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Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II / the Violent Century: Battle #24
Salerno: Foothold In Europe
Vintage WWII softcover
- GenresMilitary FictionHistory
160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1991
About the author
David Mason
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
April 24, 2026
Salerno, located on the central left side of the Italian boot, was the first slice of territory captured by the Allies from the Axis on the European continent in 1943. Why, then, has this critical battle been nearly forgotten? Anzio gave us a lousy, cynical movie with Bob Mitchum. Salerno has no Hollywood landmark. One reason for the oblivion is that the commander of the invasion, American General Mark Clark, was a certifiable idiot; some rate him the worst American general of the war, and the fool who designed the Italian campaign was none other than Winston Churchill. Churchill dreamed up the Italian campaign to knock the Fascist regime out of the war by striking at "the soft underbelly of the Axis". He was right on political grounds. Il Duce fell from power as soon as British and American troops landed in Sicily in July, and Italian soldiers started throwing their hands up in surrender. But what made him think the Germans would not occupy Italy, or that the march up the boot, through mountainous country in wet summer weather, would be easy? Churchill nevertheless convinced Eisenhower to launch an invasion of the mainland, and Clark, one-time deputy to Ike, persuaded him the landing should take place just south of Naples. The objective of the Salerno campaign, Operation Avalanche, was to march one American and British column from there north to Naples while simultaneously launching another south to link up with Montgomery's Eighth Army moving up from Calabria. The plan was audacious, courageous, and wrong.
Avalanche depended on success in catching the Germans by surprise and securing an armistice with the new, post-Mussolini Italian government before the men hit the beach. Hitler knew full well his Italian ally was in political trouble at home after the Axis withdrawal from Tunisia, and ordered Operation Axis, the German occupation of Italy, into high gear when Mussolini went missing, putting Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, whom Clark conceded was "a master of delaying tactics", in command. Hitler also surmised the new Italian head of government, Marshal Badoglio, was lying when he said Italy would fight on beside Germany. He was. Badoglio immediately began negotiations with Eisenhower for an armistice, but hedged his bets by declaring Italy would only sign after Allied troops landed. Ike refused; the Italians signed in early September, but the armistice message was read to American and British soldiers, sailors, and airmen as they were on their way to Salerno, giving them false hope of an unopposed landing. Seldom in modern history has the fate of a battle hung so closely on the political twists and turns of an enemy nation. The landing was unopposed by the Italians, not by the Germans, who were waiting with mines, artillery, and a Panzer division.
Clark, with typical ineptitude, had ordered that the landing not be preceded by aerial and naval bombardment of the beach to not alert the Germans. But there was no element of surprise to play. The Germans already had information on where the landings would take place, based on their interception of messages by the Italian government. Plus, the landing had to take place just south of Naples to allow for Allied air cover over the beach. All of Italy north of Naples, including the town and beach at Salerno, was now under the command of Kesselring. The landing armada was divided between a northern wing for the British and a southern wing for the Americans, both under Clark. The aim was to take the port, city, and airport at Salerno for further landings and the linkup with Montgomery, all to be accomplished on D-Day before Kesselring could send reinforcements. The British made gains in their sector, in part because Clark had lent them the famous "Darby's Rangers" strike force from the US Army, and advanced on the town. The Americans remained pinned down on the beach. Clark had overlooked what an incredible advantage the hills atop Salerno offered the Germans. Also unforeseen was the deadly ability of the Luftwaffe to strafe the beach and sink American and British ships, particularly with a new glider bomb unknown to Allied intelligence. After 48 hours of fighting, there was a genuine threat of the Americans, though not the British, being thrown into the sea.
Clark panicked and gave an incredible order that nearly cost the Allies victory. He instructed his subordinates to draw up plans for a half-evacuation. Either the American troops on the beach would be withdrawn to the British sector, to push on to the town and airfield, or the British would be sent south to prevent the American front from collapsing. Equally incredible, his American and British officers secretly defied his order, and instead went above his head to British General Harold Alexander, Allied commander of the Mediterranean theater, who told them to stand their ground. In one of those weird developments that seem to occur only in war, Eisenhower was misinformed, probably due to faulty transmission, that Clark planned to withdraw from the entire battlefront, and he issued stop orders, too. Nevertheless, firing Clark in the middle of operations was out of the question, and Ike informed him help was on the way in the form of the 82nd Airborne, which was originally scheduled to drop on Rome, but the operation had been cancelled when Badoglio, safe in hiding, had told Ike the Germans had occupied the city. Of such snafus are some battles lost, but this one was won, no thanks to the principal players.
