I read this a good while ago, and I wonder if it’s a bit trite to put academic papers on Goodreads — though why books and not papers amounts to probably something superficial — but anyway, this popped up and frankly it’s one of the most compelling papers I’ve ever read, so to hell with it. It also pays to read people’s objections to this paper, and Bostrom’s replies: I think when all is said and done, on minimal or perhaps no patching, the argument for the trilemma stands.
Not to be confused, of course (though confusion abound) with the simulation hypothesis, which is just the affirmation of the third lemma, however one cashes that out. Nor to be confused with the (perhaps misleadingly named) simulation realism of Chalmers, which is an epistemologically-oriented (but not skeptical) take on the simulation hypothesis that consists in roughly, chaining “we cannot know we are not in a simulation” to the negation of “…and so, nothing is real.” On second thought, perhaps not misleadingly named?
The other thing I’ll say is that this paper, perhaps not by itself — simulation literature is very old — but certainly for me most cleanly makes the case for a naturalistic creator. Said a different way: the simulation argument posited here and its offshoots (like simulation realism) make the most convincing case against metaphysical atheism I’ve yet read (now of course it depends what one takes atheism to mean; here “belief in a creator” will do). And so I think Chalmers is right here: there is a brand of “simulation theology” that makes a plainly coherent pitch for a naturalistic creator who is mostly omnipotent and omniscient (jury’s out on benevolence), in the “next universe up,” as the phrasing goes; a creator who, well…created our universe. In fact, it’s been argued (by the philosopher Richard Brown) that all arguments for theism, save the ontological argument of Aquinas, are better arguments for simulation (theology), and that strikes me as roughly correct.