What do you think?
Rate this book
Il Congresso di Vienna
Tra l’autunno 1814 e la primavera 1815, Vienna divenne il teatro dell’incontro tra i potenti dell’Europa, uniti nel tentativo di costruire una pace stabile dopo il trauma della Rivoluzione francese e delle guerre napoleoniche. Mai il gioco della diplomazia era stato esercitato su così larga scala, e nelle stanze del castello di Schönbrunn venne inaugurata una nuova era nella storia del continente. Harold Nicolson racconta il Congresso di Vienna con l’acume del diplomatico e l’eleganza dello scrittore, abile tanto nella ricostruzione dello scontro tra i diversi interessi nazionali quanto nella descrizione psicologica dei protagonisti. Un classico della letteratura storica che, estendendo il suo sguardo all’analisi delle conseguenze dell’evento, si rivela anche una critica e attualissima riflessione sulla difficile via della pace.
279 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1946
4 people are currently reading
239 people want to read
About the author
Harold Nicolson
190 books29 followersSir Harold George Nicolson KCVO CMG was an English diplomat, author, diarist and politician. He was the husband of writer Vita Sackville-West, their unusual relationship being described in their son's book, Portrait of a Marriage.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
September 9, 2014
Harold Nicolson's history of the attempt by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria to bring order and balance to Europe in 1814 after over twenty years of warfare inflicted on Europe by France under the Revolutionary governments and later Napoleon Bonaparte is essential for an understanding of the period. Nicolson, who published this book in 1946 at the age of 60, had been in the British Foreign service from 1911 to 1929 before resigning to take up a career as a writer and in Parliament; brings a diplomatists eye to the problems involved in maintaining an alliance of governments. His descriptions of the various participants is memorable. Tsar Alexander I of Russia, who insisted on handling the negotiations and refused to delegate authority, is described as an idealistic mystic with a touch of mental illness; Lord Castlereagh of Great Britain is cold, aloof, awkward of speech but very capable, Clement von Metternich of Austria, whom most historians credit for the peace which lasted from until 1848, is too clever for his own good and Talleyrand of France is not to be trusted. There is a definite pro-British bias in the book; on several occasions Nicolson says "we" when describing British efforts but I would still recommend this book to anyone interested in the Napoleonic Era and early 19th century European history.
April 22, 2018
Published in 1946 that is, at a time when Europe were just waking up from the military ambtions of dictators that had thrown her into total war, drawing parallels with the last days of the napoleonic saga would have been easy and very tempting. Well, hat off to the author because he doesn't! On the contrary, he insists history is a matter of circumstances and, as circumstances differ with various generations it doesn't repeat itself.
Such a view (again, remarkable considering the context) makes of this book more than an account of a diplomatic conference in european history. It's a window open on the circumstances that affected its decisions, from the personalities involved to the events (tragic or downright ridiculous) that changed its agendas more than once.
Being himself a diplomat, the portraits Harold Nicolson offers of Talleyrand, Lord Castlereagh, the Tsar Alexander Ist or, between the lines, Napoleon and Louis XVIII are a gem. Replacing it all in the context of a tumultuous period he, in the end, doesn't hide his admiration for such an endeavour. Indeed, it's easy to criticise the shortfalls and failures of such a conference (e.g. the rise of nationalisms, People's Springs...) but, let's not forget we'll have to wait 1914 for Europe to be plunged again into the chaos of a total war. Having laid the foundations for a century of peace is not that bad, is it?
A nice read.
Such a view (again, remarkable considering the context) makes of this book more than an account of a diplomatic conference in european history. It's a window open on the circumstances that affected its decisions, from the personalities involved to the events (tragic or downright ridiculous) that changed its agendas more than once.
Being himself a diplomat, the portraits Harold Nicolson offers of Talleyrand, Lord Castlereagh, the Tsar Alexander Ist or, between the lines, Napoleon and Louis XVIII are a gem. Replacing it all in the context of a tumultuous period he, in the end, doesn't hide his admiration for such an endeavour. Indeed, it's easy to criticise the shortfalls and failures of such a conference (e.g. the rise of nationalisms, People's Springs...) but, let's not forget we'll have to wait 1914 for Europe to be plunged again into the chaos of a total war. Having laid the foundations for a century of peace is not that bad, is it?
A nice read.
March 29, 2018
This is an extended review of this quality work of diplomatic history.
The capitulation of Paris to the allied armies of Great Britain, Prussia, and the Russian and Austrian empires on March 31, 1814, and the abdication of Napoleon eleven days later, ended more than two decades of general European war. Although not all these four European powers had engaged France continually since 1792, each had been major players in the drama. By April of 1814, they wanted an end to the carnage, destruction, and financial drain of war, as well as the creation of a system of relations within Europe that would prevent the rise of a second Napoleon. Following the victory of their combined arms, the Allies met in Vienna to seek answers to these questions of how to ensure peace and stability.
The Congress of Vienna, by Harold Nicolson, is the saga of the diplomatic maneuverings at Vienna that produced their final settlement, the Second Peace of Paris, in November 1815. The ultimate diplomatic solution was the Quadruple Alliance of November 20, 1815 in which the victorious Allies agreed to continue their coalition against France, meet yearly to discuss issues of ongoing importance, and aid each other in repressing classical liberal political movements across the continent. In the process, the Allies doused the last flickering embers of the bonfire of continental political liberalism ignited by the French Revolution over twenty years earlier. In its place, a heavy fog of conservatism and political repression came to rest over the continent. Although there were occasional breaks in this fog over the next generation, it was not until the revolutions of 1848 that it showed any signs of lifting over significant portions of Europe.
This begs the question of what happened at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-5 that allowed conservative politicians to clamp down on the opposition and maintain their grip on political power into the second half of the nineteenth century. It also requires an explanation of why they were successful in their efforts. Nicolson provides us with many of the answers in his book.
One of Nicolson’s goals is to identify and describe the important events surrounding the negotiations in Vienna. As a result, The Congress of Vienna reads, at times, like a chronicle. More often, however, Nicolson offers the reader the salient points of the larger story and his interpretation of how these events influenced the diplomacy of the four Allies and the diplomacy of France as well. The overriding theme that set the tone for the entire Congress was, understandably given the length of the Napoleonic Wars, that of war weariness. According to Nicolson, by 1814, “What the Allies desired above everything was security and repose.” (100)
Contrary to popular belief, the Russian Campaign of 1812 was not the end for Napoleon and his battle-hardened soldiers. Though casualties were severe, he managed to collect enough men and supplies back in France to continue fighting for another year and a half, winning several battles along the way. Nicolson describes the subsequent campaigns of Napoleon, and the response of his opponents, in brief but sufficient detail. One of the most important consequences of the continued fighting was that events on the battlefield led France’s opponents to sign the Treaty of Chaumont on March 9, 1814. This was the culmination of Viscount Castlereagh’s efforts to bring all of Napoleon’s enemies into an official alliance and prevent any of the four from signing a separate peace with the French Emperor. By April of 1814, Napoleon was beaten. On April 11, he abdicated the throne of France, although only temporarily as it turned out.
Believing that force had finally solved their greatest problem, allied diplomats sat down to forge an agreement that would eliminate the specters of revolution and general war through a stable system that would balance the major powers of Europe. Working within his main theme of the need to provide for peace and security, Nicolson explains the major issues decided at Vienna and the interests, often conflicting, of each major participant. For example, Lord Castlereagh, as the lead British negotiator, desired to see Prussia and Austria strengthened by territorial acquisitions in the German lands and Italy, respectively. This would serve as a counterbalance to Russia’s growing land strength, on the one hand, and renewed French aggression, on the other, and create a balance of power that would help insure stability for all. Britain’s primary compensation would be some, but not all, of the colonial possessions acquired during its ongoing battles with France.
