Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age
5/2025.
Who wants to play a game of Risk in the solar system? Here’s a rule book.
Written way back in 2002, Dolman here tries to do for space strategy what Alfred Thayer Mahan did for naval strategy: explain it as an area of practical activity, based on historical empirical evidence. A lot has happened in space since then, but the fundamental issues are the same: how can a power use space for defense and deny use of space to its adversary powers? The result here is mixed.
He sagely leaves open the possibility that military competition in space may give way to economic competition- the proliferation of commercial space in the 2020’s, many components of which are seen as “national champions” by their respective powers, seems to be just that. Therefore, powers should ensure their ability to get that economic value for themselves.
Dolman also concerns himself with how necessary military might will he, with a (now out of fashion) sense that liberal democracy was on the march and would soon be the sole form of government around the world. Time hasn’t shown that progress to be inevitable or rapid, and this military strength is still a need for powers.
In fact, Dolman’s dictum here “Who controls low-Earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind” is the start of all the national-champion nonsense that has seen one great power seek to deny another any access to LEO orbits and spectrum for commercial purposes, almost regardless of secondary effects and political cost. That is, it has become dogma and not strategy.
Gravity is, for him, the deterministic but invisible topographic factor here: well worn paths emerge where gravity is more manageable, like transfer orbits between space objects (he envisions manned stations to proliferate), parking in the GSO belt or using the moon (4.5% of fuel costs compared to Terran launch) as a base. Those who occupy gravitational high ground (for instance, high LEO planes) would have a firepower and maneuverability advantage in conflict with those at lower ground. Likewise, controlling the the lanes through the Van Allen belts could allow a power to decide who gets to go farther out of earth orbit for things like lunar colonization or space mining.
Chapter 5 gives a great overview of the origins of space law and the negotiation history of the Outer Space Treaty. Despite Dolman’s insistence (disproven by 20 years of private and public innovation) that competition is a better inducer for space activity, it seems that cooperative action is by far preferable, and space is an area of great power cooperation- with one exception. The US has consistently excluded China from space cooperation even while working with the USSR and Russia (coop-etition?). That could backfire in coming years, as China sees less need for US cooperation and does more on its own: with the goal of resource exploitation for China, at the expense of the US.
Overall, the book shows its age, especially as an example of post-Cold War gloating about the superiority of capitalism. It’s not clear Dolman saw the rise of China, even though it was evident by 2001, when this was being written. Dolman salivates over putting people into space with an accelerated manned space flight program, but aside from “firing the imagination”, it’s unclear what an expensive program would aim to do. He has a patriotic belief in american goodness that verges on blindness. Somehow America is meant to apply Third Reich “Geopolitik” but take away all the nasty bits like genocide because we are well meaning people? That’s a dubious proposition on a good day. Even so, he cautions it means less social spending to support the space industry, so it shouldn’t be taken lightly.