Clark managed to turn the tide of battle despite himself, with a little help from a hesitant German commander on the scene. Kesselring's man behind the hills, Colonel-General Vietinghoff, failed to exploit the gap between the American and British armies in time. What he did succeed at was causing enormous panic among Allied troops. Panzer attacks, 88m cannon artillery rounds, and constant shelling induced a retreat of frightened Tommies and GIs a la' the French "sauve qui peut" in 1940. Clark had to leave his flagship at sea and move among the troops himself to prevent a full rout. But by then, Kesselring had other priorities. Montgomery's march up the boot necessitated a German withdrawal all along the front, including Salerno, to create the Gustav Line north of Naples to halt the Eighth Army's advance. Kesselring needed every soldier, tank, and artillery piece he could muster. After the failed Vietinghoff counteroffensive, the Allied ships in Salerno Bay blasted away at German positions above the hills day and night. The British had finally captured the airstrip outside salerno, allowing U.S. and Royal Air Force planes to land and bomb German positions. When that happened, Kesselring ordered an evacuation of Naples as well. Clark and his airborne commander, Matthew Ridgway, drove into what Clark described in his memoirs as a"ghost town". With Teutonic efficiency and ruthlessness, the Germans, after declaring Naples an open city, destroyed every berth in the harbor, scuttled all ships in the port, and tore up all transportation equipment and means of communication. They had, however, left a few nasty surprises for the Allies. Time bombs and booby traps greeted the liberators, causing heavy casualties. The Eight Army at last caught up with Clark's divisions, and the road to Rome was open.
Was Salerno, despite the foul ups, a success for the Allies? Clark insisted in his memoirs, which David Mason quotes uncritically, that it was: The beach head was taken and secured, the link up with Montgomery accomplished, and Naples conquered. What Clark failed to mention is that with customary myopia and vanity, he proceeded to blow his own victory. Stupidly he raced north to Rome, unopposed since Kesselring had withdrawn behind the Gustav Line and declared the capital an open city, but left the German units to his right flank untouched, with an easy retreat upwards towards Monte Cassino. Alexander never forgave Clark for this lapse, that ensured a whole year of bloody fighting on the boot, until the German surrender in 1945. Clark entered Rome on June 4, 1944, not as a conqueror but more like a buffoonish figure who had extinguished his own flame of triumph.
Avalanche depended on success in catching the Germans by surprise and securing an armistice with the new, post-Mussolini Italian government before the men hit the beach. Hitler knew full well his Italian ally was in political trouble at home after the Axis withdrawal from Tunisia, and ordered Operation Axis, the German occupation of Italy, into high gear when Mussolini went missing, putting Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, whom Clark conceded was "a master of delaying tactics", in command. Hitler also surmised the new Italian head of government, Marshal Badoglio, was lying when he said Italy would fight on beside Germany. He was. Badoglio immediately began negotiations with Eisenhower for an armistice, but hedged his bets by declaring Italy would only sign after Allied troops landed. Ike refused; the Italians signed in early September, but the armistice message was read to American and British soldiers, sailors, and airmen as they were on their way to Salerno, giving them false hope of an unopposed landing. Seldom in modern history has the fate of a battle hung so closely on the political twists and turns of an enemy nation. The landing was unopposed by the Italians, not by the Germans, who were waiting with mines, artillery, and a Panzer division.
Clark, with typical ineptitude, had ordered that the landing not be preceded by aerial and naval bombardment of the beach to not alert the Germans. But there was no element of surprise to play. The Germans already had information on where the landings would take place, based on their interception of messages by the Italian government. Plus, the landing had to take place just south of Naples to allow for Allied air cover over the beach. All of Italy north of Naples, including the town and beach at Salerno, was now under the command of Kesselring. The landing armada was divided between a northern wing for the British and a southern wing for the Americans, both under Clark. The aim was to take the port, city, and airport at Salerno for further landings and the linkup with Montgomery, all to be accomplished on D-Day before Kesselring could send reinforcements. The British made gains in their sector, in part because Clark had lent them the famous "Darby's Rangers" strike force from the US Army, and advanced on the town. The Americans remained pinned down on the beach. Clark had overlooked what an incredible advantage the hills atop Salerno offered the Germans. Also unforeseen was the deadly ability of the Luftwaffe to strafe the beach and sink American and British ships, particularly with a new glider bomb unknown to Allied intelligence. After 48 hours of fighting, there was a genuine threat of the Americans, though not the British, being thrown into the sea.
