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The Battle For The Rhine 1944
The post-Normandy battles as the Allies struggled to advance from the Seine to the Rhine were never less than complex and controversial. In his account of the 1944 post-Normandy campaign, Robin Neillands tells us what really happened in the long-drawn-out and costly struggle for the Rhine.
335 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
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About the author
Robin Neillands
44 books18 followersRobin Hunter Neillands was a British writer known for his works on travel and military history. A former Royal Marine who served in Cyprus and the Middle East, he later became a prolific author, publishing under multiple pen names. His military histories, often featuring firsthand accounts from veterans, challenged revisionist narratives, particularly regarding Bernard Montgomery, the Dieppe Raid, and the Allied bombing campaign in World War II. Neillands also authored numerous travel books inspired by his extensive journeys across Europe. His works, both popular and scholarly, earned him a nomination for the Royal United Services Institute’s Military Literature Award.
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May 24, 2016
This book points out some of the best and worst things that can come about from studying history. The author seems to have come into this project with a goal and thus is at times more focused on this agenda than on presenting the facts. His Agenda is a simple one and one that doesn't lack in merit. He wants to redeem Field Marshall Montgomery and show that he was the only viable and the correct choice to be the Ground Force Commander in the ETO. He seems to have a number of basic arguments why this should be the case. And two against it. They are basically as follows.
1.The Positions of Supreme Commander and Ground Forces Commander was too much for one person.
2.Montgomery was the only one with the Experience to take the role of Ground Force Commander.
3.Montgomery was the only officer that was admired and respected enough by his subordinates to take the position.
4.Montgomery was the only officer possible to give 'grip' to the Supreme Commanders strategic vision.
5.Montgomery was the only officer that always had complete control over the Battlefield and a firm fixation on the strategic goal of the allied forces foremost in mind.
The Two reasons against:
1: General George C. Marshall wouldn't allow a British Officer to take Command of US Forces.
2: Montgomery often would damage his own case.
The author general takes a number of things into account to make his point, but in some cases he focuses on something that supports his argument but ignores things that would offset those points. He pays particular attention to Patton in his pointing out all that is wrong with the policies of SHAEF and the Allied efforts in Europe. Interestingly enough, that does seem to be the general thrust of anyone trying to put a new fresh face on Montgomery and give his reputation some recovery. For myself I find it somewhat underwhelming if your argument to prove how good someone is, rests primarily on trashing another's reputation to get the results you are looking for.
Taking the points above it is something to consider if the argument is proven or if the blow strikes the air.
1.The positions of Supreme Commander and Ground Forces Commander were to much for one person to do well.
This point is probably one of the ones that he does best at showing the reality of. He gives Eisenhower full credit for his ability and performance as the Supreme Commander position, but says that as The Ground Force Commander he was less than adequate. His position on this is that with all the involvement on the level of the Supreme Commander, Ike didn't have the time to take on the day to day requirements of the Ground Force Commander as well. In the section where he goes deeply into this he points out with Montgomery being a non-starter as the Ground Force Commander (the reasons will be addressed later). Then it might have been given to an American, which he sees as the only possibility for various reasons. It should have been handled by 'Beetle' Smith. For myself I found the idea of Beetle as Ground Force Commander both intriguing and a little scary. SHAEFs Chief of Staff wasn't really known for having a very good handle on his temper and wasn't really a healthy individual either. He was in short sort of Ike's attack dog.
His belief, or at least as it comes up in the book, is that Montgomery wasn't able to be the Ground Force Commander due to the fact that George C. Marshall wouldn't allow a British to command over US forces in the ETO. More on that later. So that left Beetle as the only option. Well Ike did make a suggestion for Ground Force Commander at one point and it was kicked to the side. Interestingly enough the choice was a British Officer. General Alexander who ended up running the show in Italy. He was rejected not so much by Marshall, but the British Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps because they wanted a Ground Force Commander who had the ability to 'grip' not only the US Commanders but Montgomery as well and Alexander had already proven a failure in that department.
2.Montgomery was the only one with the experience to take the role of Ground Force Commander.
This is one of the things that perhaps makes the most and the least amount of sense. The experience of the British over the Americans in regards to actual combat was something that the British brought up often enough, much to the annoyance of US Officers turning many into less than appreciative observers. No one who believes that have worked their way up to the top of their field likes to have their noses rubbed in something, especially when it may be true. Generally speaking after a time the US reaction to British claims of experience was to accept that the British did in fact have much more experience in loosing to the Germans and not to see this as an especially useful things to learn.
The author makes much of the US Officer Corps tendency to Anglophobia. Even going so far as to say that this was something that was very common among the American Officers that made up SHAEF. He states that it arises much in the Memories of officers, but doesn't go into specifics on this. And it is true that there was some of that, although much of what is construed as Anti-British feeling is centered more on Montgomery at least for officers in the ETO. As for SHAEF it was largely a British Organization, so that is something else entirely. There is always going to be misunderstanding and finger pointing when it comes to trying to work within a single framework with two culturally different peoples. This being so the author shows a great deal of bias in this regard stating that there is no such return of dislike amongst the British Officers for their American Counterparts. When I read that I wondered if the author had somehow overlooked Alanbrooke's diary or Alexanders comments on Americans. But no, the very first book in the Bibliography is Alanbrooke. So the only conclusion would seem to be that it didn't fit the ideal so it was left out.
Now while Montgomery did have experience, the American officers in the ETO also had experience with him. What they had seen had left them somewhat underwhelmed. They largely considered Monty to be Overbearing without being able to deliver the results that he promised. But for Montgomery, he thought and treated everyone that he lacked respect for that way. Which in his case was most everyone. Nationality really didn't have much to do with it.
3.Montgomery was the only Officer that was Admired and Respected by those that served under him.
Okay, I am not sure why he made such an effort to bring this up. After all in his conclusion he states clearly that command is not a popularity contest. Interestingly enough he once again use Patton as the example of what Montgomery isn't. He uses three examples of how Patton's 'subordinates' didn't see him with universal admiration and respect. I think that if you want you can find examples of that in the case of any Commander you choose to. There are certain to be those that served under them that didn't find their command style to their liking. If I was to look for one in Montgomery's case I would choose the foreign units that served under him, or the Airborne units from Market Garden. For Patton I think I would thumb through units that had served under him during the Metz campaign.
The Author shows nothing in regards to Monty in either the positive or the negative to support his assertion. In the case of Patton, I felt that he missed the mark with those that he choose to show this lack of regard. His first choice was Bill Maudlin. Well true Maudlin the creator of Willie and Joe had no great love or respect for Patton, he never actually served under him either. The next two really serve him no better in that effort either. The first was an officer from 4th US Infantry, which served under Patton briefly during the time of the Bulge Battles, so they didn't really have much time spent with him, certainly not enough to be considered true subordinates. The last was an officer from 3rd US Armored Division, who points out that they never served under Patton, but Hodges. This being the case having three pieces of evidence that are not from subordinates of Patton's seem to negate the point. But then it would seem that maybe his conclusion was correct, it didn't matter.
4.Montgomery was the only officer possible to give 'grip' to the Supreme Commanders strategic vision.
Now this one is actually almost funny. The author assumes that if Monty was given command of the Ground Forces, he would follow the Supreme Commanders Strategic vision. That Montgomery would do so without complaint or alteration, because Monty (and the author just has to include) unlike Patton always followed orders. Well it is clear reading the book that the author has read D'Este's biography of Patton, but he choose to ignore the fact that D'Este points out that while Patton would bend directives to suit his will, he never disobeyed a direct order. Something that no less a personage than Montgomery told him he should do in regards to Alexander.
Monty's ability to follow orders also comes to question. The author is certain that he would obey a directe order, but the past had shown that wasn't he case. Ignoring the order from Churchill to attack at El Aliemien aside, he ignored an order in Sicily and took over a road that was being used by Bradley with out so much as a by your leave and then got Alexander to retroactively make it so. Something that went no little way to damaging Monty's relationship with Bradley. A US General who was not known for ever letting go of a grudge. Monty also refused to be rushed in spite of getting a direct order to do so moving up the toe of Italy to relieve the pressure on Salerno. Both of these orders were given him by Alexander, an officer he had a minimal of respect for. It is hard to imagine him doing any better serving under Ike as Ground Force Commander, when he had no respect for Ike's ability as a Military Leader at all.
5.Montgomery was the only officer that always had complete control over the Battlefield and a firm fixation on the strategic goal of the allied forces foremost in mind.
Well this is a plus and a minus in the column for Montgomery getting the nod for Ground Force Commander. Montgomery was an Officer that always had a grip on 'his' Battlefield. In short this meant that he wasn't going to be forced into doing something ad hoc, wouldn't be drawn into attacking until he was ready and that would mean that his lines were 'tidy' and his supply was fully brought up. The author doesn't talk about the past events that others had to judge Montgomery's ability to conduct full scale operations, so he seems surprised that they would break up the winning team of 2nd British and 1st US Army in the pursuit of a beaten enemy. If he had paid attention to Montgomery's earlier actions when he had opponents that he could have chased down and inflicted large losses on it would have been fairly clear why no one expected him to make much of a showing when the opportunity came after the Normandy breakout.
Montgomery had been given a similar opportunity after the battle of El Alamein which had been the keystone for creating his career. After the battle, Montgomery followed Rommel across North Africa at a leisurely pace that allowed him to keep his battlefield tidy and his supplies close. It also allowed Rommel to pull his battered Afrika Korps all the way across Africa to Tunisia with no additional appreciable loss. If his pursuit of the defeated Afrika Korps, his follow up in the toe of the boot of Italy was absolutely glacial.
Quick open field running wasn't Montgomery's style. It was to messy allowed for the possibility of to many things outside of his control. In comparison it would be easy to say that Patton would have followed up those attacks with much more vim and vigor. Patton and Monty were polar opposites in the style that they used to conduct their battles. Both did so for simple reasons, and both were interested in keeping casualties low in their own forces while inflicting them upon the enemy. They had very different ways of doing this. Monty preferred a sledge hammer and Patton the foil. Neither was the right way to win the war. Both styles have their merits and both styles have their downsides. Monty's style had the plus of being able to take into account possible counters on the part of the enemy, it also brought the full weight of the combined arms team to bear on the point of impact. On the down side, taking the time to prepare everything also gave the enemy time to prepare, thus generating more casualties from time to time, than might have been wholly necessary. Patton on the other had was caught up in the need to make use of the unforgiving minute. As with most officers brought up in the Cavalry tradition, he would rather have a average plan now, than the perfect plan later. He believed by keeping the enemy off balance moving quickly you would win your battles at the cost of fewer lives. The down side is that almost every battle that Patton fought would have started out as a meeting engagement these small scale battles would escalate or dissipate depending on the size of the enemy force met. If your small forces run into a well prepared position, losses can be great.
The author praises Montgomery's style and denigrates Patton's, generally by stating that Patton had no concern for his troops. Again the author doesn't really point to any specifics in the case of Montgomery, but instead attacks others by way of comparison.
Now for a brief look at the two reasons the author brings up as being against Montgomery being named Ground Forces Commander.
1.General George C Marshall didn't want US forces under British Command.
It makes for interesting copy, but one doesn't need to look all the way to Washington for that. Ike didn't won't Monty in the drivers seat either. And if Marshall really didn't want US forces under British Command, they wouldn't have allowed Monty to borrow Divisions, Corps, and even an entire Army to aid him in attaining his objectives.
2.Montgomery would often damage his own case.
Well that one doesn't even really need to be brought up.
In short the author attacks American Officers to prove his point. While sometimes this brings up interesting possibilities, like his judgment that Gavin was largely at fault for the Market-Garden failure, at other times it just seems like he is taking blind pot shots for no other reason that to build up Montgomery. His attacks are so consistent and come up so often that by the time he brings up his summation, it is pretty hard to believe he means it when he writes that Ike chose the right command structure. He accuses (mostly) American historians with cherry picking their facts, while largely doing this himself throughout the book. All in all, a few interesting points, pretty much trampled to death in his rush to condemn the American Command structure to show Montgomery in a favorable light.
1.The Positions of Supreme Commander and Ground Forces Commander was too much for one person.
2.Montgomery was the only one with the Experience to take the role of Ground Force Commander.
3.Montgomery was the only officer that was admired and respected enough by his subordinates to take the position.
4.Montgomery was the only officer possible to give 'grip' to the Supreme Commanders strategic vision.
5.Montgomery was the only officer that always had complete control over the Battlefield and a firm fixation on the strategic goal of the allied forces foremost in mind.
The Two reasons against:
1: General George C. Marshall wouldn't allow a British Officer to take Command of US Forces.
2: Montgomery often would damage his own case.
The author general takes a number of things into account to make his point, but in some cases he focuses on something that supports his argument but ignores things that would offset those points. He pays particular attention to Patton in his pointing out all that is wrong with the policies of SHAEF and the Allied efforts in Europe. Interestingly enough, that does seem to be the general thrust of anyone trying to put a new fresh face on Montgomery and give his reputation some recovery. For myself I find it somewhat underwhelming if your argument to prove how good someone is, rests primarily on trashing another's reputation to get the results you are looking for.
Taking the points above it is something to consider if the argument is proven or if the blow strikes the air.
1.The positions of Supreme Commander and Ground Forces Commander were to much for one person to do well.
This point is probably one of the ones that he does best at showing the reality of. He gives Eisenhower full credit for his ability and performance as the Supreme Commander position, but says that as The Ground Force Commander he was less than adequate. His position on this is that with all the involvement on the level of the Supreme Commander, Ike didn't have the time to take on the day to day requirements of the Ground Force Commander as well. In the section where he goes deeply into this he points out with Montgomery being a non-starter as the Ground Force Commander (the reasons will be addressed later). Then it might have been given to an American, which he sees as the only possibility for various reasons. It should have been handled by 'Beetle' Smith. For myself I found the idea of Beetle as Ground Force Commander both intriguing and a little scary. SHAEFs Chief of Staff wasn't really known for having a very good handle on his temper and wasn't really a healthy individual either. He was in short sort of Ike's attack dog.
His belief, or at least as it comes up in the book, is that Montgomery wasn't able to be the Ground Force Commander due to the fact that George C. Marshall wouldn't allow a British to command over US forces in the ETO. More on that later. So that left Beetle as the only option. Well Ike did make a suggestion for Ground Force Commander at one point and it was kicked to the side. Interestingly enough the choice was a British Officer. General Alexander who ended up running the show in Italy. He was rejected not so much by Marshall, but the British Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps because they wanted a Ground Force Commander who had the ability to 'grip' not only the US Commanders but Montgomery as well and Alexander had already proven a failure in that department.
2.Montgomery was the only one with the experience to take the role of Ground Force Commander.
This is one of the things that perhaps makes the most and the least amount of sense. The experience of the British over the Americans in regards to actual combat was something that the British brought up often enough, much to the annoyance of US Officers turning many into less than appreciative observers. No one who believes that have worked their way up to the top of their field likes to have their noses rubbed in something, especially when it may be true. Generally speaking after a time the US reaction to British claims of experience was to accept that the British did in fact have much more experience in loosing to the Germans and not to see this as an especially useful things to learn.
The author makes much of the US Officer Corps tendency to Anglophobia. Even going so far as to say that this was something that was very common among the American Officers that made up SHAEF. He states that it arises much in the Memories of officers, but doesn't go into specifics on this. And it is true that there was some of that, although much of what is construed as Anti-British feeling is centered more on Montgomery at least for officers in the ETO. As for SHAEF it was largely a British Organization, so that is something else entirely. There is always going to be misunderstanding and finger pointing when it comes to trying to work within a single framework with two culturally different peoples. This being so the author shows a great deal of bias in this regard stating that there is no such return of dislike amongst the British Officers for their American Counterparts. When I read that I wondered if the author had somehow overlooked Alanbrooke's diary or Alexanders comments on Americans. But no, the very first book in the Bibliography is Alanbrooke. So the only conclusion would seem to be that it didn't fit the ideal so it was left out.
Now while Montgomery did have experience, the American officers in the ETO also had experience with him. What they had seen had left them somewhat underwhelmed. They largely considered Monty to be Overbearing without being able to deliver the results that he promised. But for Montgomery, he thought and treated everyone that he lacked respect for that way. Which in his case was most everyone. Nationality really didn't have much to do with it.
3.Montgomery was the only Officer that was Admired and Respected by those that served under him.
Okay, I am not sure why he made such an effort to bring this up. After all in his conclusion he states clearly that command is not a popularity contest. Interestingly enough he once again use Patton as the example of what Montgomery isn't. He uses three examples of how Patton's 'subordinates' didn't see him with universal admiration and respect. I think that if you want you can find examples of that in the case of any Commander you choose to. There are certain to be those that served under them that didn't find their command style to their liking. If I was to look for one in Montgomery's case I would choose the foreign units that served under him, or the Airborne units from Market Garden. For Patton I think I would thumb through units that had served under him during the Metz campaign.
The Author shows nothing in regards to Monty in either the positive or the negative to support his assertion. In the case of Patton, I felt that he missed the mark with those that he choose to show this lack of regard. His first choice was Bill Maudlin. Well true Maudlin the creator of Willie and Joe had no great love or respect for Patton, he never actually served under him either. The next two really serve him no better in that effort either. The first was an officer from 4th US Infantry, which served under Patton briefly during the time of the Bulge Battles, so they didn't really have much time spent with him, certainly not enough to be considered true subordinates. The last was an officer from 3rd US Armored Division, who points out that they never served under Patton, but Hodges. This being the case having three pieces of evidence that are not from subordinates of Patton's seem to negate the point. But then it would seem that maybe his conclusion was correct, it didn't matter.
4.Montgomery was the only officer possible to give 'grip' to the Supreme Commanders strategic vision.
Now this one is actually almost funny. The author assumes that if Monty was given command of the Ground Forces, he would follow the Supreme Commanders Strategic vision. That Montgomery would do so without complaint or alteration, because Monty (and the author just has to include) unlike Patton always followed orders. Well it is clear reading the book that the author has read D'Este's biography of Patton, but he choose to ignore the fact that D'Este points out that while Patton would bend directives to suit his will, he never disobeyed a direct order. Something that no less a personage than Montgomery told him he should do in regards to Alexander.
Monty's ability to follow orders also comes to question. The author is certain that he would obey a directe order, but the past had shown that wasn't he case. Ignoring the order from Churchill to attack at El Aliemien aside, he ignored an order in Sicily and took over a road that was being used by Bradley with out so much as a by your leave and then got Alexander to retroactively make it so. Something that went no little way to damaging Monty's relationship with Bradley. A US General who was not known for ever letting go of a grudge. Monty also refused to be rushed in spite of getting a direct order to do so moving up the toe of Italy to relieve the pressure on Salerno. Both of these orders were given him by Alexander, an officer he had a minimal of respect for. It is hard to imagine him doing any better serving under Ike as Ground Force Commander, when he had no respect for Ike's ability as a Military Leader at all.
