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The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe And the Birth of Warfare As We Know It
A distinguished historian describes how the Enlightenment and the French Revolution led to the first total war in history during the age of Napoleon, when such embodiments of modern-day warfare--conscription, guerrilla warfare, unconditional surrender, disregard for the rules of combat, civilian mobilization, and more--made their first appearance.
420 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2007
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About the author
David A. Bell
12 books16 followersLibrarians note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
David A. Bell is the Sidney and Ruth Lapidus Professor in the Era of North Atlantic Revolutions at Princeton University and the author of several previous books, among them The First Total War and Shadows of Revolution.
David A. Bell is the Sidney and Ruth Lapidus Professor in the Era of North Atlantic Revolutions at Princeton University and the author of several previous books, among them The First Total War and Shadows of Revolution.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 47 reviews
May 13, 2021
The central thesis of David Bell's First Total War is that the Napoleonic wars, both in the way they were thought of and in the way they were fought, represented an almost complete break with the style of the 18th century, where wars had become more and more limited, a matter of aristocratic codes and diplomatic maneuvering, and where battle was avoided as much as possible. While Bell is in agreement with the vast majority of Napoleonic scholars that in terms of actual battles and fighting and military technology (ie, the things we would normally think of as constituting warfare) very little had changed from the preceding century- indeed as he and several other scholars note, if a soldier of Louis XIV fell asleep for a hundred years, he would have very little trouble fitting into the regiment he found when he woke up. (Well, except for perhaps being a hundred year old sleeping princess with a weird uniform and craaazy vocabulary, but let that pass!) No, the real revolution took place in the way that war was thought of. He states that "the intellectual transformations of the Enlightenment, followed by the political transformations of 1789-1792 produced new understandings of war that made possible the cataclysmic intensification of fighting over the next twenty-three years.”
Guided by the work of the brilliant (if unrepentant) Nazi legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, he traces how war had gone from being considered a normal and perfectly acceptable part of interstate interactions to being thought of in an increasingly demonized way as the exception to the natural order of things rather than the rule. Therefore, those who engaged in it were increasingly demonized, enemies were increasingly thought of as devils and subhuman, and the result of the conflicts could not longer be simply making a point or exchanging a province or two- instead it had to mean total and complete victory over your evil opponents, because now making war had to be a) justified, at all, which was not the case previously, since again, it was thought to be the norm, and b) had to be justified on moral grounds as an absolute necessity. This lead to black and white thinking, where on the one hand you get some enlightenment thinkers who dream of perpetual peace and utopia, and some others who dream of war as a "cleansing" pursuit that will "purify" a nation and lead it forward (there are many striking quotes he cites from Revolutionary figures- particularly the Girondin wing of the revolutionary parties- who use this sort of language. Pretty scary actually). Ultimately, he concludes, this tradition of thinking about war in in a black and white, good and evil sort of way has carried right down into the present day, where he states, "it has become very difficult to discuss war in non-apocalyptic terms."
Given the history of the past ten years, with its wars and diplomatic rifts and seemingly intractable conflicts and unending disasters, it would be easy to be in at least partial sympathy with Bell's conclusions. Indeed, he uses this history to make his point (and, one suspects, to try to give his area of expertise the kind of immediate relevance it has not seemed to have in a good while). I think that he is right to state, as he does numerous times, that theorizing of war, how it is thought of, how people respond to it and why, has become an under discussed and and even "ghettoized" (as he phrases it) topic. And he convinced me he is absolutely right to bring to the fore again. Furthermore, I think that his understanding of the Napoleonic era as something that served as a model for future generations of statesmen, soldiers and historians, is also right on the money. It doesn't matter how much of it was myth or not when you're looking at it from the perspective of what it influenced in the future. Nationalist mythmakers made great hay out of the Napoleonic era as the "first national war," and they were quite successful at doing it. I also think that Bell's work in pointing out the development of "military culture" in this period was really fascinatingly done. This era was really the first time that the "army" was separated out from the "civilian" population as a whole separate entity with a separate ethos, living space, way of thinking and education. In fact, the word "civilian" did not even exist in many languages- and those languages it did exist in it meant simply a student of civil law, not a "noncombatant" as we would think of it today. It is from this separation that the ideology of "militarism" largely arose in Western Europe, and he is right to point out that Prussia, the country who did the most to promote these ideas, got its reforms and its mindset straight from its perceptions of what had happened to it at the hands of Napoleon.
However, in presenting the Napoleonic era as a time of total rupture and break with the past, I think he somewhat overstates his case. As many other Napoleonic scholars of the revisionist school have found, there are far more continuities to be found with the 18th century than Bell really wants to speak about in this text- not just in terms of military tactics and technology, but also in terms of who controlled the army, how it was organized, how it was used, its means of supporting itself logistically, and even how war was thought of by the majority of countries who were still monarchical and not shaken by the upheavals of revolution. The point has been made time and again that the other countries changed very little about their armies or how they used war during or after the Napoleonic wars. The Congress of Vienna was meant to restore the status quo, and it did so quite effectively for quite some time, formalizing the aristocratic, diplomatic constraints of the 18th century into the Concert of Europe- which ensured that limited war in Europe did not return until 1914. That is the other thing- the continuities that Bell sees between the "total war" of the 19th century and the 20th century have a large gap between them- the 19th century, where wars and diplomacy and the governments who engaged in them looked nothing like the changes he claims for the Napoleonic era. Also, his definition of "total war," which seems to be just huge armies against huge armies trying to crush each other out of existence completely rather than having a negotiated peace, does not mean the sort of "total war" that existed in the 20th century- involving entire societies and economies, which were completely mobilized for war and a part of the effort. Certainly the Napoleonic wars, which lasted a quarter century, affected many millions of people for many long years, but societies were not mobilized for war the way they were in the 20th century. In addition, Bell also discounts that whatever differences the Napoleonic wars might have opened up with its immediate 18th century predecessors, the 18th century was actually rather an aberration in the annals of warfare. "Limited war" did not really exist before that point- and one only has to go back to the wars of religion that rocked the continent just previous to it to see that armies and battles being separated from "civilian" life was not the norm. So to phrase the idea of armies going at each other without the limits of aristocratic codes as a revolutionary new thing doesn't really work.
Despite all these deficiencies, I do think the work is absolutely worth reading for its fascinating take on the way that war was conceptualized and how that changed in this period (which is after all his major point), and also, I really do have to mention it: It is just FUN. For serious, Bell is a fantastic writer and he knows how to set a scene and toss off a dryly humorous line to keep you hooked when the stories of speeches and battles isn't quite doing it for you. He's wonderful at creating a sense of place, even better at putting his finger on the best way to describe someone's characters (oh, the endless wonderful anecdotes!). His opening chapter story of the Duc de Lanzun and his brazen, dashing life as a courtier and a soldier made me smile to no end- there's this part where he and his lover dash across the battlefields of Corsica under enemy fire laughing and singing all the way- oh man, it's just great. You can see it and smell it. His stories might sidetrack a little from his central arguments, but they ultimately add to it and besides the book the enjoyable, wonderful read that it is. That's why it gets the fourth star, despite its faults.
Whether you're a lover of a good swashbuckle, or a man with a twinkle in his eye, or just simply a war historian, this is the book for you. Settle into your big leather armchair in front of the fire and let it snow. You'll be solidly entertained for the weekend.
Guided by the work of the brilliant (if unrepentant) Nazi legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, he traces how war had gone from being considered a normal and perfectly acceptable part of interstate interactions to being thought of in an increasingly demonized way as the exception to the natural order of things rather than the rule. Therefore, those who engaged in it were increasingly demonized, enemies were increasingly thought of as devils and subhuman, and the result of the conflicts could not longer be simply making a point or exchanging a province or two- instead it had to mean total and complete victory over your evil opponents, because now making war had to be a) justified, at all, which was not the case previously, since again, it was thought to be the norm, and b) had to be justified on moral grounds as an absolute necessity. This lead to black and white thinking, where on the one hand you get some enlightenment thinkers who dream of perpetual peace and utopia, and some others who dream of war as a "cleansing" pursuit that will "purify" a nation and lead it forward (there are many striking quotes he cites from Revolutionary figures- particularly the Girondin wing of the revolutionary parties- who use this sort of language. Pretty scary actually). Ultimately, he concludes, this tradition of thinking about war in in a black and white, good and evil sort of way has carried right down into the present day, where he states, "it has become very difficult to discuss war in non-apocalyptic terms."
Given the history of the past ten years, with its wars and diplomatic rifts and seemingly intractable conflicts and unending disasters, it would be easy to be in at least partial sympathy with Bell's conclusions. Indeed, he uses this history to make his point (and, one suspects, to try to give his area of expertise the kind of immediate relevance it has not seemed to have in a good while). I think that he is right to state, as he does numerous times, that theorizing of war, how it is thought of, how people respond to it and why, has become an under discussed and and even "ghettoized" (as he phrases it) topic. And he convinced me he is absolutely right to bring to the fore again. Furthermore, I think that his understanding of the Napoleonic era as something that served as a model for future generations of statesmen, soldiers and historians, is also right on the money. It doesn't matter how much of it was myth or not when you're looking at it from the perspective of what it influenced in the future. Nationalist mythmakers made great hay out of the Napoleonic era as the "first national war," and they were quite successful at doing it. I also think that Bell's work in pointing out the development of "military culture" in this period was really fascinatingly done. This era was really the first time that the "army" was separated out from the "civilian" population as a whole separate entity with a separate ethos, living space, way of thinking and education. In fact, the word "civilian" did not even exist in many languages- and those languages it did exist in it meant simply a student of civil law, not a "noncombatant" as we would think of it today. It is from this separation that the ideology of "militarism" largely arose in Western Europe, and he is right to point out that Prussia, the country who did the most to promote these ideas, got its reforms and its mindset straight from its perceptions of what had happened to it at the hands of Napoleon.
However, in presenting the Napoleonic era as a time of total rupture and break with the past, I think he somewhat overstates his case. As many other Napoleonic scholars of the revisionist school have found, there are far more continuities to be found with the 18th century than Bell really wants to speak about in this text- not just in terms of military tactics and technology, but also in terms of who controlled the army, how it was organized, how it was used, its means of supporting itself logistically, and even how war was thought of by the majority of countries who were still monarchical and not shaken by the upheavals of revolution. The point has been made time and again that the other countries changed very little about their armies or how they used war during or after the Napoleonic wars. The Congress of Vienna was meant to restore the status quo, and it did so quite effectively for quite some time, formalizing the aristocratic, diplomatic constraints of the 18th century into the Concert of Europe- which ensured that limited war in Europe did not return until 1914. That is the other thing- the continuities that Bell sees between the "total war" of the 19th century and the 20th century have a large gap between them- the 19th century, where wars and diplomacy and the governments who engaged in them looked nothing like the changes he claims for the Napoleonic era. Also, his definition of "total war," which seems to be just huge armies against huge armies trying to crush each other out of existence completely rather than having a negotiated peace, does not mean the sort of "total war" that existed in the 20th century- involving entire societies and economies, which were completely mobilized for war and a part of the effort. Certainly the Napoleonic wars, which lasted a quarter century, affected many millions of people for many long years, but societies were not mobilized for war the way they were in the 20th century. In addition, Bell also discounts that whatever differences the Napoleonic wars might have opened up with its immediate 18th century predecessors, the 18th century was actually rather an aberration in the annals of warfare. "Limited war" did not really exist before that point- and one only has to go back to the wars of religion that rocked the continent just previous to it to see that armies and battles being separated from "civilian" life was not the norm. So to phrase the idea of armies going at each other without the limits of aristocratic codes as a revolutionary new thing doesn't really work.