Clark panicked and gave an incredible order that nearly cost the Allies victory. He instructed his subordinates to draw up plans for a half-evacuation. Either the American troops on the beach would be withdrawn to the British sector, to push on to the town and airfield, or the British would be sent south to prevent the American front from collapsing. Equally incredible, his American and British officers secretly defied his order, and instead went above his head to British General Harold Alexander, Allied commander of the Mediterranean theater, who told them to stand their ground. In one of those weird developments that seem to occur only in war, Eisenhower was misinformed, probably due to faulty transmission, that Clark planned to withdraw from the entire battlefront, and he issued stop orders, too. Nevertheless, firing Clark in the middle of operations was out of the question, and Ike informed him help was on the way in the form of the 82nd Airborne, which was originally scheduled to drop on Rome, but the operation had been cancelled when Badoglio, safe in hiding, had told Ike the Germans had occupied the city. Of such snafus are some battles lost, but this one was won, no thanks to the principal players.
Clark managed to turn the tide of battle despite himself, with a little help from a hesitant German commander on the scene. Kesselring's man behind the hills, Colonel-General Vietinghoff, failed to exploit the gap between the American and British armies in time. What he did succeed at was causing enormous panic among Allied troops. Panzer attacks, 88m cannon artillery rounds, and constant shelling induced a retreat of frightened Tommies and GIs a la' the French "sauve qui peut" in 1940. Clark had to leave his flagship at sea and move among the troops himself to prevent a full rout. But by then, Kesselring had other priorities. Montgomery's march up the boot necessitated a German withdrawal all along the front, including Salerno, to create the Gustav Line north of Naples to halt the Eighth Army's advance. Kesselring needed every soldier, tank, and artillery piece he could muster. After the failed Vietinghoff counteroffensive, the Allied ships in Salerno Bay blasted away at German positions above the hills day and night. The British had finally captured the airstrip outside salerno, allowing U.S. and Royal Air Force planes to land and bomb German positions. When that happened, Kesselring ordered an evacuation of Naples as well. Clark and his airborne commander, Matthew Ridgway, drove into what Clark described in his memoirs as a"ghost town". With Teutonic efficiency and ruthlessness, the Germans, after declaring Naples an open city, destroyed every berth in the harbor, scuttled all ships in the port, and tore up all transportation equipment and means of communication. They had, however, left a few nasty surprises for the Allies. Time bombs and booby traps greeted the liberators, causing heavy casualties. The Eight Army at last caught up with Clark's divisions, and the road to Rome was open.
Was Salerno, despite the foul ups, a success for the Allies? Clark insisted in his memoirs, which David Mason quotes uncritically, that it was: The beach head was taken and secured, the link up with Montgomery accomplished, and Naples conquered. What Clark failed to mention is that with customary myopia and vanity, he proceeded to blow his own victory. Stupidly he raced north to Rome, unopposed since Kesselring had withdrawn behind the Gustav Line and declared the capital an open city, but left the German units to his right flank untouched, with an easy retreat upwards towards Monte Cassino. Alexander never forgave Clark for this lapse, that ensured a whole year of bloody fighting on the boot, until the German surrender in 1945. Clark entered Rome on June 4, 1944, not as a conqueror but more like a buffoonish figure who had extinguished his own flame of triumph.
May 25, 2020
A brief history of the Salerno beach landings. Read in honour of my Grandfather-in-law Joseph Middleton who took part in the battle with the Commandos. Good selection of maps and pictures and some decent descriptions of the main battles.
May 27, 2024
Great schematics and a good amount of maps. The story itself is too distant for my taste. A Birds Eye view from the generals’ perspectives and above. The units are numbers and nouns, but not people. A mix of stories humanizing the combatants, as in some other books of this series, would have made the presentation more effective.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews