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Die Wehrmacht Im Kampf #36
Panzer Battles
Born in 1904, von Mellenthin joined the Seventh Cavalry Regiment in 1924. In 1935, he began his general staff training and in 1939 was an intelligence officer. By the end of the war, he had risen in rank to Major General and was Chief of General Staff, Fifth Panzer Army, on the Western Front. Active in the Polish campaign of 1939, the conquest of France, the Balkans, the desert with Rommel, as well as in Russia, at Stalingrad, and Kursk, he was in a unique position to write Panzer Battles , having been present at every major panzer campaign. In 1944, he was moved to the Western Front under Field Marshall von Rundstedt. Captured in 1945 by the Americans, he moved to South Africa after the war and became an executive for a major German airline.
256 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1955
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June 30, 2025
Panzer Battles is a fascinating and illuminating book. It was written by General-Major Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, a German staff officer (equivalent to an British Brigadier, not a Major-General as you might expect) who fought on several fronts in World War Two.
The book illustrates many of the major campaigns of the war from the point of view of the German Wehrmacht (armed forces) and, specifically, discusses armoured warfare – the use of tanks and other armoured vehicles, and armoured formations, including mechanised infantry (panzer grenadiers). This makes it a source not just for historians but also an important work to be studied by prospective officers. I believe it was (and maybe still is) required reading at Sandhurst and West Point. While it was two British officers (Captain Basil Liddell-Hart [Retired] and Major-General JFC Fuller) who first advocated using concentrated fast-moving armoured formations as a means of breaking through/encircling enemy fronts, it was the Germans who developed the theory into well-practised and efficient reality and, thereby, taught the rest of the world how to fight most effectively in modern war using modern weapons. This has held true and continues to be effective.
Von Mellenthin came from a military family – his father was an Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) of artillery and was killed in 1918. The family originated in Silesia, Brandenburg and Prussia and, on his mother’s side, was related to Frederick the Great. Despite his family history he enlisted as a private in the cavalry, working hard and studying to become an officer. He was clearly a man of intelligence and great skill because he ended up with 1-star general rank and was appointed Chief of Staff of an Army Group.
As a career army officer, von Mellenthin’s war experience began at the beginning when he was involved in the swift overrunning of Poland, a campaign that tested the practices that General Heinz Guderian had developed from the British theories and made German practice during the thirties.
This stressed the need for mobility, concentrated forces on a narrow front, close cooperation between the infantry, artillery and air force, and the fitting of high-quality radio transceivers in tanks, other armoured vehicles and aircraft so that they could all talk to each other and react quickly to battlefield conditions. Another crucial factor that added immensely to the Germans’ success during the whole war, and enabled them both to ‘appear from nowhere’ and to win battles against far larger enemy forces, was the principle of their reserves being high-quality, well-trained troops with excellent weapons, high morale and the mobility to move rapidly across wide areas of terrain. Another difference between the Wehrmacht and other armies at the beginning of the war was the Germans’ willingness to allow their junior commanders to make decisions on the spot in order to exploit battlefield opportunities that arose without having to consult divisional HQs. If a unit reached its objective easily and knew that the enemy was weakened, disorganised and/or in a panic or retreating, even a Leutnant or Hauptmann (Lieutenant or Captain) could make the decision to continue the fight even if reinforcements were unavailable. These are some of the reasons that Blitzkrieg (lightning war) worked so well for them.
The Polish campaign was highly successful and fully justified the German operational methods, even given that Poland was woefully unprepared or capable of fighting that kind of war, which we must remember was brand new in 1939. Poland had a large and extremely brave and committed army but was no match for the Wehrmacht. Poor Poland was subjugated in about six weeks. Many Poles managed to escape and make their way to England, where they joined the British Army and the RAF, and fought with distinction.
Von Mellenthin was then involved in the campaign to invade France. Here the Germans concentrated their tanks and attacked en masse, whereas the French stuck to the old-fashioned principle of spreading their tanks out among the infantry (also a British practice at that time). As a consequence, the panzers overwhelmed the opposing tanks and cut through the French lines with little trouble. Tactics were not the only reason that France fell, of course, the political situation left a lot to be desired, but this book deals only with the military aspects of the war and tank battles in particular, so it is a less complicated read, if not totally comprehensive.
From France, von Mellethin moved on to Yugoslavia and then Greece, gaining experience all the time. This marks the end of Part One of the book, which is fairly short.
Part Two is a long section describing von Mellenthin’s experiences in the Western Desert under General Erwin Rommel, a man respected by both sides and who invaded Egypt and came within 60 miles of Alexandria which, had he been able to capture, would have finished the British in North Africa. As it was, he waged a two-year campaign that began with huge success but ultimately failed in its objectives. This was due to many factors, including mistakes by Rommel, a huge build-up of British forces before their final enormous attack at El Alamein and, of course, Operation Torch, in which a huge American and British force invaded North Africa via Morocco and Algeria. Von Mellenthin treats us to an almost running commentary of the whole campaign and explains how and why they did what they did, what the British and Italians (and, later, the Americans) did and how it all went.
What students of various wars sometimes forget is that many of the decisive battles are fought by the same people who are moved around to where they are most needed. For example, we generally think of General (later Field Marshal) Rommel as fighting the British and Commonwealth forces in Libya and Egypt (and, later, the British and Americans in Tunisia) but he also fought in France with many of the same units he had commanded there. Likewise, General (later Field Marshal) Montgomery was commander of the Normandy landings and his XXX Corps was the armoured outfit involved in the Arnhem debacle (see the film, A Bridge Too Far), and later fought in Germany. US Major-General Patton fought in Sicily, Italy and France, then Germany. Von Mellenthin was no exception and he was soon whisked off to the Russian Front where he again served with distinction.
Russia was a different kettle of fish, of course, as Napoleon had found out 130 years or so previously. The German attack, Operation Barbarossa, began on 22 June 1941 and went very well (as long as you weren’t Russian). The Russian air force was almost totally destroyed on the ground in surprise air attacks first, their army was disorganised and badly led, thanks to Stalin who had purged many of the top officers in case they were not loyal to him or were not ardent Communists, and they mostly had tanks that were not up to the job until the T-34 became available in large numbers.
Russia is huge, however, and the Russians are a very tough and resourceful people; they also have the weather on their side – it is so vast that if you dare to invade it and don’t win quickly, the weather will slow you down and then stop you. The Germans were doing well until the Allies’ secret weapon – Adolf Hitler – intervened and forced his generals to change strategy for political and economic reasons. That meant delaying the capture of Moscow, and without winter kit the German armies suffered immensely during the winter until the Russians were ready to counter attack in the spring.
This is not a history of the war but a book review so I won’t regale you with more facts than necessary but the upshot was that owing to this and several other bad decisions by Hitler, the German Sixth Army was wiped out/captured at Stalingrad and from then on it was mostly retreat all the way back to Germany.
Von Mellenthin gives us a blow-by-blow history of how this happened and, in fact, the Germans won many battles and got out of many terrible scrapes while fighting, on average, at 5 to 1 against and sometimes 10 to 1 against. They kept throwing the Russians off balance, attacking their rear and wiping out forward troops through good tactics, speed, mobility, concentrated force and superior generalship. To read von Mellenthin’s account you sometimes wonder if they were in fact winning it all sounds like they were so good, but of course they were going sideways, up and down but, ultimately, always backwards. The Russians managed to produce huge numbers of tanks and guns, and were sent thousands of tanks and aircraft by the USA and the UK. Furthermore, they had millions of men and they were quite prepared to sacrifice them all to save Mother Russia.
By the time the Russians were crossing into Poland, the Americans and British were winning after some bitter fighting in France and Belgium, having invaded on D-Day (6 June 1944). Von Mellenthin was posted to the Alsace/Lorraine area where he faced Major-General George S. Patton’s Third Army. Patton was a West Pointer who had learned all the lessons both from ancient history and from what the Germans had achieved earlier in the war. He believed in mobility, hard hitting and pushing and motivating his men, and they loved him (despite a few hiccups). He fought the Allied equivalent of Blitzkrieg. The British had also learned these lessons in North Africa, and Montgomery's men were the ones who (primarily) had beaten and captured 250,000 Germans in Tunisia.
Von Mellenthin describes in great detail how the Allies advanced, what he and his fellows did to try to counteract it and their relative strengths. By this time the German armies were well below strength and the Americans and British (in the northern sector) had ample supplies – when they could get them to the front fast enough.
The last-ditch attempt to disrupt the Allied advance was the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, which caught the Allies on the hop and required a huge and heroic response. The American 101st Airborne Division (the Screaming Eagles) clung on desperately to Bastogne (near the Belgian border with Luxembourg) in the snow (see Band of Brothers HBO series) while Patton raced to their aid in a mad dash that saved that vital road junction (though the 101st always swore they didn’t need rescuing). These heroics held up the German advance for days until the weather cleared and the Allied air forces could batter the German armoured divisions and halt the attack before the panzers could reach a huge Allied fuel dump not far away, which would have made their lives easier.
