repayment," seemed incredible. Yet here it all is. In this book Unger convincingly shows that the whole nation WAS seriously caught up in abstruse debates about monetary policy and precious metals. This during an era when, since 1862 at least, all U.S. money was backed merely on faith.
The discussion, of course, was not always carried out on an elevated plain. Calvinist preachers claimed that gold money was "God's will" and its use would inaugurate a new "glorious era," while silver or Greenback supporters said that gold money was only a conspiracy by "the great Jew bankers of the world" and would bankrupt the nation. The parties did generally divide into a "soft money" West (bereft of banks) and a "hard money" East (where finance was supported by bonds, especially government bonds), yet Unger complicates the picture and shows the myriad alliances, between industry and labor, between farmers and reformers, that made up these feuding sides.
In the end the goldbugs won, and on January 1, 1879 every dollar of U.S. currency, for the first time in 17 years, became redeemable in gold. Although one reformer called it the "greatest event of modern times," the consequences were less than either side imagined. Still, the debate would continue on throughout the century, and then reemerge after Nixon closed the "gold window" in 1971, ending the hundred year experiment. Though the specifics may change, the debate about gold and monetary policy (especially since the rise of Ron and Rand Paul) remains, so occassionally this book, for all its atavistic debates and overwrought Victorian language, could seem surprisingly topical.
Authoritative and exhaustive to the verge of being impenetrable, Unger lays out how underlying social attitudes hastened the United States exiting its experiment with fiat currency. In Unger's telling, there were many points at which the brakes could have been pulled on the adoption of the gold standard: Grant's decision on the bill expanding the issue of fiat greenbacks to address the panic of 1873, Sherman's effort to raise funds for gold redemption, etc. However, Unger explains that these brakes were not pulled because the prevailing social consensus, spurred by religious sentiments, recognized gold as "real" money. And once the compromise was struck for the Treasury to purchase silver, the proverbial nail appears to have struck the coffin.
One side of the story that seems to be missing (because it is a social narrative) is the outlook of the syndicated banks that held the bonds and made the gold resumption possible. Their transatlantic perspective might be beyond the scope of this book, but their absence renders the fuller picture hard to gauge.
Unger hints that the later silver movement - made famous by the Populists and William Jennings Bryan - was built on some of the arguments made by the Greenback movement on the relationship between deflation and high interest rates. However, he also underscores that silver could court a larger audience because it assuaged underlying fears around the intrinsic value of unbacked paper money and carried historical resonance that made it easier for people to buy into the idea. In short, it carried wider resonance because it was less novel. A valuable reminder.
This book is excessively dry which makes it nearly impossible to keep your attention long enough to actually understand the big picture of the Greenback debate in the late 19th Century, much less the minutiae of it. Not only that, but it seems like the conclusion of the book is that after years of debates, not much really happened. Really? That is the money shot (pun intended) after 480 long pages? Ugh.
Now it's possible that I am somehow misinterpreting the conclusion because I spent the majority of the book self-diagnosing myself with narcolepsy (luckily it cleared up when I finished the last page), but I don't think I am. Honestly, If it's possible to know less about the Greenback Era after reading this book than before I started, than mission accomplished.
I've read a bunch of random history books about things most people find excessively boring and yet I have almost always come away entertained, this however, was not one of those times. I picked this book out after seeing it won the Pulitzer Prize for History in 1965 so I figured it should be interesting, what I didn't realize is that it must have been the only history book written in 1965 because otherwise the award makes no sense.
To be fair, it seems unbelievably well researched. To be fairer, yawn.