Despite all these deficiencies, I do think the work is absolutely worth reading for its fascinating take on the way that war was conceptualized and how that changed in this period (which is after all his major point), and also, I really do have to mention it: It is just FUN. For serious, Bell is a fantastic writer and he knows how to set a scene and toss off a dryly humorous line to keep you hooked when the stories of speeches and battles isn't quite doing it for you. He's wonderful at creating a sense of place, even better at putting his finger on the best way to describe someone's characters (oh, the endless wonderful anecdotes!). His opening chapter story of the Duc de Lanzun and his brazen, dashing life as a courtier and a soldier made me smile to no end- there's this part where he and his lover dash across the battlefields of Corsica under enemy fire laughing and singing all the way- oh man, it's just great. You can see it and smell it. His stories might sidetrack a little from his central arguments, but they ultimately add to it and besides the book the enjoyable, wonderful read that it is. That's why it gets the fourth star, despite its faults.
Whether you're a lover of a good swashbuckle, or a man with a twinkle in his eye, or just simply a war historian, this is the book for you. Settle into your big leather armchair in front of the fire and let it snow. You'll be solidly entertained for the weekend.
July 9, 2022
It's hard rating this book because some of it is excellent, what I call the middle third. However, the very long opening third is not as appealing to me, but I admit that that is personal. The author spends a great deal of time leading up to Napoleon's takeover of France. If you are interested in the French Revolution, then there's no problem, but I found all the background to be rather tedious.
Once he gets to Napoleon himself, the book really improves with an interesting look at what 'total war' meant in that time period. Here he describes the fighting in the Peninsula as a primary example of what both the French and the Spanish guerrillas were willing to do to win. The atrocities were sickening but effective. The guerillas were not all patriotic partisans, but they gave Wellington much valuable intelligence in his efforts against the French.
I found the discussion of Napoleon's war years and his philosophy to be the most interesting. He talked peace, and did give France a valuable legacy in his law codes and the idea of merit instead of just a name, but he was a man of war. He needed war to provide his glory. The author uses the short last third to summarize what was gained and what was lost in these years of war. He brings out a point I've always thought ironic about the Naoleonic years. His rise and fall gave, what became Germany, the chance to go from a sometimes pathetic opponent to the powerhouse it was after unification, eventually leading to the 20th century when Total War again raised its ugly head. (3.5 stars)
Once he gets to Napoleon himself, the book really improves with an interesting look at what 'total war' meant in that time period. Here he describes the fighting in the Peninsula as a primary example of what both the French and the Spanish guerrillas were willing to do to win. The atrocities were sickening but effective. The guerillas were not all patriotic partisans, but they gave Wellington much valuable intelligence in his efforts against the French.
I found the discussion of Napoleon's war years and his philosophy to be the most interesting. He talked peace, and did give France a valuable legacy in his law codes and the idea of merit instead of just a name, but he was a man of war. He needed war to provide his glory. The author uses the short last third to summarize what was gained and what was lost in these years of war. He brings out a point I've always thought ironic about the Naoleonic years. His rise and fall gave, what became Germany, the chance to go from a sometimes pathetic opponent to the powerhouse it was after unification, eventually leading to the 20th century when Total War again raised its ugly head. (3.5 stars)
April 12, 2022
David A. Bell tackles a fairly big concept in a merely moderate-sized book. The main thesis is that warfare underwent a profound change at the end of the Eighteenth Century that still drives how we think of it today.
Now, this has nothing to do with technical details, such as how deadly particular weapons are, or how fast an army can sweep across the landscape, or how more bigger and more complicated governments can finance bigger and more complicated armed forces. No, this is about how society as a whole views the concepts of “war”, “peace”, and the military itself.
Bell posits that warfare in Europe at this time was a relatively ordered and limited affair. Aristocratic gentlemen were expected to be well-rounded individuals, and part of that was knowledge and training in the arts of war. Men could be generals and courtiers and literati all at the same time, and this was expected of them. Contrast that to current norms where the military is almost a world apart, its own splinter society, with its own ethos and social circles. At the same time warfare has become less of a contest between limited elements of society, to being struggles between those societies themselves, with mass conscription, and the targeting of civilian populations.
Bell does well presenting the social shifts of this period, and has some very interesting things to say about the Enlightenment as something of a ‘peace movement’ that also came to embrace (in some threads at least) the idea of a final apocalyptic war to sweep aside the old order and bring about a more peaceful world (that is, a “war to end all wars”). He then traces these thoughts through Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, with the Vendee and the Spanish Ulcer coming in for especial attention.
However, I think Bell has mistaken an especially large tree for the forest. Human history is full of a tension between “total” and “limited” warfare, and what is acceptable varies over time and culture. He is so busy looking at this, fairly dramatic, shift, that he completely fails to acknowledge that this has ever been different. This weakens the overall argument and keeps it from being as informative as it might be. That said, the lens he his looking through is a worthwhile one, and this is a book to provoke thought, but it’s not as complete a package as he would like to believe.
Now, this has nothing to do with technical details, such as how deadly particular weapons are, or how fast an army can sweep across the landscape, or how more bigger and more complicated governments can finance bigger and more complicated armed forces. No, this is about how society as a whole views the concepts of “war”, “peace”, and the military itself.