What is so fascinating about this book is the amount of detail, not only about the strategy and tactics but also about the logistics, communications, the importance of good intelligence about the enemy and, also important, the relationship between brother officers. As stated earlier in this review, sometimes you felt he believed they were winning even while losing the war, and he heaps praise on many of his fellow officers, but reading the accounts it is easy to see why – they certainly achieved a lot, even against enemies with more assets. It is just so sad that it was all in the name of a disgusting, irrational and morally reprehensible cause that cost millions of innocent people their lives, families and livelihoods, in so many countries, not to mention a level of destruction never seen before or since.
At the end of the book he gives an appreciation of the Russian forces. This is because he wrote it in the Fifties when the Cold War was in full swing and nuclear war and/or invasion by ‘the Russian hordes’ was a genuine fear in the West. His assessment is racist by our standards (hardly surprising) but also gives praise to the Russians and their methods, though scathing of the Soviet strategy that individuals don’t matter and sheer numbers will overcome the enemy, resulting in so many Russian deaths that could be avoided if different methods were employed.
This book must be read purely in military terms, which is the way it has been written. Von Mellenthin was not the sort of officer to sit far behind the lines and sit in an ivory tower; he and many other officers located their HQs quite close to the action and in many cases travelled to the front in armoured vehicles and directed battles ‘on the ground’. Nevertheless, this book by necessity describes grand strategy and tactics in a dispassionate way, describing the heroic actions of all sides in the push and pull of military actions. What this avoids completely, of course, is much in the way of the human costs involved. He praises his comrades and enemies alike for their heroism, stoicism, hardiness and grit but does not talk about the appalling suffering of men and civilians being shot, blown to bits, freezing to death or being hacked up with sharpened spades and stabbed with bayonets in the hand-to–hand fighting of the Russian winter when their guns froze. The loss of life was tremendous and horrific, so while I can admire his abilities as a soldier, I cannot condone his actions. He also does not mention, as most histories do not, that in many instances the troops were issued with drugs such as methamphetamine, known innocently as 'pep pills' to enable them to continue fighting even when they were exhausted. This may also explain some of the atrocities carried out by soldiers whose 'blood was up' and were unable to control their souped-up state.
It is difficult to say if von Mellenthin was a committed Nazi – his criticisms of Hitler are based on his inept strategy and ridiculous orders rather than any moral abhorrence, although he states that he did not know about the Holocaust and most of the other atrocities until after the war when he was imprisoned by the Allies for two and a half years and had an opportunity to discuss it with other officers. It is impossible to believe that he knew nothing, however, especially having been on the Russian front where summary executions were commonplace. He admits that people were murdered there because at one point he states that if the regime had been clever they would have befriended the Russian peasantry because when the Germans first invaded many of them welcomed them as liberators from Stalin’s vicious policies. Indeed, it is difficult to say which of these vile dictators was worse.
In any case, he was not a war criminal because he was released and he and his family emigrated to South Africa where, in 1961, he became head of Lufthansa South Africa, a post he held until 1969. He died on 28 June 1997, aged 92.
I enjoyed the book very much and recommend it to people interested in armoured warfare, tactics and what is possible with well-motivated, well-equipped troops with good leadership and flexible tactics.
The book illustrates many of the major campaigns of the war from the point of view of the German Wehrmacht (armed forces) and, specifically, discusses armoured warfare – the use of tanks and other armoured vehicles, and armoured formations, including mechanised infantry (panzer grenadiers). This makes it a source not just for historians but also an important work to be studied by prospective officers. I believe it was (and maybe still is) required reading at Sandhurst and West Point. While it was two British officers (Captain Basil Liddell-Hart [Retired] and Major-General JFC Fuller) who first advocated using concentrated fast-moving armoured formations as a means of breaking through/encircling enemy fronts, it was the Germans who developed the theory into well-practised and efficient reality and, thereby, taught the rest of the world how to fight most effectively in modern war using modern weapons. This has held true and continues to be effective.
Von Mellenthin came from a military family – his father was an Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) of artillery and was killed in 1918. The family originated in Silesia, Brandenburg and Prussia and, on his mother’s side, was related to Frederick the Great. Despite his family history he enlisted as a private in the cavalry, working hard and studying to become an officer. He was clearly a man of intelligence and great skill because he ended up with 1-star general rank and was appointed Chief of Staff of an Army Group.
As a career army officer, von Mellenthin’s war experience began at the beginning when he was involved in the swift overrunning of Poland, a campaign that tested the practices that General Heinz Guderian had developed from the British theories and made German practice during the thirties.
This stressed the need for mobility, concentrated forces on a narrow front, close cooperation between the infantry, artillery and air force, and the fitting of high-quality radio transceivers in tanks, other armoured vehicles and aircraft so that they could all talk to each other and react quickly to battlefield conditions. Another crucial factor that added immensely to the Germans’ success during the whole war, and enabled them both to ‘appear from nowhere’ and to win battles against far larger enemy forces, was the principle of their reserves being high-quality, well-trained troops with excellent weapons, high morale and the mobility to move rapidly across wide areas of terrain. Another difference between the Wehrmacht and other armies at the beginning of the war was the Germans’ willingness to allow their junior commanders to make decisions on the spot in order to exploit battlefield opportunities that arose without having to consult divisional HQs. If a unit reached its objective easily and knew that the enemy was weakened, disorganised and/or in a panic or retreating, even a Leutnant or Hauptmann (Lieutenant or Captain) could make the decision to continue the fight even if reinforcements were unavailable. These are some of the reasons that Blitzkrieg (lightning war) worked so well for them.
The Polish campaign was highly successful and fully justified the German operational methods, even given that Poland was woefully unprepared or capable of fighting that kind of war, which we must remember was brand new in 1939. Poland had a large and extremely brave and committed army but was no match for the Wehrmacht. Poor Poland was subjugated in about six weeks. Many Poles managed to escape and make their way to England, where they joined the British Army and the RAF, and fought with distinction.
Von Mellenthin was then involved in the campaign to invade France. Here the Germans concentrated their tanks and attacked en masse, whereas the French stuck to the old-fashioned principle of spreading their tanks out among the infantry (also a British practice at that time). As a consequence, the panzers overwhelmed the opposing tanks and cut through the French lines with little trouble. Tactics were not the only reason that France fell, of course, the political situation left a lot to be desired, but this book deals only with the military aspects of the war and tank battles in particular, so it is a less complicated read, if not totally comprehensive.
From France, von Mellethin moved on to Yugoslavia and then Greece, gaining experience all the time. This marks the end of Part One of the book, which is fairly short.
Part Two is a long section describing von Mellenthin’s experiences in the Western Desert under General Erwin Rommel, a man respected by both sides and who invaded Egypt and came within 60 miles of Alexandria which, had he been able to capture, would have finished the British in North Africa. As it was, he waged a two-year campaign that began with huge success but ultimately failed in its objectives. This was due to many factors, including mistakes by Rommel, a huge build-up of British forces before their final enormous attack at El Alamein and, of course, Operation Torch, in which a huge American and British force invaded North Africa via Morocco and Algeria. Von Mellenthin treats us to an almost running commentary of the whole campaign and explains how and why they did what they did, what the British and Italians (and, later, the Americans) did and how it all went.
What students of various wars sometimes forget is that many of the decisive battles are fought by the same people who are moved around to where they are most needed. For example, we generally think of General (later Field Marshal) Rommel as fighting the British and Commonwealth forces in Libya and Egypt (and, later, the British and Americans in Tunisia) but he also fought in France with many of the same units he had commanded there. Likewise, General (later Field Marshal) Montgomery was commander of the Normandy landings and his XXX Corps was the armoured outfit involved in the Arnhem debacle (see the film, A Bridge Too Far), and later fought in Germany. US Major-General Patton fought in Sicily, Italy and France, then Germany. Von Mellenthin was no exception and he was soon whisked off to the Russian Front where he again served with distinction.
Russia was a different kettle of fish, of course, as Napoleon had found out 130 years or so previously. The German attack, Operation Barbarossa, began on 22 June 1941 and went very well (as long as you weren’t Russian). The Russian air force was almost totally destroyed on the ground in surprise air attacks first, their army was disorganised and badly led, thanks to Stalin who had purged many of the top officers in case they were not loyal to him or were not ardent Communists, and they mostly had tanks that were not up to the job until the T-34 became available in large numbers.
Russia is huge, however, and the Russians are a very tough and resourceful people; they also have the weather on their side – it is so vast that if you dare to invade it and don’t win quickly, the weather will slow you down and then stop you. The Germans were doing well until the Allies’ secret weapon – Adolf Hitler – intervened and forced his generals to change strategy for political and economic reasons. That meant delaying the capture of Moscow, and without winter kit the German armies suffered immensely during the winter until the Russians were ready to counter attack in the spring.
This is not a history of the war but a book review so I won’t regale you with more facts than necessary but the upshot was that owing to this and several other bad decisions by Hitler, the German Sixth Army was wiped out/captured at Stalingrad and from then on it was mostly retreat all the way back to Germany.
