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Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power
This survey of Western political thought ranges from Aristotle to "The Federalist Papers", showing how the doctrine of executive power arose and how it has developed to the present day. Although there were various "proto-executives", from Roman dictators to Christian kings, the modern executive first appears with Machiavelli's "The Prince". Yet Machiavelli's strong - even cruel - leader undermines republican theory. Subsequent philosophers, Mansfield argues, seized upon the Prince and transformed him into the American president. Liberalized by Locke, constitutionalized by Montesquieu, Machiavelli's bloodthirsty executive was finally "tamed" by channelling his antinomian energies into a uniquely flexible constitutional framework.
392 pages, Paperback
First published September 14, 1989
205 people want to read
About the author
Harvey C. Mansfield
51 books95 followersHarvey Claflin Mansfield, Jr. is a Professor of Government at Harvard University.
He has held Guggenheim and NEH Fellowships and has been a Fellow at the National Humanities Center; he also received the National Humanities Medal in 2004 and delivered the Jefferson Lecture in 2007. He is a Carol G. Simon Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He is notable for his generally conservative stance on political issues in his writings.
Mansfield is the author and co-translator of studies of and/or by major political philosophers such as Aristotle, Edmund Burke, Niccolò Machiavelli, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Thomas Hobbes, of Constitutional government, and of Manliness (2006).
Among his most notable former students are: Andrew Sullivan, Alan Keyes, Robert Kraynak, John Gibbons, William Kristol, Nathan Tarcov, Clifford Orwin, Mark Blitz, Paul Cantor, Delba Winthrop, Mark Lilla, Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, Francis Fukuyama, Shen Tong, and James Ceaser.
He has held Guggenheim and NEH Fellowships and has been a Fellow at the National Humanities Center; he also received the National Humanities Medal in 2004 and delivered the Jefferson Lecture in 2007. He is a Carol G. Simon Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He is notable for his generally conservative stance on political issues in his writings.
Mansfield is the author and co-translator of studies of and/or by major political philosophers such as Aristotle, Edmund Burke, Niccolò Machiavelli, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Thomas Hobbes, of Constitutional government, and of Manliness (2006).
Among his most notable former students are: Andrew Sullivan, Alan Keyes, Robert Kraynak, John Gibbons, William Kristol, Nathan Tarcov, Clifford Orwin, Mark Blitz, Paul Cantor, Delba Winthrop, Mark Lilla, Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, Francis Fukuyama, Shen Tong, and James Ceaser.
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October 21, 2024
The book is really a collection of academic essays about the philosophical development of executive power that can get quite difficult without familiarity with the wide range of thinkers discussed. I thought this book would be in favor of the taming of the Prince, how the Machiavellian energy of the executive could be compatible with liberal constitutional government, and to an extent Mansfield thinks it is, but Mansfield rejects Machiavelli’s philosophical realism in the conclusion as not inevitable and favors Aristotle’s approach intended for philosophers not politicians which would lead to a genuinely mixed regime or opportunity for an ideal philosopher king, pambasileia-kingship over all, a term I learned from the book.
The critique is fundamentally the same as Leo Strauss who is referenced, that Machiavelli is simply a teacher of evil in the guise of necessity not for the content of his teachings which have been practiced since time immemorial but for being bold enough to proclaim such doctrines under his own name, against the philosophers and theologians who caused much trouble in his time as ever. I prefer to understand Machiavelli as a renaissance humanist. Mansfield is right about a few things however such as the facade democratic governments have given to an essentially monarchical institution in the unitary executive. The modern executive cuts against traditional republican ideals but does not quite satisfy advocates of monarchy since the modern executive does not claim to rule under his own name but the people or the constitution and so ends up with more prerogative than kings past with less responsibility and so is formally weak but practically strong, the greatest tyranny done in the name of a greater good given the experience of 20th century totalitarianism and irresponsibility of democratic government. Mansfield chides modern intellectuals for assuming democracy the only valid regime and should consider the philosophy behind their assumptions and rival claims of partisans rather than claiming to be neutral scientists. I too would prefer either an identifiable sovereign ruling in their own name or a realistic mixed regime of competing elements.