Bell posits that warfare in Europe at this time was a relatively ordered and limited affair. Aristocratic gentlemen were expected to be well-rounded individuals, and part of that was knowledge and training in the arts of war. Men could be generals and courtiers and literati all at the same time, and this was expected of them. Contrast that to current norms where the military is almost a world apart, its own splinter society, with its own ethos and social circles. At the same time warfare has become less of a contest between limited elements of society, to being struggles between those societies themselves, with mass conscription, and the targeting of civilian populations.
Bell does well presenting the social shifts of this period, and has some very interesting things to say about the Enlightenment as something of a ‘peace movement’ that also came to embrace (in some threads at least) the idea of a final apocalyptic war to sweep aside the old order and bring about a more peaceful world (that is, a “war to end all wars”). He then traces these thoughts through Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, with the Vendee and the Spanish Ulcer coming in for especial attention.
However, I think Bell has mistaken an especially large tree for the forest. Human history is full of a tension between “total” and “limited” warfare, and what is acceptable varies over time and culture. He is so busy looking at this, fairly dramatic, shift, that he completely fails to acknowledge that this has ever been different. This weakens the overall argument and keeps it from being as informative as it might be. That said, the lens he his looking through is a worthwhile one, and this is a book to provoke thought, but it’s not as complete a package as he would like to believe.
September 5, 2012
What a book! Hard to put down! David Bell offers an original thesis and argues it brilliantly throughout. Highly recommend it to serious students of history!
December 29, 2017
Why Bell? Why did you feel compelled to write this?
Bell writes like a sophisticated, knowledgeable, yet callow doctorate candidate trying to prove a thesis that is far less interesting than he supposes. It's unfortunate because much of his research illustrates interesting observations about this particular era of French and European politics, but his thesis is... well... somewhat boring, nor does it feel as original as he tries to convey through his passion and tone.
Also unfortunate is how dated Bell's analogies often feel just ten years after publication (e.g. General Norman Schwarzkopf? Really? You couldn't come up with a figure who has better recognition and relevance beyond your own generation? C'mon Bell...)
And whether or not the Napoleonic era represented "the birth of warfare as we know it," our own era of increasing cyberwarfare and stateless terrorism make the great destructive wars of the 20th century recede even further away to an antiquated past. Bell's text is beginning to already feel outdated.
Bell writes like a sophisticated, knowledgeable, yet callow doctorate candidate trying to prove a thesis that is far less interesting than he supposes. It's unfortunate because much of his research illustrates interesting observations about this particular era of French and European politics, but his thesis is... well... somewhat boring, nor does it feel as original as he tries to convey through his passion and tone.
Also unfortunate is how dated Bell's analogies often feel just ten years after publication (e.g. General Norman Schwarzkopf? Really? You couldn't come up with a figure who has better recognition and relevance beyond your own generation? C'mon Bell...)
And whether or not the Napoleonic era represented "the birth of warfare as we know it," our own era of increasing cyberwarfare and stateless terrorism make the great destructive wars of the 20th century recede even further away to an antiquated past. Bell's text is beginning to already feel outdated.
January 27, 2022
A lot of reviews on here claim this book is lacking in the actual details of the military history aspect, but it never claimed to be a military history of battlefield actions-only an ideological, cultural, and methodological history of the first perfection of total war.
If the French Revolution was in fact the birth of this type of carnage is historically debatable, but it certainly was a new phenomenon in the introduction of mass mobilization which brought forth a military scale that previously didnt exist (even if I would contend the 30 Years War of over a century before was more of a total war in terms of deadliness overall).
In what it sets out to do, the book is very good. Chock full of source material and primary accounts. Some (then) contemporary comparisons seem stretched, but they do fit the thesis of how warfare is viewed after the revolutionary period.
If the French Revolution was in fact the birth of this type of carnage is historically debatable, but it certainly was a new phenomenon in the introduction of mass mobilization which brought forth a military scale that previously didnt exist (even if I would contend the 30 Years War of over a century before was more of a total war in terms of deadliness overall).
In what it sets out to do, the book is very good. Chock full of source material and primary accounts. Some (then) contemporary comparisons seem stretched, but they do fit the thesis of how warfare is viewed after the revolutionary period.
July 16, 2010
A new history of the Napoleonic Wars in which the author describes the emergence of total war out of 18th century concepts of limited war. He does a good job with subjects such as the relationship between soldiers and civilians, and he also does a good job of connecting this history to the present day.
I'm not completely convinced by his analysis that semantic changes by themselves can account for changes in warfare. However, I thought his analysis of the strong traditional Catholic opposition to Napoleon's armies throughout Europe was very interesting, and something I had not heard of before. The importance of religion in preserving traditional ideas in the face of challenge is definitely a concept useful for us today.
I'm not completely convinced by his analysis that semantic changes by themselves can account for changes in warfare. However, I thought his analysis of the strong traditional Catholic opposition to Napoleon's armies throughout Europe was very interesting, and something I had not heard of before. The importance of religion in preserving traditional ideas in the face of challenge is definitely a concept useful for us today.
June 7, 2019
This is a well researched book that covers highlights of the French Revolution and napoleonic wars. It was easy to read, not too dense and was interesting.
The stated aim of the book is to establish the period as the turning point from aristocratic, gentlemanly warfare into complete civilian mobilisation. A shame for me was the setup of this idea only receiving lip service until it was brought together briefly in the last couple of chapters.
Of interest are the contemporary references (at the time of publishing in 2006) and parallels drawn with the US led invasion of Iraq. These feel a bit thin and more like the opinion of the author suited to the public mood at publication, although it is of interest to read.