Von Mellenthin gives us a blow-by-blow history of how this happened and, in fact, the Germans won many battles and got out of many terrible scrapes while fighting, on average, at 5 to 1 against and sometimes 10 to 1 against. They kept throwing the Russians off balance, attacking their rear and wiping out forward troops through good tactics, speed, mobility, concentrated force and superior generalship. To read von Mellenthin’s account you sometimes wonder if they were in fact winning it all sounds like they were so good, but of course they were going sideways, up and down but, ultimately, always backwards. The Russians managed to produce huge numbers of tanks and guns, and were sent thousands of tanks and aircraft by the USA and the UK. Furthermore, they had millions of men and they were quite prepared to sacrifice them all to save Mother Russia.
By the time the Russians were crossing into Poland, the Americans and British were winning after some bitter fighting in France and Belgium, having invaded on D-Day (6 June 1944). Von Mellenthin was posted to the Alsace/Lorraine area where he faced Major-General George S. Patton’s Third Army. Patton was a West Pointer who had learned all the lessons both from ancient history and from what the Germans had achieved earlier in the war. He believed in mobility, hard hitting and pushing and motivating his men, and they loved him (despite a few hiccups). He fought the Allied equivalent of Blitzkrieg. The British had also learned these lessons in North Africa, and Montgomery's men were the ones who (primarily) had beaten and captured 250,000 Germans in Tunisia.
Von Mellenthin describes in great detail how the Allies advanced, what he and his fellows did to try to counteract it and their relative strengths. By this time the German armies were well below strength and the Americans and British (in the northern sector) had ample supplies – when they could get them to the front fast enough.
The last-ditch attempt to disrupt the Allied advance was the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, which caught the Allies on the hop and required a huge and heroic response. The American 101st Airborne Division (the Screaming Eagles) clung on desperately to Bastogne (near the Belgian border with Luxembourg) in the snow (see Band of Brothers HBO series) while Patton raced to their aid in a mad dash that saved that vital road junction (though the 101st always swore they didn’t need rescuing). These heroics held up the German advance for days until the weather cleared and the Allied air forces could batter the German armoured divisions and halt the attack before the panzers could reach a huge Allied fuel dump not far away, which would have made their lives easier.
What is so fascinating about this book is the amount of detail, not only about the strategy and tactics but also about the logistics, communications, the importance of good intelligence about the enemy and, also important, the relationship between brother officers. As stated earlier in this review, sometimes you felt he believed they were winning even while losing the war, and he heaps praise on many of his fellow officers, but reading the accounts it is easy to see why – they certainly achieved a lot, even against enemies with more assets. It is just so sad that it was all in the name of a disgusting, irrational and morally reprehensible cause that cost millions of innocent people their lives, families and livelihoods, in so many countries, not to mention a level of destruction never seen before or since.
At the end of the book he gives an appreciation of the Russian forces. This is because he wrote it in the Fifties when the Cold War was in full swing and nuclear war and/or invasion by ‘the Russian hordes’ was a genuine fear in the West. His assessment is racist by our standards (hardly surprising) but also gives praise to the Russians and their methods, though scathing of the Soviet strategy that individuals don’t matter and sheer numbers will overcome the enemy, resulting in so many Russian deaths that could be avoided if different methods were employed.
This book must be read purely in military terms, which is the way it has been written. Von Mellenthin was not the sort of officer to sit far behind the lines and sit in an ivory tower; he and many other officers located their HQs quite close to the action and in many cases travelled to the front in armoured vehicles and directed battles ‘on the ground’. Nevertheless, this book by necessity describes grand strategy and tactics in a dispassionate way, describing the heroic actions of all sides in the push and pull of military actions. What this avoids completely, of course, is much in the way of the human costs involved. He praises his comrades and enemies alike for their heroism, stoicism, hardiness and grit but does not talk about the appalling suffering of men and civilians being shot, blown to bits, freezing to death or being hacked up with sharpened spades and stabbed with bayonets in the hand-to–hand fighting of the Russian winter when their guns froze. The loss of life was tremendous and horrific, so while I can admire his abilities as a soldier, I cannot condone his actions. He also does not mention, as most histories do not, that in many instances the troops were issued with drugs such as methamphetamine, known innocently as 'pep pills' to enable them to continue fighting even when they were exhausted. This may also explain some of the atrocities carried out by soldiers whose 'blood was up' and were unable to control their souped-up state.
It is difficult to say if von Mellenthin was a committed Nazi – his criticisms of Hitler are based on his inept strategy and ridiculous orders rather than any moral abhorrence, although he states that he did not know about the Holocaust and most of the other atrocities until after the war when he was imprisoned by the Allies for two and a half years and had an opportunity to discuss it with other officers. It is impossible to believe that he knew nothing, however, especially having been on the Russian front where summary executions were commonplace. He admits that people were murdered there because at one point he states that if the regime had been clever they would have befriended the Russian peasantry because when the Germans first invaded many of them welcomed them as liberators from Stalin’s vicious policies. Indeed, it is difficult to say which of these vile dictators was worse.
In any case, he was not a war criminal because he was released and he and his family emigrated to South Africa where, in 1961, he became head of Lufthansa South Africa, a post he held until 1969. He died on 28 June 1997, aged 92.
I enjoyed the book very much and recommend it to people interested in armoured warfare, tactics and what is possible with well-motivated, well-equipped troops with good leadership and flexible tactics.
March 5, 2008
Panzer Battles isn't a theoretical work as much as it is a practical thesis built upon personal experience. Major General von Mellenthin recounts his experiences on three major fronts of World War II. The most interesting accounts deal with his service with Rommel in the desert, but it may well be that the most enlightening portions deal with his analysis of the latter days on the eastern front and the western front.
The lessons that this veteran of armored combat teaches in this book are almost so obvious as to question the value of citing them here. However, since these insights were ignored to the peril of Allied (and sometimes, Axis) forces, I cite them here.
First of all, over and over again, he cites his enemies tendency to throw armored units piecemeal against the concentrated forces of German armor. Before one is even 50 pages into the book, we read that de Gaulle did so with the 4th Armored Divison after the Sedan. Before one is 70 pages into the book, one discovers that Cunningham had scattered the 7th Armored Division all over the desert, but Rommel didn't have the logistic support to exploit that error. On page 101, we read concerning the Gazala battles that "The British armor had suffered heavily--once again their command failed to coordinate the tank brigades." (Once again, we read that the Germans had inadequate supplies to exploit their advantage--the second lesson) With regard to the eastern front, we read: "The fighting on the Chir river was made easier by the methods adopted by the command of the Russian Fifth Tank Army. They sent their various corps into battle without co-ordinating the timing of their attacks, and without the co-operation of the numerous infantry divisions." (p. 184)
Second, von Mellenthin makes no bones about the fact that Rommel lacked patience with securing a solid supply line and that he paid the price in the desert for that failure. Later, during the last days of the war, we see how Hitler's orders to stand and refuse to surrender ground also ignored supply problems (and more). von Mellenthin cites Guderian's observation that a tank's engine is as important as its gun (p. 155) but notes how inadequate attention to logistics created colossal failures. Consider: At Stalingrad, the German troops needed 500 hundred tons of supplies per day. When Hitler ordered them to stand their ground and the High Command insisted on airlifting supplies, it would have required 250 Ju-52 planes per day, meaning that with attrition and damage repairs that 1,000 planes needed to be available, it's easy to see why the MOST brought in for one day was 300 tons and the AVERAGE was 100 tons (usually, a heroic effort on behalf of pilots) (p. 188).
Third, von Mellenthin emphasizes the need to be able to place concentrated force at a particular point (schwerpunkt or spearhead) by using armored mobility to reach the vulnerable points before the enemy expects it.
Fourth, he writes about the value of positioning guns such that they can triangulate on the same target, rather than spreading them out in a line as per Field Marshal Model during the defense of Poland (pp. 283-284).
Finally, his summary of how Hitler's total command of the war is a cautionary tale for current managers. Hitler's obsession with not even letting his generals know what he was planning until they "needed to know" is equivalent to modern managers who keep their employees in the dark. Further, because Hitler was both obsessed and secretive, no one could offer truly sound counsel. This is a warning to all people in leadership.
The lessons that this veteran of armored combat teaches in this book are almost so obvious as to question the value of citing them here. However, since these insights were ignored to the peril of Allied (and sometimes, Axis) forces, I cite them here.