5.Montgomery was the only officer that always had complete control over the Battlefield and a firm fixation on the strategic goal of the allied forces foremost in mind.
Well this is a plus and a minus in the column for Montgomery getting the nod for Ground Force Commander. Montgomery was an Officer that always had a grip on 'his' Battlefield. In short this meant that he wasn't going to be forced into doing something ad hoc, wouldn't be drawn into attacking until he was ready and that would mean that his lines were 'tidy' and his supply was fully brought up. The author doesn't talk about the past events that others had to judge Montgomery's ability to conduct full scale operations, so he seems surprised that they would break up the winning team of 2nd British and 1st US Army in the pursuit of a beaten enemy. If he had paid attention to Montgomery's earlier actions when he had opponents that he could have chased down and inflicted large losses on it would have been fairly clear why no one expected him to make much of a showing when the opportunity came after the Normandy breakout.
Montgomery had been given a similar opportunity after the battle of El Alamein which had been the keystone for creating his career. After the battle, Montgomery followed Rommel across North Africa at a leisurely pace that allowed him to keep his battlefield tidy and his supplies close. It also allowed Rommel to pull his battered Afrika Korps all the way across Africa to Tunisia with no additional appreciable loss. If his pursuit of the defeated Afrika Korps, his follow up in the toe of the boot of Italy was absolutely glacial.
Quick open field running wasn't Montgomery's style. It was to messy allowed for the possibility of to many things outside of his control. In comparison it would be easy to say that Patton would have followed up those attacks with much more vim and vigor. Patton and Monty were polar opposites in the style that they used to conduct their battles. Both did so for simple reasons, and both were interested in keeping casualties low in their own forces while inflicting them upon the enemy. They had very different ways of doing this. Monty preferred a sledge hammer and Patton the foil. Neither was the right way to win the war. Both styles have their merits and both styles have their downsides. Monty's style had the plus of being able to take into account possible counters on the part of the enemy, it also brought the full weight of the combined arms team to bear on the point of impact. On the down side, taking the time to prepare everything also gave the enemy time to prepare, thus generating more casualties from time to time, than might have been wholly necessary. Patton on the other had was caught up in the need to make use of the unforgiving minute. As with most officers brought up in the Cavalry tradition, he would rather have a average plan now, than the perfect plan later. He believed by keeping the enemy off balance moving quickly you would win your battles at the cost of fewer lives. The down side is that almost every battle that Patton fought would have started out as a meeting engagement these small scale battles would escalate or dissipate depending on the size of the enemy force met. If your small forces run into a well prepared position, losses can be great.
The author praises Montgomery's style and denigrates Patton's, generally by stating that Patton had no concern for his troops. Again the author doesn't really point to any specifics in the case of Montgomery, but instead attacks others by way of comparison.
Now for a brief look at the two reasons the author brings up as being against Montgomery being named Ground Forces Commander.
1.General George C Marshall didn't want US forces under British Command.
It makes for interesting copy, but one doesn't need to look all the way to Washington for that. Ike didn't won't Monty in the drivers seat either. And if Marshall really didn't want US forces under British Command, they wouldn't have allowed Monty to borrow Divisions, Corps, and even an entire Army to aid him in attaining his objectives.
2.Montgomery would often damage his own case.
Well that one doesn't even really need to be brought up.
In short the author attacks American Officers to prove his point. While sometimes this brings up interesting possibilities, like his judgment that Gavin was largely at fault for the Market-Garden failure, at other times it just seems like he is taking blind pot shots for no other reason that to build up Montgomery. His attacks are so consistent and come up so often that by the time he brings up his summation, it is pretty hard to believe he means it when he writes that Ike chose the right command structure. He accuses (mostly) American historians with cherry picking their facts, while largely doing this himself throughout the book. All in all, a few interesting points, pretty much trampled to death in his rush to condemn the American Command structure to show Montgomery in a favorable light.
December 27, 2019
Battle for the Rhine?
Battle between the Generals.
Now without that nasty David Irving flavour.
Battle between the Generals.
Now without that nasty David Irving flavour.
February 24, 2018
This book should have been called, "Monty's Battle to Overcome the Stupidity of the American Generals and Beat the Nazis single-handed." That would have more accurately indicated the tone of the book. While I appreciate that the author had a thesis, and that he backs up his claims with quite a bit of evidence, the tone was overbearing and extremely taxing. I am an American, so admittedly this may have bothered me more than it would bother other readers. But the impression one takes away from this book is that Field Marshall Montgomery, who was British, never made a mistake and was always right. The American Generals on the other hand, never did anything right. From Patton to Ike, they were all idiots. Ike receives the best treatment, but the best Neillands had to say about Ike amounted to saying that he was a nice guy but a worthless commander.
Neillands may very well be largely correct in his assertions, but the fact that his evidence is so completely one sided, and the fact that he is a British historian pushing the line that the British had the only leadership worth anything, leads me to suspect that perhaps there is some evidence that would support a different conclusion... or at least a more nuanced conclusion. If not, then his case would have been made much more effectively had it not been laid on so thick, with such a liberal dose of derisiveness for anyone not British. I have not studied WWII's European theater closely enough to dispute his thesis, and I found myself agreeing with Mongomery's suggested strategy over Eisenhower's while still in the first chapter. But I found myself feeling more and more argumentative over his views as the book went on, exactly because of its overbearing tone.
Just to give some context, I am not an American apologist. I have read books extolling the military virtues of Rommel, Zhukov, Montgomery, and Patton, but have never had this kind of reaction, so this is not a reaction brought on by being a US-military fanboy.
I still might have rate this book three stars, except that it added very poor writing to its irritating manner. Neillands could have really used an editor. The main problem was that it was extremely repetitive. There were sentences that I would have sworn I had heard (audio version) word for word just a few minutes before. There were whole paragraphs that essentially repeated facts or analysis that was given a few paragraphs before. Neillands would spend (what I assume would be) pages describing the command situation, or Monty's position on an issue, then a while later try to make another point by giving the same analysis. It was extremely tiring and I almost stopped in the first chapter.
My other complaint is that Neillands has a very tedious (read academic) writing style, which while common in academia, is not necessary. To be honest, I read this kind of writing a lot, and I would have overlooked this issue were it not for the other, bigger problems.