Russia and Tsar Alexander I, on the other hand, desired the recreation of an independent Polish state. Due to Alexander’s personality, which Nicolson describes as colloquially schizophrenic, at times the purpose of a rejuvenated Polish state would be to push Russian influence to the banks of the Oder River; at others, the new Poland would enjoy its ancient liberties and full independence. All of this was anathema to Austria and its representative, Count Metternich, however, because of its linkage to the question of what to do with Saxony. A restored Poland would require the cession of some of the lands acquired by Austria and Prussia in the three Polish partitions of the previous century. If necessary, Austria could claim provinces in northern Italy and Illyria as compensation. Prussia, on the other hand, maintained that in this case, it had no other option but the complete annexation of Saxony. This Austria would not allow because it would augment Prussian power within the German lands at Austria’s expense.
The eventual solution to this quandary came from, of all people, the French minister to the conference, Talleyrand. The ultimate political survivor, Talleyrand maneuvered through the byzantine complexities of revolutionary politics in France and emerged at Vienna with the solution to the joint Polish-Saxon question. His greatest concern was that Prussia not gain a dominant position in Germany. He foresaw (correctly, as it turned out) that Prussia, if it gained the ascendance in Germany, would have the economic strength and manpower to threaten the security of all Europe. Therefore, he joined French interests in opposing this outcome with those of Britain and Austria in what Nicolson calls “one of the most useful achievements in all of diplomatic history.” (154) Their treaty of alliance, signed January 3, 1815, called the bluff of Prussia and Russia on the territorial question, and resulted in a nominally independent Polish state and Prussia’s acquisition of 40% of Saxony, while Austria gained the Tyrol, Salzburg, future Italian concessions, and Illyrian territory on the Adriatic coast.
Just as things seemed to be falling into place, however, Napoleon made his escape from Elba and disrupted the entire scene. Though defeated, for good this time, by Wellington (with assistance from Prussia late in the day) at Waterloo, what would become of France now? The Second Peace of Paris imposed modest indemnities and an army of occupation, as well as small territorial concessions. Great Britain, as the primary power responsible for Napoleon’s second defeat, could have dictated a peace that enhanced its continental power appreciably, yet chose not to. The reason, according to Nicolson, lay in Britain’s desire for a balance in continental Europe, certainly, but also in the personality of Castlereagh.
This attention to personality is one of the important pieces of The Congress of Vienna that helps to explain the outcome of the Congress. Personality is especially critical in diplomatic history, and doubly so when autocratic monarchs such as Alexander I are involved in the deliberations. Nicolson accents the contrast between the diplomatic opportunity to shape the peace presented to Alexander I in 1814, which he squandered, and what Castlereagh achieved given a chance the following year.
The denouement, for France, was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy under Louis XVIII.
Elsewhere, as part of the security framework established at Vienna and perpetuated at subsequent conferences from 1816-22, the European powers attempted to maintain order on the continent through intervention in any situation where revolutionary forces appeared to threaten the establishment. In this manner, the forces of reaction and conservatism maintained their superior position against the republican ideologies unleashed first in the United States overseas and in France on the continent. In a way, this set the stage for what would happen in the revolutionary year of 1848. By bowing the knee at the alter of political repression in the name of peace and order, men such as Metternich did little to alleviate the issues such as serfdom and economic inequality that were integral causes of the 1848 revolutions.
One strength of The Congress of Vienna lies in Nicolson’s ability to elucidate the motives of each major participant in the Congress. Granted, this is what diplomatic histories do, but he does so effectively. The major European land powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, desired territorial compensation for their exertions against Napoleon. Great Britain, however, chose modest colonial possessions as its reward for over two decades of resistance, allowing it to steer clear of acquisitions that seemed tempting but would only draw it into future conflicts with a potentially revenge-minded France. The author’s approval of this course shows especially in Nicolson’s praise of Castlereagh for seeking a moderate treaty with France, even in the Second Peace of Paris, that would give France no reason for any lingering animosity. Nicolson, writing in 1946, probably had in mind what the Treaty of Versailles did in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. Nicolson could see how Versailles contributed to the rise of Nazism in Europe; to him, any statesmanship that succeeded in avoiding this in the past appeared exceptionally far-sighted. While this conclusion may be a product of the value of its time, it’s not necessarily dated or irrelevant.