First of all, over and over again, he cites his enemies tendency to throw armored units piecemeal against the concentrated forces of German armor. Before one is even 50 pages into the book, we read that de Gaulle did so with the 4th Armored Divison after the Sedan. Before one is 70 pages into the book, one discovers that Cunningham had scattered the 7th Armored Division all over the desert, but Rommel didn't have the logistic support to exploit that error. On page 101, we read concerning the Gazala battles that "The British armor had suffered heavily--once again their command failed to coordinate the tank brigades." (Once again, we read that the Germans had inadequate supplies to exploit their advantage--the second lesson) With regard to the eastern front, we read: "The fighting on the Chir river was made easier by the methods adopted by the command of the Russian Fifth Tank Army. They sent their various corps into battle without co-ordinating the timing of their attacks, and without the co-operation of the numerous infantry divisions." (p. 184)
Second, von Mellenthin makes no bones about the fact that Rommel lacked patience with securing a solid supply line and that he paid the price in the desert for that failure. Later, during the last days of the war, we see how Hitler's orders to stand and refuse to surrender ground also ignored supply problems (and more). von Mellenthin cites Guderian's observation that a tank's engine is as important as its gun (p. 155) but notes how inadequate attention to logistics created colossal failures. Consider: At Stalingrad, the German troops needed 500 hundred tons of supplies per day. When Hitler ordered them to stand their ground and the High Command insisted on airlifting supplies, it would have required 250 Ju-52 planes per day, meaning that with attrition and damage repairs that 1,000 planes needed to be available, it's easy to see why the MOST brought in for one day was 300 tons and the AVERAGE was 100 tons (usually, a heroic effort on behalf of pilots) (p. 188).
Third, von Mellenthin emphasizes the need to be able to place concentrated force at a particular point (schwerpunkt or spearhead) by using armored mobility to reach the vulnerable points before the enemy expects it.
Fourth, he writes about the value of positioning guns such that they can triangulate on the same target, rather than spreading them out in a line as per Field Marshal Model during the defense of Poland (pp. 283-284).
Finally, his summary of how Hitler's total command of the war is a cautionary tale for current managers. Hitler's obsession with not even letting his generals know what he was planning until they "needed to know" is equivalent to modern managers who keep their employees in the dark. Further, because Hitler was both obsessed and secretive, no one could offer truly sound counsel. This is a warning to all people in leadership.
February 22, 2013
Perhaps more like 2.5 stars than 2. Parts of the book are interesting, but far too much of it is simply a recitation of troop dispositions. There are numerous maps that assist in following the text, but I still felt at times it would be better to place tokens on a map. Very dry stuff. I felt the book improved when he went to Russia, or when he used extended quotes from some of his colleagues.
There really aren't any people in the book, other than a handful of admired commanding officers. There are many battalions, divisions, and armies, but no soldiers.
I'm perhaps most interested in the author's moral blind spot. At one point he says the Russian advances into eastern Germany rival only ancient Rome for violence and human deprivation. I'd guess those Russian soldiers might make a much more recent comparison. In the last few weeks of the war, when he was posted on the western front, he is saddened by the collapse of his army but doesn't seem upset by the destruction of his country.
In his final analysis he makes sure to point out that he restricted his work to the purely military, as if to say it is independent of the state for which it does its business. He feels he should hold his head up proudly to have done an honorable job as a German officer. He says that it wasn't until he was in captivity that he learned of what the Nazis had done. He feels nothing would have been served had Hitler died in the July 20 attempt. He also asks the question whether the Germans could have won the war.
It seems to me he's missing the big picture. If it's true he never knew about Nazi atrocities until after the war (as seems to be the case of the vast majority of German personal narratives from WWII), he must certainly understand from what he learned later that rather than asking the question "could we have won?" he should have asked "should we have won?"
Mellenthin, to my eyes, is that most dangerous of patriots: the man who says "my country, right or wrong". Hitler was only able to exterminate Europe's Jews because the honorable German officer class did such magnificent jobs overrunning Europe. Perhaps if Mellenthin and his colleagues had had a little less honor, a little less patriotism, things might have turned out differently.
There really aren't any people in the book, other than a handful of admired commanding officers. There are many battalions, divisions, and armies, but no soldiers.
I'm perhaps most interested in the author's moral blind spot. At one point he says the Russian advances into eastern Germany rival only ancient Rome for violence and human deprivation. I'd guess those Russian soldiers might make a much more recent comparison. In the last few weeks of the war, when he was posted on the western front, he is saddened by the collapse of his army but doesn't seem upset by the destruction of his country.
In his final analysis he makes sure to point out that he restricted his work to the purely military, as if to say it is independent of the state for which it does its business. He feels he should hold his head up proudly to have done an honorable job as a German officer. He says that it wasn't until he was in captivity that he learned of what the Nazis had done. He feels nothing would have been served had Hitler died in the July 20 attempt. He also asks the question whether the Germans could have won the war.
It seems to me he's missing the big picture. If it's true he never knew about Nazi atrocities until after the war (as seems to be the case of the vast majority of German personal narratives from WWII), he must certainly understand from what he learned later that rather than asking the question "could we have won?" he should have asked "should we have won?"
Mellenthin, to my eyes, is that most dangerous of patriots: the man who says "my country, right or wrong". Hitler was only able to exterminate Europe's Jews because the honorable German officer class did such magnificent jobs overrunning Europe. Perhaps if Mellenthin and his colleagues had had a little less honor, a little less patriotism, things might have turned out differently.
January 26, 2021
At 65 yrs from its original publication in 1955 Panzer Battles is an interesting read. The writing itself now history. Organized into four parts - part one covers Case White (Polish Campaign), Case Yellow (French Campaign) and the Balkans; part two recounts von Mellenthin's time with the Afrika Korps; part three covers the Eastern Front campaign's von Mellenthin participated in; and part four is von Mellenthin's involvement with Army Group G and the final days of the Western Front, and the collapse of the Eastern Front during the final days of the war.
At the conclusion of parts three and four von Mellenthin provides some interesting insights. Part three concludes with a chapter on his observations of the Russian way of war and the Russian soldier. This chapter is obviously targeted at the Western leadership post war in preparation for what was to become the Cold War. Reading this summary of the Russian conduct of war one wonders how much the German General Staff post war shaped the strategies of NATO as this chapter was relevant right up through the early 90's. Russia is a very different place now with that nation's focus on unconventional warfare and conducting proxy wars.
Part four includes a retrospective where von Mellenthin discusses the war from a national strategic perspective. I found this chapter insightful and a discussion that I've rarely encountered in previous WW2 historical reads. From a strategic perspective von Mellenthin believes by 1941 Germany had already lost the war. He states,
There were several sections I found a little disappointing. The coverage of Case White, a campaign he did not participate in, could have been left out all together based upon the summary overview provided. He does provide a very short lessons learned from that campaign that is really the only worthwhile section of that chapter. This lessons learned could have been added to the Case Yellow campaign as an introduction as a start of the book.
Von Mellenthin's coverage of military operations are, for the most part, from his experience. Therefore the only campaign that really had full coverage based upon his posting was the North African Campaign with Field Marshal Rommel. I found most interesting the summary of what a day with the Afrika Korps staff was like, the use of intelligence information in the operational planning process and von Mellenthin's 'what if' analysis of the British 8th Army performance.
But even in this part of the book there are some missing sections that one would have expected von Mellethin to cover at least in part. For example, missing was the account of Count Almasy's trek through the southern fringes of the battlefield, the Brandenburger ops, and especially how Col Fellers' Department of State intercepts were utilized by the staff for planning. This last piece regarding 'The Good Source' I would have expected von Mellenthin as the staff Ic (intelligence officer) to have had good insight.
As mentioned previously the later war Eastern and Western Front campaigns are from a narrow perspective focused on primarily those units von Mellenthin was a member and supporting units. Even so the recounting of those particular operations are good reads. They recount the operations at the echelon at which he was assigned and usually one level below - occasionally providing lower level echelon's when needed to adequately describe the battle.
Von Mellethin can be a bit of a fan boy for his superiors. This is especially true with General Baulk. The reader can definitely see that his writing was to place the German senior military leadership - except for OKW - in the best light possible. He also goes to some length to say the military leadership in the field never fully understood the implementation of the final solution. We now know this narrative is misleading at best.
Overall this is a great read for WW2 enthusiasts. There is great material here. Just know it is from a single man's viewpoint. Don't expect to get a historical overview of a Front for the entire duration of the war. A lot of good pieces of interesting history recounted first hand which is always of great interest.
At the conclusion of parts three and four von Mellenthin provides some interesting insights. Part three concludes with a chapter on his observations of the Russian way of war and the Russian soldier. This chapter is obviously targeted at the Western leadership post war in preparation for what was to become the Cold War. Reading this summary of the Russian conduct of war one wonders how much the German General Staff post war shaped the strategies of NATO as this chapter was relevant right up through the early 90's. Russia is a very different place now with that nation's focus on unconventional warfare and conducting proxy wars.
Part four includes a retrospective where von Mellenthin discusses the war from a national strategic perspective. I found this chapter insightful and a discussion that I've rarely encountered in previous WW2 historical reads. From a strategic perspective von Mellenthin believes by 1941 Germany had already lost the war. He states,
By the end of 1941 German war economy was in a serious plight. We did not have the oil supplies necessary for waging war on a world-wide scale; the Eastern campaign was making colossal demands for vehicles, armor, antitank guns, and spare parts. Moreover, the lend-lease pact was having a serious effect-Russia was receiving replacements and equipment from the inexhaustible resources of the British Empire and the USA.