I cannot recommend this book unless the potential reader is looking for a detailed treatise advocating for the British role in the Battle for the Rhine in late 1944. If you want a ton of detail about Montgomery's feud with the US commanders, then you may enjoy this book. Otherwise, move along.
Neillands may very well be largely correct in his assertions, but the fact that his evidence is so completely one sided, and the fact that he is a British historian pushing the line that the British had the only leadership worth anything, leads me to suspect that perhaps there is some evidence that would support a different conclusion... or at least a more nuanced conclusion. If not, then his case would have been made much more effectively had it not been laid on so thick, with such a liberal dose of derisiveness for anyone not British. I have not studied WWII's European theater closely enough to dispute his thesis, and I found myself agreeing with Mongomery's suggested strategy over Eisenhower's while still in the first chapter. But I found myself feeling more and more argumentative over his views as the book went on, exactly because of its overbearing tone.
Just to give some context, I am not an American apologist. I have read books extolling the military virtues of Rommel, Zhukov, Montgomery, and Patton, but have never had this kind of reaction, so this is not a reaction brought on by being a US-military fanboy.
I still might have rate this book three stars, except that it added very poor writing to its irritating manner. Neillands could have really used an editor. The main problem was that it was extremely repetitive. There were sentences that I would have sworn I had heard (audio version) word for word just a few minutes before. There were whole paragraphs that essentially repeated facts or analysis that was given a few paragraphs before. Neillands would spend (what I assume would be) pages describing the command situation, or Monty's position on an issue, then a while later try to make another point by giving the same analysis. It was extremely tiring and I almost stopped in the first chapter.
My other complaint is that Neillands has a very tedious (read academic) writing style, which while common in academia, is not necessary. To be honest, I read this kind of writing a lot, and I would have overlooked this issue were it not for the other, bigger problems.
I cannot recommend this book unless the potential reader is looking for a detailed treatise advocating for the British role in the Battle for the Rhine in late 1944. If you want a ton of detail about Montgomery's feud with the US commanders, then you may enjoy this book. Otherwise, move along.
October 9, 2023
OK as a factual history of the race to the Rhine and the stalemate at the Siegfried Line, this is filled with repetitious and unconvincing analysis of the command problems that plagued the Allied effort. This *does* serve as a frame for the best defense Montgomery will ever have, but it is not successful in the end. Simply repeating over and over that Ike's strategy was not adequately implemented is to miss that the strategy was itself flawed. But it was dictated by political concerns at the time, not military efficiency. And without doubt Monty was best kept well away from anything with geopolitical implications.
At least the author places the blame at the American command level and gives G.I.s their due for "tenacity" and determination, something not all British historians can muster the good grace to do.
At least the author places the blame at the American command level and gives G.I.s their due for "tenacity" and determination, something not all British historians can muster the good grace to do.
December 7, 2007
A good look at the strategy of this period of the war. He claims to bridge the Monty-vs-Patton argument that historians, amateur and otherwise, break down, but he's clearly on Montgomery's side. He does a very good job of backing it up, though.
He's not very complimentary to most American generals, and perhaps rightly so, but I think he is excessively harsh on Patton. That said, I'm emotionally a Patton-o-phile, but I am convinced that Montgomery had some right ideas.
He's not very complimentary to most American generals, and perhaps rightly so, but I think he is excessively harsh on Patton. That said, I'm emotionally a Patton-o-phile, but I am convinced that Montgomery had some right ideas.
July 2, 2011
This is a deeply detailed and exhaustively research account from the first hours after D-Day up to The Battle of the Bulge. Sometimes repetetive as a Montogmery apologist, this author also takes Patton down a few notches. This account makes for good balanced reading to the dramatic and simplified popular accounts of the movies "Patton" and "A Bridge too Far"
March 1, 2021
A bit of Ike bashing to boost Monty's historical legacy
This is a well-being and needed history of the campaign across France after the breakout from Normandy. The author makes a strong well-supported case that American commander sympathies towards Montgomery have unfairly tarnished his military reputation. Unhappily for the book's reception by an American audience, to make his case for Montgomery's strengths, he indulges himself in some gratuitous disparagement of Eisenhower as Commander of the armies. Montgomery was a bit of a prickly pear in his interactions with the American commanders, rubbing people the wrong way. Ike never took Bradley or Patton by their collars during the campaign across France and Ike never exhibited what the author and Montgomery term as "grip" in his relationship with those subordinates during this campaign.
Montgomery rightly perceived that a focused overall ground command was lacking after the breakout. Ike operated more as a committee chairman and allowed focus to drift. He failed to make opening Antwerp the biggest priority objective after the breakout. He failed to concentrate forces to meet immediate objectives as logistics became the hampering obstacle for the Allies. Not taming his supply chain was Ike's biggest failure, one which left his broad front strategy hamstrung.
Patton was an insubordinate glory hound. The press and public loved him. Montgomery was British, General Marshall disliked him, and Monty kept forgetting that Ike was his commander. The Market Garden campaign failed not in concept, but in its execution, if it ever was achievable along the the lengthy stretch of road which exposed the attacking forces to too many defensible chokepoints.
A greater concentration of force, a fuller American participation and focus might have made the thrust to the Rhine in the north achievable as Montgomery envisioned. Ike failed to provide that concentration and focus as needed at that time and in that moment. Air forces support and lift for the airborne elements were lacking. Ike's focus on this thrust might have rendered a successful outcome and an early crossing of the Rhine. Arguably, Ike trusted Monty to provide the necessary focus on that operation.
The author seems to rightly argue that Bradley and Patton have been overrated as commanders. Bradley's inattention to the vulnerability of his thin lines in the Ardennes made the German winter offensive a graver threat than was necessary. His antipathy towards Monty perhaps contributed to his enabling Patton's subversion of overall strategy.
In the end, the Nazis fell. Perhaps it could have been accomplished earlier at less cost. If Monty's strengths had been recognized and fully taken advantage of by Ike, then the Rhine might have been crossed before Christmas. Perhaps.