Overall I liked it but didn’t love it.
The stated aim of the book is to establish the period as the turning point from aristocratic, gentlemanly warfare into complete civilian mobilisation. A shame for me was the setup of this idea only receiving lip service until it was brought together briefly in the last couple of chapters.
Of interest are the contemporary references (at the time of publishing in 2006) and parallels drawn with the US led invasion of Iraq. These feel a bit thin and more like the opinion of the author suited to the public mood at publication, although it is of interest to read.
Overall I liked it but didn’t love it.
February 26, 2015
According to Bell, total war developed from the Enlightenment idea that war should be eradicated. By wiping the slate clean through total warfare, a new era could emerge free from the scourge of war. It's a prime example of historical irony. Bell uses intellectual, military, and political history to make his original case that a "culture of war" began in the late 18th century that has ramifications today. See Adam Gopnik's brilliant review essay, "Slaughterhouse" found in the 2/12/07 issue of The New Yorker. Gopnik teases out the implications of the thesis much better than the author himself.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/200...
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/200...
March 18, 2025
The Napoleonic Wars were the world war of their era, laying waste to large tracts of Europe and racking up a huge toll in economic destruction and human suffering. They also generated an enormous amount of historical writing and literature, from Tolstoy's War and Peace to Bernard Cornwell's Sharpe series today. They remain endlessly (and morbidly) fascinating.
They also, argues David A. Bell in this historical interpretation, represented a distinct shift from an older model of warfare to something new, an ominous foretaste of the mass slaughters of the twentieth century.
According to Bell, warfare in Europe in the eighteenth century had evolved into a sort of aristocratic chess game, in which rulers jockeyed for strategic advantage, pitting relatively small mercenary armies under the command of aristocratic part-time soldiers against each other, mostly obeying accepted codes of honor and going easy on civilian populations. The French revolution, however, in overturning age-old models of society, ushered in a new conception of war as encompassing entire societies and aiming at total destruction of the enemy. Revolutionary France raised huge armies and professionalized the military, promoting on merit and providing a path to upward mobility to talented officers such as the young Napoleon Bonaparte.
The new concept of total war was first practiced within France, as the revolutionary government suppressed the uprising in the Vendée with unprecedented brutality. The generals who carried out atrocities there would go on to use similar tactics to suppress anti-French resistance in conquered areas, most notably Italy and Spain, where modern-style guerrilla warfare with atrocities on both sides was born.
It's not an edifying tale. But if you are interested in the period that shaped modern Europe, or in the nature of warfare, it's compelling reading. In the Epilogue the author links the period to events taking place at the time he was writing the book (it was published in 2007), in a place called Iraq.
They also, argues David A. Bell in this historical interpretation, represented a distinct shift from an older model of warfare to something new, an ominous foretaste of the mass slaughters of the twentieth century.
According to Bell, warfare in Europe in the eighteenth century had evolved into a sort of aristocratic chess game, in which rulers jockeyed for strategic advantage, pitting relatively small mercenary armies under the command of aristocratic part-time soldiers against each other, mostly obeying accepted codes of honor and going easy on civilian populations. The French revolution, however, in overturning age-old models of society, ushered in a new conception of war as encompassing entire societies and aiming at total destruction of the enemy. Revolutionary France raised huge armies and professionalized the military, promoting on merit and providing a path to upward mobility to talented officers such as the young Napoleon Bonaparte.
The new concept of total war was first practiced within France, as the revolutionary government suppressed the uprising in the Vendée with unprecedented brutality. The generals who carried out atrocities there would go on to use similar tactics to suppress anti-French resistance in conquered areas, most notably Italy and Spain, where modern-style guerrilla warfare with atrocities on both sides was born.
It's not an edifying tale. But if you are interested in the period that shaped modern Europe, or in the nature of warfare, it's compelling reading. In the Epilogue the author links the period to events taking place at the time he was writing the book (it was published in 2007), in a place called Iraq.
August 4, 2019
An interesting take on the years between the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, this work is not a purely military or socioeconomic study of that time. It seeks to cage that era in French history and look to define it in the concept of "Total War." In this case, the idea of Total War being the driving force that dictates a nation and its people can apply to the French nation. The author starts in the mid-18th century, trying to set the philosophical stage for what would drive the French during the Revolution, the Reign of Terror, and eventually Napoleon. The work does try to touch on all aspects of life as far as what can tie back to the original argument, but at times, it can be uneven. Eventually, the author defines the era in terms of the man who most impacted the early 19th century, Napoleon. His persona and actions came to define France and the definitions of war. Yet, by going down that road, he moves away from his original arguments, and it can be difficult to figure out where the author wants to go.
It doesn't help that the author jumps around a bit in the timelines, focusing on the military campaigns to Russia in 1812-1813, only to then jump back to the Spanish conquests/insurgencies of the 1800s. That can be hard for a reader to follow, especially if the reader is not as familiar with the timeline/actions of the Napoleonic Wars. Not a bad read, but maybe not the greatest work on the subject.
It doesn't help that the author jumps around a bit in the timelines, focusing on the military campaigns to Russia in 1812-1813, only to then jump back to the Spanish conquests/insurgencies of the 1800s. That can be hard for a reader to follow, especially if the reader is not as familiar with the timeline/actions of the Napoleonic Wars. Not a bad read, but maybe not the greatest work on the subject.
February 4, 2024
Bell argues that the French Revolutionary Wars were an early instance of the concept of total war, both in action and (much more) in rhetoric. They routinely involved violence on previously-rare levels, but more significantly, they made war not just the concern of the nobility and a few select soldiers but the concern of the entire nation.