The book begins with the common problem of political philosophy which is an inherent recalcitrance in human nature to resisting even just authority, based in thumos or spiritedness. In Aristotle’s Politics there are fundamentally three regimes with good and bad forms, democracy oligarchy and monarchy and he spends the most time on the first two as monarchy depends not so much on the type of regime but the individual ruler especially in its ideal form the pambasileia of a philosopher king. The ruling principle of democracy is equal freedom or isothymia which is according to nature as blind necessity in which offices are open to all by lot or popular election. The ruling principle of oligarchy is self-assertion or megalothymia against nature for superiority of wealth or birth. Monarchy occurs when the best man who embodies the principle of the regime, most free or wealthiest, is given authority above the laws.
In these regimes Aristotle divides powers into deliberative, judicial, and the offices as parallels to the human soul which roughly correspond to legislative, judicial, and executive but Aristotle places deliberation first and places the offices in several people rather than one except in monarchy where the sovereign is above the regime. Deliberation means choice and corresponds to oligarchy and judging means opinion corresponds to democracy but while democracy can admit of oligarchic elements oligarchy cannot which biases Aristotle towards democracy as the least worst regime, somehow the multitude being less corruptible than an individual. Within the offices which command the law, literal execution is placed as the lowest function. The Roman Polybius presented a cyclical history of the three regime types which Rome was able to combine in practice by balance of powers but not in principle. There will always be partisans of one form of government over another but practical regimes will partake in each yet no regime will satisfy entirely although Polybius placed monarchy as the first regime and Cicero agreed with Aristotle that monarchy in theory the best regime but liable to become tyranny the worst regime. Common to the ancient writers was that in republics the executive be it consul or dictator was not a unitary separate institution but plural or subordinate to the deliberative body. It would be a long development of first medieval christian monarchy then early modern realism that would develop the idea of an independent unitary executive and subsequently liberal and republican thinkers who would adapt this energy into popular constitutional governments.
The pambasileia ran counter first to Aristotle’s concern of tyranny and retribution in the name of divinity to which he proposed the mixed regime as an achievable good, then christian theology and the status of the church revived a dispute over executive power and finally republican and constitutional assertion of legislative and popular sovereignty. The discussion of the theologico-politico executive of Aquinas Dante and Marsilius was the most new and interesting to me, as christianity altered the relationship of religious and political authority so a pope or king could claim to be an executive of a higher power who was inherently good not from caprice or superstition. These authors still remained relatively within an Aristotelian frame though. Aquinas began where Aristotle left and differed on two points, that the tyranny of an individual worse than a multitude and that worldly happiness a sufficient reward for virtue. For Aquinas a king ought to willingly submit to the authority and teaching of the church. Dante starts from the teleological principle that there is a highest good for human nature and combines this with theism so ontologically as there is one god there ought to be one ruler of the earth who reigns independently but supported by the spiritual power. Marsilius was the most radical of the medieval thinkers and makes papal authority subordinate to secular authority and derived political authority from the people.
Machiavelli although himself a republican adapted princely energy by rejecting the possibility of an ideal regime according to nature and making virtue consist of human will against natural necessity and chance. Machiavelli’s prince would appropriate the use of sensational public executions to renew authority from a political interpretation of christianity and Rome’s founding to remind the public of their fear and awe. Bodin and Hobbes developed the theory of sovereignty to legalize the prince, making him formally strong to appeal to majesty rather than fear by combining legislative and executive authority but practically weak relying on magistrates and strategically not wielding power which constitutes a different path than the tamed prince. Hobbes theoretically universalized the will to power as democratic vanity independent of regime type in which all can satisfy their desire to rule by collectively placing it in the sovereign while retaining a natural right of defense for themselves.
The taming of the prince constitutes the latter chapters, as each faced the practical reality of a world where republics were rare and that the classical virtues of philosophers unsuited to an emerging commercial society. Locke constitutionalizes the prince from the model of England by formally submitting the executive to the legislative who authorizes it but retains a natural right of punishment in the people and so in the prince as an executor of natural right who is granted prerogative to secure safety which nature does not guarantee, a fundamental tension meant to satisfy Whig advocates of parliamentary supremacy and Tory royalists that is left theoretically unresolved. Montesquieu also from British example moderates the prince by separating the judicial from the executive thereby removing the right to punish from the executive who can only pardon and veto, otherwise allowing things to run their course, reversing Machiavelli’s means and ends as executive action makes an exception to the laws for the benefit of the people rather than fear of swift punishment and awe of sensational example. The American founders particularly Publius-Hamilton republicanize executive prerogative into popular government by channeling ambition as the people’s naysaying to themselves by rejecting their direct right to rule via the constitution and through the president who is involved in legislation negatively and satisfies their thymia by winning election and the possibility of re-election.
