Bagration 1944: The destruction of Army Group Centre

Osprey Campaign #42

by Steven J. Zaloga

Osprey's overview of the most calamitous defeat of the German armed forces in World War II (1939-1945). On 22 June 1944, three years to the day after Germany's 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army launched a massive offensive in Byelorussia. Codenamed 'Operation Bagration', this campaign climaxed five weeks later with the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw. The Wehrmacht's Army Group Centre was routed, a total of 17 Wehrmacht divisions were utterly destroyed, and over 50 other German divisions were shattered.

Genres: History, Military History, Military Fiction, Germany, World War II, War, Russia

96 pages, Hardcover

First published January 15, 1996

About the author

Steven Zaloga is an author and defense analyst known worldwide for his articles and publications on military technology.  He has written over a hundred books on military technology and military history, including “Armored Thunderbolt: The US Army Sherman in World War II”, one of the most highly regarded histories of the Sherman Tank.  His books have been translated into Japanese, German, Polish, Czech, Romanian, and Russian. He was a special correspondent for Jane’s Intelligence Review and is on the executive board of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies and the New York Military Affairs Symposium. From 1987 through 1992, he was the writer/producer for Video Ordnance Inc., preparing their TV series Firepower.  He holds a BA in history from Union College and an MA in history from Columbia University.

Mr. Zaloga is also a noted scale armor modeler and is a host/moderator of the World War II Allied Discussion group at Missing-Lynx.com, a modelling website. He is a frequent contributor to the UK-based modeling magazine Military Modelling. He is a member of the Armor Modeling and Preservation Society.

Reviews

[Dimitri · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you don't want your eastern front in Glantz size, this is a good start for the race to the Berezina and the "liberation" of Minsk. One look at the map and the hopelessness of division vs. Corps becomes clear. The discreet influence of the upcoming D-Day shows in the outflux of German air power and armoured might to respectively nihil and at half strength.

This makes Bagration a David vs. Goliath tale, with the vastly outnumbered Army Group Centre rooted in infantry strongpoints, bleeding the North and the Ukraine slowly dry to stave off its disintegration.

Still, a nod of appreciation to the summum of Maskirovka is in order. Just like OKH kept hesitating over Pas De Calais in the West, so it fretted over the frailest Ukraine in the East.

[Sleepy Boy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Excellent overview of a campaign often over looked in the west due to Normandy and the Falaise Pocket.

[Elliott · Rating 1 out of 5]

My alternate title “Bagration 1944: Germany’s ‘Oh, shit!’ Moment on the Eastern Front.” was tragically rejected. It would have better reflected the absolute stupidity of the German War Machine but, then this book minimizes that very broad national stupidity into the usual: “Hitler did it!”
A simple code for understanding the books of knowing or unknowing Wehrmacht apologists goes like this: “If it was a bad decision it was solely Hitler’s doing. If it was a good decision it was solely made by the generals.” Bagration was a terrible defeat therefore Hitler’s responsibility.
Very little praise is given where it is due: the Soviet Army. Where the German Army was very reliant on horses, the Soviet Army was very mechanized. Its tanks and artillery were some of the finest in the world. Their soldiers were well motivated to kick the invaders from their land. You can complain about ‘elegance,’ and decry the lack of subtlety- but, the Soviets won, and won the most impressive victory of the war here.
Just reading this book though, it seems the campaign was fought entirely within the OKW:

“The failure of the German Army to resist the Red Army advances…led to sweeping personnel changes in the upper leadership of the Wehrmacht and a rigid centralization…under Hitler, who blamed the senior generals for the defeats, especially the more outspoken ones… As a result, Hitler came to be surrounded…by the more sycophantic generals.”

Of course, Hitler always surrounded himself with sycophantic generals. That’s why the Germans were in the Soviet Union to begin with- none of them resisted or criticized to any real degree. After the war the surviving generals saw what happened to the upper leadership, went ‘Oh-oh! They’re gonna find out about my slave labor camps…’ and thus concocted tales about how even though they did everything Hitler wanted when he wanted they secretly thought he was an asshole and resisted him at every turn.

Later in the book you also get the author intimating that the Soviets deserved the invasion:

“…when the Soviet Union had been allied to Germany.” The Soviet Union was never allied to Nazi Germany. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a nonaggression treaty. Was it cynical? Yes, very much so on both sides. Did it work to create a trade agreement to the Nazis? Also yes. Was it an alliance? No.

This is a good book for illustrations, and maps- but, as a work of history…blah.

[Dalinar · Rating 1 out of 5]

I'd like not to waste time on this review but i'm gonna do it so you can save it. It's a very short book which makes itself very heavy to read. Short story, the old one. Hitler and Stalin are all mighty rulers who make all desicions and know everything, but have many many luck and (rarely) a military staff who works paralell to them or against (¿?) their command and do very impresive and heroic actions OR who oppose to them and are right... The soviets only won because mighty usa awake at the right moment, and because the nazis made very bad choises the eastern front. (Long story read the book)

This would be normal west (propaganda) history. Well... it would be if the author weren't contradicting himself continously. So, he points the "allmighty" theory while pointing out very impresive moves and tactics from both Hitler and Stalin. Indeed he affirms the lucky and heroic staff but also points the errors commited by them, save by the rule of their "leaders".
Also points out the "yankee made the soviets won" while reducing the effect of the troops move to Normandy, reducing it to "hitler's preocupations", while telling the amazing industrial capacity, the incredible military tactics, the impresive concealed movements, etc. And the "bad nazi choises" are just ridiculous reading all the manouvers they try, how they fought. While been true errors were made, isn't true all were wrong choises.

At last this book it's heavy, not in content, not in reading another language, it is for the author affirms one thing and the opposite in a few pages. He presents the contradiction and chooses the "classical" west histoy so... While enriching reading stats, war data and armament comparations from the WW2, its also very frustratic in its affirmations.

I do not recommend this book far from reading just data charts

[Marcus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Usual fare in Osprey's Campaign series, which is a short introductory publication regarding a specific battle or military operation. The booklet provides the setting, information about opponents and the actual action. Whole package is supported by illustrations, photos and maps, usually of very high quality.

This particular booklet requires a special praise in one specific regard. On more than one ocassion Osprey managed to bungle their publications about large, modern operations. The limited space combined with the extreme complexity of such events made the attempts to cover them in Campaign series quite incomprehensible. Not in this case however - Zaloga keeps things extremly simple and manages galantly to provide a pretty good, although truely 'bare bones' coverage of this huge offensive.

[Steve Scott · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found this to be a confusing book, occasionally repetitious, with a narrative as opaque as if the fog of war had descended upon it. The maps were inadequate, and I couldn't follow the movement of units throughout the description of the conflict. It was a swirl of divisions, corps, and regiments, twirling about the page in flanking movements.

The author thought that rather than maps he'd include pictures of fighting from the Eastern front and, at the end of the book, several pages of advice to war gamers on what they could do to adapt gaming to scenarios to fit a Bagration scenario.

I wondered what happened to General Walter Model after he'd been tasked to stabilize the situation for the Germans. He's mentioned briefly, and just disappears. I found another German general misnamed.

This was an important battle. This was not a good book.

[Zeyd · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating depiction of Operation Bagration, with a great deal of detail. Unfortunately small, as with all Osprey books, and ultimately far too expensive for what it is.

[Grant · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent overview of one of the world's most decisive campaigns. Bagration and Overlord combined meant the end of the Third Reich.

[Judy · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a very good, succinct account of the Red Army's Operation Bagration, which destroyed the German Army Group Center on the Eastern Front. Zaloga gives a good play-by-play of the battle, and provides analysis of the battle and leadership roles in the battle. For example, Hitler's "no retreat" policy is discussed at length, and it is clear that this policy led to the capture of many more Germans than necessary during Bagration, as well as loss of life.

I appreciated the addition of detailed maps to give the reader a better idea of the actions that took place during the operation. It also helps the reader to examine and come to conclusions on their own.

I highly recommend this as a good overview of Bagration and a way to understand World War II on the Eastern Front better.

[Iain · Rating 2 out of 5]

Adequate coverage of an operation that is woefully underrepresented in Western literature. Dubious map quality as typical for Osprey of this era. After general background material is covered, only about a third of the text covers the actual topic.