There were several sections I found a little disappointing. The coverage of Case White, a campaign he did not participate in, could have been left out all together based upon the summary overview provided. He does provide a very short lessons learned from that campaign that is really the only worthwhile section of that chapter. This lessons learned could have been added to the Case Yellow campaign as an introduction as a start of the book.
Von Mellenthin's coverage of military operations are, for the most part, from his experience. Therefore the only campaign that really had full coverage based upon his posting was the North African Campaign with Field Marshal Rommel. I found most interesting the summary of what a day with the Afrika Korps staff was like, the use of intelligence information in the operational planning process and von Mellenthin's 'what if' analysis of the British 8th Army performance.
But even in this part of the book there are some missing sections that one would have expected von Mellethin to cover at least in part. For example, missing was the account of Count Almasy's trek through the southern fringes of the battlefield, the Brandenburger ops, and especially how Col Fellers' Department of State intercepts were utilized by the staff for planning. This last piece regarding 'The Good Source' I would have expected von Mellenthin as the staff Ic (intelligence officer) to have had good insight.
As mentioned previously the later war Eastern and Western Front campaigns are from a narrow perspective focused on primarily those units von Mellenthin was a member and supporting units. Even so the recounting of those particular operations are good reads. They recount the operations at the echelon at which he was assigned and usually one level below - occasionally providing lower level echelon's when needed to adequately describe the battle.
Von Mellethin can be a bit of a fan boy for his superiors. This is especially true with General Baulk. The reader can definitely see that his writing was to place the German senior military leadership - except for OKW - in the best light possible. He also goes to some length to say the military leadership in the field never fully understood the implementation of the final solution. We now know this narrative is misleading at best.
Overall this is a great read for WW2 enthusiasts. There is great material here. Just know it is from a single man's viewpoint. Don't expect to get a historical overview of a Front for the entire duration of the war. A lot of good pieces of interesting history recounted first hand which is always of great interest.
February 6, 2019
This is a very mixed bag. Yes, it is a fascinating first hand account, and many of the author’s judgements – at least on purely military matters – seem fair minded, and demonstrate his familiarity with the thoughts and writings of his erstwhile enemies. But it is ultimately as self serving as the memoirs of Badoglio and Weygand, which I have also read (though Mellenthin is far more interestingly written). There is a lot of guff about the Soviet “Asiatic hordes” and how the Germans were the torchbearers of “civilisation.” It is extraordinary that he could write and believe that at the same time that he confesses he knew about the murderous activities of the Einsatzgruppen. About the Final Solution he claimed to be entirely ignorant until after the war. Yeah right….Modern scholarship is fairly united in destroying the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht, a myth which people like Mellenthin were guilty of disseminating.
Despite this, the panzer battles themselves are engrossingly described, especially in the western desert. And the portraits of those generals he worked with are fascinating – from the flawed but charismatic Rommel to the flawed and unpleasant Model.
Despite this, the panzer battles themselves are engrossingly described, especially in the western desert. And the portraits of those generals he worked with are fascinating – from the flawed but charismatic Rommel to the flawed and unpleasant Model.
July 13, 2012
If you want understand how WWII was fought in Africa & Europe with combined arms and specifically armor you must read this book. This is the memoir of one of the men in just the right place in history to see every European front and work just below high command and just above the men in the field.
He understood the high-level strategic command.
He understood the field tactics.
He took orders from and consulted with some of the most famous German commanders.
Nothing really tells the story of the German thought process in WWII better than when he was always talking strategy and conducting the 'business of war' in Poland, France, and Africa, but upon arrival to Russia he learned to operate a tank & practiced basic marksmanship with a rifle.
The cons to this book are the German & western bias. All the successes were due to the men in the field. The losses were due to Hitler's ridiculous mistakes. And the Russians were lucky, over-supplied by Americans, or anything but tactically or strategically better. An understandable attitude of a defeated man from a defeated army that was looking at imperialist Soviets poised to conquer all of Europe in the 1950's & 60's.
He understood the high-level strategic command.
He understood the field tactics.
He took orders from and consulted with some of the most famous German commanders.
Nothing really tells the story of the German thought process in WWII better than when he was always talking strategy and conducting the 'business of war' in Poland, France, and Africa, but upon arrival to Russia he learned to operate a tank & practiced basic marksmanship with a rifle.
The cons to this book are the German & western bias. All the successes were due to the men in the field. The losses were due to Hitler's ridiculous mistakes. And the Russians were lucky, over-supplied by Americans, or anything but tactically or strategically better. An understandable attitude of a defeated man from a defeated army that was looking at imperialist Soviets poised to conquer all of Europe in the 1950's & 60's.
November 28, 2012
An excellent, well-written account of the Second World War by an officer of the German General Staff who served on several different fronts & under several different legendary commanders during the course of the war. I found this book fascinating, and if I were an Armor-branch officer, and therefore likely to serve in the same types of roles as the author, I would make a point of trying to read it every other year or so.
August 26, 2010
I found the German perspective of the war in North Africa to be enlightening. Mellenthin was there and tells it how it was in the desert much as Speer does in "Inside the Third Reich".
August 20, 2016
Panzer Battles is a great account of tank warfare during WW2.
May 8, 2020
Upon his release from captivity in the late 1940s, Major General Friedrich von Mellenthin emigrated to South Africa where his wife was born and still had family. In addition to his business endeavors in travel and tourism, he began work on this memoir and analysis of the German Army in the Second World War. In telling both his story and that of Germany’s war, he augmented his own recollections with contributions from friends and colleagues for details and contributions while also drawing on British and American sources available in print (footnoted in the text). Contributors included his brother General Horst von Mellenthin, Colonel Dingler, Lieutenant General von Nazmer, and his former commander General Balck.
Beginning his career in 1924 in the cavalry, Von Mellenthin graduated from the German Kriegsakademie in September, 1937 and began his career as a General Staff officer. The Kriegsakademie was a product of 19th Century efforts to reform the Prussian Army after repeated defeats by Napoleon. Its mission generally was to give the Prussian Army a command team with capability to cope with almost any situation. The most famous example was the Great War tandem of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Von Mellenthin’s service then included only rare command positions as most of the time he was either the staff intelligence or operations officer.
In the Preface and Conclusion, von Mellenthin states that he ‘endeavored to give an objective account…written from the German point of view” while also attempting “to avoid conclusions based on individual prejudice or patriotic sentiments.” Both chronologically by publication date and by tone and content, Panzer Battles is a part of the first wave of post-war German accounts of the war. At just under 400 pages, Panzer Battles covers the campaigns in Poland, France, and the Balkans in Part One; the “Western Desert” with Rommel in Part Two; Russia (Part Three); and the final months in the West in Part Four. The narrative text is supported by 61 line-drawn maps.
Through most of the book, Von Mellenthin’s perspective is that of the divisional/corps/army level staff, though he often digresses to discuss tactical issues relating to the use of tanks in particular but also to the use of combined arms formations. He also offers views on what this or that opposing Allied commander might have done differently and to his advantage. While his observations reflect a professional career soldier’s experience and training, he does often totally miss the political factors that were at work on Allied commanders and their strategy.
In 1955, before Panzer Battles was published, the Federal Republic of Germany officially joined NATO. Two weeks after that, the Warsaw Pact was founded and included the communist eastern half of Germany as the German Democratic Republic. This alteration in the status of postwar Germany (still divided then between East and West) probably contributed to von Mellenthin’s discussion of fighting the Soviets during World War Two. Von Mellenthin includes several themes in his account of the war –
• The dislike for the Nazis on the part of the professional officer corps
• Occupied populations generally tolerated or even welcomed German soldiers until they experienced the attentions of the Gestapo and the SS
• Command errors and battlefield defeats were due to Hitler ignoring the advice of the professionals (such as not invading Malta!)
• Russians are Slavic/Asiatic animals and there are lots and lots and lots of them
• Without Lend Lease, Germany could have defeated Russia
• The Allies were also guilty of war crimes against German civilians and members of the German armed forces
This book was generally well received when it appeared. The book jacket of my copy quotes S.L.A. Marshall calling it “Vast in scope, keen in its technical appraisal, respectful of history…Should make other military authors doff their hats and respectfully bow.” A rather effusive and even excessive judgment from our vantage point some 60 years later as we recognize the white wash of the German military it represents as demonstrated on research over following decades.
The tell-tale is often in what von Mellenthin omits from his narrative. He notes that in 1937 that he served on the staff of General von Witzleben who in his retirement was a central figure in the July 20 plot. Curiously, there is no discussion of whether or not von Mellenthin was ever approached to participate and von Mellenthin’s attitude towards the plot is at best unclear.
Von Mellenthin may have also contributed to the myth of Polish cavalry attacking German tanks with lances – although in his reference he says that it was with sabers. With regard to the Battle of Britain, he twice refers to Britain’s “superior radar equipment” though more recent accounts note that actually German radar equipment was technically superior while the RAF networked it more effectively.