This is a well-being and needed history of the campaign across France after the breakout from Normandy. The author makes a strong well-supported case that American commander sympathies towards Montgomery have unfairly tarnished his military reputation. Unhappily for the book's reception by an American audience, to make his case for Montgomery's strengths, he indulges himself in some gratuitous disparagement of Eisenhower as Commander of the armies. Montgomery was a bit of a prickly pear in his interactions with the American commanders, rubbing people the wrong way. Ike never took Bradley or Patton by their collars during the campaign across France and Ike never exhibited what the author and Montgomery term as "grip" in his relationship with those subordinates during this campaign.
Montgomery rightly perceived that a focused overall ground command was lacking after the breakout. Ike operated more as a committee chairman and allowed focus to drift. He failed to make opening Antwerp the biggest priority objective after the breakout. He failed to concentrate forces to meet immediate objectives as logistics became the hampering obstacle for the Allies. Not taming his supply chain was Ike's biggest failure, one which left his broad front strategy hamstrung.
Patton was an insubordinate glory hound. The press and public loved him. Montgomery was British, General Marshall disliked him, and Monty kept forgetting that Ike was his commander. The Market Garden campaign failed not in concept, but in its execution, if it ever was achievable along the the lengthy stretch of road which exposed the attacking forces to too many defensible chokepoints.
A greater concentration of force, a fuller American participation and focus might have made the thrust to the Rhine in the north achievable as Montgomery envisioned. Ike failed to provide that concentration and focus as needed at that time and in that moment. Air forces support and lift for the airborne elements were lacking. Ike's focus on this thrust might have rendered a successful outcome and an early crossing of the Rhine. Arguably, Ike trusted Monty to provide the necessary focus on that operation.
The author seems to rightly argue that Bradley and Patton have been overrated as commanders. Bradley's inattention to the vulnerability of his thin lines in the Ardennes made the German winter offensive a graver threat than was necessary. His antipathy towards Monty perhaps contributed to his enabling Patton's subversion of overall strategy.
In the end, the Nazis fell. Perhaps it could have been accomplished earlier at less cost. If Monty's strengths had been recognized and fully taken advantage of by Ike, then the Rhine might have been crossed before Christmas. Perhaps.
January 15, 2018
An enlightening account of what happened between the breakout from Normandy in August '44 and January '45. Not really a book to bother with though unless you are interested in such details as why did it take the Allies so long to make the Rhine when things were going so well?
Of course, parts of the answer are Arnhem and the Bulge but they are not the whole story, as they are two months apart. A fuller picture includes a lack of a clear strategy; people not following the strategy such as it was; personality clashes; an American supply corps which was a law unto itself; Eisenhower trying to do two highly demanding jobs which took him in different directions; a steadily weakening Canadian force and the failure to open the Scheldt Estuary, without which the capture of Antwerp could be of no real benefit.
The big negative here is how much time is taken up with the strategy problems, repeating the arguments multiple times. A lot of people won't get past the first 20% because of this. However, it is worth persevering because evidence is well researched and thoughtfully presented. You know, for instance, that a historian knows what they're talking about when they take the line that the failure at Arnhem was more "a road too narrow" than a "Bridge too Far". Admittedly the latter sounds great but as getting across the Rhine was the point of the exercise, not aiming for Arnhem would've been pointless and of course, the troops at Arnhem held out for much longer, with much less than they had anticipated, so they actually did more than was expected of them.
I was left wondering if Montgomery was on the Autism Spectrum though? If anyone has ever looked into this, as they have into the psychology of many other leading historical figures. It would make at lot of sense.
Of course, parts of the answer are Arnhem and the Bulge but they are not the whole story, as they are two months apart. A fuller picture includes a lack of a clear strategy; people not following the strategy such as it was; personality clashes; an American supply corps which was a law unto itself; Eisenhower trying to do two highly demanding jobs which took him in different directions; a steadily weakening Canadian force and the failure to open the Scheldt Estuary, without which the capture of Antwerp could be of no real benefit.
The big negative here is how much time is taken up with the strategy problems, repeating the arguments multiple times. A lot of people won't get past the first 20% because of this. However, it is worth persevering because evidence is well researched and thoughtfully presented. You know, for instance, that a historian knows what they're talking about when they take the line that the failure at Arnhem was more "a road too narrow" than a "Bridge too Far". Admittedly the latter sounds great but as getting across the Rhine was the point of the exercise, not aiming for Arnhem would've been pointless and of course, the troops at Arnhem held out for much longer, with much less than they had anticipated, so they actually did more than was expected of them.
I was left wondering if Montgomery was on the Autism Spectrum though? If anyone has ever looked into this, as they have into the psychology of many other leading historical figures. It would make at lot of sense.
June 12, 2017
A well written, well researched historical analysis of the time period. He argues logically that General Eisenhower's strategy from September through December 1944, was ineffective and may have prolonged the war several months. He hails Eisenhower as a great Supreme commander, but an indifferent ground forces commander. In the author's opinion, Ike failed to adequately grip his immediate subordinates especially George Patton and Omar Bradley. The author argues that General Montgomery's assessment was correct, but his lack of tact undermined the strength of his arguments. The American army group generals are shown as being incompetent and unprofessional who were more concerned with looking good to the press than strong generals.
March 30, 2021
Good strategic to operational consideration of the Campaigns in Northern Europe, from the end of the Normandy Campaign to the start of 1945. Makes good points about Ike's strengths and sometimes overlooked weaknesses; as C in C he really should have done better setting and maintaining priorities, anticipating supply needs, amd especially forcing his generals to execute his orders. On the other hand, especially towards the end the author let's his admiration for Monty get the better of him. In particular I found his discussion of the Bulge plagued with factual errors and distortions. Overall though glad I read the book!
September 25, 2022
Do you really know Ike and Monty?
Great read. Author makes a sensible, reasoned argument that refutes a lot of the anti-Monty narratives that are so common among US WW2 generals and (often) American historians. Although I’m American, I’ve never been an Ike or Bradley fan. This book makes a compelling case that as a combat leader, Ike was a mess. And that Bradley was not only incompetent, but also extremely self-serving and duplicitous.
And while Monty was a flawed human, he was an effective commander who cared about his troops. And I didn’t see it that way before reading this great book.
Great read. Author makes a sensible, reasoned argument that refutes a lot of the anti-Monty narratives that are so common among US WW2 generals and (often) American historians. Although I’m American, I’ve never been an Ike or Bradley fan. This book makes a compelling case that as a combat leader, Ike was a mess. And that Bradley was not only incompetent, but also extremely self-serving and duplicitous.