This started in France when the argument that a Republic should be beyond war, was shouted down by the argument that one apocalyptic war was needed to annihilate the enemies of the Republic. So, they proclaimed mass conscription (though never really put into practice as fully as in rhetoric) and rhetorically stirred up the entire nation into anger at their enemies. Then, the other powers of Europe almost all adopted these points to a significant degree.
Total war, as Bell agrees, is inherently a fuzzy concept. Yet it's clear he has hit on a real point: another way in which the French Revolution helped birth the modern era.
This started in France when the argument that a Republic should be beyond war, was shouted down by the argument that one apocalyptic war was needed to annihilate the enemies of the Republic. So, they proclaimed mass conscription (though never really put into practice as fully as in rhetoric) and rhetorically stirred up the entire nation into anger at their enemies. Then, the other powers of Europe almost all adopted these points to a significant degree.
Total war, as Bell agrees, is inherently a fuzzy concept. Yet it's clear he has hit on a real point: another way in which the French Revolution helped birth the modern era.
March 5, 2023
This is an excellent study, scholarly but accessible, and written with a dry wit. Bell's thesis is persuasive, though some other historians have also argued persuasively that Napoleon's wars cannot be seen as 'total war'; it does rather depend on the definition of that phrase. There is also the question of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries - how 'total' were they?
The only weakness I can see is Bell's treatment of naval warfare, which is very brief. This is a pity, as it would be interesting to have his comments on the changes between the generally 'gentlemanly' naval battles of the ancien regime era and those fought to annihilate the enemy, as advocated and achieved by Nelson and his contemporaries.
The only weakness I can see is Bell's treatment of naval warfare, which is very brief. This is a pity, as it would be interesting to have his comments on the changes between the generally 'gentlemanly' naval battles of the ancien regime era and those fought to annihilate the enemy, as advocated and achieved by Nelson and his contemporaries.
June 17, 2021
A decent history of the transformation of war surrounding the Revolution. The arguments about *why* war transformed are moderately persuasive. But the book is absolutely full of variations on "lots of people think X is true, but Y is clearly true based on this one anecdote. Now, admittedly, that anecdote is atypical for all sorts of reasons, but...you're just going to have to trust me on this."
I think this would work much better as a simple history with some nice anecdotes. The attempt to build a countervailing theory isn't persuasive enough to justify the effort.
I think this would work much better as a simple history with some nice anecdotes. The attempt to build a countervailing theory isn't persuasive enough to justify the effort.
August 18, 2020
An extensive and thoughtful book on how warfare evolved over the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe, narrating the change from aristocratic soldiers to the Napoleonic wars with a particular focus on France. Having never read or studied this era of history I found this book a good summary and introduction to the period. Despite not knowing anything about events I found it easy to follow and it goes into sufficient detail, covering a range of viewpoints and perspectives.
March 16, 2023
Good overview of the period
I liked the author's topic and broad review of a critical 25-30 year span of history. We cannot understand today's Western culture without knowledge of this period. I disliked the brief introductions of people and then moving on. I think the editing was too harsh and led to abrupt passages.
I liked the author's topic and broad review of a critical 25-30 year span of history. We cannot understand today's Western culture without knowledge of this period. I disliked the brief introductions of people and then moving on. I think the editing was too harsh and led to abrupt passages.
September 9, 2023
war was nice before Napoleon ruined it.
This book opens with the claim that war had become manageable and tame by the eighteenth century and then revolutionaries used it to mobilize entire nations into hate filled machines of extermination. The author then launches into long descriptions of atrocities with hints that America has inherited these tendencies.
This book opens with the claim that war had become manageable and tame by the eighteenth century and then revolutionaries used it to mobilize entire nations into hate filled machines of extermination. The author then launches into long descriptions of atrocities with hints that America has inherited these tendencies.
January 19, 2024
The book is not necessarily about the Napoleonic Wars, but about the evolution of that conflict as it evolved into a Total War in (dreadful civilian casualties, near-genocide in the Vendee, the growing size and scope of conscripted soldiers, etc). Well documented argument in claiming the conflict(s) was more like a Total War in the 20th Century sense then previous conflicts of the 18th Century.
October 4, 2020
Very interesting read on the culture of war and militaries before and during the Napoleonic era. Really appreciated the chapters on the Vendée and the peninsular war as, especially the Vendée, often is overshadowed by other more famous battles during this time.
April 6, 2019
Well, it damn well ought to be good if I'm basing my extended essay on it.
March 13, 2023
Great!
Good book, had to read for a class and would highly recommend it. If you are interested in this period a must read
Good book, had to read for a class and would highly recommend it. If you are interested in this period a must read
December 10, 2023
napoleon n shit
October 30, 2024
Very enjoyable ... interesting thesis - broad sweep over French Revolution and early 1800's Napoleonic wars.
November 19, 2008
"The First Total War" by David Bell looks at the relationship between culture and war as it transitioned from the limited wars of the Englightenment to the Napoleonic "nation at arms" that overran Europe in a space of less than 20 years.
This is not a beginner's book on the Revolutionary/Napoleonic period, but complements any reading on the topic. I am sometimes wary about academic tomes that look at culture, as a boring writing style will kill the book before I finish it (as opposed to a really boring but detail-filled book about something I am interested in). Bell avoids this trap, successfully exploring the bridge between Europe's Englightenment/Revolutionary cultures and the way states changed the way they made war.
The Englightenment sought to mitigate the horrors of war following the bloody excess of the 30 Years' War. Battles were rare, sieges were common. Armies were expensive because recruits were so hard to find (and not in great number). Aristocrats led them because it was expected of them, and the smaller battles were not as bloody as they would later become. An army would call it quits if the enemy obtained an advantageous position or when the first breach was made in the city walls.
