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422 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
When I give food to the poor, they call me a saint.--Despite being my top priority book for the past 6 years, I’m embarrassed to only finish it now. My only excuse is it’s an academic book and I get distracted.
When I ask why the poor have no food, they call me a communist.
-Hélder Câmara
Over and over we hear the same familiar story: peasants down on their luck, whether due to natural disaster or the need to pay for a parent’s funeral—would fall into the hands of predatory lenders, who would seize their fields and houses, forcing them to work or pay rent in what had once been their own lands; the threat of rebellion would then drive the government to institute a dramatic program of reforms.…I’m also reminded of Michael Hudson’s framing of civilizations (The Collapse of Antiquity: Greece and Rome as Civilization’s Oligarchic Turning Point), where political “tyrants” (visible; long-term administration with incentive for social cohesion’s stability) have been a means of countering economic oligarchs (better hidden in abstraction, engaging in short-term predatory behaviors, esp. usurers i.e. money lenders) who reduce the masses to debt bondage. Once more, Graeber writes:
[…] China was for most of its history the ultimate anti-capitalist market state. Unlike later European princes, Chinese rulers systematically refused to team up with would-be Chinese capitalists (who always existed). Instead, like their officials, they saw them as destructive parasites--though, unlike the usurers, ones whose fundamental selfish and antisocial motivations could still be put to use in certain ways. In Confucian terms, merchants were like soldiers. Those drawn to a career in the military were assumed to be driven largely by a love of violence. As individuals, they were not good people, but they were also necessary to defend the frontiers. Similarly, merchants were driven by greed and basically immoral; yet if kept under careful administrative supervision, they could be made to serve the public good. Whatever one might think of the principles, the results are hard to deny. For most of its history, China maintained the highest standard of living in the world--even England only really overtook it in perhaps the 1820s, well past the time of the Industrial Revolution.--Eurocentric history assume China was caught in a “high-level equilibrium trap”, i.e. huge economy but minimal growth. Bagchi reveals dynamism from late-Ming (1368-1644) to Qing (1644 up to 1860 Second Opium War). Once again, the tyrant vs. oligarchy dynamic was at play; Qing rulers countered the nobility by promoting small-holding peasant proprietorship. This, combined with regulated markets (prevent debt bondage/speculators), led to high agricultural productivity, building the surplus to allow economic diversity.