And while Monty was a flawed human, he was an effective commander who cared about his troops. And I didn’t see it that way before reading this great book.
January 29, 2023
Neillands, a British historian, presents a tour de force of allied efforts to reach the Rhine River in 1944 following the breakout in France. Both his research and conclusions are sound, and he pulls no punches. American readers may bristle at his elevation of Field Marshal Montgomery and many criticisms of General Eisenhower and some American generals; but the passage of time and the replacement of emotions with facts can only serve to benefit our understanding of events in northwest Europe during World War II, and increase our appreciation for the brave, hard-fighting American and British soldiers who made victory possible.
September 1, 2023
Definitely from the British perspective which was nice to hear. Defended Montgomery. Again, nice to hear the other side of the story. Nothing is one way.
Learned some new things about this phase of the war. Makes me want to dive into other books for more details on the specific battles.
I’ve never listened to an audio book where I heard missed edits, made me chuckle, being a podcaster and recognizing the misses.
Learned some new things about this phase of the war. Makes me want to dive into other books for more details on the specific battles.
I’ve never listened to an audio book where I heard missed edits, made me chuckle, being a podcaster and recognizing the misses.
November 13, 2018
The real truth
A fair review of the truth.
Obviously Monty was held back but he was the most level headed Commander not searching for personal glory but by good reasoning knowing the enemies possible moves.
Above all doing his best to not waste mens lives
Brilliant well researched book.
A fair review of the truth.
Obviously Monty was held back but he was the most level headed Commander not searching for personal glory but by good reasoning knowing the enemies possible moves.
Above all doing his best to not waste mens lives
Brilliant well researched book.
May 10, 2017
Less of a history and more of a misplaced dispute on how history has regarded personalities of the war and who was responsible for winning. Generals Ike, Bradley, Patton and MacArthur are consistently torn down and the praise for Monty gets repetitively nauseous.
June 27, 2018
Gives an alternative view
Definitely an eye opener to an alternative view. However, by its nature the subject was a little dry and occasionally the point was laboured a little too much and too often.
Definitely an eye opener to an alternative view. However, by its nature the subject was a little dry and occasionally the point was laboured a little too much and too often.
October 6, 2018
US didn’t win WWII on their own!!!
Having grown up watching movies about WWII and the impression given by them that the US won on their own, it is a very pleasant change to see other countries given credit for their contributions.
Having grown up watching movies about WWII and the impression given by them that the US won on their own, it is a very pleasant change to see other countries given credit for their contributions.
November 19, 2019
Not as straight forward as I thought!
I always thought the push to Berlin was just a slog through a western European winter. I now see the journey as battle of wills . I think we were lucky the Soviet union did not take more of the spoils. All explained beautifuly
I always thought the push to Berlin was just a slog through a western European winter. I now see the journey as battle of wills . I think we were lucky the Soviet union did not take more of the spoils. All explained beautifuly
July 22, 2017
gives insightful commentary on the battles between D-Day and the crossing of the Rhine.
March 19, 2018
An engaging narrative, supplemented by first hand accounts from veterans, make this a fascinating read. It would have been useful to have some maps included in the book.
July 29, 2018
The most complete history.
This was the most balanced, warts and all account of that part of the second world war. A good book for any Commander to read.
This was the most balanced, warts and all account of that part of the second world war. A good book for any Commander to read.
October 23, 2014
Neillands' book covers the Allied effort to reach and cross the Rhine River, following the breakout from Normandy. In the main, the book is a British perspective on what went wrong with this campaign, with a focus on command arrangements and strategy.
While Neillands offers some well considered and supported criticism of Eisenhower as Ground Force Commander (but not Supreme Allied Commander), there are some things the he repeatedly harps on that detract significantly from his arguments. The moaning about unfair treatment of the British and Montgomery goes on a bit too long. There's also Neillands' criticism of Eisenhower's handling of Bradley and Patton (and Bradley's handling of Patton), which gets repetitive in the extreme. The author mentions "grip" (as in having one's subordinates firmly in hand) so many times that it I couldn't help but roll my eyes every time it cropped up. It cropped up often. I'll grant that this term was used by Montgomery and other British leaders in their communications, but it got really distracting and obnoxious. Besides that, Neilland also contradicts himself during the narrative, particularly on the importance of the press on command decisions. The book (at least the Kindle edition) also lacks any illustrations or maps, so if the reader isn't already familiar with the Allied commanders and geography of the Northwest Europe Campaign, it may be a little difficult to follow.
While [u]The Battle For The Rhine[/u] has some glaring shortcomings, it is not without it's strengths. Neillands makes excellent use of sources in his narrative, particularly the American and British official histories, and the memoirs of various Allied leaders. There are also many extracts from the author's interviews of American and British combat soldiers, which add great flavor to the narrative (which concentrates mostly on higher-level command issues). The chapter covering the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary is a particularly interesting and strong one.
Overall, this book is quite a mixed bag. There are a couple of really good chapters in it, and it's valuable for an American reader to get the British perspective on this campaign. On the other hand, the author let himself get distracted with harping on some favorite subjects, and makes a couple of serious self-contradictions which seriously detract from his narrative and arguments.
While Neillands offers some well considered and supported criticism of Eisenhower as Ground Force Commander (but not Supreme Allied Commander), there are some things the he repeatedly harps on that detract significantly from his arguments. The moaning about unfair treatment of the British and Montgomery goes on a bit too long. There's also Neillands' criticism of Eisenhower's handling of Bradley and Patton (and Bradley's handling of Patton), which gets repetitive in the extreme. The author mentions "grip" (as in having one's subordinates firmly in hand) so many times that it I couldn't help but roll my eyes every time it cropped up. It cropped up often. I'll grant that this term was used by Montgomery and other British leaders in their communications, but it got really distracting and obnoxious. Besides that, Neilland also contradicts himself during the narrative, particularly on the importance of the press on command decisions. The book (at least the Kindle edition) also lacks any illustrations or maps, so if the reader isn't already familiar with the Allied commanders and geography of the Northwest Europe Campaign, it may be a little difficult to follow.
While [u]The Battle For The Rhine[/u] has some glaring shortcomings, it is not without it's strengths. Neillands makes excellent use of sources in his narrative, particularly the American and British official histories, and the memoirs of various Allied leaders. There are also many extracts from the author's interviews of American and British combat soldiers, which add great flavor to the narrative (which concentrates mostly on higher-level command issues). The chapter covering the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary is a particularly interesting and strong one.