Shifting over to the Revolutionary period and you find France setting the pattern with an army recruited from its citizens, not its jails, well-animated by patriotism and cause. Valmy was just as much a battle between two philosophies, as the Prussians call it quits when they see nothing to be gained while the French claim a great victory because they did not lose. In reality, had the Prussians pushed the blade home, they would have slain a political philosophy, not an army, but they never saw it that way.
"But they never saw it that way" accounts for much of the way France's enemies fought when Napoleon began his military ascent. It took a decade for Europe to realize that a different kind of war was being fought, and in order to fight it, change it must. Army reform, social reform, "revolution from above" and nationalism all had to pass in Prussia before Blucher could take the fight to France. Austria could not court nationalism, but took up limited conscription and reorganized its army. Russia changed nothing but found it easy to stir nationalism as a force to resist Napoleon upon being invaded in 1812. Nationalism fueled the Spanish insurgency. Anti-Frency nationalism motivated revolts (passive or active) throughout the remainder of Napoleon's non-French empire.
Total war was the genie that could not be put back into the bottle, even when Napoleon was twice forced to live in enforced powerless obscurity. (Well, at least they got it right the second time.)
Bell successfully writes about the evolution of an idea that animated an evolution in warfare. He is in good company with Jeff Lynn, whose "Battle" also traces the way nations fight wars based on their cultures. It also supplements Keegan's "Six Army's at Normandy," which stands as a military history but is also animated by the reality that an army always reflects the nation that sends it to war.
This is not a beginner's book on the Revolutionary/Napoleonic period, but complements any reading on the topic. I am sometimes wary about academic tomes that look at culture, as a boring writing style will kill the book before I finish it (as opposed to a really boring but detail-filled book about something I am interested in). Bell avoids this trap, successfully exploring the bridge between Europe's Englightenment/Revolutionary cultures and the way states changed the way they made war.
The Englightenment sought to mitigate the horrors of war following the bloody excess of the 30 Years' War. Battles were rare, sieges were common. Armies were expensive because recruits were so hard to find (and not in great number). Aristocrats led them because it was expected of them, and the smaller battles were not as bloody as they would later become. An army would call it quits if the enemy obtained an advantageous position or when the first breach was made in the city walls.
Shifting over to the Revolutionary period and you find France setting the pattern with an army recruited from its citizens, not its jails, well-animated by patriotism and cause. Valmy was just as much a battle between two philosophies, as the Prussians call it quits when they see nothing to be gained while the French claim a great victory because they did not lose. In reality, had the Prussians pushed the blade home, they would have slain a political philosophy, not an army, but they never saw it that way.
"But they never saw it that way" accounts for much of the way France's enemies fought when Napoleon began his military ascent. It took a decade for Europe to realize that a different kind of war was being fought, and in order to fight it, change it must. Army reform, social reform, "revolution from above" and nationalism all had to pass in Prussia before Blucher could take the fight to France. Austria could not court nationalism, but took up limited conscription and reorganized its army. Russia changed nothing but found it easy to stir nationalism as a force to resist Napoleon upon being invaded in 1812. Nationalism fueled the Spanish insurgency. Anti-Frency nationalism motivated revolts (passive or active) throughout the remainder of Napoleon's non-French empire.
Total war was the genie that could not be put back into the bottle, even when Napoleon was twice forced to live in enforced powerless obscurity. (Well, at least they got it right the second time.)
Bell successfully writes about the evolution of an idea that animated an evolution in warfare. He is in good company with Jeff Lynn, whose "Battle" also traces the way nations fight wars based on their cultures. It also supplements Keegan's "Six Army's at Normandy," which stands as a military history but is also animated by the reality that an army always reflects the nation that sends it to war.
June 16, 2009
I had a bit of up and down with this book before even getting to the first chapter - (oh, the cliche of a book as a journey, how do you sneak in when I try to avoid you?).
To begin with, I picked it up in a book sale cheaply in a minor explosion of glee, being as I am a total sucker for anything to do with the Napoleonic Wars. I blame Bernard Cornwell, C.S. Forrester, and most of all Georgette Heyer. (Yes, Georgette Heyer - don't laugh till you've read an Infamous Army.) Then, as I read the introduction, I started getting a bit worried, as Bell starts expounding about how he is going to reevaluate the period with a new culturally-based theory of war and how society's perceptions changed it during the period of question.
This sort of thing tends to set off alarm bells on my head, because people who go into a field looking to overturn 'outdated dogma' (or similar) and create bold new theories often tend to come out with, to be frank, things that are just a little insane, and not in a good way. Especially in fields that have already had plenty of attention already. Thankfully though, Bell isn't one of these people - his argument is constructed slowly and carefully, and he has a very nice way of using his primary sources to weigh up other people's arguments against each other's and against his own. He's a good historian, in other words.
He's also a good writer, and the book (once you get through the introduction and its ominous overtones of 'All New Amazing Theory!!') is engaging as all hell. Which it should be, really - the events it's talking about are pretty damn near to 'all hell' time after time, so it would be a feat to make them boring. All the same though, there's a nice mix of semi-dramatised retelling of key events in the history-docu reenactment style with a more widescreen sober analysis of the wider events, and it transitions pretty well between, too.
He also blessedly keeps most of the slightly laboured parallel-drawing with the modern USA to the introduction and epilogue too, where they can be more safely ignored. The actual history is way more interesting.