Hamilton who wrote the bulk of the Federalist Papers did explicitly advocate during the constitutional convention an American monarchy as a president serving for life under good behavior, an absolute veto, and appointment of governors but was not seconded. The election of the president however much a compromise resembles that of the Holy Roman Emperor by prince electors or pope by college of cardinals than one elected by congress which was Madison’s original plan or a plural executive of the New Jersey plan. Hamilton and the Federalists however would effectively get their way through the Washington and Adams administration and being cited by supreme court justices. The president prior to the 22nd amendment was not term limited and could theoretically serve for life which did happen with Franklin Roosevelt, but Washington’s personal example of the two term tradition held until then as a kingdom without a king. The twelfth amendment electing the vice president on the same ticket increased the unitary nature of the executive who as president of the senate with a tie breaking vote has a role in divided government. The pocket veto, in which a law not signed within ten days does not become law, is even broader than the formal veto which can be overridden by a 2/3 veto. This is something like royal assent in that the president must respond either positively or negatively, in the latter case a larger majority must approve the law so is meant to appeal to popular support or constitutional authority.
The critique is fundamentally the same as Leo Strauss who is referenced, that Machiavelli is simply a teacher of evil in the guise of necessity not for the content of his teachings which have been practiced since time immemorial but for being bold enough to proclaim such doctrines under his own name, against the philosophers and theologians who caused much trouble in his time as ever. I prefer to understand Machiavelli as a renaissance humanist. Mansfield is right about a few things however such as the facade democratic governments have given to an essentially monarchical institution in the unitary executive. The modern executive cuts against traditional republican ideals but does not quite satisfy advocates of monarchy since the modern executive does not claim to rule under his own name but the people or the constitution and so ends up with more prerogative than kings past with less responsibility and so is formally weak but practically strong, the greatest tyranny done in the name of a greater good given the experience of 20th century totalitarianism and irresponsibility of democratic government. Mansfield chides modern intellectuals for assuming democracy the only valid regime and should consider the philosophy behind their assumptions and rival claims of partisans rather than claiming to be neutral scientists. I too would prefer either an identifiable sovereign ruling in their own name or a realistic mixed regime of competing elements.
The book begins with the common problem of political philosophy which is an inherent recalcitrance in human nature to resisting even just authority, based in thumos or spiritedness. In Aristotle’s Politics there are fundamentally three regimes with good and bad forms, democracy oligarchy and monarchy and he spends the most time on the first two as monarchy depends not so much on the type of regime but the individual ruler especially in its ideal form the pambasileia of a philosopher king. The ruling principle of democracy is equal freedom or isothymia which is according to nature as blind necessity in which offices are open to all by lot or popular election. The ruling principle of oligarchy is self-assertion or megalothymia against nature for superiority of wealth or birth. Monarchy occurs when the best man who embodies the principle of the regime, most free or wealthiest, is given authority above the laws.
In these regimes Aristotle divides powers into deliberative, judicial, and the offices as parallels to the human soul which roughly correspond to legislative, judicial, and executive but Aristotle places deliberation first and places the offices in several people rather than one except in monarchy where the sovereign is above the regime. Deliberation means choice and corresponds to oligarchy and judging means opinion corresponds to democracy but while democracy can admit of oligarchic elements oligarchy cannot which biases Aristotle towards democracy as the least worst regime, somehow the multitude being less corruptible than an individual. Within the offices which command the law, literal execution is placed as the lowest function. The Roman Polybius presented a cyclical history of the three regime types which Rome was able to combine in practice by balance of powers but not in principle. There will always be partisans of one form of government over another but practical regimes will partake in each yet no regime will satisfy entirely although Polybius placed monarchy as the first regime and Cicero agreed with Aristotle that monarchy in theory the best regime but liable to become tyranny the worst regime. Common to the ancient writers was that in republics the executive be it consul or dictator was not a unitary separate institution but plural or subordinate to the deliberative body. It would be a long development of first medieval christian monarchy then early modern realism that would develop the idea of an independent unitary executive and subsequently liberal and republican thinkers who would adapt this energy into popular constitutional governments.