This English translation was the work of experienced translator H. Betzer and edited by Leonard Charles Frederick Turner, a South African veteran of the war who had already helped write and edit several volumes of the Official South African history of the Second World War and lectured at South African military colleges. [It appears that he left South Africa for Australia shortly after editing von Mellenthin’s book, reportedly repelled by the “increasing racial divide of apartheid era South Africa”.] With an understanding of the book’s failings and its bent, it is still worth reading both for its military insights but also as a marker on our collective journey to understanding the Second World War in the fullest possible way.
Beginning his career in 1924 in the cavalry, Von Mellenthin graduated from the German Kriegsakademie in September, 1937 and began his career as a General Staff officer. The Kriegsakademie was a product of 19th Century efforts to reform the Prussian Army after repeated defeats by Napoleon. Its mission generally was to give the Prussian Army a command team with capability to cope with almost any situation. The most famous example was the Great War tandem of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Von Mellenthin’s service then included only rare command positions as most of the time he was either the staff intelligence or operations officer.
In the Preface and Conclusion, von Mellenthin states that he ‘endeavored to give an objective account…written from the German point of view” while also attempting “to avoid conclusions based on individual prejudice or patriotic sentiments.” Both chronologically by publication date and by tone and content, Panzer Battles is a part of the first wave of post-war German accounts of the war. At just under 400 pages, Panzer Battles covers the campaigns in Poland, France, and the Balkans in Part One; the “Western Desert” with Rommel in Part Two; Russia (Part Three); and the final months in the West in Part Four. The narrative text is supported by 61 line-drawn maps.
Through most of the book, Von Mellenthin’s perspective is that of the divisional/corps/army level staff, though he often digresses to discuss tactical issues relating to the use of tanks in particular but also to the use of combined arms formations. He also offers views on what this or that opposing Allied commander might have done differently and to his advantage. While his observations reflect a professional career soldier’s experience and training, he does often totally miss the political factors that were at work on Allied commanders and their strategy.
In 1955, before Panzer Battles was published, the Federal Republic of Germany officially joined NATO. Two weeks after that, the Warsaw Pact was founded and included the communist eastern half of Germany as the German Democratic Republic. This alteration in the status of postwar Germany (still divided then between East and West) probably contributed to von Mellenthin’s discussion of fighting the Soviets during World War Two. Von Mellenthin includes several themes in his account of the war –
• The dislike for the Nazis on the part of the professional officer corps
• Occupied populations generally tolerated or even welcomed German soldiers until they experienced the attentions of the Gestapo and the SS
• Command errors and battlefield defeats were due to Hitler ignoring the advice of the professionals (such as not invading Malta!)
• Russians are Slavic/Asiatic animals and there are lots and lots and lots of them
• Without Lend Lease, Germany could have defeated Russia
• The Allies were also guilty of war crimes against German civilians and members of the German armed forces
This book was generally well received when it appeared. The book jacket of my copy quotes S.L.A. Marshall calling it “Vast in scope, keen in its technical appraisal, respectful of history…Should make other military authors doff their hats and respectfully bow.” A rather effusive and even excessive judgment from our vantage point some 60 years later as we recognize the white wash of the German military it represents as demonstrated on research over following decades.
The tell-tale is often in what von Mellenthin omits from his narrative. He notes that in 1937 that he served on the staff of General von Witzleben who in his retirement was a central figure in the July 20 plot. Curiously, there is no discussion of whether or not von Mellenthin was ever approached to participate and von Mellenthin’s attitude towards the plot is at best unclear.
Von Mellenthin may have also contributed to the myth of Polish cavalry attacking German tanks with lances – although in his reference he says that it was with sabers. With regard to the Battle of Britain, he twice refers to Britain’s “superior radar equipment” though more recent accounts note that actually German radar equipment was technically superior while the RAF networked it more effectively.
This English translation was the work of experienced translator H. Betzer and edited by Leonard Charles Frederick Turner, a South African veteran of the war who had already helped write and edit several volumes of the Official South African history of the Second World War and lectured at South African military colleges. [It appears that he left South Africa for Australia shortly after editing von Mellenthin’s book, reportedly repelled by the “increasing racial divide of apartheid era South Africa”.] With an understanding of the book’s failings and its bent, it is still worth reading both for its military insights but also as a marker on our collective journey to understanding the Second World War in the fullest possible way.
July 16, 2019
This book is actually an autobiography, masquerading as an instruction manual for future armored-warfare commanders. Mellenthin started early, a junior officer in the 1930s German Reich, during the time that Hitler was rearming as fast as Krupp could make the steel. Like a lot of German soldiers, (those not killed in action,) he was promoted and re-promoted, serving in staff positions of ever-increasing importance in North Africa with Rommel, then the eastern front, the western front, and finally the cliché dismissal by Hitler, the fate suffered by most generals as the war was lost and Hitler focused on placing blame.
Professional soldiers are like soccer players. They want to play; they want to win. Mellenthin got to play, but his side lost. Agonizing about the loss created this book--ten reasons we should have won but bad coaching (Hitler) lost us the game. Sounds just like a disgruntled soccer player.
The book was written for a German audience in 1956. Germany is recovering from the devastating defeat; they are ready to hear about the war and how they really DESERVED to win, but lost for unfair reasons.
Professional soldiers don't care about morality. They want to be useful--a war fulfills their desire. It would be nice if their country had been attacked by Poland and they were valiantly and righteously defending it--second best that they (Hitler) started it. Once the war's started, the soldier's code requires him to fight without moral scruples. Mein Gott, if soldiers stopped to think about the morality, we couldn't have wars!
Mellenthin applauds the skill and training of the Wermacht as they use concentrated armor to punch holes through enemy defenses. He respects the enemy's armies too, except he's confident that the Wermacht is the best.
Mellenthin may or may not have been a Nazi, but he certainly drank the Kool-Aid. The book hints at a useful purpose: read this book to prepare for the next European war, the next one against the Soviet hoards who will attempt to conquer all of Europe. Up to this point, Europe had a major war every 20 or 30 years. He urges military strategists to prepare to meet the tank armies of the Soviets, the massed Soviet artillery, and the waves of Slavic Soviet Infantry. Atomic weapons will have an unknown influence, he says, but get ready to fight a variation of the last war.
That's what they always say.
Near the end of the book Mellenthin reveals how much Nazi indoctrination has corrupted him. He laments the atrocities committed by Soviet armies overrunning eastern Germany in 1945. Really? They were supposed to play fair, after millions of Soviet civilian deaths, millions of POWs murdered, and the organized mass-murder of Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, Communists, and everyone else who wasn't exactly their ideal?
Mellenthin reveals a bit of his racism, late in the book. Buried under false praise, he discusses, briefly, the 'nature' of the Slavic Soviet infantry. They are primitive, unafraid of death, simple, obedient until they're panicked, and otherwise obviously a bunch of trained monkeys. Mellenthin, it seems, feels cheated that the untermenschen beat his Wermacht, using superior numbers and a strong determination to prevail. What Mellenthin characterizes as a low-intelligence lack of fear I characterize as superior discipline coupled with a strong desire to defeat the invaders. That Mellenthin can't see that, a decade after the war, is perhaps the most interesting aspect of this book.
Professional soldiers are like soccer players. They want to play; they want to win. Mellenthin got to play, but his side lost. Agonizing about the loss created this book--ten reasons we should have won but bad coaching (Hitler) lost us the game. Sounds just like a disgruntled soccer player.
The book was written for a German audience in 1956. Germany is recovering from the devastating defeat; they are ready to hear about the war and how they really DESERVED to win, but lost for unfair reasons.
Professional soldiers don't care about morality. They want to be useful--a war fulfills their desire. It would be nice if their country had been attacked by Poland and they were valiantly and righteously defending it--second best that they (Hitler) started it. Once the war's started, the soldier's code requires him to fight without moral scruples. Mein Gott, if soldiers stopped to think about the morality, we couldn't have wars!
Mellenthin applauds the skill and training of the Wermacht as they use concentrated armor to punch holes through enemy defenses. He respects the enemy's armies too, except he's confident that the Wermacht is the best.
Mellenthin may or may not have been a Nazi, but he certainly drank the Kool-Aid. The book hints at a useful purpose: read this book to prepare for the next European war, the next one against the Soviet hoards who will attempt to conquer all of Europe. Up to this point, Europe had a major war every 20 or 30 years. He urges military strategists to prepare to meet the tank armies of the Soviets, the massed Soviet artillery, and the waves of Slavic Soviet Infantry. Atomic weapons will have an unknown influence, he says, but get ready to fight a variation of the last war.
That's what they always say.
Near the end of the book Mellenthin reveals how much Nazi indoctrination has corrupted him. He laments the atrocities committed by Soviet armies overrunning eastern Germany in 1945. Really? They were supposed to play fair, after millions of Soviet civilian deaths, millions of POWs murdered, and the organized mass-murder of Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, Communists, and everyone else who wasn't exactly their ideal?