To begin with, I picked it up in a book sale cheaply in a minor explosion of glee, being as I am a total sucker for anything to do with the Napoleonic Wars. I blame Bernard Cornwell, C.S. Forrester, and most of all Georgette Heyer. (Yes, Georgette Heyer - don't laugh till you've read an Infamous Army.) Then, as I read the introduction, I started getting a bit worried, as Bell starts expounding about how he is going to reevaluate the period with a new culturally-based theory of war and how society's perceptions changed it during the period of question.
This sort of thing tends to set off alarm bells on my head, because people who go into a field looking to overturn 'outdated dogma' (or similar) and create bold new theories often tend to come out with, to be frank, things that are just a little insane, and not in a good way. Especially in fields that have already had plenty of attention already. Thankfully though, Bell isn't one of these people - his argument is constructed slowly and carefully, and he has a very nice way of using his primary sources to weigh up other people's arguments against each other's and against his own. He's a good historian, in other words.
He's also a good writer, and the book (once you get through the introduction and its ominous overtones of 'All New Amazing Theory!!') is engaging as all hell. Which it should be, really - the events it's talking about are pretty damn near to 'all hell' time after time, so it would be a feat to make them boring. All the same though, there's a nice mix of semi-dramatised retelling of key events in the history-docu reenactment style with a more widescreen sober analysis of the wider events, and it transitions pretty well between, too.
He also blessedly keeps most of the slightly laboured parallel-drawing with the modern USA to the introduction and epilogue too, where they can be more safely ignored. The actual history is way more interesting.
September 5, 2012
As the author of The First Total War, David Bell is sure to point out that, “The book is a voyage of exploration, not an exhaustive survey of unplowed archival terrain.” The nature of this work is why I enjoyed it. Western thought is currently divided on the understanding of war. One camp believes war is inexcusable within civilization, while the other views war as a vital method of preservation, with the aim of extermination and purifying individuals. Bell believes historians must first understand the culture of war and how it has changed to gain insight into this current division. Bell argues the first total war is the European conflicts of 1792-1815. His ultimate argument is the transformations that took place during the Enlightenment, along with the political changes during 1789-92, created new perceptions of war that led to the extreme intensification of the Napoleonic War and altered Western thought on war.
During the 18th century, civilian and military life were intertwined, contrasting the sharp division of the two today. War was a fact of life. Bell contradicts himself, mentioning common soldiers were separate from civilian life and seems to lightly brush this fact away by restating that today's military is very different. Bell's strategy of pointing out opposing views strengthens his arguments; he points out that historians who view the conflicts of the 1700s as solely spurring the Napoleonic Wars are ignoring the aristocratic context and heightened brutality of war during the French Revolution. Bell supports his idea of transformations. The Enlightenment created opposing concepts of war (Kant vs. Humboldt), but both believed in human progress and anti-aristocratic based war. The French Revolution abolished the nobility. War and the Convention led to radicalized politics, professional soldiers, and a new war strategy of high stakes and extermination. These transformations led to Napoleon's campaign, the archetype of total war.
During the 18th century, civilian and military life were intertwined, contrasting the sharp division of the two today. War was a fact of life. Bell contradicts himself, mentioning common soldiers were separate from civilian life and seems to lightly brush this fact away by restating that today's military is very different. Bell's strategy of pointing out opposing views strengthens his arguments; he points out that historians who view the conflicts of the 1700s as solely spurring the Napoleonic Wars are ignoring the aristocratic context and heightened brutality of war during the French Revolution. Bell supports his idea of transformations. The Enlightenment created opposing concepts of war (Kant vs. Humboldt), but both believed in human progress and anti-aristocratic based war. The French Revolution abolished the nobility. War and the Convention led to radicalized politics, professional soldiers, and a new war strategy of high stakes and extermination. These transformations led to Napoleon's campaign, the archetype of total war.
February 4, 2012
David Bell provides an interesting thesis through an intellectual look at the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars and their effect on European culture and thinking. The rise of militarism and the move towards modernity in the army is categorized well throughout and supported by looking at actions from Vendee, Italy, Egypt, Prussia and Spain. From brutalizing campaigns where the limited warfare of the old regime was cast aside in favor of not only large scale relentless battles but guerrilla actions. The book is not simply a recasting of the great battles but combines the results of these battles with popular works of literature and theater at the time and the shifts in beliefs from the intellectuals down to the masses. Bell as always delivers a fresh look at a tired topic by utilizing the aspects of intellectual history and using them as a lens to view various events. In this case we see the development of a new type of warfare and how it crystallized in the Napoleonic era. The reason that I use the word interesting and disagree with various reviewers is that Bell thesis is not flawed but the fact that this warfare did not stick and went back to a traditional European model means it did not become dominant until later on. It planted the idea that this type of war could be waged and laid the groundwork for some of the great military minds to publish works such as On War creating new tactics and strategies to shape future wars. Overall well worth the time for those who enjoy military history or the exciting things that intellectual history can unlock when looking at a topic.
May 27, 2024
This book was great, a really interesting insight into the changing way of war during the 18th and 19th century. However, reading this book sometimes feels like being taken back in time to 2006, but not in a good way. It constantly references early 2000s heavily American centred events such as 9/11, which is understandable to a certain extent, but really how relevant can it be for a book about the first total war? Nonetheless this book was very interesting to read.
September 29, 2014
Interesting book about the rise of the Concept of Total War. By this, he means one in which the lines between civilian and military are blurred during war. However, he also explores the creation of a distinct military culture that is separate from civilian life, a phenomenon that was new in 1790 (yes, this focuses on the French Revolution and Napoleonic Period). Finally, he looks at the shift from seeing war as a normal state of affairs to the idea that going to war is abnormal and undesirable, but then weaves in how the idea of total war fits into this.
Good, but not great and he loses focus at times.
Good, but not great and he loses focus at times.
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