The pambasileia ran counter first to Aristotle’s concern of tyranny and retribution in the name of divinity to which he proposed the mixed regime as an achievable good, then christian theology and the status of the church revived a dispute over executive power and finally republican and constitutional assertion of legislative and popular sovereignty. The discussion of the theologico-politico executive of Aquinas Dante and Marsilius was the most new and interesting to me, as christianity altered the relationship of religious and political authority so a pope or king could claim to be an executive of a higher power who was inherently good not from caprice or superstition. These authors still remained relatively within an Aristotelian frame though. Aquinas began where Aristotle left and differed on two points, that the tyranny of an individual worse than a multitude and that worldly happiness a sufficient reward for virtue. For Aquinas a king ought to willingly submit to the authority and teaching of the church. Dante starts from the teleological principle that there is a highest good for human nature and combines this with theism so ontologically as there is one god there ought to be one ruler of the earth who reigns independently but supported by the spiritual power. Marsilius was the most radical of the medieval thinkers and makes papal authority subordinate to secular authority and derived political authority from the people.
Machiavelli although himself a republican adapted princely energy by rejecting the possibility of an ideal regime according to nature and making virtue consist of human will against natural necessity and chance. Machiavelli’s prince would appropriate the use of sensational public executions to renew authority from a political interpretation of christianity and Rome’s founding to remind the public of their fear and awe. Bodin and Hobbes developed the theory of sovereignty to legalize the prince, making him formally strong to appeal to majesty rather than fear by combining legislative and executive authority but practically weak relying on magistrates and strategically not wielding power which constitutes a different path than the tamed prince. Hobbes theoretically universalized the will to power as democratic vanity independent of regime type in which all can satisfy their desire to rule by collectively placing it in the sovereign while retaining a natural right of defense for themselves.
The taming of the prince constitutes the latter chapters, as each faced the practical reality of a world where republics were rare and that the classical virtues of philosophers unsuited to an emerging commercial society. Locke constitutionalizes the prince from the model of England by formally submitting the executive to the legislative who authorizes it but retains a natural right of punishment in the people and so in the prince as an executor of natural right who is granted prerogative to secure safety which nature does not guarantee, a fundamental tension meant to satisfy Whig advocates of parliamentary supremacy and Tory royalists that is left theoretically unresolved. Montesquieu also from British example moderates the prince by separating the judicial from the executive thereby removing the right to punish from the executive who can only pardon and veto, otherwise allowing things to run their course, reversing Machiavelli’s means and ends as executive action makes an exception to the laws for the benefit of the people rather than fear of swift punishment and awe of sensational example. The American founders particularly Publius-Hamilton republicanize executive prerogative into popular government by channeling ambition as the people’s naysaying to themselves by rejecting their direct right to rule via the constitution and through the president who is involved in legislation negatively and satisfies their thymia by winning election and the possibility of re-election.
Hamilton who wrote the bulk of the Federalist Papers did explicitly advocate during the constitutional convention an American monarchy as a president serving for life under good behavior, an absolute veto, and appointment of governors but was not seconded. The election of the president however much a compromise resembles that of the Holy Roman Emperor by prince electors or pope by college of cardinals than one elected by congress which was Madison’s original plan or a plural executive of the New Jersey plan. Hamilton and the Federalists however would effectively get their way through the Washington and Adams administration and being cited by supreme court justices. The president prior to the 22nd amendment was not term limited and could theoretically serve for life which did happen with Franklin Roosevelt, but Washington’s personal example of the two term tradition held until then as a kingdom without a king. The twelfth amendment electing the vice president on the same ticket increased the unitary nature of the executive who as president of the senate with a tie breaking vote has a role in divided government. The pocket veto, in which a law not signed within ten days does not become law, is even broader than the formal veto which can be overridden by a 2/3 veto. This is something like royal assent in that the president must respond either positively or negatively, in the latter case a larger majority must approve the law so is meant to appeal to popular support or constitutional authority.
August 2, 2025
Recognising the ideas are somewhat strong, Mansfield's work would have been far stronger if he directly engaged with counter arguments on how power develops in human social structures. Feels polemic.
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