There is also the fact that, as a diplomat himself, Nicolson is well qualified to discuss matters of diplomacy through the lens of his extensive personal experience. As a member of the diplomatic community, he displays an exceptional understanding of the important role of individual personality. This shows in the high regard in which he holds Talleyrand’s performance at Vienna, compared to the thinly concealed contempt he heaps on Alexander I (and, by extension, Woodrow Wilson at Versailles for showing many similar traits). Not only does the reader encounter the author’s opinion of the various participants’ diplomatic abilities, Nicolson also provides the opinions of the diplomats at Vienna about each other in several cases, further illuminating the story behind their decisions.
There are, however, certain flaws in this work. Again reflecting the book’s year of publication, Nicolson has an unfortunate tendency to stereotype certain nationalities. For example, the British people “are not by nature punitive” (236) and “only become conscious of foreign policy when in immanent danger from external aggression.” (243) In addition, he occasionally refers to the British using words such as “we” and “our” that tend to compromise scholarly impartiality to a modest extent. Furthermore, considering the significant number of cities and German states that he mentions from time to time, Nicolson could have aided the reader by including the occasional map for clarification.
Despite these small flaws, The Congress of Vienna is extremely readable and clear. The nuance displayed is a welcome improvement on the shorter explanations offered up by general European histories. For example, some authors write that after Vienna, Austria turned its back on the West, but Austria’s membership in the Quadruple Alliance, its participation in the Allied occupation of France, and interventions on the Italian peninsula indicate otherwise. Likewise, others imply that it was only after the return of Napoleon that the negotiators in Vienna really determined on a reactionary course. Nicolson, on the other hand, demonstrates that this was the intention all along, given the personalities of men such as Metternich and Alexander. One text attributes Russia’s diplomatic performance at Vienna as indication of Alexander I’s restraint, while Nicolson demonstrates in chapter seven that in actuality, inept diplomacy on the tsar’s part produced the eventual outcomes.
Despite its age, this remains a quality book for those seeking greater understanding of the men and personalities present at the Congress of Vienna. Newer works perhaps offer additional insights not present here, but Nicolson’s book ranks among those that more modern historians build from, which is no small achievement for something now over 70 years old.
The capitulation of Paris to the allied armies of Great Britain, Prussia, and the Russian and Austrian empires on March 31, 1814, and the abdication of Napoleon eleven days later, ended more than two decades of general European war. Although not all these four European powers had engaged France continually since 1792, each had been major players in the drama. By April of 1814, they wanted an end to the carnage, destruction, and financial drain of war, as well as the creation of a system of relations within Europe that would prevent the rise of a second Napoleon. Following the victory of their combined arms, the Allies met in Vienna to seek answers to these questions of how to ensure peace and stability.
The Congress of Vienna, by Harold Nicolson, is the saga of the diplomatic maneuverings at Vienna that produced their final settlement, the Second Peace of Paris, in November 1815. The ultimate diplomatic solution was the Quadruple Alliance of November 20, 1815 in which the victorious Allies agreed to continue their coalition against France, meet yearly to discuss issues of ongoing importance, and aid each other in repressing classical liberal political movements across the continent. In the process, the Allies doused the last flickering embers of the bonfire of continental political liberalism ignited by the French Revolution over twenty years earlier. In its place, a heavy fog of conservatism and political repression came to rest over the continent. Although there were occasional breaks in this fog over the next generation, it was not until the revolutions of 1848 that it showed any signs of lifting over significant portions of Europe.
This begs the question of what happened at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-5 that allowed conservative politicians to clamp down on the opposition and maintain their grip on political power into the second half of the nineteenth century. It also requires an explanation of why they were successful in their efforts. Nicolson provides us with many of the answers in his book.