Mellenthin reveals a bit of his racism, late in the book. Buried under false praise, he discusses, briefly, the 'nature' of the Slavic Soviet infantry. They are primitive, unafraid of death, simple, obedient until they're panicked, and otherwise obviously a bunch of trained monkeys. Mellenthin, it seems, feels cheated that the untermenschen beat his Wermacht, using superior numbers and a strong determination to prevail. What Mellenthin characterizes as a low-intelligence lack of fear I characterize as superior discipline coupled with a strong desire to defeat the invaders. That Mellenthin can't see that, a decade after the war, is perhaps the most interesting aspect of this book.
October 20, 2025
F.W. von Mellenthin's "Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War", translated by H. Betzler, edited by L.C.F. Turner, is a thoughtful analysis of how the mechanization of the military affected operational warfare in the Second World War. He was originally a calvary officer like General Patton. However he was not a frontline combat commander but was trained as a general staff officer and served as such during his experiences in theaters of combat of France, Africa, Russia and Germany.
The analysis of armor and mechanized infantry both offensively and defensively is in depth and cogent. This work is at the tactical level for combined arms combat. The best methods for tank, infantry, artillery and air power to wage warfare against various types of defenses. He shows why the underreported aspect of how logistics plays a crucial factor in the defeat of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's desert army by Lt. Gen. Bernard Montgomery. From the moribund and timid generalship of previous commanders of the British Army von Mellenthin argues for the one man principal of leadership that being dynamic and fearless, leading by example at the forefront of battle when the battle begins, and having the abilities to change battle orders as the situation changes, and being able to pick the best subordinates to lead troops and for general staff at command centers.
During his experiences on the Eastern front his analysis of the failures of Wehrmacht tactics due to strategic political concerns by the Fuhrer shows the tactical limitations imposed which result in Germany's losing the war. The set piece battle of Kursk is the prime example of how not to implement a war plan for armor against a entrenched and determined enemy which has built a defense in depth of not just several layers but up to ten layers. What he details is the Soviet armies under able leadership would use their defense in depth to grind down the Wehrmacht pincer attacks then unleash their tank armies against the flanks of the attacker. The flanks were held by Italian, Hungarian and Romanian divisions with less quality equipment and training.
Generalmajor von Mellenthin's analysis of the combat on and after the Normandy details the effective use of having air superiority over the field of battle by the U.S. Army Air Corp. His experience under several C-in-C, including Field Marshals including Gerd Von Rundstedt and Walter Model as the German armies were in serious decline after the disaster of Falaise Gap encirclement in France.
This is well translated work on tactical armored warfare as doctrines were created and proven in actual combat.
Well worth reading for those who want to know about WW2 history from the "other" side.
The analysis of armor and mechanized infantry both offensively and defensively is in depth and cogent. This work is at the tactical level for combined arms combat. The best methods for tank, infantry, artillery and air power to wage warfare against various types of defenses. He shows why the underreported aspect of how logistics plays a crucial factor in the defeat of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's desert army by Lt. Gen. Bernard Montgomery. From the moribund and timid generalship of previous commanders of the British Army von Mellenthin argues for the one man principal of leadership that being dynamic and fearless, leading by example at the forefront of battle when the battle begins, and having the abilities to change battle orders as the situation changes, and being able to pick the best subordinates to lead troops and for general staff at command centers.
During his experiences on the Eastern front his analysis of the failures of Wehrmacht tactics due to strategic political concerns by the Fuhrer shows the tactical limitations imposed which result in Germany's losing the war. The set piece battle of Kursk is the prime example of how not to implement a war plan for armor against a entrenched and determined enemy which has built a defense in depth of not just several layers but up to ten layers. What he details is the Soviet armies under able leadership would use their defense in depth to grind down the Wehrmacht pincer attacks then unleash their tank armies against the flanks of the attacker. The flanks were held by Italian, Hungarian and Romanian divisions with less quality equipment and training.
Generalmajor von Mellenthin's analysis of the combat on and after the Normandy details the effective use of having air superiority over the field of battle by the U.S. Army Air Corp. His experience under several C-in-C, including Field Marshals including Gerd Von Rundstedt and Walter Model as the German armies were in serious decline after the disaster of Falaise Gap encirclement in France.
This is well translated work on tactical armored warfare as doctrines were created and proven in actual combat.
Well worth reading for those who want to know about WW2 history from the "other" side.
July 16, 2020
З цієї книги я читав розділи 4-9 (частина 2 "В Західній пустелі"), які присвячені кампанії в Півн. Африці.
Стиль Меллентіна близький до Кессельрінгового (і кращий від Вестфалевого, як на мене). Тобто тут і детальна інформація про бої, і водночас деталі повсякдення.
Загалом, Меллентін дає доволі детальну історію боїв в Африці від лютого 1941 до серпня 1942 рр. Тобто від висадки в Півн. Африці німецького корпусу "Африка", до першої битви при Ель-Аламейні, а також Ал-Халфаї. Далі Меллентіна перевели на Східний фронт. Фактично, Меллентін описує переможні бої німців. А коли почався відступ - Меллентіна вже не було в Африці.
І це найдетальніша історія боїв, яку я бачив досі. Попри те, що це мемуари. Хоча, у випадку боїв на Ґазальській лінії і штурму Тобрука в 1942 р. Мітчем-молодший таки детальніший. Тому зауваження рос. перекладача Мітчема, що це п��реказаний Меллентін, повністю несправедливе.
Цікаво, що Меллентін захоплений Роммелем. І визнає за ним лише одну помилку: відмову від штурму Мальти після падіння Тобрука в 1942. Тобто в цьому Меллентін подібний до Нерінга (і відмінний від Кессельрінга та Вестфаля).
З цікавих деталей - хіба розповідь про італійську армію. Але вона повторює Кессельрінгову. Але якщо не читати інших книг, то ця - дуже детальна історія боїв в Півн. Африці від лютого 1941 до серпня 1942 рр.
П.С. хоча ні, в книзі є один факт, який в інших працях не згадувався: що британці недотримувалися Женев. конвенції щодо військовополонених. Здається, навіть були випадки вбивств німців, які вже здавалися в полон.
Стиль Меллентіна близький до Кессельрінгового (і кращий від Вестфалевого, як на мене). Тобто тут і детальна інформація про бої, і водночас деталі повсякдення.
Загалом, Меллентін дає доволі детальну історію боїв в Африці від лютого 1941 до серпня 1942 рр. Тобто від висадки в Півн. Африці німецького корпусу "Африка", до першої битви при Ель-Аламейні, а також Ал-Халфаї. Далі Меллентіна перевели на Східний фронт. Фактично, Меллентін описує переможні бої німців. А коли почався відступ - Меллентіна вже не було в Африці.
І це найдетальніша історія боїв, яку я бачив досі. Попри те, що це мемуари. Хоча, у випадку боїв на Ґазальській лінії і штурму Тобрука в 1942 р. Мітчем-молодший таки детальніший. Тому зауваження рос. перекладача Мітчема, що це п��реказаний Меллентін, повністю несправедливе.
Цікаво, що Меллентін захоплений Роммелем. І визнає за ним лише одну помилку: відмову від штурму Мальти після падіння Тобрука в 1942. Тобто в цьому Меллентін подібний до Нерінга (і відмінний від Кессельрінга та Вестфаля).
З цікавих деталей - хіба розповідь про італійську армію. Але вона повторює Кессельрінгову. Але якщо не читати інших книг, то ця - дуже детальна історія боїв в Півн. Африці від лютого 1941 до серпня 1942 рр.
П.С. хоча ні, в книзі є один факт, який в інших працях не згадувався: що британці недотримувалися Женев. конвенції щодо військовополонених. Здається, навіть були випадки вбивств німців, які вже здавалися в полон.
August 9, 2022
von Mellenthin was a key staff officer to several Wehrmacht commanders whose generalship kept the Nazi military machine going in spite of the overwhelming odds it faced...external and internal. von Mellenthin's account is largely dispassionate and he avoids treading into areas in which he didn't play a role. The question, addressed only in his memoir's concluding chapters, is why didn't the generals retake control of the military when the 'corporal' insisted on turning them into office boys. The willing subordination of powerful and extremely well connected generals to the raving, Austrian, military nincompoop isn't an issue von Mellethin addresses except in the final passages in which he explains that they were simply duped by the madman. Surely, the excuse that 'they really didn't know' is unfathomable. It's as if these military titans simply did as told without any say in the matter or any intellectual curiosity. It's as if they visited death and destruction upon millions simply because that's what good Prussian military officers do. Sorry, I simply don't buy it and, I suspect, neither did von Mellenthin.
May 8, 2017
von Mellenthin is at his best when describing in detail those actions in which he directly participated. In practice this amount to his chapters on the North African campaign and his time in Russia. This portion of the book is "bracketed" by coverage of campaigns that von Mellenthin reports on rather poorly. In the fashion of "this unit moved here and that unit moved there." This is a bit surprising as the final portions of the book do relate his personal experience against the Americans in Lorraine, but von Mellenthin seem reluctant to go into details about his actions against his eventual captures.
Of particular oddness is von Mellenthin's focus on the Soviet menace as he obviously feels an important aspect of his work is to prepare the Western democracies to face the Soviets in World War III.