Overall, this book is quite a mixed bag. There are a couple of really good chapters in it, and it's valuable for an American reader to get the British perspective on this campaign. On the other hand, the author let himself get distracted with harping on some favorite subjects, and makes a couple of serious self-contradictions which seriously detract from his narrative and arguments.
March 12, 2013
Wish I could say I enjoyed this book, I only got the book out as I am planning on visiting Holland in May 2013, and specifically Arnhem, were the battle of Arnhem occurred, the book is filled with details, which is understandable, as that is what it is all about, it seems to me there were a lot of lives lost due to stupidity on the part of those in charge, it is my contention that war is horrific, and those in charge worry little about loss of lifes, as they are never in the front lines, and make sure none of their relatives are as well, imagine having young man parachuted into a field were the Germans are ready to kill them which they did, horrific, what is life worth, and for what, pretty horrific, off course Europe needed to be freed from those nazi animals, but sure those in charge, needed to set aside their ego, and use young men to attain their often misguided goals.
Pet Peeve, Church a hero>>, give me a break he like many of his cronies were only concerned about themselves their status in life, enjoying the comforts. brandy and cigars, large homes, living in the lap of luxury, devoting their lives to public service please spare me.
So.....back to the book, I was hoping Mr Neillands would be able to make some sense for me about these errors that caused so much death, alas not, it is the same in every story. Imagine taking pride in using young men to turn them into killing machines, I dont care which side you are on, no wonder the world is in this turmoil due to few of these power trippers who are only thinking of themselves.
Pet Peeve, Church a hero>>, give me a break he like many of his cronies were only concerned about themselves their status in life, enjoying the comforts. brandy and cigars, large homes, living in the lap of luxury, devoting their lives to public service please spare me.
So.....back to the book, I was hoping Mr Neillands would be able to make some sense for me about these errors that caused so much death, alas not, it is the same in every story. Imagine taking pride in using young men to turn them into killing machines, I dont care which side you are on, no wonder the world is in this turmoil due to few of these power trippers who are only thinking of themselves.
July 29, 2016
This book discusses the allied push to the Rhine after Normandy. It was argued that Eisenhower's broad front strategy, i.e., attacking the entire front all the time , forcing the enemy to retreat, was problematic on several counts. Firstly, as Antwerp was not opened, the army could not be supplied properly when supplies became longer, esp when coupled with an overly bureaucratic and unaccountable supply chain. Secondly, the large front meant that the forces could not concentrate for attacks when the enemy regrouped. Thirdly, personality conflicts between the allied generals, and national interests, often led to compromise tactics and command and control issues which led to less than optimal results. While I think the issues raised were accurate, I could not help but feel the author was quite partisan to Montgomery, often showing the American generals in bad light and often hankering for national and individual glory, at the expense of the war. Eisenhower was described as without grip on the generals, and tended to change plans midway through deployment, while Bradley was portrayed as insubordinate and always looking to bend orders issued by Eisenhower.
Recommended for military history buffs, but would probably need to read other accounts of the battle for more balanced view of the American generals.
Recommended for military history buffs, but would probably need to read other accounts of the battle for more balanced view of the American generals.
September 26, 2014
This is a look at the allies' breakout from Normandy and their attempts to gain a bridgehead over the Rhine. On the way it covers the ill-fated Market Garden operation and the Ardennes offensive - otherwise known as the Battle of the Bulge.
Neillands doesn't shy away from the things that went wrong. Failures of command and personality clashes between generals, stretched supply lines, poor intelligence, dubious strategy and bad planning.
Having read this book it's hard to escape the conclusion that had things been better managed the war in Europe could well have been over by the end of 1944. Which would of course have had a significant effect on the postwar map. A thought provoking read.
Neillands doesn't shy away from the things that went wrong. Failures of command and personality clashes between generals, stretched supply lines, poor intelligence, dubious strategy and bad planning.
Having read this book it's hard to escape the conclusion that had things been better managed the war in Europe could well have been over by the end of 1944. Which would of course have had a significant effect on the postwar map. A thought provoking read.
May 23, 2014
This book was well written and well laid out. Information was presented in a easy to follow manner. That being said, this book was hard to choke down. Written from the decidedly British point of view, the author had no kind words to say about any of the American or Allied leaders. Essentially, if it weren't for Montgomery, the bumbling American Generals would have lost WWII. Sigh....as it was pointed out to me, each country has its heroes and we must respect that. Montgomery was as integral part of the fabric of war as the rest. I just wish the author would have given the others a shred of credit.
April 23, 2016
A good book, offering a different view of one of America's largest military endeavors. The author does not put Eisenhower, Bradley, or the other American commanders on a pedestal but instead gives them a critical evaluation especially as compared to the British leaders. Though I don't think I entirely agree with the resulting conclusion, it is healthy to have to re-evaluate these cherished opinions. This work demonstrates, better than many others, that warfare is primarily about logistics, that resource decisions will decide a campaign's results.
April 4, 2010
A very in-depth look at the Battle for the Rhine, from September through December 1944. I learned a lot about what happened during that time, not just the highlights that most people know. You really get into the heads of the commanding generals, and see the conflicts they have to go through. At times, it's almost too much information.
I recommend having a map at hand, because you'll need it to get a feel for the whole battlespace.
I recommend having a map at hand, because you'll need it to get a feel for the whole battlespace.
May 23, 2013
This book poses a question that any book on war could ask:
Could we have won the war sooner had certain plans worked out better?'
I didn't read this book for the answer of the "what ifs" but there is much to be learned/applied to real life.
The book also gives a good snapshot of this particular time period of WWII.
****possible spoiler*****
The answer is yes. Of course the victors of any battle or war, in hindsight, may have executed better or differently and shortened the timeline.
Could we have won the war sooner had certain plans worked out better?'
I didn't read this book for the answer of the "what ifs" but there is much to be learned/applied to real life.
The book also gives a good snapshot of this particular time period of WWII.
****possible spoiler*****
The answer is yes. Of course the victors of any battle or war, in hindsight, may have executed better or differently and shortened the timeline.
October 24, 2012
This book is a good alternative to the traditional view of WWII Allied generals and leaders. It has a perpsective that should be heard. Understanding that the author thinks Field Marshal Montgomery was the second coming and world savior, the ending conclusion about Ike's overall strategy will come as a surprise.
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