One of Nicolson’s goals is to identify and describe the important events surrounding the negotiations in Vienna. As a result, The Congress of Vienna reads, at times, like a chronicle. More often, however, Nicolson offers the reader the salient points of the larger story and his interpretation of how these events influenced the diplomacy of the four Allies and the diplomacy of France as well. The overriding theme that set the tone for the entire Congress was, understandably given the length of the Napoleonic Wars, that of war weariness. According to Nicolson, by 1814, “What the Allies desired above everything was security and repose.” (100)
Contrary to popular belief, the Russian Campaign of 1812 was not the end for Napoleon and his battle-hardened soldiers. Though casualties were severe, he managed to collect enough men and supplies back in France to continue fighting for another year and a half, winning several battles along the way. Nicolson describes the subsequent campaigns of Napoleon, and the response of his opponents, in brief but sufficient detail. One of the most important consequences of the continued fighting was that events on the battlefield led France’s opponents to sign the Treaty of Chaumont on March 9, 1814. This was the culmination of Viscount Castlereagh’s efforts to bring all of Napoleon’s enemies into an official alliance and prevent any of the four from signing a separate peace with the French Emperor. By April of 1814, Napoleon was beaten. On April 11, he abdicated the throne of France, although only temporarily as it turned out.
Believing that force had finally solved their greatest problem, allied diplomats sat down to forge an agreement that would eliminate the specters of revolution and general war through a stable system that would balance the major powers of Europe. Working within his main theme of the need to provide for peace and security, Nicolson explains the major issues decided at Vienna and the interests, often conflicting, of each major participant. For example, Lord Castlereagh, as the lead British negotiator, desired to see Prussia and Austria strengthened by territorial acquisitions in the German lands and Italy, respectively. This would serve as a counterbalance to Russia’s growing land strength, on the one hand, and renewed French aggression, on the other, and create a balance of power that would help insure stability for all. Britain’s primary compensation would be some, but not all, of the colonial possessions acquired during its ongoing battles with France.
Russia and Tsar Alexander I, on the other hand, desired the recreation of an independent Polish state. Due to Alexander’s personality, which Nicolson describes as colloquially schizophrenic, at times the purpose of a rejuvenated Polish state would be to push Russian influence to the banks of the Oder River; at others, the new Poland would enjoy its ancient liberties and full independence. All of this was anathema to Austria and its representative, Count Metternich, however, because of its linkage to the question of what to do with Saxony. A restored Poland would require the cession of some of the lands acquired by Austria and Prussia in the three Polish partitions of the previous century. If necessary, Austria could claim provinces in northern Italy and Illyria as compensation. Prussia, on the other hand, maintained that in this case, it had no other option but the complete annexation of Saxony. This Austria would not allow because it would augment Prussian power within the German lands at Austria’s expense.
The eventual solution to this quandary came from, of all people, the French minister to the conference, Talleyrand. The ultimate political survivor, Talleyrand maneuvered through the byzantine complexities of revolutionary politics in France and emerged at Vienna with the solution to the joint Polish-Saxon question. His greatest concern was that Prussia not gain a dominant position in Germany. He foresaw (correctly, as it turned out) that Prussia, if it gained the ascendance in Germany, would have the economic strength and manpower to threaten the security of all Europe. Therefore, he joined French interests in opposing this outcome with those of Britain and Austria in what Nicolson calls “one of the most useful achievements in all of diplomatic history.” (154) Their treaty of alliance, signed January 3, 1815, called the bluff of Prussia and Russia on the territorial question, and resulted in a nominally independent Polish state and Prussia’s acquisition of 40% of Saxony, while Austria gained the Tyrol, Salzburg, future Italian concessions, and Illyrian territory on the Adriatic coast.
Just as things seemed to be falling into place, however, Napoleon made his escape from Elba and disrupted the entire scene. Though defeated, for good this time, by Wellington (with assistance from Prussia late in the day) at Waterloo, what would become of France now? The Second Peace of Paris imposed modest indemnities and an army of occupation, as well as small territorial concessions. Great Britain, as the primary power responsible for Napoleon’s second defeat, could have dictated a peace that enhanced its continental power appreciably, yet chose not to. The reason, according to Nicolson, lay in Britain’s desire for a balance in continental Europe, certainly, but also in the personality of Castlereagh.