All this having been said, when von Mellenthin's account shines, it shines brightly. I just wish he'd focused more tightly on the campaigns he was willing / able to discuss from personal experience.
Of particular oddness is von Mellenthin's focus on the Soviet menace as he obviously feels an important aspect of his work is to prepare the Western democracies to face the Soviets in World War III.
All this having been said, when von Mellenthin's account shines, it shines brightly. I just wish he'd focused more tightly on the campaigns he was willing / able to discuss from personal experience.
April 19, 2019
Very good book written by a German officer after the war, with tactical insights that he felt would be of assistance to the NATO forces in any conflict with the Soviet Union. These tactics were hard won from fighting on the Eastern front. But also as transposed to fighting the Western (USA, UK) forces, and how those Western forces tactics would,in his opinion, fare against those of the Comblock. It is very interesting to "look over the shoulder",as it were, of the German commanders in some of the pivotal battles of WW2. Definitely needs to be read and on the shelf of any aspiring military historians.
March 1, 2020
What I like about Raus is that he seems to be the unbiased Austrian Writer that I've read. He said that the Russians knew how to defend a blade of grass, he meant it. When he said that the Russians were experts at infiltration, he meant that too. He said if your going to fight a Tank Battle at night make sure that your side is attacking. He fought a tank battle at night and was a le to make all his tanks operational just because he owned the Battlefield and was a le to recover all the lost tanks.
April 28, 2023
Interesting in concept, however Von Melllenthin is often an unreliable narrator, pushing ideas or recalling things that modern research has shown to not have been true.
Though an unreliable source for academia, the book does show the thought process and mind of the Wehrmacht’s generals fairly well.
Though an unreliable source for academia, the book does show the thought process and mind of the Wehrmacht’s generals fairly well.
May 31, 2018
Offers an excellent insight into warfare on the eastern front. Good analysis of manoeuvre warfare, although the author is a little one sided in his views and glosses over mistakes made by German commanders.
June 26, 2018
Very good book on a tactical strategy point of view. Written by a German officer who participated in all the various campaigns throughout the book... very interesting from a german army point of view.
July 4, 2019
Very insightful information about tactical and stratigic decision making of German generals in WWII, but the white washing of Nazi brutality and the Holocaust are difficult to see past.
March 3, 2021
Interesting historical information concerning the Afrika Corps. Well written and easy to follow.
June 21, 2014
I picked up this book while doing research for the second book in my series The Kalisun Initiative. I was looking for a solid reference guide on the tactics and challenges of one might face in an armored conflict that covers vast distances. Most modern tank battles have been decidedly one-sided so I went looking farther back to World War II, with a particular interest for armored war in the vast spaces of north Africa and the Russian steppe.
This book did not disappoint, in fact it was all that I could hope for in a paperback. The book was broken into sections that track to specific battles and includes illustrations and extensive footnotes. The author was a member of the German General Staff and served in every major front and significant percentage of the major tank battles that happened in Europe/Russia. He had direct contact with some of the preeminent military minds of the German army at the time and went into considerable detail about what was done "right", what was done "wrong" and how the unexpected surprises in war can shift the progression of a battle.
I found the discussion on armored tactics to be skillfully woven into the overall conversation the author was having. It didn't feel like a lecture on tactic A vs Tactic B, but rather a historical narrative with detailed examples of why tactic A was appropriate for a given situation.
Overall I found the book quite useful and I took extensive notes while reading it. I can see why the U.S. War college utilized his knowledge to train our tank commanders during the cold war. His experience in Russia in particular was extensive.
Cons: It can get a bit dry at times and it's clearly written for a reader who has an understanding of the basic fundamentals of warfare. He doesn't spend excessive amounts of time dealing with common phrases or discussing basic things like the "how" the army became effective. Additionally, there is no e-book version of it and finding a copy of the paperback in good shape was not easy. To some readers his self-evident pride in the effectiveness of his comrades actions may be a bitter pill given that effectiveness frequently resulted in allied casualties of significant number.
If you are interested in history this is a good book for you, especially if you have read other books on the topics before (Infantry Attacks is an excellent resource as well.). If you are interested in learning more about the tactics and techniques that were employed with great success this is a great book.
This book did not disappoint, in fact it was all that I could hope for in a paperback. The book was broken into sections that track to specific battles and includes illustrations and extensive footnotes. The author was a member of the German General Staff and served in every major front and significant percentage of the major tank battles that happened in Europe/Russia. He had direct contact with some of the preeminent military minds of the German army at the time and went into considerable detail about what was done "right", what was done "wrong" and how the unexpected surprises in war can shift the progression of a battle.
I found the discussion on armored tactics to be skillfully woven into the overall conversation the author was having. It didn't feel like a lecture on tactic A vs Tactic B, but rather a historical narrative with detailed examples of why tactic A was appropriate for a given situation.
Overall I found the book quite useful and I took extensive notes while reading it. I can see why the U.S. War college utilized his knowledge to train our tank commanders during the cold war. His experience in Russia in particular was extensive.
Cons: It can get a bit dry at times and it's clearly written for a reader who has an understanding of the basic fundamentals of warfare. He doesn't spend excessive amounts of time dealing with common phrases or discussing basic things like the "how" the army became effective. Additionally, there is no e-book version of it and finding a copy of the paperback in good shape was not easy. To some readers his self-evident pride in the effectiveness of his comrades actions may be a bitter pill given that effectiveness frequently resulted in allied casualties of significant number.
If you are interested in history this is a good book for you, especially if you have read other books on the topics before (Infantry Attacks is an excellent resource as well.). If you are interested in learning more about the tactics and techniques that were employed with great success this is a great book.
May 18, 2015
A fantastic read. If ever you find yourself in a Panzer (or any tank) this is the book you need with you!
Joking aside its a fantastic 1st hand account of battle field tactics on all fronts during the 2nd world war excluding Italy. How each campaign was fought and the tactics used. Also how each campaign was lost due to the Allies eventually emulating and improving on the German model of tank warfare along with the eventual exhausting of supply lines and material towards the end of the war.
What sets this apart it is a soldiers view of the war . It is unapologetic and has not included any political background in line with the old German General Staff.
I found the last chapter very insightful into the mindset of the soldier during the war and the realization (during his internment) after the war as to the reality.
Joking aside its a fantastic 1st hand account of battle field tactics on all fronts during the 2nd world war excluding Italy. How each campaign was fought and the tactics used. Also how each campaign was lost due to the Allies eventually emulating and improving on the German model of tank warfare along with the eventual exhausting of supply lines and material towards the end of the war.
What sets this apart it is a soldiers view of the war . It is unapologetic and has not included any political background in line with the old German General Staff.
I found the last chapter very insightful into the mindset of the soldier during the war and the realization (during his internment) after the war as to the reality.
March 3, 2009
This was an excellent book on World War 2 strategy.
Von Mellenthin is an engaging writer who very clearly tells the story from someone who lived on the front lines and fully understood the operational end of the war. It also illustrates how, even in this war, the average soldier was far removed from the politics of the day and just doing his duty.
Was also very interesting to read about how Adolf Hitler, in the end, really defeated himself. Reminds me of another would-be dictator I know.
Let us never forget the past....
Von Mellenthin is an engaging writer who very clearly tells the story from someone who lived on the front lines and fully understood the operational end of the war. It also illustrates how, even in this war, the average soldier was far removed from the politics of the day and just doing his duty.
Was also very interesting to read about how Adolf Hitler, in the end, really defeated himself. Reminds me of another would-be dictator I know.
Let us never forget the past....
March 1, 2011
This is a much better operational and tactical analysis of the German way of war than Guderian's work, and Mellenthin is a good writer, which makes this book exciting, something unexpected in an operational study. He participated in most of the major campaigns of the war, and looks beyond the political influences to strengths and weaknesses in tactics and logistics. This was a fascinating look inside the decision making and execution process of the German army, and is a good foundation for further study.
November 10, 2007
Great tactical overview of the use of tanks and mobile infantry forces during WWII on the Eastern Front. Too many contemporary Western historians overlook the massive battles waged in the Russian Steppe, which provided the nucleus for subsequent US armour theory in the postwar world. Great technical read, if you're into this kind of thing.
September 22, 2011
Autobiography of WWII experience. He fought in France, Africa, Russia and the Western Front at the end. Excellent tactical observations. Very much in favor of old-style German officer corps, but has telling opinions on the tactics of all sides. Well worth reading for a wargamer interested in small unit engagements, as well as some overall strategy. Afrika Korps the best part.
March 7, 2013
Great to read a first person account of many of these battles and the military/political intrigue behind the scenes - but towards the end of the book, I felt his bias coming through from being so close to the events. Still, you don't often get a narrative from such a senior officer at the frontline.
February 19, 2016
I loved reading this book! It is hard to put down! One has to recall that it was written in the 50s, after Korea and way before the "Ultra" revelation, so it spends a lot of time discussing Soviet intentions in Europe. And the man clearly is trying to distance himself from atrocities. But to get a real sense of how Heer tactics in WWII- this is a must read!
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