This attention to personality is one of the important pieces of The Congress of Vienna that helps to explain the outcome of the Congress. Personality is especially critical in diplomatic history, and doubly so when autocratic monarchs such as Alexander I are involved in the deliberations. Nicolson accents the contrast between the diplomatic opportunity to shape the peace presented to Alexander I in 1814, which he squandered, and what Castlereagh achieved given a chance the following year.
The denouement, for France, was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy under Louis XVIII.
Elsewhere, as part of the security framework established at Vienna and perpetuated at subsequent conferences from 1816-22, the European powers attempted to maintain order on the continent through intervention in any situation where revolutionary forces appeared to threaten the establishment. In this manner, the forces of reaction and conservatism maintained their superior position against the republican ideologies unleashed first in the United States overseas and in France on the continent. In a way, this set the stage for what would happen in the revolutionary year of 1848. By bowing the knee at the alter of political repression in the name of peace and order, men such as Metternich did little to alleviate the issues such as serfdom and economic inequality that were integral causes of the 1848 revolutions.
One strength of The Congress of Vienna lies in Nicolson’s ability to elucidate the motives of each major participant in the Congress. Granted, this is what diplomatic histories do, but he does so effectively. The major European land powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, desired territorial compensation for their exertions against Napoleon. Great Britain, however, chose modest colonial possessions as its reward for over two decades of resistance, allowing it to steer clear of acquisitions that seemed tempting but would only draw it into future conflicts with a potentially revenge-minded France. The author’s approval of this course shows especially in Nicolson’s praise of Castlereagh for seeking a moderate treaty with France, even in the Second Peace of Paris, that would give France no reason for any lingering animosity. Nicolson, writing in 1946, probably had in mind what the Treaty of Versailles did in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. Nicolson could see how Versailles contributed to the rise of Nazism in Europe; to him, any statesmanship that succeeded in avoiding this in the past appeared exceptionally far-sighted. While this conclusion may be a product of the value of its time, it’s not necessarily dated or irrelevant.
There is also the fact that, as a diplomat himself, Nicolson is well qualified to discuss matters of diplomacy through the lens of his extensive personal experience. As a member of the diplomatic community, he displays an exceptional understanding of the important role of individual personality. This shows in the high regard in which he holds Talleyrand’s performance at Vienna, compared to the thinly concealed contempt he heaps on Alexander I (and, by extension, Woodrow Wilson at Versailles for showing many similar traits). Not only does the reader encounter the author’s opinion of the various participants’ diplomatic abilities, Nicolson also provides the opinions of the diplomats at Vienna about each other in several cases, further illuminating the story behind their decisions.
There are, however, certain flaws in this work. Again reflecting the book’s year of publication, Nicolson has an unfortunate tendency to stereotype certain nationalities. For example, the British people “are not by nature punitive” (236) and “only become conscious of foreign policy when in immanent danger from external aggression.” (243) In addition, he occasionally refers to the British using words such as “we” and “our” that tend to compromise scholarly impartiality to a modest extent. Furthermore, considering the significant number of cities and German states that he mentions from time to time, Nicolson could have aided the reader by including the occasional map for clarification.
Despite these small flaws, The Congress of Vienna is extremely readable and clear. The nuance displayed is a welcome improvement on the shorter explanations offered up by general European histories. For example, some authors write that after Vienna, Austria turned its back on the West, but Austria’s membership in the Quadruple Alliance, its participation in the Allied occupation of France, and interventions on the Italian peninsula indicate otherwise. Likewise, others imply that it was only after the return of Napoleon that the negotiators in Vienna really determined on a reactionary course. Nicolson, on the other hand, demonstrates that this was the intention all along, given the personalities of men such as Metternich and Alexander. One text attributes Russia’s diplomatic performance at Vienna as indication of Alexander I’s restraint, while Nicolson demonstrates in chapter seven that in actuality, inept diplomacy on the tsar’s part produced the eventual outcomes.
Despite its age, this remains a quality book for those seeking greater understanding of the men and personalities present at the Congress of Vienna. Newer works perhaps offer additional insights not present here, but Nicolson’s book ranks among those that more modern historians build from, which is no small achievement for something now over 70 years old.
October 10, 2019
I first read this book in high school and it greatly influenced my desire to become an Historian. I read it again as a History Major at University.
Now, reading it one more time, I truly understand the intricacies and machinations of the ambassadors, royals, and politicians who attended the Congress of Vienna.
Those who want to understand today's diplomacy MUST read this book. Detailed, forthright, and humourous, Sir Harold Nicolson delves into every aspect of the Congress. I highly recommend it as a great addition to the Historian, Diplomat, Student, and Teacher.
Now, reading it one more time, I truly understand the intricacies and machinations of the ambassadors, royals, and politicians who attended the Congress of Vienna.
Those who want to understand today's diplomacy MUST read this book. Detailed, forthright, and humourous, Sir Harold Nicolson delves into every aspect of the Congress. I highly recommend it as a great addition to the Historian, Diplomat, Student, and Teacher.
March 15, 2019
3.5/5
British bias and outdated racism aside, it was very engaging and informative.
The different personalities, intrigues and interests, the secret deals-behind-deals.
British bias and outdated racism aside, it was very engaging and informative.
The different personalities, intrigues and interests, the secret deals-behind-deals.
October 26, 2017
I loved this book. I like dipping into the middle of things, and this book provided that opportunity. What really blew me away were some of the author's speculation on what 'could of' happened. For example, towards the end of chapter I ('The Retreat from Moscow') we are treated to a wonderful meditation how the world would be different if Napoleon had been taken prisoner on Russian soil.
I give you two quotations to whet your appetites:
Had Napoleon not escaped and fled back to Paris, 'The French army would have been forced to accept unconditional surrender on Russian soil ... Napoleon would have been brought back to Orcha or Smolensk where he would have handed his sword to Alexander. And what would have happened then? (p.8).
'The Tsar [Alexander I] of Russia would have had before him a completely blank map of Europe, had Beresina [Russia] marked the final downfall of Napoleon instead of Waterloo. (p. 9).
The authors style is clear, his readings of history intelligent and compelling.
I give you two quotations to whet your appetites:
Had Napoleon not escaped and fled back to Paris, 'The French army would have been forced to accept unconditional surrender on Russian soil ... Napoleon would have been brought back to Orcha or Smolensk where he would have handed his sword to Alexander. And what would have happened then? (p.8).
'The Tsar [Alexander I] of Russia would have had before him a completely blank map of Europe, had Beresina [Russia] marked the final downfall of Napoleon instead of Waterloo. (p. 9).
The authors style is clear, his readings of history intelligent and compelling.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 16, 2025
Mr. Nicholson, who participated in the drawing up of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, offers an idiosyncratic overview of the Congress of Vienna. He has his hero - Britain’s Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, his villain - Czar Alexander I of Russia (whom he compares to Woodrow Wilson, and a large cast. Talleyrand is presented as corrupt but very able. Metternich is sort of a twit. And the Germans in general are clods (wonder if having lived through WWI and Ii influenced Nicholson here). If you’re seeking a balanced account this isn’t it; if you want an informative and gossipy romp this is highly recommended!
January 28, 2024
Fabuloso libro que te ayuda a descubrir parte del camino de Europa en el siglo XIX. Además el autor establece un curioso paralelismo entre el final de la IIGM y las guerras napoleónicas. Si acierta en muchos de sus pronósticos y resultados. Un genio. Lo único malo del libro son las historias que cuenta sobre la vida privada de los protagonistas de esa época, a modo de prensa amarilla.
May 11, 2021
Rather outdated in style...using "we" for Britain and not mentioning the suspicion of homosexuality of Castlereagh etc. which newer historians would no doubt discuss. But interesting events anyway.
December 18, 2020
It’s always interesting to read a diplomatic history written by a diplomat.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews